ML19332F909

Forwards Listing of Changes,Tests & Experiments Completed During Nov 1989

ML19332F909
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	12/01/1989
From:	Robey R COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RAR-89-82, NUDOCS 8912190297
Download: ML19332F909 (29)

Text

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y'N - Commonwealth Edison t

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')' ound C!'es Nuclear Power Station c

22710 206 konue North

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Corcova, Ilknots 61242 9740 l

- Telephone 309$54-2241 s

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h RAR-89-82 December 1, 1989 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mall Station Pl-137

-Washington, D. C.

20555

' Enclosed please find a listing of those changes, tests, and experiments completed during the month of November, 1989, for Qut.d-Cities Station-Units 1 and 2, DPR-29 and DPR-30. A summary of-the safety evaluations l~

are being reported in compliance wtth 10CFR50.59 and 10CFR50.7)(e).

Thirty-nine copies are provided for your use.

1 Respectfully, COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION l.

ErN$k R. A.

bey Te:hnical Superintendent RAR/LFD/djb Enclosure cc:

R. Stols T. Hatts/J. Gr.lligan Te97 0027H/0061Z It 8912190297 891201 PDR. ADOCK 05000254 m

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Safety Evaluation #89-290' Barrier Lead Test' Assembly Special Test 1-132 2

Special Test.1-132 was' completed on.0ctobtr 12, 1989. The purpose of this test was.for fuel bundle reconstitution for reirradiation of barrier lead test t

assembly rods placed in-the core for' Unit 1 Cycle 11.

1.-

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or iV malfunction of equipment-important to safety as previously' evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the bundle has shown to meet all original design criteria and hence, will perform in a-fashion similar to other fuel bundle designs.

The six rods have

been selected to be neutronically compatible with the recipient bundle b

and do not' adversely affect transient analyses.. Revised MAPLHGR limits I

have been provided to maintain fuel' design criteria and ECCS performance.

2.

The; possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final' Safety Analysis Report is not-created because the reconstituted bundle is sufficiently similar to a standard fuel assembly.

Fuel mechanical properties have been evaluated at projected exposures to ensure the integritylof'the assembly is main-

'tained with a high degree of confidence.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi--

cation, is not reduced because the reconstituted assembly will be monitored-throughout Cycle 11 using the on-site core simulator (CMC) to ensura all applicable thermal limits are adhered to.

. Fuel handling.and fuel-storage concerna have also been evaluated and determined to be negligible.

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s Safety Evaluation #89-655.

Software Change - Process Computer A-Model i-This change).nstalls the process computer portion of the A-Model software.

.1.

.The probability of an occurrence or the' consequence of an accident, or.

malfunction of equipment important to safety as presiously evaluated

~

.in the. Final Safety Analysis Report is not' increased because a model is being. installed to augment existing monitoring for radioactive frelease.and will improve the ability of shift personnel to monitor and' 4:ontrol radioactive releases..

2. LThe possibility for an accident or malfunction of a'different-type than any previously evaluated in the Final. Safety Analysis Report is not created because this product will provide no control function. -it simply provides information-to shift personnel and has been tested in accordance with the QA Manual.

3.

The margin of' safety, as defined in the basis for any Tec'hnical Specifi-t cation, is not reduced because this software will not affect eny of the margins for safety in the basis of the Tech Specs.

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Procedure Changes QGA 100-1, 2, 3 and-QGA 500-1, 2, 4, 6-1, 6-2, 7-1, 7-2 i

This procedure change revises' statements that reference control rods insertedsto or beyond position 04 to position 02.

Change initiated due to

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-information supplied by General Electric as part of the new core loading.

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1.

7he' probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an' accident, i

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or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated up" in the Final Safety Analysis Report _is not increased because change d

incorporates a more conservative' rod position analysis incorporating-7 reload. fuel bundles.

FS6R accident possioilities are not adversely affected.

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2..

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different. type than-

.any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not l

created because change uses more conservative rod position analysis.

I 3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci -

fication, is not reduced because positioning all rods at 02 not addressed L

in Tech Specs.

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Procedure Change QOS 1300-1 g

L This revision incorporates changes done to the RCIC high temperature isola -

tion system and reflects installation of new RCIC flow controller._ Other changes-are made to clarify the. procedure. The RCIC overspeed test procedure provides further details for doing the test and creates a test data sheet.

1.

The. probability of an occurrence or the consequence.of an accident,'or malfunction of equipment important to safety as.previously evaluated L

in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because'this revision results from modifications to the system which are intended to decrease the-probability of malfunction of equipment. Other changes 7

are made to enhance the testing procedures.

p 2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than

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any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the basic method of system testing' remains unchanged, therefore, no-new possibility of'an accident is created.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced because the changes described above are in accordance with Tech Spec. requirements and should increase the margin.

of safety.

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gg n Procedure Change QOS 2300-1 This revision ~1ncorporates changes done to the HPCI high temperature isola-tion system and reflects installation of new HPCI flow controller.

1..The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety us previously evaluated in the_ Final Safety' Analysis Report is not increased because this revision does not affect the method of system testing, therefore..the probability.of an occurrence is not increased.:

2.

The possibility for an_ accident or malfuw Lion of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because system testing still meets the requirements'of the FSAR, therefore..no possibility for an accident is created.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced because this revision reflects a change in the

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Tech Specs concerning the area high temperature isolation system,.however, this change has been evaluated and found not to reduce the margin of safety.

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Procedure Change QOP 2300-3 This revision is to delete the procedure and incorporate it into-QOS'2300-1 and QOS 2300-6.

1.

The. probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because this procedure has been incorporated into QOS 2300-1. HPCI Monthly ~and

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Quarterly Test, and Q0P 2300-6, Manual HPCI.Startup-to Add Water to Reactor Vessel:and/or Control Reactor Pressure.,.This procedtre is no longer needed,'however, the method of operation is now covered under other procedures and.the probability of an occurrence is not increased.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type.than

.any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because.this change deletes an. unnecessary procedure, however, other procedures provide guidelines for manual operation, therefore, no possibility for an accident is created.

3.

The margin of' safety, au defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-cation, is not reduced because HPCI operation still fulfills all Tech Spec requirements.

l

Modification M-4-1-84-21A Description This mod called for a design change to the Area Steam Leak Detection / Isolation System to. eliminate spurious isolations which have been occurring due to minute

- steam leaks.. The system was comprised of 16 temperature switches in four groups of four per system.

Each group was configured to form a (one-out-of-two taken twice)' logic and any one of the four groups were capable of isolating the system.

E This modification reduced the number of temperature switches from 16 to 4.

The (one-out-of-two taken twice) logic is maintained along with divisional separation requirements.

The systems isolation response time is maintained through a reduction in the temperature switch setpoint.

Evaluation 1.

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the reduction from 16 temperature switches to four will not degrade the integrity of the steam leak detection / isolation system.

The system will still be totally automatic along with the capabilities for manual' initiation. The (one-out-of-two taken twice) logic and divisional power sources is still maintained along with other steam leak detection devices. The~ probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction previously evaluated has not been increased.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because this mod does not interact nor interface with other primary containment isolation systems. No single failure within the system can create a malfunction to prevent system isolation from occurring, or to.cause spurious isolations.

The possibility for an r

accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated has not been created..

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-cation, is not reduced because the reduction from 16 to 4 temperature switches will require Technical Specification changes. However, the a

margin of safety is not reduced. The new steam leak detection / isolation logic continues to satisfy the requirements for primary containment isola-tion as listed on Table 3.2.1 in the Technical Specification and the associated basis.

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t Modification M-4-1-84-21B t

Description-This mod called for a design change to the Area Steam Leak Detection /lsolation System to climinate spurious isolations which have been occurring due to minute steam leaks. The system was comprised of 16 temperature switches in four groups

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of four per system. :Each group was configured to form a (one-out-of-two taken F

twice) logic and any one of the four groups were-capable of isolating the system.

This modification reduced the number of temperature switches from 16 to 4.

The (one-out-of-two taken twice) logic is maintained along with divisional separation requirements. The systems isolation response time is maintained through a reduction in the temperature switch setpoint.

Evaluation

1. -The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the reduction from 16 temperature switches to four will not degrade the integrity of the steam leak detection / isolation system'. The system will still be totally automatic along with the capabilities for manual' initiation. The (one-out-of-two taken twice) logic and divisional power sources is still maintained along with other steam leak detection devices.

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident. or malfunction other than previously evaluated has not been increased.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because this mod does not interact nor interface with other primary containment isolation systems. No single failure within the system can create a malfunction to prevent system isolation from occurring, or to cause spurious isolations. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type other than previously evaluated has not 4

been created.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-cation, is'not reduced because the reduction from 16 to 4 temperature switches will require Technical Specification changes. However, the margin of safety is not reduced. The.new steam leak detection / isolation logic continues to satisfy the requirements for primary containment

-isolation as listed on Table 3.2.1 in the Technical Specification and the associated basis.

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h Modification M-4-1-84-033A B This, modification replaced GE CR2820 relays with Agastat solid state. time delay relays because the delay. time of CR2820's varies widely on the first pickup following.

a long period'in a deenergized condition.

I 1.

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of-an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the Agastat solid L

state design is more reliable and_will provide a more dependable delay time l-in the. event of-an accident.

The consequences of such an accident would thus be reduced.

L 2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than 9

any previously evaluated in the Fiual Safety Analysis Report is not created' because malfunction types relating to the oil in CR2820's are eliminated.-

.0ther relay failures, such as shorting,' opening or sticking are already considered in the FSAR.-

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-cation, is not reduced because the ability to meet the Tech Spec operability requirements for the RCIC and HPCI systems is enhanced by improved reliability of these relays.

The margin of safety is thus increased.

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7 Modification M-4-1-84-37A 4

Description i This modification replaced the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCl) pump flow indicating controller (F1C) 1-2340-1, GeMac model analog controller, with a digital flow controller. manufactured by Yokogawa.

The pump flow range displayed

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on'the flow indicating controller is' increased from 0-6000 gallons per minute (gpm) e to 0-8000 gpm to meet Human Engineering design standards. This modification is

- intended to upgrade the pump control system and increase the reliability of the HPCI system.

Evaluation 1.

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated.

in the Final Safety Analysis Report is.not increased because the replace-ment of the HPCI flow-controller and changeout of an internal resistor in the new HPCl MGU Signal Converter does not affect the safety-related functions as outlined in FSAR Section 6.2.5.

The probability of occurrence of a Design Basis Accident or Single Failure Event has not increased.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than f

any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the new HPC1 flow cuntroller will be seismically qualified and mounted to mitigate any component failures.

Failure of the HPCI system is still bounded by the availability of the ADS system in conjunction with the LPCl mode of the RHR system and does not create any new accidents or malfunctions not previously analyzed in the FSAR.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-cation, is not reduced because the replacement of the HPCl flow controller and changeout of an internal resistor in the new HPCl MGU Signal Converter does not have any impact on the existing basis of the Quad Cities Technical Specifications 3.5.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications remains unchanged.

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L Modification M-4-1-84-37B i.

I Description Tliis modification replaced the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) pump flow indicating controller (FIC), 1-1340-1, GeMac model analog controller, with a digital flow controller manufactured by Yokogawa.

The pump flow range displayed L

on the flow indicating controller is increased from 0-500 gallons per minute (gpm) to 0-600 gpm to meet Human Engineering design standards.

This modification is

. intended to upgrade the pump control system.and increase the-reliability of the RCIC system.

Evaluation t

I 1.

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the replace-ment of the RCIC flow controller and transmitter does not affect any safety-related functions since it is not classified as a safety-related system.

Therefore, the probability of occurrence of a Design Basis Accident or Single Failure Event has not increased.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because all new components will be seismically mounted, with the new controller being seismically qualified.

This will mitigate any component failures that could affect the operation of nearby safety-related equipment.

No new accidents or malfunctions not previously analyzed in the FSAR are introduced by this partial modification.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-cation, is not reduced because the replacement of the RCIC flow controller and transmitter does not have any impact on the existing basis of the Quad Cities Technical Specifications since the RCIC System is not a safety-related system.

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f Modification M-4-1-85-063A i

Description This modification involved installation of a new High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Turbine Motor Gear Unit (MGU) controller, 1-2386A. The previous.

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controller had a' poor _ maintenance history and was often responsible for system

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inoperability (See Licensee Event Report 265/85-02). Many of the failure reports l

cited the high temperature and humidity in the HPCI room as a contributing cause of the failure rate.

In addition, the components used for the previous controller k

are now. obsolete..The new controller is installed in the turbine building at 595' elevation, in order to provide a milder environment for the electronic equipment.

g and wired to the terminations inside the previous MGU controller cabinet located in the HPCI pump room. The previous MGU controller is disconnected and will be removed at a-later date under partial modification M-4-1-85-63C.

Operation of n

the new controller is identical to the previous controller and does not change any turbine operation.

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Evaluation 1.

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the only accident / malfunction impacted is the.Small-Break LOCA.

The initial-conditions are not changed.

The probability of occurrence is not changed.

The consequences may decrease slightly due to enhanced HPCI speed control reliability.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because no new failure modes are created.

Current redundant and/or backup systems will not be degraded. All failure mode impacts are bounded by existing analyses.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-cation, is not reduced because neither Technical Specifications nor their bases require changes.

There are no reductions in the margins of safety.

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l Modification M-4-1/2-87-22G Description This modification consists of installing red and green indicating lights on 902-8 to provide indication that the DG2 cooling water pump is running. This modification will also terminate spare conductors on existing cables and install new fuseblocks at switchgear 29 and panel 902-8.

New cable will be routed between local panel 2252-98 and 902-8.

This modification was initiated by Human Engineering Deficiency (HED) Nos. 0418 and 0271 related to swing diesel controls. Commitments were made by CECO to the NRC to resolve the HED's and bring them within the guide-lines specified in NUREG-0700.

Evaluation 1.

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the new lights have no adverse effect on the existing panel.

This partial mod does not affect the control of the DG2 cooling water pump and hence the ability of the Unit 2 diesel generator to operate and provide emergency power.

Therefore, no Single Failure Event (SFE) or Design Basis Accident (DBA), as evaluated in the FSAR, is affected by this partjal n.od.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because an existing divisional cable with spare conductors is used and is isolated from the non-safety related indicating lights circuit. The new lights, fuseblocks and conduits will be seismically mounted to mitigate failure. The new lights circuit does not interact with the DG2 cooling water pump controls. The new cable will be procured safety-related.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-cation, is not reduced because the existing and new cables have been verified to be within the capabilities of the existing fire detection and suppression systems.

Existing fire stops are being resealed with approved firestop material. The new lights circuit does not affect the operation of the DG2 cooling water pump controls and hence the availability of the Unit 2 diesel generator.

Therefore, the margins of safety defined in the basis for Tech Spec Section 3.1 and 3.12 are not reduced. No other systems discussed in the Tech Specs are affected by this partial mod.

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Modification M-4-1-87-27 g

Description

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This mod added additional ventilation to the upper portions of the drywell.

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.This modification was initiated due to high drywell temperatures.

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Evaluation i

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1.

The probability of an occurrence or the-consequence of an accident, or I

malfunction of equipment important to ssfety as_previously evaluated in

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the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because all equipment, j

ductwork, supports and conduits will be designed to the requirements of a seismic Category I structure. Loss of electrical power to the drywell ventilation system does not affect equipment important to safety.

All installation will be seismically qualified as Category I to preclude damage t

_to safety-related equipment.

i 2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the safety-related drywell wall will be maintained as safety-related..

All equipment, supports and conduit will be designed to the requirements t

of a seismic Category I structure. The penetration through containment has been designed to maintain containment integrity. Thus, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated I

in the FSAR/UFSAR will not be created.

3. _The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-cation is not reduced because leak rate testing of the containment penetration r

will be performed to assure containment integrity.

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L kl 70 Modification M-4-1-87-051A, B 1

?Descript' ion, i.

_These modifications consisted of installing a Sequential Events Recorder-a

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forEthe. annunciator system.- It is used to monitor-multi-1nput windows in the control room and2will print out a message that will'tell the operator which

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' input alarmed. 'This'is an NRC requirement basedLon a Human Factors review of the; control room.'

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-Evaluation 4g:

-11.The probability of an occurrencu or the consequence of an accident. or malfunction of equipment important to safetyuns previously evaluated.

~g in the FinaliSafety Analysis Report' is not increased because the r

f annunciator system is not discussed in the' accident analysis section

of the FSAR.- This system is not required for accident mitigation.-

The failure of the non-safety related annunciator system will net affect.the operation of any.of the plant's safety-related systems.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than-any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not crcated because no' change has been made which affects any of the bounding conditions of the FSAR accident analysis.- All bounding conditions remain the same, no new accidents are introduced by this modification.

3.-

The margin of safety, as-defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-

' cation, is not reduced because the affected system is not' required for

' accident mitigation. No Technical Specification Limiting Conditions

'for_ Operation (LCO), Surveillance Requirements (SR) or their basis will be affected by the installation, operation or failure of the modified annunciator system.

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Modification M-4-1-87-54A r

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KI Description Minor' Modification M-4-1-87-54A documented the replacement of the core _ spray

' bellows located at; penetration X-16B.

The bellows were replaced because Local Leak Rate Test; trending indicated an increase of leakage spanning the previous four fuel cycles. Longitudinally split bellow elements were assembled around 1

I the process pipe without disassembly of the piping and anchor. supports. Due to

= time constraints the outer' bellows, which only provides a method for Local Leak

-Rate Testing,'was not completed. One half of the outer bellows was assembled and-the other half will be assembled during'the next refuel outage.

/ Evaluation.

1.

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an_ accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated 4

in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the. purpose of this modification is to repair the flexible metallic bellows as pene-tration X-16B to better meet the performance objectives of the primary containment system as stated in Section 5.2.1 of the FSAR. Therefore, the probability of primary containment failure-due to a pressure transient as described-in the FSAR is reduced.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously. evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not y

created because the purpose of this modification is_to reduce leakage-at penetration X-16B by replacing the existing bellows assembly which 3

has been found to be leaking.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any' Technical Specifi-cation, is not reduced because by increasing the integrity of primary containment, the possibility of a breach in containment and resultant offsite releases in excess of 10CFR100-limits is decreased.

y&p Modification M-4-1-87-61 Description This modification replaced the' manually operated control rod drive (CRD)

' pump discharge valves 1-1301-2A/2B with motor operated valves including handwheels.

,The. controls and indications for these valves were installed on the 901-5 panel in the Control Room.. Flow controller 1-340-1 was replaced with a model that displays i

flow,neasurement in gallons per minutes (GPM),. output in % open, and-has color coded normal or abnormal deviation ranges from the setpoint.

Existing control switches and indicating lights were rearranged to provide a logical configuration for'the cantrol-panel. A new spring return to center type switches was installed at 901-5 for the CRD drive water pressure control valve (1-302-8), providing' easier

- throttling capability..The control switch and indicat1ng lights for the CRD cooling water pressure valve (1-302-10) were removed from panel 901-5, and this valve was disconnected electrically and locked in the open position.

Installation of this modification satisfied'an NRC commitment as'well as a Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED) concern.

Evaluation 1.

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis. Report is not increased because the CRD discharbe valves are not required for accident mitigation.

The addition 7

of new motor-operated-valves (MOV's) with the capabilities of. control room will enhance the operation of the CRD system. The remaining changes listed in the modification description did not alter the function / logic of the CRD system operation. This modification will not change an.v of the design criteria of the CRD system as designated in the FSAR.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a.different type than any previously' evaluated in.the Final Safety-Analysis Report is not created because providing new MOV's and control room control along with local manual operation of the CRD discharge valves does not chenge the design characteristics of the CRD system. The remaining changes listed in the modification description did not alter the function / logic of the CRD system operation. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or mal-function not evaluated in the FSAR is not created.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-l cation, is not reduced because the CRD discharge valves are not required for accident mitigation. The remaining changes listed in the modification description did not alter the function / logic of the CRD system operation.

L Therefore, they are not addressed by Technical Specification basis. All Technical Specification margins of safety will remain unchanged.

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Modification M-4-1-87-062A Description This modification revised the feedwater Regulator Isolation Valve Logic to provide a seal-in function on an open or close manual signal. A pull-to-stop function was also incorporated to provide chrottling capability for the valves.

This modification was initiated'as a result of Commonwealth Edison's commitment to perform a Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) in accordance with NUREG 0737, Supplement 1.

While using NUREG 0700 as a' guide in performing this review, Human Engineering Discrepancies were identified and modification M-4-1-87-62A was initiated.

In this particular case, it was identified that a pull-to-stop type throttle switch would enhance the operation of the feedwater Regulator Isolation Valves.

This partial modification was accomplished by replacing existing hand switches 1A-3206A and IB-3206B with switches that provide the seal-in and pull-to-stop features.

Some rewiring also took place at the control panel and at the valves' motor control centers.

Evaluation 1.

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the feed-water Regulator Isolation valves are not required for accident mitigation, additionally the valves have no affect on ace dent analyses as discussed in the FSAR. This modification will enhance the operation of the valves.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because no change has been made to the valves which affect any of the bounding conditions in the FSAR accident analysis.

Because all bounding conditions remain the same, no new accidents are introduced f

by this modification.

3.

The margin of-safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Spec 1-fication, is not reduced because these valves are not required for accident mitigation, therefore they are not addressed by Technical Specification: Basis. All Technical Specification margins of safety will remain unchanged.

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Modification M-4-1-87-62B l

Description-This partial modification relocated six (6) drywell air. temperature signals:

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. presently displayed on back~ panel 901-21, to recorder'l-2340-9 on front control panel _901-3t The thermocouples-that provide the signals are:_ _TE-5741-42A, TE-5741-42B, TE-5741-43A~, TE-5741-43D, TE-5741-44B and TE-5741-44C.

j U-This-modification was initiated as a result-of Commonwealth Edison's commit-=

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' ment to perform a Detailed Control Room Design Rev12w;(DCRDR) in accordance with' NUREGLO737.. Supplement 1.: While using NUREG 0700_as a guide in, performing-this

't review,'lluman Engineering Discrepancies were identified and modification

.M-4-1-87-62B'was initiated.

In.this particular case, it_was found that the

~Drywell Area Temperatures need to be displayed on a front panel in the control room.

Evaluation l '. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated

-in.the Final Safety Analysis ~ Report is not increased because the associated recorder and temperatures are not discussed in the accident analysis section of the<FSAR. These devices are not required-for accident mitigation.

2._<The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than

-any:previously evaluated in:the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because no change has been made which affects any of the' bounding' conditions in the-FSAR accident analysie. All bounding conditions remain the same, no-new accidents are-introduced by this modification.

3. ~The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-cation, is not reduced because the affected components are not required for_ accident mitigation, therefore, the margin of safety as discussed in the basis has not been reduced.

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Modification M-4-1-87-73A p

= Description This modification rearranged the RCIC turbine and pump inlet and outlet:

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. pressure indicators into a more logical operational format. The' change was

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required-from DCRDR commitments.

Evaluation-7 -

1. 'The probability of an occurrence or the' consequence of an accident,

- or malfunction of ' equipment important to safety as previously evaluated 9

in _ the Final Safety Analysis-Report is not increased bccause this partie' consists _only of rearranging the RCIC pump and turbine displays. 'No new equipment is being added by this partial modification.1 Therefora.

no single failure event nor design-basis accident, as evaluated in

'a the FSAR, is affected by this partial modification.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a differene than any 'previously evaluated in' the Final Safety Analysis P -

.a not created because no change has been made which affects any,

' bounding conditions in the FSAR accident analysis.- All boundi..g

.1-p tions remain the same, no new accidents are. introduced by this mov. Ec.tton, y

3.

The margin of safety, as' defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced because the' function of the reactor core iso--

b lation cooling system remains unchanged by_the rearrangement of these indicators.-- Therefore, the margin of safety defined in the basis for L

Technical Specifications 3.5.E and G are not reduced. No other systems l[

discussed in the Quad Cities Technical Specifications are affected by this partial modification.-

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Modification M-4-1-88-017 Description The modification was initiated to address concerns associated with pipe support base plate designs using concrete expansion anchor bolts. These concerns were erpressed by the NRC in I.E. Bulletin-No. 79-02.'

The modification consists of strengthening existing flued head anchor assemblies by installing new structural members end drilling new anchorages into walls and slabs.

, Evaluation y$;

1.

The p-J 1.ity of an cecurrence or the consequence of an accident, or V;

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of equipment ivportant to safety as previously evaluated

, f.yn in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the purpose 29 of the anchor frames 3s to resist pipe loads due to pipe break or seismic b

y events. The probabi).tr c' scurrence of these events is not changed l

due to reinforcement of un

.t frames. The reinforcement allows the frames

. to funt' ion as intended ti tre FSAR should these events occur.

9 The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because no changes to system operation or maintenance are made by this modification.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-cation, is not reduced because the reinforcement of the frames increases the margin of safety to that intended in the FSAR. The modification does not. impact the present Technical Specification.

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4 Modification M-4-1-68-28A, B Description.

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-The head spray piping was removed from the.RPV up to and including valve 1-1001-60..This included removal of motor-operated valves 1-1001-60 and 1-1001-63,

' control switches and indicating lights from 90-3 panels,. interlock which auto-matically closed'the valves on a RHR system isolation signal and the computer input for valve position.. In addition, valve stem leakoff lines were' disconnected, and all conduit, conduit supports, and cables.were removed from the drywell. The 1

modification was; initiated because the removable spool from the Reactor Vessel Head to the headLarca support steel is stainless steel susceptible to Intergranular

= Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC). A study performed by IMPELL Corporation-recommended removal of this' piping as the most cost-effective solution to mitigate the effects of IGSCC in this system.

Evaluation 1.

.The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is'not increased'because removal of the head spray line eliminates the potential'for IGSCC in the line,-

thereby decreasing the probability-of a line break. The head spray line is'not required for normal-or accident plant shutdown.

12. The posaibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Fi: 11 Safety Analysis Report is not created because no new interfaces with' safety-related equipment, systems, or structures, or new systems subject to failure have been introduced.

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The drywell capping detail is evaluated with the loading scenarios utilized at other areas of the containment where steel is not backed by concrete.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-cation, is not reduced because removal of the head spray line and associated electrical components does not reduce any margin of safety or limiting condition of operation as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.

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[Iw Modification M-4-1-88-029 Description' l

e The modification replaced all RWCU piping, line 1-1201-6"A -including the first elbow inside.the drywell and the outboard Primary Containment 1 solation Valve.M0:1-1200 5.

Most Intetsranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) susceptible welds

-on the RWCU piping have cracked to.the extent that overlays have been required.

,Each RWCU drywell penetration contains two inaccessible welds that cannot.be

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inspected or repaired using normal techniques. -The current condition of-these welds is indeterminate. This modification proactively replaced the RWCU penetra--

tion piping. line 1-1201-6"A with IGSCC - resistant material on Quad Cities Unit One.

' Evaluation'

=1., The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident,;

or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated

u in the= Final Safety. Analysis Report is not increased because the replaced h

'RWCU outboard valve and penetration piping are resistant to IGSCC, thereby decreasing the probability of line break and occurrence'of an accident. The replaced piping, valve and modified flued head will be-analyzed and qualified for design basis conditions. As per FSAR 10.3.3, the_RWCU system is isolated on low reactor water level.- This modification does not affect the existing safety margins of the RWCU system.

'2.

The~ possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated-in the Final Safety Analysis Report is a

not created because no change has been made that affects any of the bounding conditions stated in FSAR accident analysis. The modified g

piping and components in the vicinity of penetration X-14 are virtually identical to the original configuretion. No new interfaces with safety-related equipment, systems, or new accident or. malfunctions are introduced by this modification.

3.

The margin of safety, os defined.in the basis for-any Technical Specifi-j cation, is not reduced because the replacement of the RWCU-outboard valve, RWCU piping sections, and the partially modified flued head has no impact on the existing basis of the Technical Specifications as defined in Technical Specification 3.7,.D/4.7.D.

The modified piping and components in the vicinity of penetration X-14 are virtually identical to the original configuration.

The margins of safety are not reduced.

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Modification M-4-1-88-036 g

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Description While'doing a study cut the support of small. bore piping, it was determined that line. 1-0216-1/2", Reactor Head Vent to Drywell Equipment Drain Sump, exceeded USAS B31.1 allowables.

To bring this line back into acceptable limits, five-supports 1were added and five present supports were modified. A thermal expansion loop was added to reduce thermal, stresses on line 1-0216-1/2".

I Evaluation.

.l.

.The probability of an occurrence or the consequ'ence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety-as previously evaluated

-in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the modified piping is analyzed and supported to meet FSAR requirements.- Furthermore.

no new systems are.being added.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of.a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not

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created'because-this modification does not affect any of the bounding-conditions in-the FSAR accident analysis.

Because all bounding' conditions remain the same, no new accidents are introduced by this modification.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-cation,- is not reduced since the intended function of the modified system is not changed and the modified portion'is designed to the sama standards as the existing system.

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4 Modification M-4-80-43A Description This modification was initiated by an event that occurred on Unit 2'in May, 1988. The Unit 2 125V battery showed reduced capacity and has been sub-sequently replaced. This battery was a GNB model # NCT-1344. The Unit One' battery is the same manufacturer /model as the Unit 2 battery.

It was, therefore, decided that the Unit 1 battery would also be replaced, even though it showed no signs of deterioration. The station elected to install an alternate battery so that the normal battery replacement could be done without shutting down Unit 2.

(Batteries are crosstied between Units.)

The alternate battery was installed and will be the units battery until the new normal battery is installed.

r;aluation 1.

The probability of no occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because the temporary battery will handle the same load as the permanent battery. The temporary battery is designed to carry the normal de loads required for safe shutdown on one unit and operations requireo to limit the con-sequences of a design basis event on the other unit for a period of four hours following loss of all ac sources.

This design is identical to that of the permanent battery. As stated in the UFSAR Section 12.1.1, the portions cf Class II structures which house Class I components have been designed to provide protection for the Class I components in the same manner as Class'I structure. The permanent battery is housed within a concrete structure in the turbine building (Class II).

During the modification to replace the permanent battery in the battery room, a temporary battery will be installed in the same battery room in which is the permanent battery.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report la not created because the alternate battery rack and associated ca'He conduits will be seismically supported. The Unit 1 permanent battery instrumen-tation is located in the control room.

Instrumentation will include undervoltage detcetion, battery voltage, and ground detection which will monitor the alternate battery in the same manner as that of the permanently installed battery.

Both the main and reserve feeds to the 125 Vdc system will be unaffected by the installation of the alternate battery.

The alternate battery will use the same type of charger as the permanent battery without a load increase.

3.

The niargin of saf aty, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-cation, is not reduced because the surveillance applied to the permanent battery will be equally applied to the temporary battery.

The type of surveillances described in the Technical Specifications has been demon-strated over the years to provide indication of a cell becoming irregular or unserviceable long before it becomes a failure. The temporary battery can supply the same load as the permanent battery. The temporary 125 V6 battery is designed to carry the normal de loads plus all de loads reqaired for safe shutdown on one unit and operations required to limit the con-sequences of a design basie event on the other unit for a period of four hours following loss of all ac sources.

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Safety Evaluation #89-171' o

Modification M-4-1-88-052A

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-Description r

U This modification replaced the existing Reactor' Core isolation Cooling (RCIC) pump discharge check valve, 1-1301-50, and removed the air operator (AO) and posi-tion indication limit switches which were originally. installed _to allow an alternate imeans of testing the valve. -The RCIC pump discharge check valve was replaced because'of severe wear of the valve internals.

The valve was known to leak through,~ allowing feedwater to leak into the RCIC pump discharge piping, and once-failed to open during manual initiation of the system (See Licensee Event Report 254/87-032). The new valve is identical in design to the original valve but does not have an~ air operator. _The air operator was removed because of the poor

. maintenance history of the equipment and the fact that the valve it not required tc be remotely testabic. There are no requirements for remote or periodic testing of this valve,=however, this valve is tested once per cycle-during system injection testing after_each. refuel outage.

Evaluation 1.

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment import, ant to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because operation of the new check valve is identical to that of the existing check.valvo.

therefore, the probability of an occurrence or consequence of an accident is not increased.

2.

The poss1Lility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any' previot sly evaluated in the Final Safety-Analysis Report is not created bectuse the air operator for the valve is to be removed, however, testing of tre zu a will still be accomplished by manual initiation and injectia 7;iC which is currently performed once per cycle. There are no other tecting requirements for this valve.

3.

The margin cf safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-cation, is not reduced because this modification will not affect RCIC system operation, therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced.

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4 Modification M-4-1-88-121 i

Description Alteration of turbine turning gear logic to allow operation with main; i

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generator _ field breaker removed.

Evaluation 1.

The probability of an occurrence or the_ consequence of-an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluatea

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in the Final Safety Analysis' Report is not increased because no reference made to turbine turning gear is given in FSAR. Changing the-logic to:

allow the turning. gear to run without the field breaker in service does not change any previous FSAR evaluations.

2.

The. possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any.previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because no safety factors are jeorcrdized by the installation

-of this modification.

The possioility of an accident is not changed by allowing the turning gear to operate with the field breaker out of service.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis-for any Technical Specifi-cation,.is not reduced _because no references are given in Tech' Specs.

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a Modification M-4-1-89-150

. Description, During 1989 Unit One refueling outage, the MSIV pneumatic air supply lines' were walked down to identify requirements for new/ additional ha"gers to verify the seismic adequacy of the line. This modification added or relocated hangers /

supports to enhance the existing air supply lines.

Evaluation 1.

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased oecause the new supports have been analyzed, qualified and constructed to meet the require-wants of the ?SAR. Probability does not increase.

2.

The p,;:sibility for arc accident or malfunction of a driferent type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because this modification does not affect any of the bounding conditions in the FSAR accident analysis.

Since all bounding conditions remain the saae, no new ace; dents are introduced.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced bec.use the intended function of the modified syctem is not changed and the items modified are designed to the same or better standards as the existing system.

Therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced.

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Modification M-4-1-89-150 i

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f Description-During 1989 Unit One refueling outage, the~MSIV pneumatic _ air supply lines-were walked down to identify requirements for new/ additional hangers to verify the seismic adequacy of~the line.

This modification added or relocated hangers /

. supports;to enhance the existing air supply-lines.

Evaluation 14 The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of_an accident,'

or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not-increased because the new c.

supports have been analyzed, qualified _and constructed to meet the require -

ments of the FSAR~.

Probability does-not increase.-

2. - The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than l-any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is.not created because this modification does not affect any of the bounding conditions in the FSAR accident analysis. Since all bounding conditions remain =the same, no new accidents are introduced.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication, is not-reduced because the intended function of the modified system is rot changed and the items modified are designed to the same or better standards as the existing system. Therefore, the margin of safety is:not reduced.

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