ML20058M410

Forwards Listing of Changes,Tests & Experiments Completed During Month of Jul 1990 for Plant

ML20058M410
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	08/01/1990
From:	Robey R COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
RAR-90-60, NUDOCS 9008100107
Download: ML20058M410 (13)

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- ' Commonwealth Edison:

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Telephone 309454-2241

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[.,, lRAR-90-60 Li M .j iAugust.1, 1990- j q

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.U.'S. Nuclear--Regulatory Commission i ATTN:.. Document. Control-Desk-Hashington, D.= C. 20555 y 1

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SUBJECT:

'. Quad Cities Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2  :

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Changes, Tests, and Experiments Completed i s  ;!

NRC Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265 -i e

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t Enclosed please. find a_ listing of those changes,: tests, and experiments

-completed during the1 month of July -1990, for Quad-Cities' Station Units 1 and'2,:DPR-29 and;DPR-30. JA summary of.the safety evaluations are being f^ '; reported'in; compliance with 10CFR50.59 ind '0CFR50.71(e). j

(.: e .Thir.ty-nine copie "are provided for your use.

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Respectfully, ,

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b COMMONWEAL.TH EDISON COMPANY l

. QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR. POWER STATION f3 r F" y: '

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, jl\' f',. y yf R.i . Robey i , t . Technical Superintendent A

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J cci A.B.. Davis, Regional Administrator nw T..: Taylor, Senior Resident Inspector i' 1 <

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.} .. 'g 7 O' -C Q Modification:M-4-2-88-045

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! Description' y '

-Duet to'.aJ recent$1nterpretation by the NRC of.the-de'finition of-high/ low 4 N" ' pressure Linterf aces ~, L thef Aut'o Depressurization System (ADS)~valvesiwere evaluathd

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for spuriousioperation/duetto electrical shorts'. This evaluation discovered ithe' possibility' existed'for spurious operation due.to shorts within:certain l cables;of therADS logic._ To prevent these' shorts, new cable was'routedLto k ( , providejseparationyso shorts cannot, occur.

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-* Evaluation -

q g 1 1The-probhbility of-an occurrence or the consequence of'an accident,- 1

- or malfunction ofo. equipment important to safety as-- I reviously. evaluated

~1n the-FinaliSafetyjAnalysis Report is not; increased because this. 4 modification is beingfimplemented to reduce the potential for getting '

shorts in the proper sequence.coLeause spurious. operation.of the relief gy , valves.-DADS logic is not altered by this modification. _;

.g h 2. . 'The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type '

P- than any1previously evaluated in the Final. Safety. Analysis Report .

.is not: created because this modification reduces short circuit I

susceptibility. -All>other potential failure modes'aud.their effects i

~fromLthe modified configuration are the same as-the-existing' ADS ~

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scheme. No new-malfunction type is created.

-3. 'The margin of safety, as. defined in-the basis for any Technical Speci-g;

" j ification',11s not reduced.becauaa the Tech. Spec bases'for ADS have j

'been. reviewed. The margin of-safety is not reduced since the new'  !

. cables will-serve the same-functionans the cables theylreplace and d JU the new cable routing will meet the stations-separation criteria. '

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Sufety Evaluations #90-286

and 90-287 i Minor Design Change 4-2-90-019:

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Penetration' Seals.for Main Steamline and,

, Feedwat'e r Lines W.m M ' . .fy .

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r 1 iThis changes penetration seals details..

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1. - The probabilitiy of;an occurrence or the-consequence of an accident Q >

or malfunction.of equipment important to safety as-.previously. evaluated

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in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not' increased becausenthe new design will not change:from that which has already been analyzed in. d

"' J! Section 5 of the UFSAR. ..l w@.{ d b  : 2.1 Thel possibility for an accident'or malfunction of a.different~ type l -o than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety: Analysis Report i f- 1

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'is not' created beciause the new design will still have the same function .f p as theiold design so an accident.or-malfunction of-a different type

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3. The margin of safety, as defined'in the basis'for;any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced beca'use the new design will have the same.

1 Tech Spec: requirements asiche old design.

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l , Safety Evaluation #90-467 a Reactor. Building-Corner Room Floor Drain Discharge S Check Valves Stuck'Open a >

Description Plug 1ECCS pump room. floor drain lines to provide flood protection for

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4 l lRilR and Core Spray pumps due to back leakage from the-torus. room area. ,

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Installation of these, plugs.is necessary since the check. valves installed in--

- the floor: drain line were found' in a corrodsd' etate'sucli' that they could, not -

4 lclose, Land thus prevent back-Icakage from the torus room area.

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3. Evaluation A

1. !The probability 7of an occurrence'or the consequence of an accident. .

or malfunction of equipment:important to safety as previously evaluated-in:the, Final:SafetyiAnalysis Report is not increased.because the-

. safety function.of the?ECCS pump room floor drain discharge check ';

. valve is to' prevent back' leakage flooding from the reactor building- '

to the ECCS pump rooms <and disabling the ECCS pumps. Although the check valves are'notLspecifically addressed in the-PSAR, the inter-pretation of.the. valve function is based on 'FSAR Section 6.6.2 which  ;

-describes the submarine door addition to the compartments. .The basis for;this addition wanjto . . . " prevent' water in the torus room area.

from-leakingintoithe pump compartment and thus will assure the availability of the -ECCS in- the event of a ' passive f ailure." This  ;

passive failureLis external to the compartments. By installing plugs i in the floor drains'the same function is being-performed in that no i

~ water can: 1cak:into: the ; compartment. As further support to the function l

-interpretation..the-Dresden FSAR, Amendment 11/12, identifies that ll the design basis for this-floodLprevention system (water tight doors d and check valves) is toL11mit-the consequences of passive failures 1 during long term post-accident cooling operation of the ECCS pumps.

J In' addition, during post accident long term core cooling, a postulated- 9 4

. passive failure:could result in a leak developing inside a compartment.

only:the ECCS pump (s) located _inside that room could potentially be lost due:to a rising water level. The design basis accident is-  ;

identified ~as a-LOCA:with a loss of offsite powsr with one additional- i

' failure. ' Flooding of any one compartment would, at worst, remove ,

e two IdlR' pumps from ocpration. The DBA LOCA analysis assumes.the failure

. of a diesel generator which'would eliminate two RilR pumps and one 1 Core Spray pump-from operation. Thus, the flooding of one corner [

room is less severe than the loss of a diesel. Therefore, th:  !

F probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an' accident of I malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased.

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L- ' The. possibility-for an. accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously~ evaluated in the Final Safety /nalysis Report m is not created because installation of these. plugs oniv related to long term core cooling capability and is similar to the previous -

q;g"t installation. :The worst case scenario could result in the internal  ;)

flooding of a pumptroomt.however, this possibility existed with the '

prr"tous installation. ' Thus, the installation of these plugs does not create the possibility of an accident'or' malfunction ditferent=

than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

3. The margin'of. safety. au defined in the basis for any_ Technical Speci-;

-u fication, is not reduced because while no margin of safety is specifically described'in the Technicai . Specifications, long term core cooling

, requirements are defined. Technical Specification Section 3.5/4.5.A'

, and.B describe the RHR pump availability requirements. Only one RHR F -

pump and one Core Spray pump are required to provide long term cooling-

, , These plugs do not

" -impact requirements during those long term post accident cooling conditions. . Plugging of the floor requirements.

.c drains in the ECCS pump rooms will prevent the possibility of back

, leakage into.all of the. rooms due to flooding in the reactor building.

A leak in any one compartment could potentially disable the pumps 4 in that room, but long term core cooling capability would continue to be met.. In addition, surveillance of the rooms during normal plant operation.have been increased to once every two hours. This provides

._ additional: assurance that the ECCS pump roca environment is maintained for proper system performance.

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, , ' Safety Evaluation #90-468- '

'Sof tware Invis11ation of Emergency Response Data System. ,!

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Describilon. l i

A program was installed'that transmitted a set of plant data from.the [

station Prime computer over a data link to the NRC.. The data transmission [

is started and stopped.from menu items in the GSEP login. The NRC will request  ;

when.they'want the link etarted and stopped.

~ Evaluation .,

I l'-;The+ probability of an occurrence or the conoequence of an accident,

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or(malfunction of equipment important to safety s.;reviously evaluated

• in the Final. Saf ety Analysis Report is' not . increased because the link : .

will have no effect on' plant egr pment. It will only transmit. plant .

data from'PTHSTY to the.NRC. No avaluated safety issues"are change 'I

. t E- 2. -The possibil'ity for an accident or malfuncitan of;a d*.fferent type- [

ths.n any;previously evaluated in the Final' Safety Analysis Report ]

'io not created because the data link has been tested to' provide accurate. 't '

duta. Decisions on' actual actions to be taken will not be based only. , ,

on data-from this-link.

3..'The margin'of sa'fety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-jl 1

fication..is not reduced because no Tech Spec basis are affected' by this data' link. 1 t

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Revision 0.4 of Point llistory

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%i Description ,

.~The PTilSTY program has been enhanced by ,idding an automatic update mode.

r j , In this mode, the program will automatically update the current point valve e ,

and time as ner data is available.'

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-n g, 1. The probability of an occurrence _or the conaequence of an accident, 9 g, or malfunction of equipment important'to safety.as previously evaluated o' l

. -in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the data  :

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display is a secondary source of information used in the TSC and EOF. 3

e. Accuracy of data and display of correct information has been checked '!

k by validation testing.-

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than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report ,5 la not created because the enhanced feature will make tracking post

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accident:informationLcaster in the TSC and EOF. This will' enhance .i the ability of plant staff to diagnose accidents and malfunctions  :

4 'and take appropriate corrective action. .j i ,, 3.f The margin'of safety. e- defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-

.fication. fa,not reduc h because the data acouisition system does 1

[pk not alter any of the' basis of the Tech Specs.. .

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Using MGU Manual Control Switch  !

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, > r d'" -Using the HPCI turbine manual control switch has the potential to. damage  !

E the. turbine sig'al n converter l(2)-2386A. When:the switch ~is initially taken I out of the neutral position, the output of the signal. converter is momentarily

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l lined up to'125 VDC. :This causes a voltage spike which, over time, could; result

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in failure of the electrical equipmenti ,

Evaluation ,

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=1. :The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, '

7; or malfunction of equipment importaut to safety-as previously evaluated. i

~in the Final Safety Analysis Reporc is not increased because the MGU ,

H manual control switch.is an alternate means of turbine control that .!

would be used only after failure of all other turbine speed controls. i' b , The, switch'could only be used if the signal converter is inclated,

.therefore, the probability of malfunction of equipment is not. increased.. 't f 2. The possibility'for an accident or malfunction of a different. type  !

than any previously evaluated in.the Final Safety Analysis Report ,

is-not created because:this condition does'not affect normal' operation i of.the turbine controls. Therefore, no possibility for an accident

[t- or malfunction is' created.

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3. . The margin of safetys as' defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-

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fication. is not redaced because this condition does not affect system -

p operability as defined in Technical Specifications. ,

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Safety Evaluationt#90-482-g"  ;

Cround Alarms Due to Cycling Various. . -i Motor Operated Valves ,;

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1 JA 250:VDC! ground alarms occurs when cycling some motor operated valves'  !

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on the HPC1'and RCIC systems.

Evaluation-

, 1. .Thel probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an. accident. ,;

or malfunction of-equipment important to safety as previously evaluated' O

.1n the~ Final Safety Analysis Report As not' increased because the effects t

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of the grounds ~on the electrical components has been evaluntad by- .  !

Engineering'.- (No-adverse effects were identified, therefore the probability.

• J', ,of an occurren:elor malfunction has.not been increased.

2. .The possibility for an. accident or: malfunction of a different type e 'than any previously evaluated in theLFinal Safety Analysis Report" '

is not created because the occurrence of the ground does not prevent valveLoperation.. The spurious grounds do'not present a protlem for. ':

7p the DC system. No possibility of an accident.is. created.

3.' :The: margin of safety, as defined in the basis for'nny 11chnical Speci- 1 fication 11s not reduced because HpC1 and RCIC still ment Tech Spec

-requirements for operability.  ;

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0D-76 Computer. Program Xevision ';

=t k Description; f-L . 0D-76 has been revised to include an audible alarm when above 80% FCL -

. and below 45% rated flow. Also ,0D-76 was revised so that the eight hour. average  ;

of core thermal power works properly for three minute intervals.

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[ Evaluation. '!

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l. . The probability of at. occurrence or the consequence .of an accident, l e

or malfunction of equipmentiimportant to safety as previously evaluatedL l L in the Final Safety' Analysis Report is not increased because the computer .i g has no control overl equipment and is used only to provide additional t

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information to the operator.

2.' The possibility for an: accident nr. malfunction of a different type l than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not' created because the changc will provide an audible alarm when ';

the. unit moves into a region of potential instability. This will I.' 'further alert the:NSO of a condition previously. described in the FSAR. i And, correcting the eight hour average power for three minute intervals will increase.the-level of detail going into the average power providing- .!

the NSO with a better number for the average core thermal _ power.  ;

3. -The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technica1'Speci- '!

?* fication~ is not reduced because this program does no calculation h <

regarding_any safety limits or margin of safety as contained in the t

' Technical Specifications.

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Description

, ~This change modified the program ao that when' output is sentLto the Unit 1-9 P

- typer. the, correct typer is flagged as being in use'and the correct typer is

' reset when-the printing is finished.

Evalua' tion

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L :1.' The probability 011an occurrence or the consequence of an accidente or malfunction _of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated

1ri the Final Safety' Analysis Report is not increased because no changes

[,v are being made to the calculations'so no effect on any plant performance.

co l 2. The possibility for an accident-or malfunction of t different: type shan any previouslylcyaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because this will prevent the. printer from hanging

o. . when the program is demanded.

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$n l9 3. Thelmargin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi-

'}, cation. is not reduced because this will only correct an error in gL ,

the existing program.

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'O Safety Evaluation #90-531 o C-Model Rev 1.1 ';

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. Description.  ;

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-Thelequation for containment activity was modified to remove a redundant  ;

' correction factor'1 ~ Currently, the time dependent response of the detectors

. l p is corrected'byltwo-separate factors and is thus being applied twice in the f calculation. This redundant correction factor is eliminated by this revision.

Evaluation' '

p 1. :The probability of an occurrence or.the consequence of an accident,

.or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated iin;the Final _ Safety Analysis Report.is not increased because this ,

will provide accurate information on actual containment radiation

, tievel'for accident assessment.

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! 2. :The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type .[

than any:previously evaluated in the Finni Safety Analysis Report li tis 1not created.because none of the actual GSEp activation' levels are -

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,being changed by this.- Only.the information calculation is being 1 corrected to supply correct'information.

mf 1. 3 'The margin of safety, as defined in-the-basis for any Technical Jt~ .i 9; ' Specification, is not. reduced because no setpoints or trips use the- -

' corrected valves. The information from C-Model is not referenced 3 in the Technical Specifications. ,

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Safety Evaluation'#90-533 '

3 Slow Closure of the.Coro Spray Minimum Flow Valve  ;

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The core spray = minimum flow valve was found to slow close in a time greater 6, ' than required. If the core spray is required to-inject, a temporary flow  ;

p , would be diverted fromlthe main injection flow.. I Evaluation Li

'1! The-probability of an occurrence or'the consaquence'of.an accident, jjf '

or malfunction of equipment >important to safe *y as'previously-evaluated in the Final Safety:inalysis Report is not inc.'ensed because the required-flow and pressure, as stated in tho'FSAR wruld b, met while-the minimum "

, flow valve is not closed. Therefore, the consequecces of an accident  ;

m are not increased. -i>

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' 2.- The= possibility.for an accident or malfunction-of a different type ,

than any'previously. evaluated in'the Final Safety Analysis Report i is not created;because this condition does not place the core. spray .

system in an; alignment contrary to evaluated in-the FSAR. Therefore, 5 p ~the possibility of:a malfunction is,not' created,

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3. The margin of safety,Las defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-. ,

[ .. fication, istuot' reduced because the condition does not affect system l

operability as defined'in Technical Specifications.

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