ML20204G368

Insp Repts 50-321/87-02 & 50-366/87-02 on 870124-0220. Violation Noted:Failure to Adequately Test Mode Changing Air Sys Operation in Containment Isolation Sys

ML20204G368
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	03/04/1987
From:	Holmesray P, Nejfelt G, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20204G126	List: ML20204G122 ML20204G243 ML20204G368
References
TASK-2.K.3.18, TASK-TM 50-321-87-02, 50-321-87-2, 50-366-87-02, 50-366-87-2, IEIN-87-008, IEIN-87-8, NUDOCS 8703260385
Download: ML20204G368 (10)

See also: IR 05000321/1987002

Text

m

[pst;bSo.

'

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[*' , REGION 88

< 0 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

$ Tf ATLANT A. GEORGI A 30323

• -

.....

)

Report Nos.: 50-321/87-02 and 50-366/87-02

Licensee: Georgia Power Company

P. O. Box 4545

Atlanta, GA 30302

Docket Nos.: 50-321 and.50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: January 24 - February 20, 1987

Inspectors: Md /

Peter nior Resident Inspector

~

R Dit'e 'S'igned

/  % rez

William Ruland, Senior Resident Inspector

8l4/82

Dite Si~ned

g

(Brunsw /. _

2dZm re

George M. Nejfelt, Resident Inspector

sMm

Date Signed

O

~

~

Approved by: ,

Floyd S. Caritrell, SFdtgn' ief Date 'S4gned

Division of Reactor' Pro] ts

SUMMARY

This routine inspection was conducted at' the- site in the areas of

~

Scope:

Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observation, Plant Modification,

Surveillance Testing Observation, Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) System

Walkdown, Reportable Occurrences, On Site Followup of Eve'nts, Emergency

Planning, Three Mile Island (TMI) Item Update, and Limitorque Motor Operators.

Results: One violation, 50-321/87-02-01, was identified as a failure to

adequately test the mode changing operation of air systems used for containment

isolation systems (paragraph 7).

87032%k

PDR

p

O

k .I

pp -- ,

'

.

,

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

J.T. Beckham, Jr. , Vice President, Plant Hatch

• H.C. Nix, Plant Manager

D. Read, Plant Support Manager

• H.L. Sumner, Operations Manager

. *P.E. Fornel, Maintenance Manager

• T.R. Powers, Engineering Manager

R.W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

C. Coggin, General Support Manager

• M.H. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager

• 0.M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager (Acting)

• C.T. Moore, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager

• S.B. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Manager

• A. Vest, Procedure Upgrade Program (PUP) Manager

• R. Dedrickson, Assistant to Vice President, Plant Hatch

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,

mechanics, securit.v force members and office personnel.

NRC management on site during inspection period:

L.A. Reyes, Director, DRP, on February 13, 1987

F.S. Cantrell, Chief, Project Section 28, DRP, on January 26-27, 1987;

and on February 13, 1987

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 20, 1987,

with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not

identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the

inspectors during this inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings

and took no exception.

(0 pen) Violation 50-321/87-02-01. Failure to provide surveillance

procedures. (Paragraph 7).

(0 pen) Unresolved Item 50-366/87-02-02. Design control modification

problems. (Paragraph 4.a.).

(0 pen) Unresolved Item 50-321, 366/87-02-03. Method to ensure qualified

personnel are available to fill emergency organization positions.

(Paragraph 4b).

n

.

2

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 50-321/87-02-04. Nondestructive testing of

piping and detemination of chemical contaminates. (Paragraph 5).

.3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

No action on previous enforcement matters was taken.

4. Unresolved Items *

Two unresolved items (URIs) were identified during this report period.

These URIs were:

a. Design Control Modification Items - Two concerns were identified.

The first concern involved the development of Unit-2 design control

request (DCR)84-201 for upgrading the automatic depressurization

system (ADS) to satisfy the commitment for Three Mile Island (TMI)

item II.K.3.18. It appeared to the inspector that this DCR package

on site was closed, when in fact, an interim modification was in

place. This interim modification involved a push button which was

installed in lieu of the required key lock switch to provide for

inhibition of the ADS without a high drywell pressure. The second

item concerned the inconsistency between a Unit-2 elementary wiring

drawing (H-27979) for the remote shutdown panel and its "as built

notice" (ABN 2-77-55) for items not affected by the drawing change.

Specific examples were:

(1) indicated motor control center (MCC) for valve 2E11-F009 was

2R24-S011 on drawing H-27979, Revision 7; and was 2R27-SO96 in

ABN 2-77-55, Revision 0;

(2) the nomenclature for E11-F009 was called the inboard suction

isolation valve on drawing H-27979, Revision 7, and was called

the outboard suction isolation valve in ABN 2-77-55, Revision 0.

(3) the practice of referencing "not applicable" ABNs on the

microfiche cards maintained in the document control center

(DCC). Neither ABN 81-92 for drawing H-27979, Revision 7, nor

ABN 83-134 for drawing H-16276, Revision 17, changed the-

drawings for which they were listed.

These design control modification questions are considered as URI

50-366/87-02-02.

. b. Emergency Position Matrix - The inspector questioned whether the

licensee had made adequate plans to provide qualified personnel for

the emergency organization. It was noted that only two individuals

were qualified as Technical Support Center (TSC) Manager as indicated

by a Moore to Reddick memo dated January 27, 1987. No emergency

position matrix which reflected the recent reorganization could be

provided to the inspector. When asked, the licensee responded that

no method existed to ensure that at least one qualified person was

always available to fill each position in the emergency organization.

• An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to

determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a v,iolation or deviation.

p- -,

.

.

3

The ' licensee had already identified the problem with insufficient

, numbers of qualified personnel in their 1987 Emergency Procedure (EP)

Training Quality Improvement Program. The licensee stated that the

emergency matrix was under _ revision. This item is unresolved pending

further inspector review. This is URI 50-321,366/87-02-03: Method

To Ensure Qualified Personnel Available To Fill Emergency.

Organization Positions.

5. ' Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall

plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant

operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various

members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits

to the control room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints

and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on

equipment, controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to

limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily

journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access

controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions

with operators and their supervisors. Weekly , when on site, selected

Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable. The

confirmation was made by verifying the following: accessible valve flow

path alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, instrumentation,

major component leakage, lubrication, cooling, and general condition.

General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions

of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside

areas were visited. Observations included safety related tagout

verifications, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general

plant conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in

progress, radiation protection controls, physical security, problem

identification systems, and containment isolation.

During a plant tour on February 6,1987 on the 130' elevation of reactor

building Unit-1, the inspector noticed a white foreign material on control

rod drive system stainless steel piping and copper tubing. The licensee

was contacted and asked to determine the chemical composition of the.

material and to determine its source. The material source was the reactor

water clean up (RWCU) system heat exchanger room. The material flowed

around a floor drain hub, which was not grouted in, then dripped off the

floor drain elbow just below the 158 elevation onto the control rod drive

(CRD) piping'below. Analysis showed that the material contained high

concentrations of chlorides and sulfides. The licensee cleaned the fouled

piping and stopped the leak around the drain hub. Additional action such

as nondestructive testing of the piping and determination of the source of

the chemical contaminates is on going and will be inspector followup item

(IFI) 50-321/87-02-04.

In the area of housekeeping a number of discrepancies were observed by the

inspectors particular in the Unit-2 Northwest Diagonal (e.g., emergency

lighting on stairwell inoperable, equipment drain clogged, Gai-tronic loud

speaker plugged with paper, temporary funnel under leaking valve clogged,

,

.

9

4

potentially contaminated clothing was left behind a panel, radiation

warning signs were not stored properly; and tools, trash, and a small dead

bird were left in area). These housekeeping items were reported to the

licensee as they were found for corrective action.

In the course of the monthly activities, the Resident Inspectors included

a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of

various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily

activities to include: protected and vital access controls, searching of

personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting

of visitors, patrols and compensatory posts.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Maintenance Observation (62703)

During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance

activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for

adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical

specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the

actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements,

and adherence to the appropriate quality controls.

On January 28, 1987, the inspector noted that the hydraulic hoses from

each diesel generator control panel to gauges on another panel were hard

and inflexible. These hoses may be the hoses originally installed for the

diesel generators, since no record of replacing these hose was able to be

found by the licensee. At the exit interview the licensee stated that

preventive maintenance for these hydraulic hoses will be performed on a 5

year interval to ensure the hydraulic hose integrity. The hydraulic hoses

questioned by the inspector have been scheduled for replacement.

During this reporting period, several instances of poor maintenance

cleanup practices were observed. The particular items were discussed with

and have been corrected by the licensee.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Surveillance Testing Observations (61726)

i

'

The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillances. The

observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy,

conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument

calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances,

removal from service and return to service of the system or components

affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the

acceptance criteria.

During the inspection period, it was found by the inspector that no

procedures were established to verify the activated devices for the

following cases:

I

-

7 .

'

.

5

a. Non-interruptable Service Air: The automatic actuation of valves

(e.g. , IP52-F875, -F876, -F877, and -F878) needed for the transfer of

non-interruptable service air from the plant instrument air system to

the nitrogen. inerting system, upon loss of instrument air, was not

verified. The non-interruptable service air supplied a number of

primary containment isolation valves specified in TS Table 3.7-1

(e.g., IP33-F002, -F003, -F011, and -F014) . Also, the pressure

switches associated with this transfer (e.g., IPIS-N018, -N019,

-N021, and -N022) were tested on a 5 year surveillance frequency by

"non-safety related" surveillance procedure 57CP-P52-001-1,

Revision 0. Drawings used in this finding were: H-11667,

Revision 1; H-16251, Revision 14; and H-15239, Revision 14.

b. Drywell Pneumatic System: The integrated operation of the

drywell pneumatic system was not tested, although portions of this

system (e.g., flow transmitter by procedure 57CP-CAL-011-1S,

Revision 2) were tested. There was no verification of the automatic

actuation of the drywell pneumatic system isolation valves (e.g.,

IP70-F004, -F005, -F066, and -F067) in the event of a continuous high

flow for greater than 10 minutes indicating a drywell pneumatic

downstream header rupture. Drawings used in this finding were:

H-16286, Revision 18; and H-16299, Revision 0.

The safety significance of these items in terms of functions lost to

isolate primary system valves was negligible, because of the redundancy of

the containment isolation valves affected. However, this finding emphasized

that safety related equipment subsystems are needed to be tested

periodically to prove designed equipment operability. These items are

considered as a violation, 50-321/87-02-01.

8. ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve

and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified

both locally and in the control room to ensure that lineups were in

accordance with operability requirements and that equipment material

conditions were satisfactory. The Unit-2 reactor core isolation cooling

(RCIC) system was walked down in detail on February 12-13, 1987. The

following Unit-2 remote shutdown panel, 2C82-P001, procedural

discrepancies were found by the inspector in the validated procedure

l

upgrade program (PUP) procedure 3450-E51-001-2S, Revision 4:

a. Breaker No. 2C82-523 for the test bypass valve, 2E51-F007, was found

in the " NORMAL" position. The lineup procedure for the remote

shutdown panel, 34S0-E51-001-2S, Revision 4, Attachment 2, list the

position of this breaker in the "CLOSE" position.

It was determined that the procedure was incorrect, because this

switch is spring returned to the " NORMAL" position from the "CLOSE"

position.

!

t

,- - - . - - - , - -- -.-

,

'

,

e

.

.

6' ,

. b. The RCIC turbine flow controller, was found.j"n " MANUAL" .and set at

-; O gpm. Procedure 34SO-E51-001-2S,. Revision 4, Step 7.1.5.6, required-

that this flow controller be confirmed in "AUT0" with the flow rate

-

set at 400 gpm. Also, RCIC system electrical lineup check'off sheet

in Attachment 2 of this procedure 34S0-E51-001-2S did not specify-the-

positioning of the flow controller, 2C82-R001. '

'

'

The' Shift Supervisor, upon notification' by th'e inspector, hadL the-

~

RCIC remote shutdown flow controller. repositioned to "AUT0" and set

at 400.gpm.

The problem described does not make RCIC inoperable. The - safety -

significance of this RCIC flow controller set at zero flow rate and

in manual was negligible. Also, procedure 34S0-E51-001-25, > ,

Revision 4, .was currently being considered to change the wording of* '

Step 7.1.5.6 from " confirm" to " confirm or place" the RCIC flow -

controller. .

.

These two . items are particularly noteworthy, because they represented

procedural discrepancies not identified in the PUP validation process.

The housekeeping inside the . locked area of the remote shutdown panel was

f very poor. The area was not cleaned up after work was done in this space.

-

Also, a pair of head phone were plugged in and thrown on the floor. I

,

j Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

.

f 9. Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700) -

Newly issued -Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential ~

f- generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective s

actions appeared appropriate. Events, which were reported immediately.

'

3.,

~

p were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical ~

~

Specifications were being met and the public health and safety were of p,l

1-

-

-

utmost consideration. .J

!

! .10. Onsite Followup of Events (93702) 7 ,

On January 27/28, 1987 the failure of the Unit 2 "B" Condensate Transfer f h

Pump (CTP) resulted in the loss of about 92,000 gallons of Condensate y

L Storage Tank (CST) water. The spill was to the CTP enclosure then out

.

"

.through conduit to the control and turbine buildings. The conduit was not J

leak tight so a small amount of CST water leaked from the conduit iicTtN-

'

,

ground in the vicinity of the CST. The exact amount of water that went C

C

from the CST to the buildings and through drains to cadwaste is

indeterminate since other sources of in leakage to radwaste occurred

.

simultaneously. Radiological surveys indicated that no significant ,_ 3

contamination of the ground or the buildings occurred as a result of the J

l -

'

event.

'

.

{

,

.

'

A .

..

g

-

-

, p 9. -

'

.

f &- .

'

N" 1

.

s a

'

~7

A

T .s

s ' ' "5equanc'e of events (A11' times are Central Standard Time (CST):

,

-

- ,

, ,-

'0 ate Time ' Event ' -

s

't gw

i

c

1/27/87' d430 CSTc level from Main Control Room (MCR) reading

, ,

35.0 ft.

• p

.w

2 1735 s x Outside rounds Plant Equipment Operator (PEO) found no i

$* .

..

1

(excessi'cewaterinCSTorCTPenclosures. CST level

35.7 ft jyslocal indication.

,

. g- ,

1745 From plots of CST level made after the event, it.is-

probable that the CTP failure occurred at this time,. -

v,

'

, 2100 Radwaste reports to MCR excessive leakage into Control '

'

Buildir,g floor drain sumps. Shift Supervisor (51) out

Nq of the MCR to investigate. i >

4 2130 SS back in MCR but did not find cause of leakage. h

g Shift personnel continue to look for leakage.,

y y v q s. t

'

1

g, y(

s

\?230

P

CSTidfft.,29.5ft(MCR).

<w ,l ,

n

3 li.'28/87 0030 Water; found comNtg out of a drain hub in the conderi.e'r

' ad

bay.l , is

'

/

y

,.

y 3

4 *\ L s. -

'

g

s:

'

Lo

'

s0ido, "B" OFI tri pud.,/ '

i,

'

0105h Shift Supervisors find water near condensate booster

,k< $ pumps and in westf cable way. They investigated the

s

', EN n CST atee a.H found water on the asphalt near the CST

• encidjdd, bpproximately ocht f at of water in the

'

Jg  ;* 'g

-

e CTP enUoyure and approximately two feet of water in

the CST enclosure.

l' y  ; -

h* c 'Y 0115 Commenceq a' fort to close "B" CTF suction valve. '

d \( Bufidirig kric Grounds contacted 'to build a sandbag dike

Q'<Y '

.

'

,

to cop +Al HP/ Lab contacted and

'

,

r .

Maintenilide/p spill.I&dcontacted. m

\

~

p.

'

,'N'!0120 - Site Vice President, Managers and 'datch Duty Officer p

',y e

jotified.

-

,

s yi.

.

.,

' ,/ .

,

, e f.

)

. , ..

<.

01I/ ' "L ST ~

L

'

enclosure being * drained to r'3dwasti through manual ,

k,

3 vahts. .., .. a

S  ; ', -

-

\~

0200 Mwint(t.rp*,e requested to sets up Tymp f rom' CTP to CST I

,

• enclosm* and from Unit-2 Turbine Building to Unit-1

'

,,' 7' ' ,

/g TurbineBuilding"\eysipmentdrainuumps,.

. 1 . c g , v' *

'

'

i, 1123Q CST level 24.3 ft (local). CTPVS"1 suction valve

V[&Q k M

,

r

' (

'

'

'-

closed. Temporar9 pumps transferriag water. from CTP q

Me

, , ,

,

r

s .

.

g

.M o CST enclosures. ,

- - t

6'8 .e j

,\.

y I'51 ' * * w

f y .' (i

v\ ~

' ' '

l I .* r 't

• [.\ , _ _ _ . , , _h_

7-

-

, q. ~

d4

e

[' ..

"

, _

./'

,

- . c. -

'

8 s'

c ,

,,

~ 0250 'NRC Senior-Resident Inspector (SRI) notified. -

,

,

0336 CST enclosure drain' to radwaste stopped - by closing

manual valve. Leak path identified as through' the

gland seal of "B" CTP.

0400 NRC SRI on site.in response'to the, event.

'

.]..

0530' . Temporary pumps transferring water from Unit 2 to

Unit 1 Turbine Butiding equipment drain suinps.

0545 Leakage into turbine buildin'g west cable way reported '

,- stopped. '~ '

p

n '

i .

0600 Unit-1 condensate transfer system cross connected' to.

Unit-2 condensate transfer system. This provided

backwash wat'er for demineralizers in Unit-2 radwaste

syst.em. '

0630 CST level 23.0. ft . (MCR). The continued drop in CST

l level after "B" CTP was isolated was due to normal

. makeup to Unit-2 .without addition to the CST from

radwasteft ,

The licensee took prompt corrective actions to mitigate the effects of

this event; and no release to the environment resulted. ,

Noviolationordeviationwasidentiffted. j  :

, .

-

a .

11. Visit byJBrunswick Senior Resident' Inspector

The inspector familiaihzed himself with the site _ for emergency purposes,

obtained a badge for unescorted access, toured the emergency response

facilities and major plant > areas. TheMnsoector' reviewed the licensee's

. current emergency plan,/ the emergency - clas'41fication . procedure,'

73EP-EIP-001-0S, and the emergency operating prc,cedure flow charts. The

review was limited to a brief faintliarization with the documents.

• ' '

!

r;

, , .

No violations or deviations were identified; t' . -

-

>

'

12.

'  ?

,

.

ThreeMileIsland(TMI)]ItemII.K.3.18

,, s-

The inspector , reviewed TMI item II.K.3.18, concerning the automatic

'

depressurization system (ADS) logic, which was considered close'd by the

site licensing-' staff. # However, this THI Jtem was not completedgand an

interim modification was performed - installation of a push button rather

than a key switch to provide manual inhibition of ADS without a jhigh '

drywell pressure signal present.

~

r Documentation concerning II.K.3.18 prior to 1984 was summarized in IE

<, Inspection Reports. 50-321/83-27 and 50-366/83-29, cparagraph 11.

- Subsequent correspondences were

.

i .'. ,

.

W +

%[ r N

g *W

'

< T == -a-

9tTk e -- 8" v -'Iv*---'T * * ' ' W *

? ---'*--T-'-4'-PW"U--*NT w----'-A'-t'M'-"m-W--"7-**dW 9'-FT- 74St-25-W W-1 8k W We W+T*D'+T---"'

Pr ' ,,

%

4l

.*

'f.

j. 3' 9

Date . Originator

y

"

3:,,

'

03-15-85, GPC Partial implementation request push button

rather than a key switch to be installed for

?" the ADS manual inhibit, because of

anticipated transient without scram (ATWS)

L

,

.- considerations.

02-28-86 GPC ADS modification completed for both units

'

with the exception of the manual inhibit

switch. GPC committed to install the manual

'

inhibit key switch during the Spring 1987

Unit-1 and the Spring 1988 Unit-2 refueling

.

outages.

• '

13. Limitorque DC~ Motor Operators

^

IE Information Not' ice No. 87-08 addressed the potential degradation of

motor leads in Limitorque DC motor operators that were fitted with

.

Nomex-Kapton insulated leads and manufacture _d between December 1984 and

December 1985. The licensee has identified three Limitorque motor

- operators with' the Nomex-Kapton insulated leads (e.g. ,1E41-F001, -F011,

and'2E41-F011). However, only one valve,1F41-F001, used the insulated

leads ' manufactured in the specified 12 n.v .1 period. As a result, - a

" Justification for' Continued Operation" (JCO) was done for 1E41-F001, the

steam supply valve to the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) turbine.

The JC0 concluded that no additional action was required by the licensee,

because IE41-F001 is not a primary containment isolation valve and no.

credi.t is taken for the operation of this valve in the event of a High

Energy Line Break (HELB) in the HPCI room.

=

t

l  %

1. 4

4

h

I

,V'

y . ,,- . , ,. ,. w - - -

w i y