ML20204G243

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Notice of Violation from Insp on 870124-0220
ML20204G243
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 03/06/1987
From: Reyes L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20204G126 List:
References
50-321-87-02, 50-321-87-2, 50-366-87-02, 50-366-87-2, NUDOCS 8703260364
Download: ML20204G243 (2)


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ENCLOSURE 1 NOTICE OF VIOLATION Georgia' Power Company Docket Nos. 50-321,-50-366.

License Nos. DPR-57, NPF-5 Hatch During the NRC inspection conducted on January 24 - February 20, 1987, a

. violation of NRC requirements was identified. The violation was for a failure to adequately test the mode changing operation of air systems used ' for containment isolation : (e.g., plant instrument air / nitrogen inerting and

.drywell pneumatic). In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy.and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1986), the violation is listed below:

Unit-1 Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.a requires . written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the. activities-referenced - for applicable procedures - recommended in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.

Appendix "A", Section 8.b of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision- 2, February 1978, . requires that specific procedures for surveillance -test (i.e.,

functional ' testing) should be- written concerning containment isolation i functions.

!' Unit-1 TS 1.0 definition 0 "A logic system functional test means a test- -l of all relays and contacts of a logic circuit from sensor to activated device to insure that components are ' operable per design intent. . Where practicable, action will go to completion; e.g., pumps will be started and valves opened."

i Contrary to the above, as of February 20, 1987, no procedures were established to verify the activated devices for the following cases:

, 1. There was no verification of the automatic actuation of the valves

! (e.g., IP52-F875, -F876, -F877, and -F878) to ensure the transfer of non-interruptable service air from the plant instrument air system to the nitrogen inerting system, upon loss of instrument air. The F non-interruptable service air supplied a number of primary contain-ment isolation valves specified in - TS Table 3.7-1 (e.g., IP33-F002,

-F003, -F011, and -F014).

l 2. The integrated operation of the drywell pneumatic system was not tested, although portions of this system (e.g., flow transmitter and timer) were tested. There was no verification of the automatic actuation of the drywell pneumatic system isolation valves (e.g.,

IP70-F004, -F005, -F066, and -F067) in the event of a continuous high l.

flow for greater than 10 minutes indicating a drywell pneumatic downstream header rupture.

3703260364 870306 PDR G

ADOCK 05000321 l_ PDR L i

.. r Georgia Power Company 2 Docket Nos. 50-321, 50-366 Hatch License Nos. DPR-57, NPF-5 This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement I).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Georgia Power Company is hereby required to submit to this Office within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice a written statement or explanation in reply including: (1) admission or denial of the violation, (2) the reason for the violation if admitted, (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ORIGINAL S!GNED BY VIRO!L L. EROWNLEE 7

Luis A. Reyes, Director Division of Reactor Projects Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this (, 6 day of M ck 1987

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