IR 05000206/1986032

Insp Repts 50-206/86-32,50-361/86-22 & 50-362/86-22 on 860804-08.No Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected: Emergency Preparedness Exercise & Associated Critique & Followup of LER

ML20214L358
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	08/25/1986
From:	Brown G, Fish R, Prendergast K, Temple G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V), SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20214L334	List: IR 05000206/1986032 ML20214L331
References
50-206-86-22, 50-206-86-32, 50-361-86-22, 50-362-86-22, NUDOCS 8609100108
Download: ML20214L358 (8)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION.V Report Nos. 50-206/86-32, 50-361/86-22, 50-362/86-22 Docket Nos. 50-206, 50-361 and 50-362 License Nos.

DPR-13, NPF-10, NPF-15 Licensee:

Southern California Edison Company Post Office Box 800 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead,_ California 91770 Facility Name:

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2,

Inspection at:

San Onofre Site, San Diego County, California Inspection conduct.d:

August 4-8, 1986

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Inspectors:

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Brown, Emergency Preparedness D'atd Signed

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Ana yst, Team Leader

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- On Ad S 9'A/?6 Preparedness Ana]lystPrendergast[, Emergency Date Signed K.

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G.' M. Tehple, Embrgency Preparedness Date Signed Analyst Team Member:

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Hogan, Emergency Preparedness Specialist Approved by:

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Fish, Chief D a't e signed Emergency Preparedness Section Summary:

Inspection on August 4-8, 1986 (Report Nos. 50-206/86-32, 50-361/86-22 and 50-362/86-22)

Areas Inspected:

Announced inspection of the emergency preparedness exercise and associated critique, follow-up on two open items iden-tified in the special inspection of March 10-14, 1986 and followup of a Licensee Event Report.

Inspection Procedures 82301, and 92701 were covered.

Results:

No violations of NRC requirements were identified, k

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted A.

Southern California Edison

• K. Baskin, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering, Safety and Licensing Department

• H. Morgan, Station Manager

• M. Wharton, Deputy Station Manager

• M. Rosenblum, Manager, Nuclear Safety

• F. Jackley, Manager, Nuclear Affairs and Emergency Planning

• D. Peacor, Manager, Station Emergency Preparedness

• F. Eller, Manager, Station Security

• L. Phelps, Manager, Corporate Communications

• B. Katz, Manager, Operations and Maintenance Support

• P. Knapp, Manager, Health Physics

• D. Dack, Quality Assurance Engineer

• C. Couser, Compliance Engineer

• J. Whalen, Emergency Planning Engineer

• J. Erhard, Emergency Planning Engineer

• P. Dooley, Supervisor, Emergency Planning

• J. Currali, Quality Assurance Manager

• J. Stubbs, Emergency Planning Coordinator

• G. Buzzelli, Emergency Planning Coordinator

• D. Herbst, Supervisor, Independent Safety Engineering Group

• J. Wallace, Supervisor, Nuclear Affairs and Emergency Planning

• J. Firoved, Emergency Planning Engineer

• J. Winter, Engineer

• S. Olofsson. Emergency Planning Specialist

• R. Reed, Emergency Planning Specialist

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• G. Guliani, Combustion Engineering, Inc.

• T. James, Simulator Administrator

• C. Anderson, Emergency Planning Specialist

• D. Bennette, Supervisor, Station Emergency Planning

• Denotes those present at exit interview on August 8, 1986.

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2.

Followup AcLions (Closed) Open Item No. 50-206/86-16-02.

Licensee should strengthen procedure for status turnover to oncoming Emergency Coordinator to cover unusual situations. On 5/15/86 the licensee issued Temporary Change No. 3-4 to Procedure S0123-VIII-10. This change requires oncoming Emergency Coordinators to utilize Attachment 2 to the procedure prior to assuming the responsi-bilities. Attachment 2 provides for a written turnover record and requires a general announcement regarding the change in Emergency Coordinators.

During the exercise, the licensee satisfactorily demonstrated proper implementation of the turnover procedure. This item is considered close.

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(0 pen) Open Item No. 50-206/86-16-03. Failure of Emergency Ring-Down Phones During Loss of Power. SCE has completed an engineering study and decided to replace the old AT&T maintained system with a new SCE-maintained system which will not be susceptible to failure during a source of power problem. Funding for the new system is budgeted for 1987 and the estimated completion date is March 1, 1987. This item will remain open pending completion of the installation of the new system.

(Closed) Followup On Licensee Event Report Number 04965. On 6/7/86 the licensee reported that the Critical Function Moni-toring System (CFMS) for Unit 3 was inoperable for a period of 4 1/2 hours. The inspector determined that the system itself was not lost, only the capability to store historical data was lost (due to a disk drive failure). This matter is considered closed.

3.

Emergency Preparedness Exercise Planning The licensee's Nuclear Affairs and Emergency Planning (NA&EP)

staff has the overall responsibility for developing, conducting and evaluating ~the emergency preparedness exercise. A member of this staff was assigned to act as Lead Controller with the responsibilities of developing the scenerio package and conduc-ting the exercise. He was assisted by members of the station emergency staff and SCE contractor personnel, none of whom were participants in the exercise.

The emergency preparedness exercise objectives were established by the licensee's NA&EP staff.

The objectives were discussed and i

agreed upon by the Interjurisdictional Planning Committee. The exercise document, generated under the direction of the Lead Controller, included the objectives, instructions to exercise controllers, controller assignments, guidelines for participants, the exercise scenario, cue cards to be used during the exercise, initial and subsequent plant parameters, meteorogical and radiological data, and exercise evaluation / response forms. The exercise document was tightly controlled before the exercise. A controllers' briefing was held before the exercise. The exercise was intended to meet the requirements of Section IV.F.3 of

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Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

This was a site-only exercise with minimal participation by off-site agencies.

4.

Exercise Scenario

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The exercise scenario started with an event classified as an Alert and ultimately escalated to a General Emergency classification.

Precipitating events were as follows:

Classification Event Alert Rupture of waste gas tank resulted in unexpected high area radiation monitor readings greater than 1000 times normal radiation levels-y w--g--a-m

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Site Area Emergency An earthquake caused a loss of.

coolant accident (LOCA) greater than

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available charging pump capacity

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General Emergency Loss of all AC power resulted in-potential for loss of the third fission product barrier, having already suffered loss of two other barriers (a small containment breach and LOCA)

5.

Federal Observers Four NRC inspectors evaluated the licensee's response. One inspector was stationed in each of the licensee's ERF's.

The NRC resident inspector observed operations in the simulator..The NRC inspector assigned to the OSC accompanied some maintenance teams to evaluate their performance.

6.

Control Room The Control Room crew's ability to detect and classify emergency events, analyze plant conditions and take corrective actions, decide on protective actions, and make appropriate and timely notifications were evaluated.

Control Room personnel's responses were satisfactory with the l

following exception:

The acting Emergency Coordinator failed to properly classify the Alert in a timely manner when he did not recognize that area radiation monitor readings in the Rad Waste Building were

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sufficient for this classification.

In order to maintain the l

exercise timeline, it was necessary to issue a contingency I

message advising the Emergency Coordinator to declare an Alert.

l Inability to detect and classify an emergency is an exercise l

weakness and will be tracked as an Open Item (Nos.

j 50-206/86-32-01, 50-361/86-22-01, 50-362/86-22-01)

7.

Technical Support Center

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The Technical. Support Center staff's' ability to activate in a timely mannet, assess and classify. accidents, make dose assess-ments, decide on appropriate protective action recommendations, make proper and timely notifications, support the Control Room

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.and maintain radiological monitoring were evaluated.

Technical Support Center response actions were satisfactory with the following exception:

The IIcalth Physics staff initially calculated dose assessment projections based on an arbitrary initial time of release because they didn't know the actual time. The scenario started with a significant radioactive release from a waste gas decay tank at 0731.

It took the IIcalth Physics staff approximately 30 minutes

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to determine the correct time of release. The Health Physics staff should be mor,e aggressive in their attempts to secure necessary information.

8.

Operational Support Center The Operational Support Center staff's ability to activate and staff the facility with appropriate skills and craftsmen in a timely manner, and support the Control Room and TSC in their response to the events were evaluated.

The OSC staff actions were satisfactory, with the following exceptions:

o Poor health physics practices were used while taking smears and air samples in the OSC. For instance, the technician did not wear gloves when transfering the potentially contaminated air sample cartridge, did not identify the samples according to location and time, and did not perform a proper instrument operability check.

o Adequate protective equipment was not available for some jobs. For instance, one Bio-Pak did not function properly

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resulting in the temporary loss of services of one team member. Medical personnel responded with an inappropriate gurney to transport the injured worker down a steep stairway.

o Two team members improperly donned protective clothing.

Both failed to tape their gloves in accordance with station procedures, o

The OSC staff did not maintain adequate records of its performance. There were no records identifying which workers performed what tasks after the board was erased.

This type of information would be important in reconstructing the event.

10.

Emergency Operations Facility The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staff's ability to activate the facility in a timely manner with appropriate skills and disciplines, provide offsite dose assessment capabilities, make appropriate notifications in a timely manner, implement protective actions, interface with offsite officials, and dis-seminate information to the media were evaluated.

Performance of the E0F staff was satisfactory with the following exceptions:

There was poor coordination between the EOF and the TSC in implementing protective action recommendations (PARS). The initial PARS were developed at the TSC in accordance with pro-cedures and reviewed with the EOF prior to making the

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recommendations to offsite authorities. Shortly after the declaration of a General Emergency the offsite authorities were notified that the PAR was to shelter 5 miles in the affected sectors and two miles in all sectors. However, during subsequent interface discussions with offsite liaisons in the E0F, the EOF Senior Manager recommended evacuation of an area within 10 miles of the plant, which was accepted by offsite authorities. This action was taken without coordination with the TSC and in conflict with the specific duties described in the licensee's emergency plan. This item was identified during the previous annual exercise and closed by the licensee's corrective action to emphasize the PAR decision making responsibilities to key staff members. To further resolve the issue, the licensee listed as an exercise objective, the demonstration of the adequacy of the decision making process between the EOF and the TSC in recommen-ding protective actions.

Inability to coordinate protective action recommendations is an exercise weakness and will be tracked as an Open Item (Nos. 50-206/86-33-02, 50-361/86-22-023, 50-362/86-22-02).

The EOF issued news releases for the media that were untimeley and confusing. For instance, the first news release was not issued until over 2-1/2 hours after the Alert declaration.

One item-dealing with the evacuation was issued ten minutes before the EOF actually made the decision. Another item defined the communities to be evacuated but failed to inform the residents that the evacuation would take place in stages (one area being evacuated before another).

It was noted that these news releases would have been forwarded to the licensee's Emergency News Center for further review in the normal course of events.

It is likely that these deficiencies would have been corrected there.

How-ever, inability of the EOF to issue timely and accurate news releases is an item of NRC concern and will be tracked as an Open Item (Nos. 50-206/86-33-03, 50-361/86-22-03, 50-362/86-22-03).

11.

Critiques Immediately following the exercise, critiques were held in each of the ERFs.

Players completed critique sheets and submitted them to the lead controller at the facility. A formal critique involving site and management personnel was conducted on August 7, 1986. The purpose of the formal critique was to summarize the earlier critique sessions and to discuss weaknesses or deficiencies identified by licensee personnel during the exercise. The following represent the types of comments made at this meeting:

They failed to meet the exercise objective of recognizing o

emergency conditions and declaring appropriate emergency classifications within 15 minutes of recognition because the initial condition was not properly classified at the Control Roo _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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o They met the objective for timely notification and communi-cation capabilities, o

They met the objective to recall required emergency response personnel, o

They met the objective to make adequate turnovers and transfer of responsibilites'in accordance with their implementing procedures.

o They met the objective to staff the emergency response facilities within the specified time limits of the emergency plan.

They did not meet the objective of demonstrating the o

adequacy of the decision making process between the EOF and TSC in recommending protective actions for the general public because of uncertainty in the issuing of PARS regard-ing sheltering and evacuation. They discussed the possible source of the problem as being the potential for conflict between the PAR responsibility of the TSC and the responsi-i

hility in the EOF to interface with offsite agencies regard-ing PARS. The licensee intends to place this item on the SOCR tracking list.

They did not fully meet the objective of providing accurate

o reports of medical and repair team status and followup status reports to the Control Room and other emergency response facilities hourly or within 15 minutes of signifi-cant occurrences because of comunications difficulties. The repair team aspects of the objective were met.

o They met the objective to demonstrate the ability of the Control Room phone talkers to provide ERFs with accurate updates on plant conditions within 15 minutes of significant changes or occurrences and to provide followup reports on requests for information within the requested time, o

They met the objective to demonstrate the ability of status board keepers to update accurately within 15 minutes of significant changes.

o They met the objective to demonstrate the adequacy of radiation monitoring team deployment to provide continuous radiological assessment.

12.

Scenario Comments During the course of the exercise the licensee simulated having about 26 maintenance teams in the field.

Simulation on such a large scale made it dif ficult to determine whether the OSC was meeting all of its objectives. For instance, it was difficult to determine if the licenace would have been able to provide protec-tive equipment for the teams, or if the teams could be adequately

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tracked once they were dispatched. For this reason, use of

L phantom teams in an exercise should be avoided.

f 13. Exit Interview l

An exit interview was held on August 8,1986 with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1). The licensee was informed of the weaknesses identified during this inspection as well as the other significant observations made by the inspec-

' tors. The licensee did not identify any proprietary or safe-

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l guards information resulting from this inspection.

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