IR 05000361/1997005
| ML20138E552 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 04/29/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138E461 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-97-05, 50-361-97-5, 50-362-97-05, 50-362-97-5, NUDOCS 9705050022 | |
| Download: ML20138E552 (4) | |
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-18-Miscellaneous Engineering issues (90712, 92700)
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E8.1 (Closed) LER 361/96008 00; RCP oil collection system - voluntary report. This l
ue was discussed and resolved in NRC Inspection Reports 50-361; 362/96 11 t
i an 50-361;362/9702.
I E8.2 (Close LER 50-361/97003-00: pressurizer safety valve setpoints out of tolerance.
Followin ressurizer safety valve setpoint testing, the licensee identified that the two pressu 'zer safety valves were out-of tolerance high by 1.72 percent and 1.04 percent. These out-of tolerance setpoints exceeded the TS allowable tolerance of percent. The licensee believed the cause to be setpoint drift.
Following discov
, the licensee reset the safety valve setpoints within the l
allowable tolerance nd evaluated the safety significance of the "as found" out-of-tolerance safet valves. The licensee's evaluation concluded that there was l'
no safety consequence the event, since the conditions were bounded by a previous analysis that sho ed that design conditions would be maintained. A recently completed analysis onfirmed that the TS values for acceptable out-of-tolerance conditions on he pressurizer safety valves could be expanded to l
+ 3 percent and -2 percent with ut impacting the design basis. The licensee was considering applying for a change tolerance. The inspectors concludeo the TS to allow for such an increase in setpoint
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following discovery of the out-of-tolerthat the licensee's corrective actions, and thorough.
ce pressurizer safety valves, were timely.
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IV. Plant Supp t
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R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R 1.1 Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination,, urveyina. and Monitorina a.
Insoection Scone (83750)
Selected radiation workers and radiation protection personnel i
volved with the control of radioactive material outside the radiologically control area were interviewed. Areas reviewed included:
Control of radioactive material;
Release survey methods;
Frequency of surveys performed in the restricted area; and
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Posting of radiological areas within the restricted area.
l The inspectors reviewed HP Procedure SO123-Vll 8, Revision 7, " Control of Radioactive Material," and a memorandum to file, dated April 23,1993, "Evaluatio l
performed to determine the need to survey trash from the Restricted Area."
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9705050022 970429 gDR ADOCK 05000361 l
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-18 E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (90712,92700)
l E8.1 (Closed) LER 361/96008-00: RCP oil collection system - voluntary report. This issue was discussed and resolved in NRC Inspection Reports 50-361; 362/96-11 l
and 50-361; 362/9702.
E8.2 (Closed) LER 50-361/97003-00: pressurizer safety valve setpoints out of tolerance.
~ Following pressurizer safety valse setpoint testing, the licensee identified that the two pressurizer safety valves were out-of-tolerance high by 1,72 percent and 1.04 percent. These out-of-tolerance setpoints exceeded the TS allowable tolerance of 1 percent. The licensee believed the cause to be setpoint drift.
Following discovery, the licensee reset the safety valve setpoints within the l
allowable tolerance and evaluated the safety significance of the "as found" out-of-tolerance safety valves. The licensee's evaluation concluded that there was no safety consequence to the event, since the conditions were bounded by a previous analysis that showed that design conditions would be maintained. A recently completed analysis confirmed that the TS values for acceptable l
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out-of-tolerance conditions on the pressurizer safety valves could be expanded to
+ 3 percent and -2 percent without impacting the design basis. The licensee was considering applying for a change to the TS to allow for such an increase in setpoint tolerance. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's corrective actions, following discovery of the out-of-tolerance pressurizer safety valves, were timely
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and thorough. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Poliev
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(NCV 362/97005-06).
IV. Plant Support
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R 1.1 Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination, Survevino, and Monitorina a.
Inspection Scope (83750)
i Selected radiation workers and radiation protection personnel involved with the control of radioactive material outside the radiologically controlled area were interviewed. Areas reviewed included:
L Control of radioactive material;
Release survey methods;
Frequency of surveys performed in the restricted area; and
Posting of radiological areas within the restricted area.
- l The inspectors reviewed HP Procedure SO123-Vil-8, Revision 7, " Control of
Radioactive Material," and a memorandum to file, dated April 23,1993, " Evaluation
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performed to determine the need to survey trash from the Restricted Area."
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i L-2-ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Ooene 50-361/9 005-04 URI procurement and use of faulty SG manway gasket Opened and osed 50-361/97005-VIO
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pressurizer cooldown rate limit exceeded 50-361/97005-02 NCV CEA withdrawal sequence for rod drop testing I
50 362/97005-03 CV improper BAMU flow rate setpoint 50-361/97005-05 V EQ splice deficiencies Closed 50-362/96-005-00 LER r actor head vent valve mispositioned 50 361/96 008-00 LER R
oil collection system 50-361/97-003-00 LER pres urizer safety valve setpoints out of tolerance l
LIST O ACRONYMS USED l
ABB Asea Brown Boveri ACO assistant control operator
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" action request
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BAMU boric acid makeup CEA control element assembly CREACUS control room emergency air cleanup ystem l
CRS control room supervisor EQ environmentally qualified l
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health physics HVAC heating, ventilation, and ' air conditioning (CRR inverse count rate ratio LER licensee event report MO maintenance order PDR Public Document Room RCP reactor coolant pump RCS reactor coolant system SDC shutdown cooling SG steam generator SR surveillance requirement SS shif t superintendent TS Technical Specification
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VCT volume control tank i
WPS weld procedure specification
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-2-ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened 50-361/97005-04 URI procurement and use of faulty SG manway gasket Opened and Closed 50-361/97005-01 VIO pressurizer cooldown rate limit exceeded 50-361/97005-02 NCV CEA withdrawal sequence for rod drop testing 50-362/97005-03 NCV improper BAMU flow rate setpoint 50-361/97005-05 NCV EQ splice deficiencies 50-362/97005-06 NCV pressurizer safety valve setpoints out of tolerance Closed 50-362/96-005-00 LER reactor head vent valve mispositioned 50 361/96-008-00 LER RCP oil collection system 50-361/97-003-00 LER pressurizer safety valve setpoints out of tolerance l
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ABB Asea-Brown Boveri ACO assistant control operator AR action request BAMU boric acid makeup CEA control element assembly CREACUS control room emergency air cleanup system CRS control room supervisor-EQ environmentally qualified HP health physics HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning ICRR'
inverse count rate ratio LER licensee event report MO maintenance order PDR Public Document Room RCP reactor coolant pump RCS reactor coolant system SDC shutdown cooling SG steam generator SR surveillance requirement SS shift superintendent
i TS Technical Specification VCT volume control tank l
WPS weld procedure specification
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