IR 05000206/1986009

Insp Repts 50-206/86-09,50-361/86-08 & 50-362/86-08 on 860215-0327.Violation Noted:Failure to Comply W/Approved Housekeeping & Fire Protection Procedures for Weekly Insp of Combustibles & Transient Fire Loads

ML20197C052
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	04/25/1986
From:	Dangelo A, Huey F, Johnson P, Stewart J, Tang R, Tatum J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20197C022	List: IR 05000206/1986009 ML20197C015 ML20197C041
References
50-206-86-09, 50-206-86-9, 50-361-86-08, 50-361-86-8, 50-362-86-08, 50-362-86-8, NUDOCS 8605130224
Download: ML20197C052 (16)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY. COMMISSION REGION V-

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Report No /86-09, 50'-361/86-08, 50-362/86-08 Docket No , 50-361, 50-362 License No DPR-13, NPF-10, NPF-15 Licensee: Southern California Edison Company P. O. Box 800, 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 92770 Facility Name: San Onofre Units 1, 2 and'3

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Inspection at: San Onofre, San Clemente, California Inspection conducted: February 15 through March 27, 1986 Inspectors: b hF.R.j@ey,SeniorResident Da'te Signed Inspe Mo , Units 1, 2 and 3

h J. ewart, Resident Inspector

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hA.D'A , lo, esident Inspector 4(c Date Signed k J. um, Resident Inspector 6&c Date Signed

%cfn h R. ng, R sident Inspector Date Signed Approved By: 2dpG '

P. H. Jo' son, Chief Date Signed Reactor rojects Section 3 Inspection Summary Inspection on February 15 through March 27, 1986 (Report Nos. 50-206/85-09, 50-361/85-08, 50-362/85-08)

Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of Units 1, 2 and 3 Operations .

Program including the following areas: operational safety  !

verification, evaluation of plant trips and events, monthly surveillance activities, monthly maintenance activities, refueling activities, independent inspection, licensee event report review, and follow-up of previously identified item Inspection Procedures 71707, 61726, 37701, 30703, 73051, 62703, 73753, 92701, 62700, 72701, 73755, 71710, 56700, 92700, 64704, 35751, 36700, 93702, 61702, 61705, 61706, 61707, 61708, 61709, and 61710 were covere PDR ADOCK 05000206 G PDR

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Results: Of the ten areas examined,' one apparent violation'was identified

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' involving failue to comply with approved housekeeping-and fireiprotectio ;

procedures.

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s DETAILS'

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Southern California Edison Company 1' '

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l- H. ' Ray, Vice President', Site: Manager _ f

• G. Morgan, Station Manager ,

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. * Wharton, Deputy Station Manager., ,

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• D. Schone,. Quality Assurance Manager

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, D.- Stonecipher, Quality Control Manager -1

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• R. Krieger,: Operations Manager- '

• D. Shull, Maintenance Manager >

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'J.' Reilly, Technical Managerf f P. Knapp, Health Physics Manager

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*B. Zintl," Compliance Manager i ' I

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J. Wambold,' Training Manager . , ,

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D. Peacor, Emergency Preparedness Manager

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P. Eller, Security Manager ,

*W. Marsh, Operations Superintendent, Units 2/3 ,

i *J. Reeder, Operations Superintendent,- Unit 1

*V. Fisher, Assistant Operations Superintendent, = Units 2/3

• B. Joyce, Maintenance Manager, Units 2/3 ,

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l H. Merten, Maintenance Manager, Unit 1:

*R.' Santosuosso, Instrument and Control Superviso L

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.*T. Mackey, Compliance (Supervisor- ,_

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{ 'G. Gibson, Compliance-Supervisor-

• C. Kergis, Compliance Engineer '!

*P. King, Quality Assurance Supervisor .

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l San Diego Gas & Electric Company

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• R. Erickson, San Diego Gas and Electric - *

{ * Denotes those attending the exit meeting on March 27, 1986. f 1  !

The inspectors also contacted other licensee employees during the course  ;

of the inspection, including operations shift superintendents, control r

{ . room supervisors, control _ room operators, QA and QC engineers', . compliance  !

j- engineers, maintenance craf tsmen, and health physics engineers and ]

technician ' -

$ f j ' Operational Safety Verification *

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f j  : The inspectors performed several plant tours and verified the operability- ,

4 of selected emergency systems, reviewed the Tag Out log and verified ~  ;

! proper return.to service.of'affected components. Particular attention

!. . was given to housekeeping,' examination for potential fire hazards, : fluid

! leaks, excessive vibration, and verification ~ that maintenance requests ,

j had been ' initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc !

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While inspecting the cable spreading areas' in Units 2 and 3,. the inspector observed the following conditions: A cable. pull rope was found hanging'out of conduit QIAJ03 where the i cables exit the conduit and enter cable tray IHAJA3 in Unit 2 50'-

cable spreading roo ' A blue and green electrical cable'wasffound bundled.together and'

routed through the Unit 3 30' cable spreading area. The colors of the electrical cables would indicate'that they arel associated with the "C" and "D" safety trains, and the cables are attached to_both Class IE'and Non-Class IE cable tray '

The licensee had issued. Field Surveillance Report ~(FSR)'G-120-86;an .

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Nonconformance Report (NCR) 3-1478 to, address these discrepancies. .The cable pull rope was left-over from construction and has subsequently been removed. The blue and green electrical cables are used for conducting surveillance tests of ESF switchgear, ~ and 'are de-energized during normal -

plant operation. The licensee is currently assessing the color code requirements and separation criteria for these circuit This is an open item (50-361/86-08-01).

3. Evaluation of Plant Trips and Events Rapid Shutdown on February 16, 1986, Resulting from Loss of Vacuum-(Unit 3)

A rapid shutdown ~from 55% reactor power was commenced and the .

turbine was taken off line at 0257 on' February 16, 1986, when storm-conditions resulted in th'e influx of high levelsfof debris causing rapid. plugging of the main condenser and loss of vacuum. The condenser water boxes were cleaned, and some. repairs were required to plug condenser tubes and replace 5 low pressure turbine rupture discs. The unit. resumed operation on February 21, 198 Reactor Trip on February _ 21, 1986 (Unit 3)

At 1618 on February 21, 1986, while at 30%. power, the reactor was manually tripped when increasing combustible gas readings were detected on the Unit 3 main transformer (3XM). The licensee discontinued power operation and manually _ tripped the turbine and reactor. The main transformer was replaced with 'the. spare transformer, and the licensee was investigating the cause of the .

combustible gas indication associated with the main 4 transforme Unusual Event (UE) Declared on February'27,-1986','Due to Reactor Coolant System Leakage (Unit 3)

At 1250 on February 27, 1986 the licensee declared a IH? when RCS pressure boundary leakage was discovered in the vicinity of an upper pressurizer level instrument nozzle. .The unit was~in Mode 3=and-

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replacement of the main transformer was in progress when the leak s was found. The licensee initiated cooldown=to Mode 5 and secured <

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from the UE at 1445 on February 27, 1986. The unit entered Mode 5'

.at 1655 on February 28, 1986. The-licensee conduct _ed dye penetrant examination of the instrument nozzle from inside.the. pressurizer and found that the nozzle contained a_ crack which extended through'the nozzle. wall and into the nozzle weld area. The licensee removed the defective instrument nozzle and welded in . replacement nozzle; The-nozzle is a 3/4" schedule 160 inconel pipe s'ection1which has a 3/16" flow limiting orifice integral to the design. There are.six nozzles of this. type which penetrate the pressurizer. ;The licensee conducted dye penetrant examination of one other nozzle adjacent to-the failed nozzle and no unacceptable indications were foun Nozzle replacement was completed on March'10, 1986, and the unit?

returned to power operation on March 17.. The. defective nozzle-is being analyzed by both Combustion Engineering and HETTECK Company:to determine the failure mechanism.- The inspector will follow up'on

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this item upon issue of a Licensee Event Repor Loss of Shutdown Cooling on' March 26,'1986 (Unit 2)

On March 26, 1986, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 and the-reactor coolant system drained to mid-loop, both trains of shutdown cooling were

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lost due to air binding in the pump suction. The air binding was-the result of vortexing at the point where the shutdown cooling suction line connects to the hot. leg of.the reactor. coolant syste The vortexing resulted during a loop draining evolution which inadvertently' drained too much water from the hot leg due to an improperly functioning water level ~ indicator. Shutdown cooling flow was lost for approximately one -hour, during.which time hot leg temperature increased about 90 F and started to boil. Boiling is estimated to have continued for about 10 minutes before water level was recovered and shutdown cooling f16w was reinitiated. The licensee has completed preliminary evaluations showing thlit no damage to fuel as'semblies or reactor plant compenents occurred as a result of this thermal transient. The licensee is continuing 1 investigation of the circumstances. leading up to this event and identification of corrective actions to preclude-recurrence. The. '

results of NRC review of this_ event will be reported in the next routine inspection repor . .

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No violations or deviations: were' id,entifie ,

4. Monthly Surveillance Activities .

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.. Unit 1 ,-

The inspector observed portions of'the 18 month calibration of-intermediate range channel #1204. The channel was being calibrated

.in'accordance with procedure'S01-II-1.6.6, TCN 1-1. No

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b. Units 2 and 3 The inspector observed portions of the monthly surveillance to demonstrate the safety injection flow path. This surveillance was conducted in accordance with procedure S03-3-3.8, Attachment During this inspection period, an inspector also observed the performance of the following monthly and quarterly surveillances:

S023-II- Nuclear Instrument Safety Channel A (Excore) Linear Power Subchannel Gains Functional Test and Calibration (Unit 2)

S023-I-4.57 2RI-7819 Component Cooling Water Radiation Monitoring System Channel Functional Test (Unit 2)

S023-XXV-4.27 3RI-7874A and 3RI-7875A Main Steam Line Radiation Monitoring System Channel (Monthly) )

Functional Test (Unit 3)

S023-I-2.13 Quarterly Inspection of Batteries (Unit 2 - Battery 2B009/2D3)

No discrepancies were observe c. Station IE Battery Surveillance (Units 1, 2, and 3)

During this inspection period the inspector evaluated the station IE battery weekly and quarterly surveillance programs as required by the technical specifications. The scope of this evaluation included review of pertinent station surveillance and administrative procedures, selected surveillance data packages for all three units, and direct observation of portions of a weekly and a quarterly battery surveillance at Units 2 and The following minor deficiences were noted:

(1) In Maintenance Order No. 84113571000, Quarterly Surveillance for Unit 1 Station Battery Rack No. 1, performed on December 21, 1984, the specific gravity for cell No. 10, corrected for electrolyte level and temperature, apparently included an arithmetic erro However, the erroneous entry (1.211) and the correct value (1.219) both meet the acceptance criteri (2) In Maintenance Order No. 85110016000, weekly 1E battery surveillance for Unit 3, the prerequisites blank was not signed and dated, as required by the surveillance procedure, S023-I-2.1 The inspector was later informed that the electrician who performed the surveillance had verified that the prerequisites in the procedure were met but had forgotten to sign and date the Maintenance Data Record Form.

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y (3) Hydrometer M2-5969 was used for measuring specific gravity of the pilot cells during Unit 3 1E battery surveillance on ,

February 7, 1984. The governing surveillance procedure at that '

time, S0123-XV-1.0, required that all M&TE be calibrated and that calibration reports and logs for individual M&TE be transmitted to CDM. The re-calibration date for the hydrometer (5 entries) was recorded on the Maintenance Data Record Form three times as January 5, 1985 and twice as January 5, 1984 (and thus appeared to be past due). Neither the calibration report nor the calibration log for this hydrometer could be located in CDM. Through discussions with the SCE Metrology Laboratory Manager, the inspector learned that a copy of the Calibration Report for hydrometer M2-5969 was on file at the SCE Metrology Laboratory (i.e. , in Westminster, not at SONGS).

The inspector suggested that a copy be also placed at CDM to prevent future confusions regarding the calibration status for this hydromete The inspector noted that although the above noted deficiencies were minor and appeared to be isolated, they were indicative of a need for additional emphasis on thorough supervisory review of technical specification surveillance packages. The licensee stated that additional emphasis was being provided to cognizant supervisor During review of the surveillance data packages, the inspector noted that on numerous occasions (prior to August 1985) thermometers which had been used for technical specification surveillances had no .

record of calibration. Based on discussions with licensee personnel, the inspector determined that prior to mid 1985, although thermometers were included on the M&TE list, many SCE personnel were under the impression that thermometers used for technical specifications surveillances did not need to be calibrated. The responsibility for the SCE M&TE program was transferred from station maintenance to the Metrology Laboratory in Westminster, CA in August, 1985. The inspector noted no instances of thermometer calibration deficiencies for IE battery surveillances conducted after August, 198 Procedure S0123-II-1.0, Revision 1, TCN 1-3, requires that users of M&TE be qualified in accordance with ANSI 18.1 and/or N45, and that M&TE be obtained by qualified individuals from the M&TE issue are However, the inspector noted that any SCE personnel can check out M&TE from the M&TE tool room by showing the green SCE site badg Although the inspector observed no instances of misuse of M&TE as a result of the M&TE issuance policy, the inspector noted that this policy did not appear to be consistent with the intent of the station procedur This is an open item pending additional review and response by the licenst (50-361/86-08-02)

No violations or deviations were identifie _

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5 '. Monthly Maintenance Activities

+ Unit 1 .

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The inspector observed the following maintenance activities , i associated with the current refueling outage: ,

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(1) Diesel generator overhau ' '

(2) Main feed system modificatio '

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l- (3) Main feed pump' repair and overhau ,, . :

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no deficiencies were note ; Unit 2

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• Unit 3 ,

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associated with the A and B excore safety channel signal processing .

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drawers. Licensee Event Report 83-064 had identified that the routine removal and connecting of the cables fron'the signal processing drawers during surveillance testing caused the retaining  ;

devices in the BNC connectors to work loose resulting in a loss of' *

signal continuity.. To correct this problem, all DNC connectors on  ;

the field cables'to the excore safety. signal processing drawers were being replaced with Mil-Crimp II connectors. The work was bein ,

conducted in accordance with DCP 3-6073SJ. No deficiencies were note No violations or deviations were identifie , Engineered Safety Feature Walkdow "

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The inspector examined the Unii. 3 Post' Accident Monitoring Instrumentation (PAMI) during this report period. The transmitters and

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mechanical penetrations associated with the following instrumentation

! channels were visually ' inspected: I

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Containment Pressure Spray System Pressure , '

LPSI Header Temperature;

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Hot Leg HPSI Flow s .

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The inspector verified that-the electrical terminations for containment '

temperature (3TT-9903-1) and spray -system pressure (3PT-0303-2) were in accordance with the applicalbe'_ loop diagram \_ ,

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[=, - ' Refueling' Activitie '

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~ The inspector reviewed data that were tisken by the licensee during low' *

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power testing and power ascension. testing following the refueling outag '

Data for the following; tests were reviewed: ' '

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Reactor Shutdown-Margin ' e

. Criticality-Following Refueling

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Boron Endpoint Determination '

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Isothermal Temperature Coefficient Measurement at Hot,-

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RCS Calorimetric Flow Measurement <

• - Isothermal Temperature Coefficient-

• - Radial-Peaking Factors'and CEA. Shadowing Factors ~ ~

Measurements .

Azimuthal Tilt

Shape Annealing Matrix and Boundary, Condition ,

j Measurements-

Doppler Power Coefficient Measurements 4, The inspector found that the data were complete'as reqdired by'the implementing procedures. No violations ~or deviations were identified: Independent Iuspection

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, Inspection of Unit 1 Steam Generators Unit 1 Technical Specification 4.16 requires periodic inspection-of steam generator tubes for indication of excessive'or deteriorating '

m tube wall conditions. . During the currentfUnit 1_ refueling' outage, the licensee performed the required. inservice inspection on th '

three Unit I steam generators. During this' inspection,'special l attentiri. as paid to any in i cations of progression of . tube -

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degredation resulting'fros pr.aiously identified ~ failure mechanisms; '

specifically, intergranular attack' (IGA),: denting.or antivibration bar wear (AVB).

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, A total of.2740_ tubes (26% of the tubes in service) were l'specte n

' A' total'of 63 tubes were plugged as. a result of this -inspection. -

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The ' inspection. demonstrated that there has been no detectable  ;

, . progression of IGA, denting 'or . AVB wear.: -Of the 63 tubes'that were i plugged,,morecthan half of these 'showed no growth since previous - J .

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' inspections andfrequired plugging only because improved inspection

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and analysis techniques'were used.- All tubes having imperfections- , i

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greater than the plugging limit were plugged. The inspecto .

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reviewed'the licensee report of the subject inspe~ctions and noted no-deficiencies.' t e

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) . Housekeeping-and Fire Protection Program Review The inspector reviewed the followin'g procedures and applicable

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industry standards:. -

S0123-FP-1 Fire PrStection' Program ,

e S0123-XIII-12 = Control of1 Ignition Source l

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S0123-XIII-13 Weekly Inspection-for the Control'. _,

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'of Combustibles-and Transient Fire '

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' Handling of Compressed' Gas Cylinders ,

S0123-GAO-3 Site Housekeeping and Cleanliness _ *

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and Cleanliness Control

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i- Regulatory Guide 1.39 Housekeeping Requirements for- _

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j Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plaats

The inspectors conducted tours of the following Units ~2 and 3 areas  !

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f l Turbine Buildings (Units 2 and 3) '

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Main Steam and Feedwater Containment' Penetration Areas'(Unit 2). i

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Containment (Unit 3)

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The inspector noted that housekeeping except for isolated minor

, deficiencies was good.in most'of'the areas toured. .However, the

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{ inspector did identify the following deficiencies'in the Radwaste j Building on the 37 foot level during the period from March 10-20,

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100 Bags of assorted combustible materials- 1 I

8 wooden pallets-(not fire treated) n~t'in use

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.10 empty ca"rdboard boxes .

i 100 cubic feet of. lumber.not in use or properly stored  ;

' * 10 compressed air cylinders not properly stored -

Assorted' ladders,-debris, used paint cans, welding' receptacles l , and other_ miscellaneous materials were not properly stored. '  :

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The above materials and debris were noted to be_ improperly stored'in

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that corridor (passageway),318 was blocked, and the widthiof'

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corridor 320 was reduced in width in several locations from nine  :

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feet to two feet. Although the licensee's representative' agreed that the above deficiencies were unsatisfactory, they indicated that the conditions were of a temporary nature. The licensee stated that the transition of Unit 3 from a three week outage to operation had generated the usual amount of debris due to maintenance activities,

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however,-additional debris had been generated due to!contruction activities associated with the modifications to the Rad 0aste and Control buildings. When-the excessive materials were moved to the 37 foot level by housekeeping personel, they were deposited in the corridors in several locations in piles four to five feet hig Based on the-excessive materials stored in the corridors the inspector requested the licensee's Fire Protection staff to determine if the fire loading for the area had been exceeded. The licensee's Fire Hazards Analysis allowed a maximum fire loading of 160,000 BTU / square foot for fire zone 2-AR-37-102 The licensee performed a transient combustible analysis and determined that the actual combustible transient loading was 24,578 BTU /sq ft, or 15 percent of the maximum permissible loading. The inspector determined that if the analysis was performed for the local area of concern only, approximately 1000 square feet, then the transient fire loading would be 262,137 BTU /sq ft, which exceeds the fire

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loading for the Fire Zone. The licensee stated that the Fire Hazards Analysis does not require analysis for areas within a fire zone, only the entire fire zon This item will be reviewed during a future inspection by a regional fire protection exper (50-362/86-08-01).

The inspector reviewed the weekly reports of inspections performed by fire protection personnel on March 4 and March 11 of the Radwaste Building's 37 foot level, and noted that it had been identified that the area required cleanup, and that a request for cleanup assistance was formally documented on March 10,1986 by the Fire Protection Supervisor. The inspector toured the area on several occassions during March 10 to March 20 and noted an increasing accumulation of materials. On March 20, 1986, the inspector contacted the licensee's Fire Protection and Quality Control representatives and conducted an inspection of the 37 foot level. The licensee initiated cleanup activities and by March 21, 1986, returned the area to a satisfactory conditio As a result of the above identified weaknesses in the licensee's housekeeping program within radiologically controlled areas, the licensee initiated the following corrective actions:

• Designated and established specific areas to receive and stage material that is awaiting Health Physics release survey * Definition of Health Physics survey support requirements in dealing with a backlog of materia * Daily removal of non-fire retardant wooden pallets not in us ., .

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• Installation of a gas bottle rack at Elevation 37 for temporary storage of bottles awaiting survey by Health Physic The housekeeping deficiencies on the 37 foct level.of the Radwaste Building were identified to the licensee as a violation-(50-362/86-08-02).

9. Review of Licensee Event Reports Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, or review of the records, the-following Licensee Event Reports (LERs)..were closed:

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Unit F 85-17 ' Unit' Trip - Loss of Offsite Power .

Unit 2 83-85 Loss of One Independent Offsite Power Supply 85-57 Toxic Gas' Isolation System (TGIS) Actuations from Electrical Short Circuit 85-58 Unit Trip on Low Steam Generator Level 85-59 TGIS Spurious Actuation of Ammonia Channel 86-01 Inoperable Snubbers-Main Steam to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine (AFWPT)

86-04 Unit Trip - Loss of Main Feedwater 86-05 SIT Nos. 7 and 10 Pressure Limit: Exceeded Unit 3 82-02 Fuel Loading Stopped due to Water Leaking Through Equipment Hatch 82-03 Startup ")nitor Inoperable due to Loss of Power-Operator Oversight 82-05 Boron Injection Flow Path with no Emergency Power Source 82-07 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Heatup Rate Exceeded 82-08 ,RCS Chloride Exceeded due to Ion Exchange Resin 82-09 . Steam Generator (SG) Level Less Than 10%

82-10 Inoperable Fire Detection 83-49 VCT Low Alarm 83-50 Airlock Door Jammed Open 83-51 Air Ejector Monitor Inoperable 83-52 Breaker Opened Removing Normal Power to Safety Bus 83-53 Boronometer Drifted out of Calibration 84-11 Disconnected Leads in PPS Cabinets 85-30 Fuel Handling Isolation System (FHIS) Train B Actuation-85-37_ Neutron Flux Detectors not Swiped Prior to Installation 86-01 Unit Trip - Turbine Trip

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10.' Follow-Up'of Previously Identifi'ed Items _  ;

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~ (Closed) IE Notice 85-37: Lifted Leads ( nits 1, 2, and'3)-

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, The l'nspector. examined the . licensee's program to: control lifted leads and the use of jumpers during maintenance and -surveillance ,

activities. Information Notice 84-37iprovided' guidance:on this issue, and the licensee's controls-are consistent'with the: guidance given in.the.information noticeV 'Jrocedure S0123-II-15.3 controls ~

the use of. lif ted leads 'and 'jumperd and requires documentation of ~

such activities .on log' sheets which are kept with the applicable maintenance orders. = Restoration.is accomplished by a dual'

verification process whereby one person rest /o.res'the design configuration and a separate individual vehiffes that the restoration is complete. Typically, this verification.is not . . , - , -

independent because this' process is..c.onducted concurrently with the two individuals accompanying each-other; ' However, the dual verification process appears to be' adequate since there have been no

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programmatic difficulties observed by'the inspector related t r lifted leads and jumpers. This item is. close (Closed) Licensee Condition'(50-362/LC-2C-20): huxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Motor Bearings i .

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The licensee has installed a gravity-feed bearing' oil cooling system .

for the motor-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. .This license -'

condition has been satisfie j (Closed) License' Condition (50-362/LC-2C-24): . Emergency ~

Operations Facility (EOF) Ventilation '

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Installation of isolation dampers .on 'all HVAC pt'netrations into the : i EOF is complete. Also, the EOF doors have been gasketed the HVAC control logic has been changed to automatically stop t6e, internal recirculation fans during. isolation conditions, a'ud ~ procedures for 1 EOF isolation have been completed.' This license condition has'been y

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, satisfie '

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' (Closed) License Condition (50-362/LC-2C-25): Core' Protection-Calculator-(CPC) Softwag ,

Originally, a, change-to the Core Protection Calculator (CPC)' "

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software associated with the. application ofr the Local Power Density  ?

(LPD) penalty factor was required by the license condition. The'

licensee also desired to make additional modifications to1the CPC i software associated with the Control Element Assembly' Calculators .

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(CEACS) which delayed 'itaplementation of the CPC so'ftware change; ,

until the first outage after May-1, 1984 (Medford to Knighton letter-dated November,16, 1983). The~necessary Technical Specification:

chan'ge . requests, ware submitted to the NRC for, approvall on April .10,-

1984, and the(changes were approved on January 9,1985 -(Amendment

'" #19,to'the'Unik 3 Technical-Specifications)._1The license .

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implemented'the CPC' software change by DCP 3-60065J'on/ February'27. . o 1985. This license condition ha's been satisfie , ,

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4 (Closed) License Condition (50 362/LC-2C-26): 2 'AFW Monthly Report- ,

The licensee has completed the Unit 3 refueling outage, and .

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Auxiliary Feedwater monthly failure reports are no longer required.

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-This license condition has been' satisfie j

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' , (Open)~IE Bulletin (50-362/IB-85-03): Motor Operated Valve Failure- i

Y ,, . L The inspector reviewed licensee, actions to address IE Bulletin

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85-03, which deals with motor operated valve common mode failures

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) due to improper switch settings. The licensee had made.some .

E adjustments to valves in the shutdown cooling system to satisfy the ' 1 IE Bulletin requirements, but the . adjustments that .were made caused , i the valve position indication in the control. room to'be inaccurat '

This difficulty was discussed in paragraph 3.d of Inspection Report

! 50-362/85-36 and reported by the licensee in Licensee Event Report .

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50-362/85-036. Currently, the licensee is developing a program'to'= '

satisfy the IE Bulletin requirements. Additional licensee actions ,

) will be examined during a future inspection.' , , ,

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-361/83-14-01 and 50-362/83-14-01) <

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Evaluate Adequacy of Post-Accident Hydrogen Monitors . s ,

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Additional information was required by NRR to evaluate.thelphysicali location in containment of the post-accident hydrogen monitors,;.and'

j to also evaluate their response times. The information was provided' '

i in a letter from Baskin to Knighton dated April.20, 1983. Ther '

were no additional questions regarding this issue, and the hydrogen monitors are considered to be acceptable. This item is closed. > j f

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s (Open) Open Item (50-361/85-09-03) Informal-Component: '

Identification '

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} The inspectors had raised the concern of the: improper use'of marking valve identification on walls using felt:tip markers;as'possibly ' -

! causing the operation of the wrong valve. The licensee's correctiv action of installing valve and pump identification signs-in. lieu of7

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the felt tip markings appeared to be about:50% completed on Units.2t T and 3. The Radwaste Buildings sign-installation. appeared to be? ' ~

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essentially completed. The licensee,was planning tol install the- * .

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. signs in the Units 2 and 3 penetration buildings,in the next phase;.

of the program. The licensee was also planning to install the.signsJ in the safety equipment buildings and the secondary plant,upon

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, i completion of. installation of the penetration. building's ;signsi y -

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i This item remains open-pending? licensee-reviewiof-informalilevel;. ci 1 markings used.in conjunction with water level'stan'dpipelinstalled y

. during the current Unit.2 refueling'(see! paragraph ~3(d) above).

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I~ .(Closed) Open' Item-(50-361/85-31-02).. Pump Bearina Lubi Oil .n - '

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. Usage in Safety Related Pumps Not Tracked - '

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- The.inspectorhadpreviouslyobservedthatthejicenseewas:not" ,

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tracking the amount of oil. being'added to the[ bearings of safety'

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,related pumps. The inspector reviewed the licensee's recen '

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l implementation ~ of an Oil Monitoring Program. The Oil Monitoring

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Program. is. described :in Step 6.4 of procedure S0123-0-9, dated, .

February 11, 1986, " Operator. Rounds'and Inspections". The oil ,;

-monitoring program requires.that each ' oil addition be identified by, the amount of oil added to the specific pump bearing. .The program also' requires the documentation of oil " cleaned,up" to' aid i tracking leaking fittings which need repair. 7 The documentation of ' ,

oil consumption is made on Attachment 1 of S0123-0-9, which is then l routed to the cognizant system engineer.- ~ The. system engineer then

! evaluates the oil monitoring data sheet and initiates any ",

appropriate corrective action. This item'is close '

' (Closed) Open Item (50-362/82-06-01) FSAR Change for CILRT Sensitivity and Accuracy I

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The licensee had committed to review the accuracy and sensitivity;ofi _

equipment used to' conduct the1CILRT, and make, changes'to the FSAR as - 3 appropriate. .The licensee has; completed this review, and FSAR change package'#SCE-1164 is currently in process to make the '"y appropriate FSAR changes. This item is close .

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l' (Closed) Open Item (50-362/82-21-01) Diesel Ge'nerator G003: ,

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i Damage - Synchronization Out of Phase i

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j The licensee issued Corrective Action Request (CAR) SE-F-296 to - -

. address this issue. Although the operator did not believe that he'

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had synchronized the dierel out' of phase',; subsequent examination' of the diesel indicated that the. diesel wa's significantly out.of: phase *

when it was synchronized. The operators have received' additional' y *

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training, and the control circuit has been' changed so that the,

diesels can not be synchronized when they are out of.phasen There '

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have been no additional occurrences of this event. 1This. item is' .

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close '

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3 (Closed) Open Item (50-362/82-33-01) Administrative ControlsT l i for the Equipment Match Door

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t When the unit was in Mode 6 and containment integrity'was required, - -

. water was found leaking past the_ seal through the equipment hatch- , .c

door. The licensee subsequently changed the procedures to specifyl

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how to secure the equipment hatch door and to specify a' leak check >

i to verify that the' seal is intact. This item is: close > (Closed) Open Item (50-362/85-01-01)' Diesel Gener'ato w ,

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Govenor Settings i ,

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The Unit 3 Diesel Generator;3G003 was loaded (to'4700 KW;(100%

ratin'g) during,the monthly' operability-test on January 9,;1985~. #Ati ..

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this point,tthe operator attempted to increase load to 5200 KW (110%' -4 s

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rating)', but was unsuccessful. ;It was determined that the .

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mechanical load limit-dial wa's'out'of position. The. inspector.had _m 1 requested that the. licensee review:whether verification of load- .

3 limiter setting should be included in the; monthly surveillance test; y' ,

1-procedure. The licensee evaluated the inspector's concern an ,

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determined that application of theolocking paint 1 to the governo adjustment dials appeared to be adequate to prevent inadvertent -

, repositioning of governor < settings. Based onl observation of diesel, performance during the last~ 12 months this_fix appears to-be ' ~;

satisfactory. This itemLis; close ^

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. . . > - . n.- (C1o' sed)' Violation (50-362/85-12-01) Failure to' Perform - 5-

' Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Surveillance _ a

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A violation was issued for-failure to perform:a monthly trip' test of.- , ~

the AFW turbine driven pump. The licensee.hasirevised procedure-SW23-3-3.16 to' include the required tripTtest.and operations .

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procedures were checked for other deficiencies in the check-off'

lists. This~ item'is close >

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1 Exit'Maeting "

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On March 27, 1986 an exit meeting was 'condu'cted with the licensee 1 representatives identified in Paragraph The.; inspectors summarized-th ~

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inspection scope.and findings as' described-in this repor ,

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