IR 05000206/1990019
| ML20042F923 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 04/27/1990 |
| From: | Cicotte G, Wenslawski F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20042F917 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-90-19, 50-361-90-19, 50-362-90-19, NUDOCS 9005100171 | |
| Download: ML20042F923 (6) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:7._
. , , . . .. , ' ) U.S. NVCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-206/90-19, 50-361/90-19, and 50-362/90-19 License Nos.
DPR-13, NPF-10, and NPF-15 Licensee: Southern California Edison Company
23 Parker Street Irvine, California 92718 Facility Name: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station ' lispection at: San Clemente, California Inspection Conducted: April 16-20, 1990 ::::::=- c
Inspected by:
- M.
< v 4-23-9 0 ~ G. R Cicotte, R diation Specialist - Date Signed Approved by: /.[[/ / <ew
- I?"JMO F. A. Wenslawski, Chief Date Signed Facilities Radiological Protection Section FN Summary:
\\ ~) Inspection durinc the period of April 16-20, 1990 (Report Nos. 50-206/90-19, 50-361/90-19, anc 50-362/90-19) Areas Inspectedr' Routine unannounced inspection by a regionally based inspector of occupational exposure during extended outages and followup.
Inspection procedures 30703, 83729, 92701, and 92702 were addressed.
Results: No violations were identified in the two areas addressed.
The licensee'sprogramsappearedfullycapableofmeetingitssafetyobjectives.
. p 9005100171 900427 {DR.ADOCK0500gg6 <
,. ,
I
. ' .
) DETAILS _ 1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Bridenbecker, Vice Pres,ident, Site Manager R. Baker Compliance Engineer K. Belford, Access Dosimetry Supervisor E. Bennett, Quality Assurance (QA) Supervisor
,
- D. Brevig, Onsite Nuclear Licensing (ONL) Manager T. Cooper, Health Physics (HP) Engineer
, D. Duran, HP Engineer
- R. Erickson, Senior Engineer (San Diego Gas & Electric)
D. Farnsworth, Unit 3 Outage Manager J. Fee, Assistant Operational HP Manager
- S. Folsom, As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Coordinator
- E. Goldin, HP Engineer
- S. Jones, QA Engineer
- P.
Knapp, HP Manager
- J. Madigan, Unit 2/3 HP Supervisor
- N. Maringas, Supervisor J. Pope, Respiratory Protection Administrator J. Reilly, Station Technical Manager J. Scott, Unit 1 HP Supervisor (3 P. Shaffer, Compliance Supervisor V
- R. Warnock, Assistant HP Manager
- H. Wood, QA Engineer NRC
- C, Caldwell Senior Resident Inspector
- A. Hon,ResidentInspector
- C. Townsend, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those personnel present at the exit interview held on
April 20, 1990.
In addition, the inspector met and held discussions with other members of the licensee's staff.
2.
Occupational Exposure During Extended Outages (83729) A.
Audits and Appraisals , The inspector reviewed the audit of health physics activities.
-report SCES-033-89, dated January 24, 1990.
In addition, 12 QA , monitoring reports (QAMR) and 8 QA surveillance reports (505), from October 1989 to the time of the inspection, were reviewed.
Many of the QAMRs were initiated to address whether identified deficiencies p were indicative of programmatic problems.
Audit personnel were i ') qualified to perform the audits in accordance with Regulatory Guide ' 1.146, " Plants." Quality Assurance Program Audit Personnel in Nuclear Power - Corrective actions were generally timely and adequate to
' .. ,
.
, 7_ ( ) accomplish correction of the problems identified.
Tollowup was V conducted on those corrective actions which had not been completed by the commitment dates.
No significant concerns were identified.
B.
Changes Nomajorchangeshadbeenmadesincethelastinspectionofthis i program area.
However, the licensee did state that several , administrative changes to internal dosimetry practices had been made, in order to improve tracking of internal exposure from ' airborne radioactive materials.
C.
Planning and Preparation Outage planning was discussed with the ALARA coordinator and the , outage manager.
The licensee had involved the ALARA group early in , the review process.
The ALARA coordinator stated that the ALARA group had received significant support from station management, resulting in increased awareness of HP considerations in the planning process.
The inspector attended a coordination meeting for , the upcoming major outage on Unit 1.
The attendees represented many of the organizations on site, including several HP department personnel.
- From review of surveillances as noted in paragraph A, above, the (m inspector concluded that mockup training is used by the licensee, in s (") conjunction with other specialized training on complex tasks.
The . licensee stated that greater than half of the skilled outage workers had previous experience at the licensee's facility, and that almost all workers had extensive experience in their area.
' Supplies for the outage appeared adequate.
The licensee had instituted use of many reusable containers and containments chosen overplastic[herculite) containments,forthepurposeofminimizing . radioactive waste.
The licensee uses several methods of controlling i contract worker equipment, including use of soecial short term procedures.
Auxiliary ventilation units and 'other lu) port equipment
1ad been staged within the Unit 3 Reactor Building, iP personnel
with whom work planning and ongoing work were discussed were familiar with the status of the various tasks in progress.
- D.
Training and Qualifications of New Personnel Training records for 10 contract workers hired for the outage were reviewed.
General radiological orientation training was discussed with several workers within the Unit 3 RB and outlying work areas.
No concerns were identified.
E.
External Exposure Control Use of personal dosimetry was observed.
Representative radiation _g exposure records, and the licensee's methods for keeping, personnel
'u informed of their exposure, were reviewed.
The licensee s computerized system provides the worker with a review of remaining .
!= L - .
. , I'v) allowable exposure each time the radiologically controlled area (RCA) is entered No examples of exposures over administrative limits, or of significant extremity exposures, were observed to have occurred.
The licensee's procedures for lost /offscale dosimeters, for anomalous dosimeter readings, and for investigation of overexposures were briefly reviewed.
No concerns were identified.
F.
Internal Exposure Control Approximately 20 individual internal exposure estimations were
! reviewed.
The licensee stated, and a review of air sample data L confirmed, that no exposures in excesc of 40 MPC-hours had occurred from the start of the outage to the time of the inspection.
y Locations of air sampling stations and work in progress were consistent with suitable measurements to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 20.103(a)(3) and licensee procedure.
Procedures for calculation and evaluation of airborne radioactivity exposure were reviewed.
Use of respiratory protection equipment was observed to be consistent with 10 CFR 20.103(c) and licensee procedure.
While exiting the Unit 3 Reactor Building, the inspector noted that the dosimetry clerk on duty at the " nested" exit computer station was familiar with certain key location names and codes designated by the licensee to simplify identification of work locations.
The p) licensee uses the encoded data to correlate local air sample data ( with work in that area.
The correlated data is then used to determine the exposure to airborne radioactivity.
However, rather than use the times of entry to 7 articular areas as provided by individuals exiting the area, t1e dosimetry clerk was entering times which would capture the time s p nt in a work location, without necessarily relating that time to a specific start or end time.
The inspector noted that for long entries, this could result in misidentification of exposure, particularly for those workers who would be required to work in high airborne radioactivity areas in differing locations.
The inspector discussed the above with the licensee in a meetin the exit interview. g with the HP Manager and other HP staff, and at i l The licensee stated that the process was in a stateofchange,asthecomputerizedprogramwasjustevolving,but I that improvements in dosimetry clerk cognizance and instructions would be made to prevent recurrence.
The inspector concluded that no violation of NRC requirements had occurred, as the errors in time calculation had not resulted in sied ficant errors in exposure . ,. calculations.
No other concerns we,e identified, I l G.
Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination, Surveys, and Monitoring Tours of the Auxiliary and Radwaste Buildings for Units 2 and 3, of the Unit 1 outside areas, and of the Unit 3 RB were conducted.
IndependentradiationsurveyswereperformedwIthNRCionchamber Q'p survey instrument model #36100, serial #009162, due for calibration on August 9, 1990.
! l l . J
, p.
.. ,
, , Radiological portings, barricades, gates, and locks for high ' radiation areas, were observed to be consistent with licensee procedures and Technical Specification 6.12, High Radiation Areas.
Considering the status cf the outage, housekeeping in most areas was Some fire hoses were confi good.
quipment Buildings to the Unit 2/gured from the Units 2 and 3 Safety 3 Turbine Building basement such that it was not clear as to whether they were contaminated.
The inspector discussed the matter with the outage manager, who stated that the program for hose control was under develo) ment. When the inspector rechecked the areas obsarved, signs had seen placed on the hoses at the radiologically controlled area boundary which were consistent with licensee procedure SC123-VII-7.3.1, Revision 8, " Material Release Program." This proredure requires in part that such hoses be labeled, " Removal of hoses / cables requires HP approval."
Decontamination and work area preparation were observed.
Methods of minimizing radioactive waste resulted in relatively small amounts of material being left inside controlled areas.
Surveys and monitoring to prevent spread of potentially contaminated material to unrectricted areas was extensive and also appeared to be effective.
> H.
Maintaining Occupational Exposures ALARA /7 1.
Worker Awareness and Involvement O Personnel with whom ALARA was discussed were aware of their responsibilities regarding exposure control and how to maintain , exposure ALARA.
The licensee has an established incentive program for improvement suggestions for all aspects of operation, including ALARA.
HP " action teams" had been ' established to address specific areas of improvement.
The meeting discussed in Section 2.0, above, comprehensively addressed several issues related to maintaining exposures ALARA.
2.
ALARA Goals and Results l l The licensee's cumulative external occupational radiation ' exposure goal for the Unit 3 outage was 210 person-rem.
The ALARA coordinator attributed the goal to reductions in scope for Unit 3, as an economic consideration of the upcoming Unit 1 L outage.
The upcoming Unit 2/3 spent fuel pool reracking work was expected to require approximately 18 person-rem.
The ALARA coordinator stated that the HP department had the full support of station management, as exemplified by the Station Manager's decision to reduce the projected station goal for 1990 from 785 . to 750 person-tem, in order to challenge the department.
The - l inspector noted that this is well above the licensee's 1989 , station exposure total of approximately 567 person-rem.
The e) ALARA coordinator stated that this was primarily due to the (v reracking and to the Unit 1 outage, which will include replacementofmajorportionsofthereactorvesselinternals I
i ...., "
,, , . ._( ) and extensive steam generator repairs.
One measure used by the licensee to reduce exposure for the Unit 3 outage was chemical , treatment of the reactor coolant system, to cause a crud burst which was then cleaned up.
The process ap) eared effective, based on radiation survey information whic1 the inspector reviewed.
' The licensee's programs appeared fully capable of meeting its safety objectives.
No violations or deviations were identified.
. , 3.
Follow-up(92701), 50-206/IN-90-08, 50-361/IN-90-08, 50-362/IN-90-08(Closed): This refers to NRC Information Notice (IN) 90-08, "Kr-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel."
The licensee had distributed the IN to the appropriate departments.
The licensee had been particular1/ aware of the IN, in light of the upcoming spent fuel pool reracking activities.
No con:ern: were identified.
This - + matter is considered closed.
50-206/89-08-03 (Closed): This refers to a failure to adequately Instruct a worker concerning high dose rates, resulting in an unplanned radiation exposure (see Ins 3ection Report 50-206/89-08).
The inspector - verified that the licensee lad made the improvements, in pre-job briefings and other instructions to responsetotheNoticeofViolation.whichithadcommittedinitstimely This matter is considered closed.
(, V 4.
Exit Interview The inspector met with those individuals, denoted in paragraph I at the conclusion of the inspection on April 20,1990.-ThescopeandfIndings of the inspection were summarized.
t ' e
L l l O . k . - - m }}