IR 05000206/1989022
| ML13329A133 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 07/23/1989 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13329A132 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-89-22-MM, 50-361-89-22, 50-362-89-22, NUDOCS 8908150081 | |
| Download: ML13329A133 (40) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No /89-22, 50-361/89-22, 50-362/89-22 Docket No, 50-361, 50-362 License No DPR-13, NPF-10, NPF-15 Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company P. Box 800, 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 92770 Facility Name:
San Onofre Units 1, 2 and 3 Meeting Location:
San Onofre, San Clemente, California Meeting Date:
June 27, 1989 Prepared by:
A. Hon, Resident Inspector Approved By:
-7(22 P. H. hnson, Chief Date Signed Reactd Projects Section 3 Meeting Summary Management Meeting on November 2, 1988 (Report Nos. 50-206/89-22, 50-361/89-22, and 50-362/89-22)
Management meeting to discuss issues of current interest relating to the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Statio PDR ADOCK 05000206 G
PNU
DETAILS 1. Meeting Participants Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
J. Martin, Re-gional Administrator R. Zimmerman, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects G. Knighton, Director, Reactor Project Directorate V, NRR D. Kirsch, Chief, Reactor Safety Branch P. Johnson, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3 F. Huey, Senior Resident Inspector D. Hickman, Project Manager, NRR A. Hon, Resident Inspector A. Toth, Reactor Inspector Southern California Edison Company L. Papay, Senior Vice President K. Baskin, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering, Safety, & Licensing C. McCarthy, Vice President, Nuclear Generating Site Manager H. Morgan, Station Manager R. Rosenblum, Manager of Regulatory Affairs D. Nunn, Manager of Nuclear Engineering & Construction D. Shull Jr., Quality Assurance Manager J. Wambold, Project Manager F. Nandy, Manager, Licensing R. Krieger, Operations Manager L. Cash, Maintenance Manager R. Waldo, Acting Technical Manager P. Knapp, Health Physics Manager J. Schramm, Operations Superintendent, Unit 1 M. Merlo, Manager, Nuclear Design Engineering San Diego Gas & Electric C G. Cotton, Senior Vice President R. Lacy, Manager, Nuclear Introduction A meeting was held at the San Onfore Site on June 27, 1989 to discuss recent activities and other issues of interest relating to the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. A copy of the slides used during the licensee's presentations is enclosed as Attachment 1 to this repor. Management Discussion Mr. Martin opened the meeting by referring to topics covered at the last management meeting, held in November, 1988. The major topics included SCE improvement efforts in the areas of engineering/technical work and the quality oversight organization. The purpose of the meeting was to review progress made by SCE in these areas and to discuss problem areas
which warrant additional actio In this regard, Mr. Martin suggested a review of recent engineering problems associated with the Unit 1 nuclear instrumentation system (NIS) and steam generator level instrument Mr. McCarthy reviewed the current site organization chart and Mr. Baskin addressed recent changes in the Nuclear Engineering, Safety, & Licensing (NES&L) organization:
The recently vacated position of Manager of Nuclear Regulatory Affairs was assumed by Mr. Rosenblu *
Mr. Shull replaced Mr. Rosenblum as the corporate Quality Assurance (QA) Manager (Mr. Shull was formerly the Manager of Maintenance at San Onofre and was replaced by Mr. Cash.)
- The relocation of NES&L from Rosemead to Irvine was initiated in November, 1988 and scheduled to be completed in August, 198 Use of the Irvine facility will significantly reduce travel time and should improve corporate office access to San Onofr The new Quality Assurance Manager, Mr. Shull, provided his initial impressions of the quality assurance organization. He stated that SCE possesses considerable technical talent; however, until recently, QA oversight lacked sufficient depth and experience, especially in technical and maintenance area This weakness was evidenced by Notices of Viola tion involving areas which had not been effectively probed by QA. He noted that a number of improvements have been initiated since the last management meeting. Mr. Shull and Mr. Rosenblum cited the improved QA Auditor Certification Program as an example. This program was imple mented in January 1989 to assess QA auditor qualification with respect to the ANSI standar Written examinations and oral examination boards were given to lead auditors to evaluate their critical skills and inquisitive attitude. These boards resulted in 20 of 67 lead auditors being downgraded for necessary retraining and requalificatio In response to Mr. Kirsch's inquiry about QA staff background and involvement in the engineering organization, Mr. Rosenblum stated that QA reviews some of the design changes and 10CFR50.59 evaluations. In addi tion, the Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) has begun to review all NCR resolutions. Mr. Shull stated that the organization generally possesses the necessary technical skills; also, expertise can be drawn from-other organizations through cross training. However, Mr. McCarthy pointed out that there is currently a licensed operator shortage, necessitating a freeze on job transfers from the Operations Divisio Mr. Martin and Mr. Zimmerman expressed concern about the infrequent presence of QA and other management inside the protected are Dr. Papay and Mr. Rosenblum acknowledged this concern and stated that a higher level of expectation in this regard had been communicated to all levels of management. Mr. Shull stated that specific monitoring areas and frequency requirements had been assigned to all levels in the QA organization. Mr. Martin reemphasized the importance of the oversight
organizations being actively involved in day-to-day plant operations in order to aid in the anticipation and identification of problems before events occur. In this regard, Mr. Martin inquired about the progress of QA improvement efforts since the last management meeting. Mr. Baskin replied that SCE had begun to implement improvements in the areas of personnel reassignment and the Auditor Certification Program. Licensee representati-ves considered that although there has been some recent downward trend in QA effectiveness, it has begun to turn around and significant improvement is expected during the next 6 to 9 month Mr. Martin asked for three recent examples of significant findings by the QA organization. Mr. Rosenblum cited the following examples: 1) a Tech nical Specifications error regarding low temperature overpressure protec tion, 2) health physics monitoring problems associated with the control and release of contaminated material outside the protected area, and 3) evaluation of Unit 1 return to service activities to identify problem areas following major modifications, such as the nuclear instrumentation system and steam generator level instruments. Mr. Martin concluded discussion of this topic by reemphasizing the importance of self-critical oversight organizations, and noted that the NRC will closely monitor SCE's effort in this area during the coming month Mr. Nunn reviewed the findings and recommendations of the safety system functional inspection (SSFI) Task Force, as presented at the previous meeting. Mr. Nunn then discussed in-house design efforts planned for 1989 and 199 In this regard, he noted that Unit 1 would be the area of most activity. With respect to the design base documentation (DBD) effort, Mr. Nunn reported that the pilot DBD program was underway and scheduled for completion by the end of 1989. Mr. Martin cautioned SCE to consider participating in the development of an industry consensus. Mr. Baskin acknowledged this and stated that SCE has been participating in the NUMARC DBD standard development progra Mr. Merlo reviewed Nuclear Engineering Design Organization (NEDO)
progress since the last meeting. He stated that major programmatic changes are being made in the areas of system design engineer training, better communication of performance expectations, increased emphasis on quality monitoring, and additional emphasis on organizational readjust ment from a plant construction environment to an operations/modification environment. A videotape prepared for system design engineer training, to communicate management's expectations of excellence, was shown at the meeting. In response to a question from Mr. Johnson, Mr. Merlo stated that typically a system design engineer is expected to be in the plant at least every two weeks and similar guidelines were established for others at NED Two problems associated with Unit 1 Cycle 10 outage activities were discussed:
Mr. Martin noted that the NIS problems appeared to indicate a weakness in the interface between the system design engineer and the control room. Mr. Merlo agreed and attributed this problem to a failure to communicate expectations for full coverage of the control
room by the design engineer, and to delayed interface training due to the outage workload. Both Mr. Baskin and Mr. Merlo agreed with Mr. Martin's assessment and indicated that SCE would continue to improve this interface. In addition, Mr. Merlo said that the NIS modification could have been smoother if more attention had been paid to identification and correction of electrical noise problems before-system installation, as well as during post-modification testin *
The second problem discussed involved the steam generator wide range level instruments. Mr. Merlo said that engineers involved in the design change overlooked dynamic flow effects in the steam genera tor, and that SCE also had not properly involved Westinghouse in the design modification process. Mr. Huey noted that the root cause for this error needs to address more than just the design group, since other involved groups (such as operations and quality assurance) had opportunities to identify and correct the problems. Mr. Nunn said that the root cause investigation was intended to focus on the accountability of responsible individuals who made the mistake. He agreed, however, that others involved in the modification process should also be evaluate Mr. Morgan discussed SCE root cause investigation activities. He stated that equipment failures are investigated by the system cognizant engineer as part of the NCR resolution process; human errors are investigated by the division to which the involved individual belongs; and reportable events are investigated by the Compliance organization. Although inde pendent, Compliance often uses inputs from other division findings to formulate conclusions for licensee event report Mr. Zimmerman and Mr. Johnson noted that SCE was considered one of the leaders in root cause assessment a few years ago; however, the industry has made significant progress in this area since then and appears to have surpassed SCE's effort. An example of actions taken by other facilities involves the use of a centralized and dedicated root cause investigation group which is independent of other organizations. Mr. McCarthy stated that SCE would evaluate new concepts for application at San Onofre. Mr. Morgan agreed, noting that some recent licensee event reports (LERs) were inadequat Mr. Martin reemphasized the need for SCE to learn from industry experi ence in this area and noted that the NRC will assess SCE efforts closel Mr. Baskin summarized NES&L's continued planned improvement actions as follows:
Continue implementation of the SSFI Task Force recommendation *
Increase in-house design and modification activities with adequate independent revie *
Continue improvement of the interface between the design engineer and the statio *
Complete consolidation and continued reevaluation of NES&L's effectivenes Mr. Knapp discussed program changes to control potentially radioactive item In August 1988, one contaminated item was found outside the protected area in an unmarked container. SCE subsequently spent about 200 man-days of effort searching for additional examples of this problem, and identified a total of 82 items of minor contamination outside the protected area. Mr. Knapp attributed the root cause for these deficien cies to inadequate worker training and to the large amount of material leaving the controlled area during outage He stated that corrective actions were being taken to raise the workers' awareness through revised red badge trainin Furthermore, a hold-down area was established inside the protected area, in which all items will be surveyed before releas Also, an INPO assistance visit was requested and performe Recent experience has indicated that these actions have been effectiv Mr. Martin inquired about efforts to improve the reliability of the post accident sampling system (PASS).
Mr. McCarthy replied that SCE had initiated a high-priority effort to improve PASS reliability. SCE had purchased some new instruments, although some have a long lead tim Mr. McCarthy then reported on the status of the substance abuse progra Currently all SCE and contractor employees are under the random drug test program. This test program, in conjunction with a periodic plant search program, has resulted in a downward trend of drug problems. SCE planned to continue the detection and education effort and implement the balance of' the Fitness for Duty rul Mr. Zimmerman stated that a recent Unit 1 rigging problem did not appear to have been addressed in an appropriate or timely manner by SCE manage ment. Mr. Morgan agreed that SCE management was slow to respond to the event, in that management actions were not initiated until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the event occurred. However, he believed that subsequent management actions were appropriate. Mr. Shull said that the root cause of this event was more than a poor rigging practice and involved a serious breakdown of the maintenance order proces He believed it was more important to identify the final root causes and communicate this message to station personnel than to hastily retrain people only on rigging practices. Mr. McCarthy also concurred that a number of lessons were learned from this inciden.
Conclusion Mr. Martin concluded the meeting with the following summary:
SCE appears to have laid necessary ground work for significant improvements in the performance of engineering and nuclear oversight organization However, continued active involvement by upper levels of SCE management is needed to sustain these improvement *
The root cause investigation program appears to need reevaluation to expand its scope and effectivenes *
SCE's efforts in the above areas should produce additional findings and "value added" to overall plant safety and reliability. The NRC will follow this closely in the coming month NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING June 27, 1989 Southern California Edison
SCE / NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING SCE AGENDA Opening Remarks Nuclear Organization Update a
NGS
"
NES&L Nuclear Oversight Organization Nuclear E&C Reorganization and Consolidation a
Design Bases Documentation Nuclear Engineering Design Activities
"
Progress To Date
Unit 1, Cycle 10
"
NIS Case Study
"
Steam Generator Wide Range Level Future Actions Control of Potentially Radioactive Items Update on Substance Abuse and Fitness for Duty
Southern California Edison Company Organization Update L. T. Papay Senior Vice President C. B. McCarthy Kenneth P. Baskin Vice President Vice President &
Nucl. Engr Site Manager Safety and Nucl. Gen. Site I
Licensing I
Manager Manager of RNulaor
-
Nucl. Engrg. &
I Regairs yConstruction Station Manager Manager of Project Nuclear StSuManager
---
-OversightH aintn Manager Manager Manager manager Depuy Sttio MangerNuclear
.Bud etsan QNS&
Manager Operations Adm fn/stration-E&
R (
I TraiinciServices S Mainaenance Htan is Site ruppor Health Physics Services Manager Technical L:
Denotes Change
NES&L Relocation to Irvine a
Initial Move -- November 1988
.
Quality Assurance
.
Nuclear Fuel m Construction in Progress m
Completion of Move -- August 1989
Rosemead General Office E
60 Freeway a NES&L Department Relocation Map (approx. 45 miles)
New NES&L Location Irvine Operations Center (approx. 20 miles)
San Onofre
Nuclear Oversight Organization Vice President Nuclear Engineering Safety and Licensing Manager of Nuclear Oversight SieProcurement Nuclear independent Ouity Quality Quality Quality Safety Safety Assurance Control Assurance Programs Group Group
Nuclear Oversight Organizational Improvements m Auditor Certification Program
.
Certification Procedure Upgraded
.
Written Examination
.
Oral Review Board
-
Evaluation of Critical Skills
-
30% of Lead Auditors Downgraded (20/67)
-
Training / Development Needs Defined
.
Organizational Improvements (Continued)
m Development of Oversight Personnel
.
Technical Training
-
Performance Based Auditing
-
Observation Training
-
Interview Skills
-
Plant Systems
.
Cross-Training / Depth Enhancements
-
Inter-group Reassignments a
Supervision Changes
.
Site QA (100%)
m Missed Opportunities Evaluation
Nuclear Oversight Recent Activities
Return to Service Evaluation - Unit 1 m Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP)
m Health Physics Monitoring
Review Basic SSFI Conclusions - June 1988 m SCE Lacks Full Understanding of Basic Design of Systems Reviewed a
SCE Lacks Ready Access to Accurate Design Information a
Many Identified Deficiencies Result from Inadequate Access to Basic Design Information a
Technical Work Is not Always Complete and Technically Correct a
SCE Relies Heavily on Contractors
Review Task Force Results - September 1988 Findings Recommendations a
Design Process
24
-
Design Bases Document
-
Establish Design Accountability/Responsibility
-
System Design Engineers
-
Design Process Feedback
-
Supervision/Management a
Training
12
-
Systems Training
-
Technical Training
-
Cross-Training with Station
Review Task Force Results - September 1988 (Continued)
Findings Recommendations a
Resources
9
-
Enhance Technical Design Resources
-
Single A/E m Organization
8
-
Consolidate Design Engineering Function
Nuclear Engineering and Construction Task Force Recommendations a
Consolidate Nuclear Functions
"
Increase Level and Quality of In-House Design a
Develop a Design Bases Documentation Program
Nuclear Engineering & Construction Consolidate Functions a
Nuclear Fuel Management to NE&C m Transition of Design Related Activities
.
Procurement Engineering
.
O&M Services
.
Station Technical
.
COPE Program
Nuclear Engineering & Construction Increase Level and Quality of In-House Design a
Resources a
Level of In-House Design
Quality -- Engineering Excellence Program
Nuclear Engineering & Construction 1989 Resource Plan PERSONNEL 200
-
189 190 180 C)Proposed li Aduai
___
170 li 161 160 ISII 140 130 o
120 101 I
III NO DEC JAN MARCH JUNE SEP DEC-4------1988---*
1989
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION DIVISION D. E. NUNN MANAGER OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
& CONSTRUCTION D. F. PILMER S. MIYASATO TECHNICAL CONSULTANT C. K BALOG K E OCONNOR P. D. MYERS M. L. MERLO M. P. SHORT P. A. HONLEY SITE NUCLEAR NUCLEAR NUCLEAR NUCLEAR ENGA DESIGN BASES TECHNICAL ENGINEERNG CONSTRUCTICN FUEL DESIGN DOCUMENTATION SUPPORT G. HOLLAWAY VACANT M WHARTON B. CARUSLE COLSON I
FUEL
[
DIVISION C
TRUCTION ANALYSIS MECHANICAL NUCLEARSENIOR SUPPORT ENGINEERI ENGINEERS J. HUEY S. BEERS A KANEKO D. FREY D. HALL FUEL
]
ENGINEERING C. KRAMER DOCUMENTATION TECHNICAL PJING PROCUREMENT ELECTRICAL PLANNING DBD SUPPORT EENGINEERS C.M ORAN EROOGERS R. MILLER B. TURPEAU D. HADLEY
--
PRCUECT PRCEDURES &
PROCUREMENT MATERIAL ADMINISTRATION CIVIL / PLANT TRAINING ENGINEERING N. DICKINSON R. RICE TECHNICAL SERVICES N
In-House Design 60%
60aned Actual
40 300 20%
15%
9.9%/4 lo 8.0 %
U1C1o U2C5 U3C5 UlCil 1988 1989 - 1990
Design Bases Documentation Status a
Pilot DBD's Underway
.
S023 Instrument Air
.
SO1 SLSS (Sequencer)
.
S023 Component Cooling Water
.
EQ Topical
"
NSSS / Industry Participation
.
CE / W Document Retrieval
.
NUMARC / INPO / Region V Utilities Efforts Scope
"
All Systems with Safety Functions a
Major Topical Areas
Design Bases Documentation Verification
Verification Program in Development for 4th Quarter
.
Multi-Organization -- SSFI Style
.
Incorporate Lessons from SONGS 1 Schedule
5 - 6 Unit 1 Systems/Year
9 - 10 Unit 2/3 Systems/Year m Completion by 1995
Design Bases Documentation Lessons Learned from SONGS 1
"
Schedule Changes
.
Accident Analysis Topical
.
Electrical Systems
.
Component Cooling Water a
Verification Program
.
Operability derived from design bases
.
Post-installation testing program derived from design bases
.
Vendor supplied skids (i.e., black boxes)
Nuclear Engineering Design Organization Progress Since November 1988 Meeting a System Design Engineering Concept Implemented a Engineering Excellence Program Initiated to Change Culture a Engineering Quality Monitoring Program Established m Engineering Resources Increased a Training Program and Design Change Process Improvements in Final Review
Unit 1, Cycle 10 Successes
Restart Report
.
14 Items Identified
-
8 Modifications
-
2 Analysis
-
2 Tech Spec changes
-
2 Other
10 of 14 Items Resulted from a Questioning Attitude
Assumed Leadership Role in Solving Problems a
Retained Outage Experience In-House
Unit 1, Cycle 10 Problem Areas
Engineering Quality Monitoring Program Identified 15 Specific Areas For Improvement a
Commissioned Separate Case Studies
.
NIS
.
S/G Wide Range Level Problem
"
Improve Interface with Operations
NIS Case Study Background a
System Replaced Due to Age and Availability of Parts
"
New System Purchased in 1987 & Designed in Summer 1988
Noise Problems Encountered during Installation & Test
"
Dedicated On-Site Team a
Station Cognizant Engineer & Core Physics Group Involvement
NIS Case Study Initial Plant Startup m Initial Startup May 16 Halted due to Noise Problems a
Design Engineer / Station Cog Engineer not available in Control Room a
Vendor Representative available but not in Control Room a
Case Study Commissioned
NIS Case Study Findings m Lack of feedback from Design Organization to Operations Personnel n
More Guidance Needed on Post-Modification Testing a
Roles of NGS/NES&L not Understood m All Recommendations will be Implemented
S/G Wide Range Level Background a
Initiated Change during Cycle 10 to Correct Design a
Converted Existing Narrow Range Instruments to Wide Range m Utilized Existing Wide Range Level Tap
.
Cold Calibrated Wide Range
.
Turbine Equipment Protection a
Changed Auxiliary FW Initiation from Narrow Range to Wide Range
S/G Wide Range Level Preliminary Findings m Engineers overlooked dynamic flow effects a
Vendor not consulted a
Modification procedures need clarification m Post-modification testing inadequate Actions m
Review all Cycle 10 post-modification tests a
Increase percent of design that is independently reviewed
Engineering Assessment Summary Progress To Date m Improvement in Quality and Questioning Attitude a
Established Self Critical Assessment Process m Retaining Experience In-House Continuing Improvements
Interface with Site Organizations m Areas of Technical Expertise a
Focus on Operational-Based Engineering Organization
Future Actions
"
Aggressive Implementation of Task Force Recommendations
.
Design Process
.
Training
.
Resources
.
Organization a
Increase Design Percentage a
Personnel Changes a
Independent Review of Design Products
.
Predetermined Sample Bases
.
Feedback for Improvement
Future Actions (Continued)
Operational Based Engineering
.
State of System Reporting
.
Operations Involvement
.
System Ownership
Independent Assessment of Nuclear Consolidation Progress
Program Changes Control of Potentially Radioactive Items
Introduction a
Brief Chronology
.
Initial Identification
.
Subsequent Findings
.
Issuance of Stop Work Order
.
Lifting of Stop Work Order
Program Changes Control of Potentially Radioactive Items (Continued)
m Characterization of the Items Found
.
Removable Contamination
.
Fixed Contamination a
Causes and Corrective Actions
.
Root Cause
.
Contributing Causes
.
Other Actions 32