IR 05000206/1990017
| ML20043F828 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1990 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043F824 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-90-17, 50-361-90-17, 50-362-90-17, IEB-89-002, IEB-89-2, NUDOCS 9006180195 | |
| Download: ML20043F828 (11) | |
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c U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION Y
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Report Nos.
50-206/90-17, 50-361/90-17, 50-362/90-17 Docket Nos.-
50-206, 50-361, 50-362 License Nos.
DPR-13, NPF-10, NPF-15 Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company Irvine Operations Center-23 Parker Street Irvine, California 92718 Facility Name:
San.Onofre Units 1, 2 and 3
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Insp'ection at:
San Onofre Site, San Clemente, California Inspection conducted: March 25 through April 28 and May 2,1990 Inspectors:
C. W. Caldwell, Senior Resident Inspector
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A. L. Hon, Resident. Inspector C. D. Townsend,-Resident Inspector Accompanying-Inspector:
D. Pereira, License Examiner
!f0 b7-59//
= Approved By:
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P.jH. ' Johnson, Chlefv Uate Signed Reactor Projects Section 3-Inspection Suninary
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Inspection on March 25 through April 28 and May 2, 1990 (Report Nos.
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L 50-206/90-17, 50-361/90-17, and 50-362/90-17)
l-Areas Inspected:
Routine resident inspection of Units 1, 2 and 3 Operatinns Program including the following areas: operational safety verificatior radiological protection, security,, evaluation of plant trips and event monthly surveillance activities, monthly maintenance activities, engint: ced-safety feature system walkdown, onsite review committee, independent inspec-tion, licensee event report review, and followup of previously identified
.i tems.
Inspection procedures 30703, 40500, 60710, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71710, 90712, 92700, 92701, 93702 were utilized.
Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) Items:
None
9006180195 900601 PDR ADOCK 05000206 O
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Results:
General Conclusions and Specific Findings:
The licensee showed improvement in operational evolutions, such as the
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l successful shutdown of Unit 3 at the end of the 24 month fuel cycle (Paragraph 4).
The Unit 3 Cycle V refueling outage was implemented successfully during
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this report period, apparently as a result of well planned and coordi-nated efforts by the departments involved.
While the licensee attempted to strengthen the role of the Independent Safety. Engineering Group (ISEG) by having it more actively involved in addressing safety issues independently, there was a weakness in the program in that ISEG activities lacked in-depth review in some cases, as evidenced by the response to NRC Bulletin 89-02 (Paragraph 8.b).
Significant Safety Matters:
None.
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Summary of Violations:
None.
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Open Items Summary:
During this report period, 1 new followup item was opened and 2 were closed.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Southern California Edison Company H. Ray, Vice Preside;it, Nuclear Engineering, Safety, and Licensing (NES&L)
- R. Bridenbecter, Vice President and Site Manager
- H. Morgan, Station Manager
- B. Katz, Nuclear Oversight Manager, NES&L
- K. Slagle, Deputy Station Manager
'*R.'Krieger, Operations Manager
- L. Cash, Maintenance Manager
- M. Short Technical Manager M. Merlo, Nuc1 car Design Engineering Manager, NES&L P. Knapp, Health Physics Manager
- D. Peacor, Emergency Preparedness Manager
- D. Herbst, Quality Assurance Manager, NES&L C. Chiu, Quality Engineering Manager-J. Schramm, Operations Superintendent, Unit 1
- V. Fisher. Operations Superintendent, Units 2/3 R. Rosenblum, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- L. Brevig', Supervisor, Onsite Nuclear Licensing T. -Calloway, Substance Abuse Program Manager
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R. Plappert, Compliance Manager San Diego Gas and Electric Company
- R. Erickson, Site Representative City of Anaheim G. Edwards, Site Representative City of Riverside
- C, Harris, Site Representative
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting on May 2, 1990.
The inspectors also contacted other licensee employees during the course of.the inspection, including operations shift superintendents, control-room supervisors, control room operaters, QA and QC' engineers, compli-ance engineers, maintenance craftsmen, and health physics engineers and technicians.
2.
Plant Status Unit 1 During the inspection period, Unit 1 operated at full power with no significant operating concern,,
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Unit-2 The Unit operated r.' power without significant operating concerns throughout this peru d.
Unit 3 The Unit operated at power until April 14, 1990 when it was shut down for the Cycle 5 refueling outage, scheduled for 78 days. The outage was in progress for the rest of this inspection period.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
t The inspectors performed several plant tour.s and verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed the tagout log and verified proper return to service of affected components. Particular attention was given to housekeeping, examination for potential fire hazards, fluid. leaks, excessive vibration, and. verification that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspectors also observed selected activities by licensee radiological protection and security personnel to confirm l ~
proper implementation of and conformance with facility policies and
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procedures in these areas.
Radiological' Barrier Control (Unit 1)
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On April 2,1990, the inspector observed a licensed reactor operator manipulate equipment by reaching across a posted High Radiation /Contami-nation radiological barrier. When questioned by the inspector, the operator believed that this action was appropriate. Approximately 10 minutes later, the same operator was observed in a similar action. The
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inspector questioned the. health physics (HP) supervisor at-the
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- radiological control point on this observation._ The HP supervisor clarified that it was not SCE's policy to perform equipment manipulation across such a barrier without a radiological exposure pennit (REP) and appropriate anti-contamination clothing (i.e. lab. coat.and gloves).
Thus, the operator did not meet these requirements.
For corrective actions in response to the inspector's concern, the HP supervisor contacted the operator to clarify the requirement, and the Unit super-vision also counseled the operator. Additionally, a reminder regarding HP requirements was placed in the Unit I night orders, and_HP personnel l
added clarification to some of the radiological barrier postings to
_ prevent this type of problem in similar areas. The inspector found that l.
the licensee's training programs and procedures were very specific in this area. 'Therefore, this was considered to be an isolated incident and not a programatic problem.
L The inspector found the licensee's actions timely and appropriate.
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Therefore, this item requires no further review.
No violations or deviations were noted during the inspection.
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4.
Evaluationof.PlantTripsandEvents(93702)
l Plant Shutdown for' Refueling at the End of the Cycle (Unit 3)
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In the past, operators have experienced difficulties in controlling the axial shape index (ASI) while shutting down the reactor at the end of a 24-month fuel cycle.
For example, during the Unit 2 shutdown for the
Cycle 5 refueling outage in 1989, a high ASI tripped one core protection
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calculator (CPC) reactor protection channel and was approaching the trip setpoint of the second channel. Without success in attempting to improve the ASI, the operator nianually tripped the reactor at 25% power instead of the 15% power specified in the normal shutdown procedure.
Details of this phenomenon were discussed in Report 89-24 and Unit 2
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LER 89-19.
In preparation for the Unit 3 outage, the licensee evaluated previous
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events related to the ASI difficulties, analyzed the core conditions and developed an optimum shutdown. strategy. The reactor power was reduced
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to 80% a day earlier for the circulating water system heat treat. As a result of past problems with xenon oscillations, the power level was held for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for xenon to reach equilibrium and the shutdown was then initiated at a rate of 15% per hour, using both soluble boron and the control element assemblies to control the ASI.
The inspector observed the shutdown in the control room and noted that-
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it was well executed and supported by the core analysis engineers. The ASI' behaved as predicted and when the Unit was taken.off line, there was at least an hour's margin before the ASI would have caused problems.
Therefore, the inspector considered LER 361/89-19 closed based on the licensee's successful shutdown strategy.
No violations or deviations were noted during the inspection.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Activities (61726)
During this report period, the inspectors observed or conducted inspection of the following surveillance activities:
a.
Observation of Routine Surveillance Activities (Unit 1)
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S01-V-2.14.1
" Auxiliary Feedwater Surveillance Test" u
501-11-1.6.20 "Nuclect Instrumentation System Surveillance" S01-12.3-10
"#1 Emergency Diesel Generator. Load Test" b.
0bservation of Routine Surveillance Activities (Unit 2)
S023-3-3.25 Once A Shift Surve111ence (Modes 1-4)
L S023-II-1.1.2 " Reactor Plant Protection System Channel Fuactional Test (Monthly)"
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ObservationofRoutineSurveillanceActivities.(Unit 3)
S023-3-26.1 Once A-Day Surveillance (Mode 5-6)
No violations or-deviations were noted during the inspection.
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6.
Monthly Maintenance Activities (62703)
During this report period, the inspectors observed or conducted
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-inspection of the following maintenance activities:
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a.
Observation of Routine Maintenance Activities (Unit 1)
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MO 89092721000 " Repair Charging Motor Filter Retainer Brackets At Welds" MO 90012728001, "#1 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Standby Pump Inade-
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quate Thread Engagement On Intake Flange" l
l MO 90042124000 " Turbine Plant Cooling Water To Sphere Isolation Valve SI-TCW-CV-516-ACT, Actuator Pumps Every 3 Minutes" b.
Observation of. Routine Maintenance Activities (Unit 2)
e MO 90041013000, "31 Day Containment High Range Radiation Monitor u
Train 'A' Maintenance.
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Observation of Routine Maintenance Activities (Unit 3)
MO 90013492000, " Relocate 'A' Train hand switch into temporary panel 3CR64" M0 89110953000, "3XU1 Aux Transformer Feed to Bus 3A06 Control Cir-cuit; Relaying and Metering Preventive Maintenance" CW 09001082300, "DCP 3-6674.00 Bus 3LO34 Cable Termination"
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No violations or deviations-were noted during the inspection.
7.
Engineered Safety Feature Walkdown (71710)
The inspector walked down the Unit 3 containment emergency sump during the outape. The sump condition appeared to be satisfactory. No violations or deviations were noted during the inspection.
8.
Independent Inspection
a.
Licensed Operator Staffing (Units 1, 2 & 3)
As followup on previous resident inspector concerns regarding operator attrition in Units 2/3, a Region-based inspector observed control room operations, communications, and other conditions m
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during an inspection conducted on April 16 - 20, 1990. The inspector interviewed the control room operations staff of dif-a
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ferent shifts and positions on Unit 1 and on Units 2 and 3.
The inspector noted that these higher than normal attrition rates j
among Unit 2/3 licensed operators had continued during the first quarter of 1990.
He expressed concern that continuation of this trend might erode the operating experience base at Units 2 and 3 I
and thus could impact the future performance of the Operations staff.
Licensee management stated that a new class of licensed operator candidates will be examk.ad in June 1990, and that other steps had been initiated to at,ess and correct this condition,
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including active recruitment of new operators. The inspector noted L
that conditions underlying the increased attrition rate may also require additional management attention. The resident inspectors will continue to monitor licensee actions in this regard, b.
Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG)
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NRC Bulletin (NRCB) 89-02, " Stress Corrosion Cracking of High-Hardness Type 410 Stainless Steel Internal Preload Bolting in Anchor-Darling Model S350W Swing Check Valves or Yalves of Similar Design", requested the licensee to inspect all safety-related check valves to determine whether they used the potentially defective
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material in the internal retaining block studs. The licensee's
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initial response, submitted on December 7,1989, stated that Units 2 and 3 did not use the susceptible material in safety related check valves. Later, the licensee found that this conclusion was
incomplete in that the scope of the evaluation addressed only those check valves included in the Inservice Testing (IST) program. The IST program, in turn, only includes all active safety-related check valves and passive safety-related check valves which must meet specified maximum leakage criteria to perform their safety func-tion. The program does not include other passive safety-related check valvei. The licensee inzormed the NRC of that finding via
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telephone and planned to revisc the response after completing the-I evaluation.
As followup to this issue, the inspector reviewed how the licensee L
- prepared the response to Bulletin 89-02 and found that ISEG did the a
L technical review and Licensing submitted the response letter i
without further in-depth review.
By reviewing the ISEG program and interviewing the people involved in preparing this response, the inspector noted the following weaknesses that could have generic implications:
y ISEG routinely screens incoming NRC Bulletins, Information
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L Notices, INP0 Significant Operating Experience Reports and
Significant Event Reports, and vendors' technical bulletins l
for applicability to San Onofre.
ISEG then either forwards L
them to the responsible organizations for action or addresses
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them in-house, depending on their scope and nature.
For NRCB
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f 89-02, a routine Screening Committee of ISEG staff was held to s
discuss this NRCB, among other items, and assigned it to an
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ISEG engineer for in-house evalu6 tion. The scope and metho-dology of the evaluation were not reviewed with other cogni-
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zant personnel, such as the IST engineer.- The ISEG engineer erroneously assumed that all safety-related valves were in the x
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IST program, and limited the evaluation to the IST program.
This error was not discovered during the course of his evalua-
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tion or by others in the review process.
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When the draft evaluation was completed by ISEG, it was sent
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(through company mail with a routing slip) to others for
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However, the routing did not include a copy of the
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incoming Bulletin and specific questions for review. When the
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IST engineer received the package, several people had already initialed it to indicate their concurrence. With other com-peting workload, the review was-superficial, and the erroneous assumption that all safety-related check valves had been
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included was overlooked. - The response to the HRC eventually l.
passed through Licensing, by whom the formal response was
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submitted.
This process relied heavily on one individual to have done it
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correctly the first time. Given the finite resources in ISEG e-'
and the diverse subject matters to be addressed, the inspector L
considered that this is not a realistic expectation.
In response to the error noted above, the licensee initiated a Division Investigation for a root cause determination. The preli-
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minary finding was consistent with the inspector's findings. The l
l inspector raised the concern that~ISEG (normally an independent safety verification group) had prepared this response, and the work
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did not appear to have been independently or meaningfully reviewed l
by others. The inspector discussed this with the licensee, who
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stated that ISEG was organizational 1y independent from the Station, and thus met the intent of the. Technical Specifications.
In order
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to develop and maintain the technical capability within ISEG, the licensee chose to retain flexibility either to evaluate the NRCBs directly or assure they are properly addressed by other organiza-
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tions. The inspector noted that such a practice, in view of the
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Technical Specifications requirements applicable to ISEG, requires
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meaningful and independent verification by others.
The licensee concurred with the inspector's conclusion that by having ISEG perform work, some of the system checks and balances L
were removed. As a result, the licensee comitted to revise the ISEG program accordingly. The revised program will require the participation of subject experts in each NRCB response task who will be held accountable for the quality of both the scope and the finished product of the evaluation. At a minimum, the participa-tion of the subject experts will be in the form of formal meetings held specifically for each NRCB. The program revision will be implemented by May 26, 1990, before review of the next NRCB.
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i The inspector considered the licensee's response to be appropriate, and will. evaluate the corrective actions during) future routine inspections. This item is closed (362/90-17-01.
c.
New Fuel Storage Facility (Unit 1)
On April 5,1990, during a routine walkdown of the vital areas of Unit 1, the inspector found three excore fission chambers in the new fuel-storage facility. The fission chambers were in an old, badly worn wooden box, the lid of which was removed enough to
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Normally the new fuel storage facility is locked closed to preclude unauthorized access. On this occasion, however, contract workers were erecting scaffolding inside the building and the door had been left open, permitting the inspector to enter the facility without a key. Other access control was not provided. The fission chambers were identified as containing three grams of 93% uranium 235. The facility was found to be dirty and cluttered, including three damaged wooden boxes, bird feathers in the supply fan cage, and dirt on the floor.
The building's storage requirements (as recognized by the licensee)
are established in American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
Standard N45.2.2, which sets the material conditions for a storage facility based on the intended use of that facility.
For example, the supply fan was intended to supply the facility with dust-free,
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low humidity _(below 80% humidity) air by taking a suction on the atmosphere once a day for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> at approximately noon to get the driest air possible. The fan is also equipped with a humidistat to stop the fan if the air is at greater than 80% humidity. A mainte-nance review of the fan's filter identified that the filter had not been replaced since 1986. On visual inspection by the inspector, it was not evident that a filter was present at all.
Nonconformancereport(NCR) 90040048 was generated by the licensee to investigate the appropriateness'of.this facility for use in storing special. nuclear material (SNM) and new fuel. The inspector also questioned the appropriateness of SNM being stored in an unlocked space being monitored only by contractor personnel.
This item will remain unresolved (as defined in paragraph 12)
pending.further licensee evaluation of the NCR and of SNM storage conditions (206/90-17-01).
No violations or deviations were noted during the inspection.
9.
On-SiteReviewCommitteeMeeting(40500)
The Inspector attended On-Site Review Committee (OSRC) meetings for Unit 1 and Units 2 and 3 on April 19 and April 23, respectively. These meetings were convened to review the previous months' operational activities and reportable events, i
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These meetings were conducted in an appropriately formal manner, and offered opportunities for those present~to raise questions regarding Unit operations and other issues reviewed.
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No violaticas or deviations were identified.
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I 10. ReviewofLicenseeEventReports(90712,92700)
Through direct observations, discussion with licensee personnel, or i
review of appropriate records, the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were closed:
Unit 1-89-01, Revision 1,
" Reactor Vessel Thermal Shield Support Block Out of Tolerance"
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89-09, Revision 1,
" Delinquent Effluent Dose Determinations Due to Procedure Deficiency" 89-21, Revision 0,
" Reactor Trip On Low Flow Due To Instrument Cable Degradation" i
89-21, Revision 1,
" Reactor Trip On Low Flow Due To Instrument
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. Cable Degradation"
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89-23, Revision 0,
" Manual Reactor Trip Following Dropped Shutdown. Bank.
Rods Due To Failed Contactor Coil and Blown Fuse" 89-23, Revision 1,
" Manual Reactor Trip Following Dropped Shutdown Bank Rods Due To Failed Contactor Coil and Blown Fuse" 89-29. Revision 0,
" Potential Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)
Diversion Flow Through RWST Recirculation Filter" 89-30. Revision 0,
" Potential Diversion of Emergency Core Cooling
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System Recirculation Flow Through A Spring-Loaded Ci;eck Valve"
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89-19, Revision 0,
" Manual Reactor Trip During Plann'ed Shutdown Due to ASI Approaching CPC Trip Setpoint" 89-24, Revision 0,
" Missed Fire Watch Posting Due To Personnel Error" 89-24. Revision 1,
" Missed Fire Watch Posting Due To Personnel Error" Unit 3 89-05, Revision 0,
" Tech. Spec. Action Requirement Exceeded Due to COLSS Backup Computer Failure" t
No violations or deviations were identifie g
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i 11.
FollowuponpreviouslyIdentifiedItems(92701)
a.
(Closed) Improper Temporary Cable Installation (206/89-18-03)
During a previous inspection, the inspector found that tempor:ry cables were strung across both trains of the Class IE 4160 Volt electrical cable trays. This was contrary to the guidance provided in IEEE Standard 384-1977, which was part of the principal design code applicable to San Onofre.
The inspector noted that the licensee's procedure, $0123-I-1.36. Revision 0, " Cables - Installe-tion of Temporary Cables,* dated May 28, 1986 was not developed in accordance with the above standard and thus was not adequate to assure that all of the requirements of the standard were addressed.
In response to the inspector's finding, the licensee revised the above procedure to reflect the requirements of IEEE 384-1977.
Revision 1 of 50123-I-1.36 became effective on March 12, 1990. The licensee noted that this was implemented cfter the original date
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committed to by the licensee's response, due to a tracking system oversight. The inspector reviewed the above corrective actions and found them to be adequate. Therefore, this item is closed.
b.
LClosed) Inadequate Train Separation Inside Instrumentation Panel L361/88-18 03)
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During the previous inspection, the inspector found that some of the wiring of the redundant safety trains were in contact with each other and with non-safety circuits inside the instrumentation panels. This condition was not in compliance with the licensee's construction specifications.
In response, the licensee committed to inspect other Unit 2 pancis during the Cycle V refueling outage.
During the Unit 2 Cycle 5 refueling outage in the fall of 1989, the licensee completed the inspection. Osficiencies were identified
and dispositioned.
Therefore, this item is closed.
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12.
Unresolved Item
Unresolved items are items about which additional information is required to determine whether they are violations, deviations, or unre-
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solved items. An unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 8.c.
13.
ExitMeeting(30703)
On May 2, 1990 an exit meeting was conducted with the licensee repre-sentatives identified in Paragraph 1.
The inspectors summarized the inspection scope and findings as described in the Results section of this report.
The licensee acknowledged tie inspection findings and noted that appro-i.
priate corrective actions would be implemented where warranted. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
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