IR 05000206/1986029
| ML13323B174 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1986 |
| From: | Dangelo A, Huey F, Johnson P, Stewart J, Tang R, Tatum J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13323B173 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-86-29, IEIN-84-37, IEINM-84-37, NUDOCS 8607110203 | |
| Download: ML13323B174 (12) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No /86-29 Docket No License No DPR-13 Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company P. 0. Box 800, 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 92770 Facility Name: San Onofre Uni Inspection at: San Onofre, San Clemente, California Inspection conducted: June 7 through June 27, 1986 Inspectors:
__
F. R. uey, Senior Resident
.Date Signed Insp tor, Units 1, 2 and 3 CJ..P. tewart, Resident Inspector Date Signed
. D'
elo, Resident Inspector Date Signed b tum Resident Inspector Date Signed CYR. C. a g, Resident Inspector Date Signed Approved By:
-7I (a P. nson, Chief Date Signed Reacto Projects Section 3 Inspection Summary Inspection on June 7 through June 27, 1986 (Report No. 50-206/85-29)
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of Unit 1 Operations Program including the following areas:
operational safety verification, evaluation of plant trips and events, monthly surveillance activities, monthly maintenance activities, independent inspection, licensee events report review, and.follow-up of previously identified item Inspection Procedures 71707, 93702, 61726, 62703, 73051, 37701, 92700, 92701 and 92702 were covere.
Results: Of the areas examined, no deviations or violations were note PDR ADOCK 05000206 G__
DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Southern California Edison Company H. Ray, Vice President, Site Manager
- G. Morgan, Station Manager
- M. Wharton, Deputy Station Manager D. Schone, QualityAssurance Manager D. Stonecipher, Quality Control Manager R. Krieger; Operations Manager D. Shull, Maintenance Manager J. Reilly, Technical Manager P. Knapp, Health Physics Manager
- B. Zintl, Compliance Manager D. Peacor, Emergency Preparedness Manager P. Eller, Security Manager
- J. Reede.r, Operations Superintendent, Unit 1 H. Merten,.Mainfenance Manager, Unit 1 R. Santosuosso, Instrument.and Control Supervisor T. Mackey, Compliance Supervisor'.
- C. Cpuser, Compliance Engineer San Diego.Gas & Electric Company R. Erickson, San Diego Gas' and Electric
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting on June 27, 1986.
The inspectors also contacted other licensee employees during the course of the inspection, including operations shift superintendents, control room supervisors, control room operators, QA and QC engineers, compliance engineers, maintenance craftsmen, and health physics engineers-and technician.
Operational Safety Verification The inspectors performed several plant tours and verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed the Tag Out log and verified proper return to service of affected components. Particular attention was given to housekeeping, examination for potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibration, and verification that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc No violations or deviations were identifie.
2 Monthly Surveillance Activities Operability Verification for Pressurizer Safety Relief Valves RV-532 and RV-533 (Unit 1)
The inspector observed the 18-month surveillance on the pressurizer safety relief valve position indicators (RV-532 and RV-533). The purpose of the surveillance was to demonstrate operability and functional capability of the valve position indicators, required by technical specificationk as part of the accident monitoring instrumentatio.Thesurveillance was conducted in accordance with procedure SOl-II-1.4.191 and applicable technical specification requirement No deviations or violation's were identifie.
Monthly Maintenance Activities The inspector observed maintenance activities associated with replacement of the rotating element of the-west main feedwater pump. These activities were observed to be in compliance with properly issued maintenance orders and no deviations or violations were note.
Independent Inspection of. Activities Associated with the November 1985 Water Hammer Event Review of Design Modifications The status of water hammer event related design modifications was discussed in report 50-106/86-22. The inspector reviewed the DCP packages and inspected the installed systems. No deviations or violations were note All required modifications had been completed and tested. Final station turnover was :in progress for the following items, to be completed prior to return to operation. Additional mode-dependent testing will be accomplished for some items during power escalatio )
Steam generator blowdown modifications (DCP 3400.04).
2)
Uninterruptible power supply to event computer (DCP 3400.16).
3)
Uninterruptible-power supply to vital bus #4 (DCP 3400.13).
4)
Modification to-electrical auxiliary system (DCP 3400.06).
5)
Automatic isolation of main feedwater (DCP 3400.09). Review of Procedure Changes to Preclude Recurrence.of Water, Hammer Event Related Deficiencies The licensee has completed issue of all procedure changes described in report 50-206/86-22..The inspectors have reviewed these
procedures and consider that, they are adequate to preclude recurrence of water hammer event related.deficiencies. The inspectors have'also confirmed that plant operations personnel.have completed training on the revised procedure Re iew of Vale Testing Program Inspectibn report 502206/86-16 addressed specific changes to the valve inservice testing (IST) program that:thelicensee implemented as a result o'fes sons learned from the water hammer event. The licensee has revised the IST program to incorporate the changes discuss'ed intreport 50-206/86-16..The inspector has reviewed the imp t
hanes-,and considers that the revised program is adequate- 'to preclude recurrenceof undetected valve failures similar to those resulting in the waterhammer event. In addition to the program administrative.changes discussed in report 50-206/86-16, the licensee has provided fqr periodic visual inspection and/or reverse fl6w operability checking of the following safety related check valves (SIS-303, 304, 003, 004, 010 and AFW-305, 306, 312, 317, 318, 320, 384, 388, 399).
(Followup Item 50-206/86-16-01, Closed). Review of Plant Material Condition NRC inspection report 50-206/86-22 described NRC inspection activities-associated with the licensee's Material Condition Review Program (MCRP). That report specifically addressed materia condition problems noted inside Unit 1 containment involving improperly installed electrical conduit and described corrective actions being implemented by the licensee'to effect an overall upgrade of containment material condition '
Following completion of licensee corrective actions, theinspector performed.follow up inspection inside containment on June 9 and 10, 1986, to confirm satisfactory licensee corrective action. The following conditions were noted:
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(1) The overall cleanliness and general system material conditions inside containment were significantly improved and were on a par with the-Mode 1 conditions seen in Units 2/3. As an example of the level of effort expended on cleaning up Unit 1
.,containment, surface contamination levels have been reduced below those-requiring complete protective clothin (2) The types of electrical deficiencies n6ted during previous inspections had been corrected. No additional electrical type deficiencies were noted during follow up.inspection (3) The licensee appeared to have taken aggressive action to perform a thorough and independent assessment and upgrading of system and component 'material conditions inside containmen SCE assigned responsible and knowledgeable personnel to implement this task force effort and the results were impressive. During the previous containment inspection, the inspector observed 5 or 6 material condition deficiencies that-
were consider&d significant. As a result of the licensee task force'review, licensee personnel found and corrected about 70 similar deficiencie During subsequn-containment inspection tours, the inspector had to look in great deta.il tofind any problems and most of these were minor workmanship related deficiencie A detailed inspection of-pcifi.c eompohent for potentially function affecting material condition deficiencies identified only two additional problem areas not identiffied during" the lic'ensee task force review. It should be Ooted that none df these pobleim appeared to affect component operatbiity;however, they represent deficiencies-that should not remain uncorrected following a.major outage. The observed deficiencies f.ll into-the following tw6categories:
Pneumatically bpera'e'd valve control air system deficiencies:
(a)
Diaphragm gasket leaks on pressurizer spray valves (PCV-430H and, o
30C)
(b) Air leak on regulator for reactor coolant pump CCW valve (CCW-CV-722C)
(c) Two nuts missing from diaphragm flange on reactor coolant loop sample valve (CV-955)
(d) Control air lines for pressurizer spray valves (downstream of ISA-067) not properly supported (e.g., support brackets not bolted to the wall)
(2) Instrumentation environmental protection deficiencies:
(a) Cover "0" ring improperly installed on steam generator level instrument (MSS-LT-455)
(b) Terminal box cover improperly secured on steam generator level instrument (MSS-LT-3400C)
The-above noted deficiencies were reviewed with site management on June 1 As a result, an additional management inspection of Unit 1 containment was conducted on June 1 The following conclusions were reached following this inspection:
o All pneumatic valves will be reinspected for proper material conditio All environmentally qualified instrumentation will be reinspected for proper installation of environmental protection feature o Following the above inspections, a,management team will perform an overall material condition assessment inspection of Unit 1
\\,containment to-confirm overall as well as specific satisfactory condition Additional follow.-up inspection has confirmed significant progress in correcting these deficiencies. During an inspection tour on June 19, no additional deficiencies were noted. These inspection activities have verified completion of the licensee's implementation of the MCRP to have been completed.. Monitoring of the licensee's performance in this area will continue as part of the ongoing NRC inspection progra Review of Operational Readiness Program In order to provide added assurance that Unit 1 is ready to return to service, in light of the lessons learned from the water hammer event, the licensee.has implemented an Operational Readiness Program (ORP). This new program is a supplement to the'MCRP and Area Monitoring Program (AMP) discussed in report 50-206/86-22. The primary purpose of the ORP program is to extend the existing startup and surveillance testing program to provide an enhanced assurance of plant operational readiness. Implementation of this program will be completed during plant restar The inspector reviewed the licensee's ORP and considered the program to be comprehensive and well organized. The program accomplishes the following operational readiness verifications that are in addition to activities already required by regulation or commitment to the NRC:
(1) Validate Operator Training and Procedure Adequacy (a).Each operating shift will demonstrate ability to operate the new Dedicated Shutdown (DSD) facilit o Start and operate the DSD diese o Start and operate the new west AFW pum o Establish.and maintain steam generator level using the DSD system,.
o Start and operate the north charging pump from the DSD facilit (b Perform a loss-of-satidn-power test at 25% reactor powe Restorepower using diesel generator o Confirm 4725 KW is not exceede Parallel,diesel generator with offsite powe (2) Surveillance Testing (a) Verify AFW system delivery capability of 375 gpm full flow and 125 gpm floW to each steam generato (b) Complete all operations surveillances as soon as system/component becomes available, regardless of periodicity requirement (3) System Alignment and Equipment Performance Evaluation (a) Perform all existing system alignment (b) Collect data as soon as the plant stabilizes at full power and evaluate performance.against historical dat (c) Develop baseline data for selected plant equipmen (4) Major Component Integrity (a) Inspect all pumps to ensure proper lubrication prior to Mode (b) Monitor selected pumps for vibration during initial startu (c) Leak test all feedwater heater (d). Perform inservice testing on all valves prior to Mode (e) Perform an extended reliability run on diesel generator (5), Perfoprm all, fire protection system surveillances prior to Mode 4, regardless 'of periodicity requirement (6> Perf6rm a dynamic test of the following circuits by inducing actual plant parameter changes:
(a) Volume control tank low low leve.(5) Residual, heat removal valve interloc (c) Steam dum (d) Service air isolatio (7) Administrative Programs (a) Stroke all control valves identified by MCR (b) Perform management inspections to confirm plant readines (c) Conduct Unit and Station AMP team meetings to confirm plant readines Review of Functional Testing of Safety Related Equipment During the current outage the licensee completed extensive modifications to the electrical penetrations in containment. The inspector reviewed the functional testing performed by the licensee to confirm proper retermination of all electrical leads and proper function of all affected components. This review consisted of a detailed review of the functional test-packages for selected safety
related components and programmatic review of the overview provided by the Quality Assurance organization for functional test activities.
Froma programmatic standpoint, the licensee performed a four part program to ensure proper function of components affected by the containment electrical penetration activity. The program included:
(1) administrative controls over physical retermination work, (2)
continuity checking of individual circuits, (3) meggering of individual circuits and (4) functional test of affected component The first three parts-of this program were reviewed during the previous inspection-period and are discussed in report 50-206/86-2 During the current review inspector attention was focused on the last part, component functional tes Ineparticular, the inspector reviewed the functional test packages for each of-the three safety injection loop isolation valves (S1-SIS-MOV-850A,.850B and 850C).. The inspector reviewed the specific maintenance drders that accomplished the functional tests and confirmed -that all valve circuits were properly tested.. No problems were note.
Review of Licensee Event Reports Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, or review of the records, the following Licensee-Event Reports (LERs) were closed: (Closed) Licensee Event Report 83-04, Uncapped Air Duct This item was repaired as a part of the HVAC system upgrade performed during the current outage.. This item is close (Closed) Licensee Event Report 82-03, Two Dropped Rodlets During the current refueling outage, the rodlets were recovered. No damage to the assembly was discovered. This item is close (Closed) Licensee Event Report 81-06, Environment Qualification of Terminal Blocks During this outage all licensee committed modifications to meet 10 CFR 50.49 were completed. This item is close (Closed).
Licensee Event Report 83-01, Inadequate Maintenanc Procedure The licensee has made several changes to maintenance procedures involved. Based on a review of this procedure as a result of other inspections made forthe auxiliary feedwater pump special inspection, the procedures used to control the work activity meets requirements. This item is close.
Follow-Up of Previously Identified Items (Closed) Followup Item 81-42-01, Electrical Reverification This item related to discrepancies which existed on electrical drawings. The licensee has undertaken 'a program to verify the as-built condition of all drawings.' Since the 1984 return-to-service of the unit, several inspections were performed in the construction are In no case were significant as-built problems identified. This item is close (Closed) Followup Item 81-42-03, Ashcroft Pressure Gage Replacement The instruments in question have been replaced with devices qualified for the intended service. No violations of requirements were identified. This item is close (Closed) Followup Item 82-37-01, CCW Heat Exchanger Corrosion This item involved corrosion which was noted on the support of the heat exchanger shell. The support was inspected and found to be able to perform its intended function. The corrosion damage was repaired. In addition the licensee implemented programs which are designed.to identify this type of deficiency and take corrective action. Two of these programs,are a result of the water hammer event. This item is close (Closed) Violation (50-206/84-19-01) FME Problems in Unit 1 No. 1 Diesel Generator This item concerned a failure to follow FME procedures in Unit 1 N diesel generator (e.g., a person wearing a wrist watch in.the FME area, materials taken in and out of the FME area not properly logged). A violation was issued in Octoberj 198 SCE took prompt corrective actions including.:
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work stoppage ordered in the diesel area, allowing total clean up of the FME area;
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complete audit of the FME logs against actual inventory of the area; improved training program for all FME monitors, including instruction to stop work if FME objectives cannot be met or if FE cannot be effectively controlled; requirement for the FME supervisor and/or QC inspector to verify the FME zone' log and observe adequacy of the zone at least bnce per, -shift; Sollo up QA field surveillances to verify that corrective actions had been properly implemented for the diesel generator
.,,actiVit In addition, General Administrative Order S0123-GAD-3 was issued in February, 1985 to clarify FME responsibilities.within the statio As stated in this order, the maintenance manager is responsible for, among other tasks, establishing FME/inventory control during maintenance, testing and inspection activities, and for establishing retrieval practices for foreign materials accidentally introduced into FME areas during'these activities. Maintenance procedure S0123-1-1.18, "FME/Inventory Control During Maintenance, Testing and Inspection Activities", was implemented in July, 1985. The inspector reviewed 50123-1-1.18, and found it to be well-written and to provide clearly defined policies and responsibilities forFME control. There were no FME deficiencies noted-during the recent Unit 1 outage. This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-206/82-35-01) Licensee Changes to.EPIPs Appear to.Dec' eas'eEmergency Plan Effectiveness This issuewas raise whenUnit 1 experienced a surveillance failure of the -No diesel generator while the No. 1 diesel generator and themain transformer were removed from service for maintenanc Thisreduced' the poweravailable to the unit to one offsite power source the auxiliary transformerI SCE concluded that this was not an.UnusuaIl Eventas d fined in'the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs). Athat time, the NRC inspector determined that SCE'hid recently modified the EPIPs to require reporting of such events-and declaring them as<Unusual Events, only while in Modes 1 through 4'Un t1 as inMode-5 at the' time of the above described event. It was felt that theimbdified EPIPs might diminish the (IIIeiabe indicatign'ft plants se t
effectiveness of the;.emergency plan since the mode of a plant was not a.,reliable indicatioh of the flant.'s susceptibility to threatening the public health and safety following an event. This issue was referred byRegion V to NRC Headquarters' Emergency Preparedness Branch (EPB) for review. The following summarizes the EPB's Decemberf30, 1983 response to RegionV:
In general, the practice of using operating modes to assist in event classification is considered acceptable, provided that the classification scheme is reasonabl The use of operating modes in the original SONGS procedures (i.e., EPIPs SO1-VIII-11.1 and S023-VIII-11.1) is not considered reasonable since the definitions of some initiatin conditions (e.g., loss of AC power) were restricted to modes 1 through 4 onl SCE's modified procedure defines a loss of decay heat removal capability (for 30 minutes in mode 5 and' 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> in mode 6) as an unusual event, and provides general guidance for considering situations that are not 'specifically defined in the procedure but might indicate a trend away from safe'conditions. The EPB felt that these two added elements'appeared to'address meaningful situations that might have been excluded from th detailed emergency classification matrices in the original EPIPs, and thus made the modified procedures acceptabl The inspector learned that EPIPs.S01-VIII-11.1 and S023-VIII-1 had been cancelled in March of 1983 and superseded by EPIP SO1-VIII-1 and S023-VIII-1. NRC Region V's Emergency Preparedness section reviewed these EPIPs in January and February of 1986. No deficiencies or violations were identified. This item is close (Closed) Followup Item (50-206/85-33-01) Possible.Modification or Additional Training Regarding Verifying Bearing Oil Level In..1ight of the improper repair of the Unit 1 steam driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump in 1985 (for details see inspection report 50-206/86-22, paragraph 11.c), a question was raised regarding possible design change or additional training emphasis for bearing oil systems without sight glass.or other method of directly observing.bearing oil leve In January, 1986, SCE initiated an evaluation of the adequacy of bearing oil level indicators for all safety-related equipment at Units 1, 2 and 3. The following actions were taken:
For pumps'with'only a~chicken feeder, the addition of a bull's
'< eye for oil level indication was first considered but later determined to,be not fedsible.;
For sight glasses, maximum and minimum oil level marks were scribed on the" glass by means of Facility Change Notices (FCNs)
IIna cases (including those pumps with existing bull's eye oil indicator),a tag was installed by each oil indicator specifying.maximum and minimum oil leve The aboveactions were.completed'for all safety-related pumps at Unit -1'in'May, 1986, and will be completed at Units 2 and 3 within the',next few months. The inspector examined a sample of the safety-related,pumps at unit 1 and did not find any problem with regard to the above described actions. This item is close (Closed) Followap Item (50-206/82-10-02) Reliability of North Saltwater Cooling Pump Discharge Valve Due to three failures in early 1982 associated 'with the north saltwater cooling (SWC) pump discharge valve (POV-5),.a question was raised as to the reliability of this valv Apparently, during one of the failure events, the valve only closed about halfway after the pump was deenergized;. This could have permitted water from the discharge of the other (south) SWC pump to flow at a high rate in the reverse direction through the north SWC pump, causing the pump to rotate in.a reverse direction. In this instance, this did not occur because the operators immediately
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restarted the pump before any reverse rotation occurre The licensee has installed two new check valves SWC-382 and.SWC-383 would prevent backflow and thus reversed pump rotations. In addition, auto-start features wereon the pumps to enable auto pump,start on low discharge pressure and thus guaranteed uninterrupted cooling water supply. Also, valves POV-5 and POV-6 (the discharge valves. for the south SWC pump)'were made into manual
.valves and left: open such that the SWC system will always be aligned and operable without relying on valve or air supply solenoid actio The ab.ove actions :were completed in 1984. This item is close (Closed)-IE 'Information N6tice '(84-37), Use of Lifted Leads and Jumpers During Maintenanceor Surveillance Testing This Informafion Notice described several instances associated with the use of lifted leads: or jumpers during maintenance or surveillance testing. One of these occurred at 'San Onofre Unit 3 in 1984 when 4 of 8 reactor trip breakers did not have their shunt trip devices operable because.some 'leads had not been reconnected in the reactor protection system following an earlier surveillance testin These instances referenced above were apparently caused by procedural error, inadequacy or vagueness, e.g., lack of procedural steps to reconnect specific lifted leads, lack of requirements for independent verification of proper system restoration after testing, lack of requirement for functional tests following 18-month surveillance procedures, et SCE has taken actions in accordance with the recommendations in the Information Notice. Procedures were developed and/or revised to eliminate inadequacies or vagueness, and to require dual verification of system restoration. These actions were completed in December 198 This item is close (Closed) Followup Item (50-206/82-10-04) Inspection of Safety Related Equipment in Areas Devitalized During Outage Prior to Return to Service During the 1982 outage period, SCE changed the status of certain vital areas in Unit 1 to accommodate outage work and personnel access. SCE committed to inspect safety related equipment in these areas prior to returning Unit 1 to service to ensure that this equipment had not been deliberately tampered with while it was not afforded vital area protectio SCE conducted a security inspection of these devitalized areas in August 1983, in accordance with security procedure S0123-IV-1.7 The vital area perimeter has been established to its original configuration. This item is close.
Exit Meeting On June 27, 1985 an exit meeting was conducted with the licensee representatives identified in Paragraph 1. The inspectors summarized the inspection scope and findings as described in this report.