IR 05000361/1999005
| ML20206Q261 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 05/10/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206Q254 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-99-05, 50-361-99-5, 50-362-99-05, 50-362-99-5, NUDOCS 9905190089 | |
| Download: ML20206Q261 (16) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.: 50-361;50 362 License Nos.: NPF-10; NPF-15 Report No.: 50-361/99-05;50-362/99-05 Licensee: Southern California Edison Co.
l Facility: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 Location: 5000 S. Pacific Coast Hw San Clemente, California
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Dates: April 26 to 30,1999 I Inspector: Michael P. Shannon, Senior Radiation Specialist Approved By: Gail M. Good, Chief, Plant Support Branch ATTACHMENT: Supplemental information l
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9905190089 990510 PDR ADOCK 05000361 G PDR
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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J San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 NRC Inspection Report No. 50-361/99-05; 50-362/99-05 l j
Plant Succort
- Overall, an effective external exposure control program was implemented. High radiation areas were properly controlled and posted in accordance with station procedures. Radiation workers were knowledgeable of the radiological conditions in assigned work areas, knew the proper response to electronic dosimeter alarms, and wore dosimetry properly. Excellent radiation exposure permit required pre-job ALARA briefings provided to the workers involved with Unit 3's r'sactor cavity decontamination and steam generator nozzle dam removal (Section R'.1).
- A good internal exposure control program was in place. In general, continuous air monitors, portable air samplers, and high efficiency particulate air filter ventilation units l were appropriately used to monitor and evaluate radiological conditions and limit airborne exposures during work evolutions (Section R1.2).
- Radiological outage work planning was good. Radiological work tasks were well planned and ALARA personnel were appropriately involved during the outage planning stage. The ALARA plans and radiation exposure permits used for Unit 3's upper reactor cavity decontamination and steam generator nozzle dam removal properly incorporated site and industry lessons learned and appropriate radiological controls (Section R1.3).
- Radiation workers properly used contamination monitoring equipment. All radioactive material containers were labeled, posted, and controlled in accordance with regulatory j requirements. Contamination boundaries were clearly identified and properly posted. !
Radiological postings were conspicuous and clear (Section R1.4). )
- Overall, a good ALARA program was implemented. The 1999 Unit 3 refueling outage i
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dose goal of 177 person rems was established using past best performance and industry experience for similar scope work. ALARA personnel properly tracked, trended, and distributed outage exposure status to maintain station awareness. A strong hot .
spot reduction program was implemented. An excellent temporary shielding program j effectively reduced outage exposure by approximately 100 person-rems (Section R1.5). )
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committee meeting held on March 3,1998, did not have a quorum (Section R1.5). j
- A good contractor radiation protection technician qualification program was maintained. ;
Qualification cards included all the tasks assigned to contractor radiation protection ,
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technicians (Section R5.1).
- An effective nuclear oversight program was implemented. The auditors assigned to '
l provide oversight of the radiation protection program were well qualified to perform
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radiation protection audits /surveillances. Audit SCES-808-98 was comprehensive and provided management with a good assessment of the radiation protection program performance. The station identified radiological concerns nnd issues at the proper threshold which provided management with a good perspective to assess the radiation protection program (Section R7.1).
- The failure to survey radioactive material prior to the removal from the restricted area was identified as an unresolved item pending review of the licensee's investigation.
This item was placed in the licensee's corrective action program as Action Request 990401474 (Section R7.1). ,
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REPORT DETAILS
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Summary of Plant Status i Unit 3 was in Week 5 of a scheduled 8-week refueling outage during this inspection. Unit 2 operated at full power.
IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 External Exposure Controls 1 j
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Insoection Scope (83750)
Selected radiation workers and ' radiation protection personnel involved in the external exposure control program were interviewed. A number of tours of the radiological controlled area, including Unit 3 reactor containment building, were performed. The 1 following items were reviewed:
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- Control of high radiation areas
- Personnel dosimetry
- Radiation exposure permits a Job coverage by radiation protection personnel ,
- Housekeeping in the radiological controlled area b.
Observations and Findinas High radiation areas were properly controlled and posted in accordance with regulatory requirements. All Technical Specification required doors were properly locked, and flashing lights were working and appropriately used in accordance with regulatory requirements. All radiological postings were clearly and consistently posted.
Field interviews with radiation workers revealed that workers were knowledgeable of the radiological conditions in assigned work areas and knew the proper response to electronic dosimeter alarms. The inspector determined that the use of radiological controlled area entry tickets effectively communicated general work area radiological conditions to station radiation workers. All workers observed wore dosimetry properly.
I During tours of the Unit 3 containment building, the inspector observed that workers appropriately used cool and cold zone ALARA low dose waiting areas in accordance
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with management's expectations.
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! Radiation exposure permits were written clearly providing station workers with the appropriate controls and radiological information to safely accomplish assigned tasks.
On April 27,1999, the inspector attended a radiation exposure permit required pre-job ALARA briefing for the movement of the Unit 3 upper guide structure. On April 29,1999, the inspector attended radiation exposure permit required pre-job ALARA
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briefings for Unit 3's reactor cavity decontamination and steam generator nozzle dam removal. All briefings were conducted in a professional manner. Lead group personnel discussed the job scope in detail. The ALARA planners use of the white dry erasure l board for the steam generator work and the enlarged survey map of the reactor cavity for the upper reactor cavity decontamination and the upper guide structure movement work effectively communicated the expected radiological conditions and radiological survey information to each worker involved in the tasks.
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However, during the pre-job ALARA briefing for the upper guide structure movement, )
the inspector noted that the maintenance foreman made two statements which gave the impression that the maintenance foreman was not familiar with the procedure. The first statement was, "I think the procedure says that the upper guide structure has to be a foot above the upper guide structure stand before moving it." The maintenance foreman then stated,l think the procedure states that the upper guide structure has to be raised a foot above the lower reactor cavity lip before the remainder of the move can be made."
No one at the meeting challenged the maintenance foreman's knowledge of the procedure. After the briefing, the inspector and the maintenance foreman verified that the procedure did require the upper guide structure to be approximately a foot above both the upper guide structure stand and lower reactor cavity lip prior to each move.
The maintenance foreman acknowledged that "I think" was a poor choice of words.
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l During the pre-job ALARA briefing, the inspector noted that the maintenance foreman '
did not assign the maintenance workers a particular task for the movement of the upper guide structure. The maintenance foreman stated that an additional meeting would be j held at a later time with the maintenance crew to determine which tasks would be j assigned to each worker. The briefing was not stopped to address this issue. The I inspector commented that not having work assignments in-place prior to the meeting could lead to confusion among maintenance workers and radiation protection personnel at the job-site. The licenses acknowledged the inspector's comment. The inspector
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noted that the ALARA planner told the maintenance foreman that one of the maintenance workers involved in the upper guide structure movement would have to wear a lapel air sampler, but the ALARA planner did not evaluate which one would be near the potential airborne source. Additionally, although the workers were asked if they had any questions, no cne was questioned about the radiation exposure permit, I radiological conditions, or ALARA work methods to ensure that the information was correctly communicated to the people involved in the task.
The inspector noted that the radiation exposure permit required briefings for the reactor cavity decontamination and steam generator nozzle dam removal effectively addressed the above observations. The inspector concluded that excellent ALARA pre-job briefings were provided to workers involved with reactor cavity decontamination and steam generator nozzle dam removal.
During tours of the radiological controlled area, the inspector observed a number of radiological work activities. In general, workers followed good health physics practices.
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Radiation protection job coverage was appropriate for radiological work observed. Field radiological briefings provided by radiation protection personnel were very good. The briefings re-enforced radiologicalinformation and controls needed to safely accomplish
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l l tasks. The inspector followed work being performed on Unit 2's low pressure coolant l injection (LPCI) check valves 200 and 202. The inspector noted that when a large amount of water unexpectedly leaked into the work area and sprayed some of the workers repairing check valve 202, the radiation protection technician providing job coverage maintained excellent oversight of the radiological conditions and controls and properly assessed the radiological consequences in a timely manner.
l Housekeeping throughout the radiological controlled area was good. In general, areas l
were free of debris. Tools and equipment staged for radiological work activities were properly controlled.
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c. Conclusions
Overall, an effective external exposure control program was implemented. High radiation areas were properly controlled and posted in accordance with station l
c procedures. Radiation workers were knowledgeable of the radiological conditions in !
assigned work areas, knew the proper response to electronic dosimeter alarms, and j wore dosimetry properly. Radiation exposure permits were written clearly and provided
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l station workers with the appropriate controls to safely accomplish tasks. Excellent radiation exposure permit required pre-job ALARA briefings were provided to the workers involved with Unit 3's reactor cavity decontamination and steam generator nozzle dam removal. However, there was a lack of a questioning attitude during the radiation exposure permit required pre-job ALARA briefing for the movement of the upper guide structure. Radiation protection job coverage was appropriate for radiological work observed. Housekeeping throughout the radiological controlled area 3 was good. In general, areas were free of debris. Tools and equipment staged for work !
activities were properly controlled.
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R1.2 Internal Exposure Controls j a.
Insoection Scope (83750)
Selected radiation protection personnel involved with the internal exposure control program were interviewed. The following programs were reviewed: J
- Air sampling, including the use of continuous air monitors and filtration units
- Respiratory protection
- Whole body counting
- Internal dose assessment b.
Observations and Findinos in general, continuous air monitors, portable air samplers, and high efficiency particulate air filter ventilation units were appropriately used to monitor and evaluate radiological conditions and limit airborne exposures during work evolutions. However, on l
April 26,1999, the inspector noted that the portable air sampler used to monitor work activities on the fueling bridge in Unit 3's fuel handling building was approximately 50 feet away from the work area. A review of the ventilation flow diagram of the fuel l handling building work area revealed that the air sampler was not placed between the worker and the possible source of airborne radioactivity On April 28,1999, the licensee documented this issue in Action Request 990402159 to evaluate the overall placement of air sampling / monitoring equipment.
As of April 29,1999, there had been no respiratory equipment issued for radiological l reasons during Refueling Outage Cycle 10. No problems were identified with the total l effective dose equivalent /as low as is reasonably achievable (TEDE/ALARA) evaluations performed to justify not using respiratory equipment for steam generator and reactor cavity decontamination work. There were eight positive whole body counts which occurred during Refueling Outage Cycle 10 that exceeded the licensee's action limit for recording internal dose. The highest calculated internal dose was approximately 17 millirems. No problems were identified with the whole body counting and internal j dose assessment programs.
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c. Conclusions
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A good internal exposure control program was in p! ace. In general, continuous air monitors, portable air samplers, and high efficiency particulate air filter ventilation units were appropriately used to monitor and evaluate radiological conditions and limit airborne exposures during work evolutions. Proper TEDE/ALARA evaluations were performed to ensure compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20, Subpar
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No problems were identified with the whole body counting and internal dose assessment programs.
R1.3 Plannina and Preparation j i
a. Inspection Scope
(83750)
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Radiation protection division personnel involved in radiation protection planning and preparation were interviewed. The following items were reviewed.
- ALARA job planning
- Job scheduling and sequer.cing
- ALARA packages ]
- Incorporation of lessons learned from similar work
- Supplies of radiation protection instrumentation, protective clothing, and consumable items b.
Observations and Findinas Radiological work tasks were well planned, and ALARA personnel were appropriately involved during the outage planning stage. Post-job briefings captured lessons learned from craft workers and radiation protection personnel. At the completion of radiological
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incorporation into future similar radiological work packages. A review of the ALARA l plan and radiation exposure permit used for Unit 3's upper reactor cavity decontamination and steam generator nozzle dam removal work packages revealed that lessons learned from past similar work and the industry were properly incorporated into the radiological work packages to improve job task performance.
From field observations and interviews with radiation workers, the inspector determined that there were no problems with the radiation protection support, instrumentation, l protective clothing, and consumable supplies needed to support outage radiological work.
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c. Conclusions
Radiological outage work planning was good. Radiological work tasks were we!!
planned, and ALARA personnel were appropriately involved during the outage planning stage. Post-Job briefings captured lessons learned from craft workers and radiation l protection personnel. The ALARA plans and radiation exposure permits used for Unit 3's upper reactor cavity decontamination and steam generator nozzle dam removal properly incorporated site and industry lessons learned and appropriate radiological controls.
R1.4 Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination: Surveyina and Monitorina a.
Inspection Scoce (83750)
Areas reviewed included:
- Contamination monitnr use and response to alarms
- Control of radioactive material a Portable instrumentation calibration and performance checking programs
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Adequacy of the surveys necessary to assess personnel exposure b.
Observations and Findinas All personnel observed exiting the radiological controlled area properly used personnel contamination monitors. Radiation protection personnel stationed at the egress point provided appropriate and timely guidance to workers who alarmed the monitors. While exiting contaminated areas, the inspector observed radiation worker activities and noted use of good health physics practices.
During tours of the radiological controlled area, the inspector noted that all radioactive material containers were properly labeled, posted, and controlled. Contamination boundaries were clearly identified and properly posted. Step-off pads were placed at the entrances / exits to contaminated areas. Trash and laundry barrels were properly maintained to prevent the spread of potential radioactive contamination.
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All portable radiation detection instrumentation observed in use in the radiological ;
controlled area were properly calibrated and source response checked in accordance j with station procedures.
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Independent radiological measurements performed by the inspector during tours of the !
radiological controlled area confirmed that radiological postings reflected general l radiological conditions within the room. All radiological postings were conspicuously and 1 clearly posted in accordance with station procedures and regulatory requirements.
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c. Conclusions
Radiation workers properly used contamination monitoring equipment. All radioactive material containers were properly labeled, posted, and controlled. Contamination boundaries were clearly identified and properly posted. Portable radiation detection l instrumentation was properly calibrated and source response checked. Radiological '
postings were conspicuous and clear.
R1.5 Maintainina Occupational Exoosure As Low As is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)a.
Inspection Scone (83750)
Radiation protection personnelinvolved with the ALARA program were interviewed. The ,
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- ALARA committee support
- Unit 3 refueling outage exposure goal establishment and status
- Hot spot reduction program
- Temporary shielding program
- Chemistry shutdown controls b.
Observations and Findinas From a review of the five ALARA committee meeting minutes held since January 1998, the inspector determined that the committee was not fully supported by all divisions. For example, operations and nuclear oversight divisions had not attended 60 percent of the ALARA committee meetings, while nuclear training and nuclear construction divisions had not attended 40 percent of these meetings.
Further, during the review of the ALARA committee meeting minutes, the inspector noted that the ALARA committee meeting held on March 3,1998, did not have a quorum as defined by Section 6.2.2.3 of Procedure SO123-Vll-20.4,"ALARA Program,"
Revision 1. This section stated that,"A committee meeting quorum shall exist by the presence of the Chair or Vice-Chair and 50 percent of designated member division managers, or their designees." Specifically, there were only four of the nine designated member division managers or their designees present for the above ALARA committee meeting. Technical Specification 5.5.1 requires procedures for the ALARA program.
The fa4ure to have a quorum for the March 3,1999, ALARA committee meeting was identified as a Violation of Technical Specifications. However, because this was an
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j isolated case, and the safety significance of this event was low, this failure constituted a violation of minor significance and was not subject to formal enforcement action. On April 28,1999, the licensee documented this issue in Action Request 990402163.
The outage exposure goal of 177 person-rems for planned work was aggressive and was developed using historical dose information and past actual task exposure j information. Division representatives and the ALARA committee were appropriately J involved in the development of these goals. ALARA personnel properly tracked, I trended, and distributed exposure information and goals to maintain station awareness.
As of April 29,1999, the station's actual exposure was approximately 8 person-rems ;
more than the projected exposure goal; however, the inspector noted that the station was approximately 5 days ahead of the outage schedule. From a review of the ;
remaining scheduled work and projected dose to accomplish the work, the inspector !
determined that the goal of 177 person-rems for planned work was attainable.
As of April 29,1999, there were 70 radiological hot spots located throughout the I radiological controlled area. From a review of licensee supplied documentation, the 2 inspector determined that all hot spots had been evaluated for removal. The licensee determined that 31 of the 70 hot spots were not required to be eliminated, because the ;
hot spots were located in areas that did not add to station exposure, or it was not <
ALARA for workers to remove them. The remaining 39 hot spots had an associated maintenance order to flush or remove the hot spot when a particular component or ;
system was worked. The inspector concluded that the licensee had implemented a !
strong hot spot reduction program.
No problems were identified with the temporary shielding program. There were l
38 temporary shielding packages installed during Refueling Outage Cycle 10, saving the ;
station approximately 100 person-rems. All shielding installations observed were '
properly tagged and posted in accordance with station procedure requirements and installed in accordance with engineering specifications. The inspector randomly i
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selected 2 of the 38 temporary shielding packages for review. Both shielding packages contained proper engineering evaluations, dose saving estimates, pre-and post- ;
shielding surveys, and drawings / pictures of the shielding installation. The individual '
responsible for the temporary shielding program demonstrated strong program knowledge. Overall, the inspector determined that the station had an excellent temporary shielding program in place.
l Chemistry shutdown controls removed approximately 811 curies of activity frorn the reactor coolant system. However, Unit 3's Refueling Outage Cycle 10 steam generator general area channel head dose rates were approximately 3 rems per hour higher than Cycle 9 dose rates. ALARA personnel explained that the higher dose rates might have a direct correlation to the days the unit was on line. On March 31,1999, the licensee wrote Action Request 990302189 to investigate this discrepancy.
c. Conclusions
Overall, a good ALARA program was implemented. However, the ALARA committee was not fully supported by all station divisions. The ALARA committee meeting held on
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March 3,1998, did not have a quorum. The 1999 Unit 3 refueling outage dose goal of 177 person-rems was established using past best performance and industry experience for similar work. Station division managers and the ALARA committee were appropriately involved in establishing outage exposure goals. ALARA personnel properly tracked, trended, and distributed outage exposure status to maintain station awareness. A strong hot spot reduction program was implemented. An excellent temporary shielding program effectively reduced outage exposure by approximately 100 person-rems.
R5 Staff Training and Qualification in Radiological Protection and Chemistry RS.1 Radiation Protection Staff Trainino
a. Inspection Scope
(83750)
The inspector interviewed personnel involved with contractor radiation protection technician training and resume evaluation. The following items were reviewed:
- Radiation protection technician training refueling outage lesson plans
- Resumes of contractor radiation protection technicians
- Radiation protection management oversight of the training program b.
Observations and Findinas
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Fifty four contractor radiation protection technicians were hired to support outage radiological work activities. A review of the resumes indicated that about 60 percent of the contractor radiation protection technicians were returnees. All contractor radiation protection technicians met or exceeded ANSI 3.1 requirements (3 years radiation protection experience). The inspector noted that the licensee's Technical Specifications required only a 2-year experience level technician. The use of ANSI 3.1 level contractor radiation protection technicians was considered a program strength.
Lesson plans used for training contractor radiation protection technicians included site and industry lessons learned. Radiation protection management was involved in developing the qualification task topics. All contractor radiation protection technicians were required to pass the Northeast Utilities examination within the past 2 years before being approved to work at the station. The Northeast Utilities examination was used to assess the basic radiation protection technical knowledge of the contractor radiation protection technicians. Additionally, all contractor radiation protection technicians were tested on site-specific information and station radiation protection procedures.
On-the-job training and evaluations were given before contractor radiation protection I technicians were assigned independent tasks. Based on a review of contractor radiation protection technician qualification cards, the inspector determined that the qualification cards were well developed and included all the tasks assigned to contractor radiation protection technicians.
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c. Conclusions
A good contractor radiation protection technician qualification program was maintained.
Radiation protection management was appropriately involved in the contractor radiation j protection program. Qualification cards included all the tasks assigned to contractor i radiation protection technicians.
R7 Quality Assurance in Radiological Protection and Chemistry Activities R7.1 Nuclear Oversicht Audits and Surveillances. and Radiation Division Self-Assessments and Radioloaical Action Reauests
a. Inspection Scope
(83750)
Selected personnelinvolved with the performance of nuclear oversight audits and sunteillances and radiation division self-assessments were interviewed. The following items were reviewed: i
- Qualifications of personnel who performed nuclear oversight audits and surveillances i
- Nuclear oversight audits performed since December 1,1998 l
- Nuclear oversight surveillances performed since December 1,1998
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- Radiation protection division self assessments performed since December 1, 1998
- Radiological action requests written since August 1,1998 b.
Observations and Findinas Audits and Surveillances Two individuals (one of whom was on a 1-year cross training assignment from the radiation protection division) provided oversight of the radiation protection program.
Both of these individuals had strong operational radiation protection backgrounds. The lead radiation protection nuclear oversight auditor was registered by the National Registry of Radiation Protection Technologists. The inspector determined that the cross training assignment of a radiation protection division individual to the nuclear oversight division was a program strength.
No problems were identified during the review of the audit schedule and plans pertaining to the radiation protection program. Since the last inspection of this area in December 1998,1 radiological audit,2 surveillances, and 13 radiological leadership reports (observations) were performed. The inspector determined that radiation protection and nuclear oversight management were appropriately involved in developing
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the audit scope. No problems were noted during the review of the audit checklist used to perform the audit.
Nuclear Oversight Audit Report SCES-808-98 identified six improvement opportunities.
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All items were documented in the station's corrective action system and nuclear oversight personnel appropriately tracked these items fur closure. Audit SCES-808-98 was comprehensive and provided management with a good assessment of the radiation protection program performance.
Division Self-Assessments Two radiation protection division self-assessments covering the radiation protection division's 1998 third and fourth quarter performance were performed since October 1998. The self-assessments provided a critical appraisal of the radiation protection division's performance. No problems were identified with these self-assessments.
Radiological Action Requests The inspector reviewed a summary of radiological action requests written since August 1,1998, and selected five of these action requests for a more in-depth review.
In general, no problems were identified. The station identified radiological concerns and issues at the proper threshold to provide management with a good perspective to assess the radiation protection program. Overall, action requests were closed in a timely manner.
l During the review of these action requests, the inspector noted that on April 19,1999, I the licensee identified and documented in Action Request 990401474 that a cell phone case, contaminated with licensed material reading as high as 25,000 counts per minute, I was taken outside the restricted area. The root cause investigation for this event was not completed at the time of this inspection. However, while reviewing similar events in ,
which licensed material was released outside the restricted area, the inspector noted I that on April 30,1997, the licensee documented in Action Request 970401897 that a Unit 3 high pressure turbine steam deflector, contaminated with licensed material reading as high as 2800 counts per minute, was released outside the restricted area.
Additionally, on April 6,1998, the licensee documented in Action Request 980400773, that two waste gas sample pumps were released from the restricted area with contamination levels up to 20,000 disintegrations per minute per 100 square centimeters.
This last event was discussed and resolved in NRC Inspection Report 50-361;-363/98-11 as a minor violation of 10 CFR Part 20.1501(a).10 CFR Part 20.1501(a) requires that each licensee make or cause to be made, surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the concentrations or quantities of radioactive material, and the potentidl radiological hazards that could be present. The potential failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20.1501(a) prior to the removal of the contaminated cell phone case from the restricted area was identified as an unresolved item pending review of the licensee's investigation of Action Request 990401474
( 50-361;-362/9905-01).
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c. Conclusions
An effective nuclear oversight program was implemented. The auditors assigned to provide oversight of the radiation protection program were well qualified to perform radiation protection audits /surveillances. Audit SCES-808-98 was comprehensive and ,
provided management with a good assessment of the radiation protection program j performance, improvement opportunities were appropriately documented in the !
station's corrective action system. The station identified radiological concerns and )
issues at the proper threshold which provided management with a good perspective to assess the radiation protection program. The failure to survey radioactive material prior
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j to the removal from the restricted area was identified as an unresolved item pending i review of the licensee's investigation. This item was placed in the licensee's corrective action program as Action Request 990401474.
R8 Miscellaneous Radiological Protection and Chemistry lasues (92904)
R8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-361/9822-01: Failure to consoicuousiv oost a hiah radiation area The inspector verified that corrective actions described in NRC Inspection Report 50-361/98-22 were implemented. No similar high radiation area posting problems were identified.
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i R8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-361/9822-02: Failure to follow the instructions of a radiation i exoosure oermit The inspector verified that corrective actions described in NRC Inspection ,
Report 50-361/98-22 were implemented. No similar radiation exposure permit i problems were identified.
V. Manaaement Meetings X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at ,
an exit meeting on April 30,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
I No proprietary information was identified.
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i ATTACHMENT m i
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED j
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Licensee 1
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- J. Barrow, Project Manager, Health Physics
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- R. Clark, Manager, Nuclear Oversight Division '
- G. Cook, Supervisor, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- T. Cooper, Supervisor, Health Physics
- B. Corbert, Supervisor, Health Physics 1
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- J. Fee, Manager, Maintenance Division
- M. Humphrey, Supervisor, Health Physics j
- R. Krieger, Vice President, Nuclear Generation
- J. Madigan, Manager, Health Physics
- S. Mahler, Engineer, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- D. Nunn, Vice President, Engineering and Technical Services
- A. Scherer, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs i
- S. Schofield, Supervisor, Health Physics i
- K. Slagle, Manager, Nuclear Oversight Division i
- R. Waldo, Manager, Operations
NRC
- J. Sloan, Senior Resident inspector j
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INSPECTION PROCEDURE USED l
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83750 Occupational Radiation Exposure 1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED. and CLOSED
Opened j
50-361;362/9905-01 URI Failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20.1501(a) prior
to removal of radioactive material from the restricted area
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50-361/9822-01' VIO Failure to conspicuously post a high radiation area I
50-361/9822-02 VIO Failure to follow the instructions of a radiation exposure permit
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l LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
A summary of radiological Action Requests written since August 1,1998
ALARA Committee Meeting Minutes from January 1,1998 to April 30,1999
Third and Forth Quarter 1998 Health Physics Division Self-Assessment Report
Nuclear Oversight Audit SCES-808-98 l
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Nuclear Oversight Surveillances SOS-043 98 and SOS-018-99 i
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Procedures 1
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l Health Physics Procedure SO123-Vil-20, " Health Physics Program," Revision 5
l Health Physics Procedure SO123-Vil 20.4, " SONGS ALARA Program," Revision 1
Health Physics Procedure SO123-Vil-20.4.2, " Temporary Shielding," Revision 4 !
Health Physics Procedure SO123-Vil-20.7, " Internal Occupational Exposure Monitoring Program,"
Revision 2
Health Physics Procedure SO123-Vil-20.9, " Radiological Surveys," Revision 4
Health Physics Procedure SO123-Vil-20.9.2, " Material Release Surveys," Revision 2 l
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Health Physics Procedure SO123-Vil-20.11, " Access Control Program," Revision 4 j
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