IR 05000206/1986016
| ML13323B146 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1986 |
| From: | Brown G, Dangelo A, Fish R, Huey F, Johnson P, Stewart J, Tang R, Tatum J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13323B143 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-86-16, NUDOCS 8606190592 | |
| Download: ML13323B146 (16) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report N /86-16 Docket N License N DPR-13 Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company P. 0. Box 800, 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 92770 Facility Name:
San Onofre Unit 1 Inspection at:
San Onofre, San Clemente, California Inspection conducted:
March 10-14 and March 28 through May 12, 1986 Inspectors:
_____
R uey, Senior Resident Date Signed Insp tor, Units 1, 2 and 3 J. P tewart, Resident Inspector Date Signed A D'
elo Resident Inspector Date Signed J. tun Resident Inspector Date Signed C. ang, Res* ent Insp tor Date Signed V A. Brown Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Analyst Approved By:
P. hnson, Chief Date Signed React Project Section 3 R. F. Fish, Chief Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Section 8606190592 860602 PDR ADOCK 05000206 G
-2 Inspection Summary Inspection on March 10-14 and March 28 through May 12, 1986 (Report No. 50-206/85-16)
Areas Inspected:
Special.emergency preparedness inspectioh of issues related to the"November 21, 1985 water hammer event. Routine-resident inspection of Operations Program including the following areas:
operational safety verification, monthly surveillaice activities, monthly maintenance activities, refueling activities, independent inspection,licensee events report review, and follow-up of previously identified item Inspection Procedures 37701, 71707, 73051, 62703, 73052, 73753, 62700, 72701, 62703, 60710, 82201, 82203, 82206, 92700, 92701, 61726, 60705 and 92702 were covere Results:
No violations or deviations were identifie DETAILS -
PART 1 Resident Inspection Staff -
March 28 -
May 12, 1986 1.. Persons Contacted Southern California Edison Company H. Ray, Vice President Site Manager
- G. Morgan, StationManager
- M. Wharton, Deputy.Station Manager
- D. Schone,,Quality Assurance Manager D. Stonecipher, Quality Control Manager
- R. Krieger, Deputy Station Manager
- D. Shull, Maintenance Manager J.. Reilly, Technical Manager P. Knapp,'Health Physics Manager
- B. Zinti, Corpliance Manager J. Wambold,,Training Manager D. Peacor, Emergency Preparedness Manager P. Eller, Security Manager
- J. Reeder, Operations Superintendent, Unit 1 H. Merten, Maintenance Manager,.Uni *R.Santosuosso, Instumet and Control Supervisor
- T. Mackey, Compliance SuperMvisorg G. Gibson, Compliance Supervisor eCowser, Compliance Engineer
- P King, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- R..Waldo, Plant Computer Supervisor San Diego Gas & Electric Company
- R. Erickson, San Diego Gas and Electric
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting on May 1,.198 The inspectors also Contacted other licensee employees uring the course of the inspection, includingoperations shift superintendents, control room supervisors, control roomoperators, QA and QC engineers, compliance engineers, maintenance craftsmen, and health physics engineers and technician.
OperationalSafety Verification The inspectors performed several plant tours and verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed the Tagut log and verified proper return to service of-affected componentsC.oParticularattention was given to housekeeping, examination for pbtential.fire hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibration, and verification thatmintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc p Monthly Surveillance Activities
The inspector observed portions of the diesel generator load test on diesel generator No. 2, which is required by technical specifications every 31 days. The test was observed to be conducted in accordance with procedure S01-12.3-10, TCN4-No deviations or violations were identifie.
Monthly Maintenance Activities The following post maintenance testing activities for Unit 1 were observed by the inspector during the current inspection period. No deviations or violations were identifie (a) In-Service Leak Test for Miniflow Orifice FO-1405 for South Charging Pump The inspector observed the in-service leak test (VT-2) on flow orifice (FO-1405).and the piping downstream of the flow orifice locatedon the miniflow line of Unit 1 south charging pump. FO-1405 and this section of piping were replaced during the current outag The test was conducted in accordance with procedure S0123-V-4.16, Revision 2, TCN 2-2, as well as the pre-established and pre-approved test requirements and acceptance criteria which are delineated in Traveler No. S01-056-85, Revision 2. There were no leakages observed through the flow orifice and/or the replacement piping downstream of i The inspector noticed that several entries in the Oil Monitoring Data Form (posted in the charging pump room) lack specificity. On January 24, 1986, (south charging pump) and on February 15, 1986, and March 20, 1986 (north charging pump), it was recorded that oil had been added to the "reservoir" or-"0B" (outboard bearing).
It is not clear whether the lube oil had been added to the pump or motor bearing. The SCE Maintenance Lube Oil Manual specifies that Chevron GST oil 46 be used for the charging pump motor (no substitute allowed), and Chevron GST oil 32 be used on the charging pump bearing (DTE light can be used as emergency substitute).
The inspector was informed by the plant equipment operator that anytime they add-lube oil to safety related equipment, a phone call must be made to the control room to verify the type of oil used. The inspector reviewed this item with the Unit 1 superintendent, who agreed to ensure that oil additions are more clearly recorde (b) Letdown Isolation Valve CV-525 Stroke Test During the.current outage, cables and conduit for CV-525 were rerouted to avoid interferehce with piping. 'In addition, the valve actuator was overhauled due to excessive leakage noted during recent LLRT-. The valve initially failed the post-maintenance stroke test which is part of the Operations In-Service.Valve'Testing (SO1-12.4-2, TCN 5-7).
The inspector observed the licensee efforts to correct the stroke time of-CV-525 by' adjusting the flow control valve on thevalve actuator. The valve was subsequently tested and the stroke time was found.to be satisfactor (c) South Charging Pump In-Service Testing The inspector observed the in-service test (IST) of the south charging pump (G-8B) which is performed to demonstrate the operability of the pump in compliance with the.Unit 1 technical specifications requirement 3.2. *The overall-in-service testing program for pumps is addressed in procedure SO1-V-2.14, Revision 6, TCN 6-2. Detailed IST for charging pumps is delineated in Procedure S01-V-2.14.11, Revision 1. The IST was conducted in accordance with applicable procedures and no discrepancies were identified. The inspector is currently reviewing IST data associated with this tes The results of this review will be documented in the next routine inspection repor (d) Diesel Generator No. 2 Post Maintenance Testing The diesel generator was overhauled during the current outage. The inspector observed the licensee preparations for the 15-minute and one-hour.no -load tests as part of the restoration and maintenance verification testing. The inspector also observed the cold crankshaft web deflection measurements. All measurements were within the acceptance criteria as stated in procedure S01-I-8.15, Revision 0, TCN 0-1 No violation or deviation was identifie..Followup of Water Hammer Event Check Valve Design (1) Following the Unit 1 water hammer event on November 21,- 1985, the licensee determined that the water hammer was caused by the simultaneous failure of five safety related check valves in the main feedwater.system. All of the valves which failed were Pacific swing type check valves. Two of the valves.(FWS-345 and 346) had failed completely, in that the valve disk had become disconnected from the hinge arm and was found lying in the.bottom of the-valve body. Three of the valves (FWS-398, 438, and-439) had degraded to the point of inoperability in that the disk to hinge arm nut had come loose, allowing the disk to offset such that disk antirotation lugs became wedge under the hinge arm, preventing proper seating of the dis (2) As a result of the failure of these check valves, the licensee initiated a program to evaluate the adequacy of Unit 1 check valve design and application. The -first part of this program involved a determination of the cause of the failure of the five feedwater check valve As documented in the April 8, 1986 "Investigation Report", the licensee has determined that the failure of.the five feedwater check valves was the result of a combination of effects involving: dangling of the valve disk in the flow stream; excessive flow turbulence due to the close proximity of three of the check valves to their respective flow regulating valves; and susceptibility to
degradation of the specific disk-to-hinge arm fastening configuration under these particular flow conditions. To correct this set of problems, the licensee took several actions. The Pacific check valve design was replaced with an Atwood Morrill design that eliminated the two piece disk and hinge configuration. The three feed regulator check valves were moved further downstream from their respective feed regulating valves. -The licensee conducted.testing of the new check valve design and flow configuration to demonstrate satisfactory performance under varying flow conditions. The licensee reviewed all available NPRDS check valve data, reviewed over 500 LER's involving check valves over the last 10 years, and conducted a telephone survey of 22 utilities regarding their experiences with check valves. The licensee has concluded that their corrective actions will preclude recurrence of.similar check valve failure The results of additional NRC inspection of the above activities will be included in the report to be issued by the IE, Vendor Program Branch, documenting a March 1986 site visi (3) The second part of the'licensee check valve review-program involved-efforts to determine whether any other Unit 1 check valves may have experienced similar failure mechanisms. The licensee implemented a four part program to.make this determinatio (a) Every Pacific check valve (29 total) in the plant was disassembled and inspected. One additional valve failure S
was discovered involving a feedwater heater check valve (FWH-437), on which the hinge pin had failed resulting in the disc and hinge arm falling to the bottom of the valve bod (b) A review of maintenance histories for all Unit 1 swing check valves (141 total maintenance orders) identifie five check valves which had required corrective maintenance involving problems with.valve internal These valves were disassembled and inspected and no problems were observe (c) Calculations were performed to identify which Unit 1 swing check valves would be expected to be.less than fully open during nominal operating conditions., A total of 15 check valves were identified, disassembled and inspected. All of these, valves were classified as involving turbulent flow in accordance with the 10 pipe diameters upstream and 5 pipe diameters downstream turbulence rule. Only one of these valves was determined to be-inoperable, a service and domestic water valve (SDW 002), which was observed to have excessive corrosion of the valve sea (d) A review of NPRDS check valve data indicated that certain models of Borg Warner, Crane, Kerotest and Pacific check valves have a.higher than normal failure rate. The
licensee has identified four checkyatves (one Borg Warner, one Crane-and two Kerotest) at SONGS: 1 of those experiencing the higher failure rat Disassembly and inspection of these valves identified no problems with the exception of one Kerotest spring loaded check valve on the gaseous nitrogen system (GNI i02)
which required seat lappin (4).The resident inspectors, independently reviewed the maintenance and testing histories for Unit 1 check valves and concluded that.the valves selected by the licensee;.for inspection were proper and sufficient. The inspectors also reviewed.the check valve configuration for several safety related systems to identify check valves whose failure could prevent proper safety system function. As a result of this. review, the inspector requested the licensee to inspect discharge check valves associated with the electric auxiliary feedwater pump. 'These valves were disassembled, inspected and found to be satisfactory. The.inspectors also observed several of the disassembled check valves and concurred with.the licensee operability determinations. (This inspection activity completes resident action on items 1.b.1, 1.b.2, l.b.3, 1. and'1.e.1.of NRC Action List Il for Unit 1 Return to Service). Check Valve Testing (1) The Unit 1 water hammer event clearly demonstrated that the manner in which the in-service testing (IST). program implemented by the licensee was not effective in detecting the failure of several.safety related check valve One of the most.significant 'failings of the program appears to be a lack of dedicated coghizant engineering leadership of the program in order to ensure proper interpretation of test results an priority of test.performance. This appears to be of special importance for Unit 1, which involves several unique plant design configuration (2) The generic aspects of,the adequacy of 1ST program implementation by licensees is currently under evaluation by the NRC offices of<IE and NRR, and their evaluations will. be reported separately'.
In light.of the specific'problems noted at San Onofre, the resident inspectors addres.sed their IST program.concerns with the licensee and requested that the specific program changes intended by.the licensee for Unit 1 return to se.rvice be identified. The licensee identified that the following IST'program 'changes would be implemented -for Unit 1 return to service:
(a) The Station Technical organization will assume responsibility for the.control of testing of all valve The program will be.revised to require that a minimum of
25% of all cold shutdown valves be tested each Mode 5 outage. The goal will be to test all valves, if time allow (b) Station Technical will organize and maintain a comprehensive, computerized.data base for all valves in the IST program. The cognizant, IST engineers will utilize this data base to:
o Track the testing status of each valv o Establish a technical performance base for each valv Provide maintenance and testing visibility to the IST engineer in order for him to adjust valve program testing frequency to ensure 'that the program remains responsive to current condition o Provide for data base review by the IST engineer to ensure that maintenance outage'work.on valves takes into account the valve's program performance. The'
Engineer will adjust testing interval on the basis of the Code requirements and his professional judgmen o Cold shutdow n interval valves will.be selected on the basis of the testing performance and -the maintenance history (i.e., the worst Performing valves will get tested more than others).
o Reports -will be provided to the cognizant engineer to identify problem valves which need design upgradin o The IST engineer will, on a periodic basis, issue trend reports to management identifying problem areas and to highlight trends. Trends that are of concern will be brought to theattention of the On-Site Review Committe c)'
The IST procedure for the six 10 inch'f'eedwater check valves downstream of the feed regulators will be revised to require a quantitative leak chec d)
The two 12 inch feedwater check valves on the'feed-pump discharge will be disassembled and inspected each refueling outag 'e) Station Technical will evaluate the current test requirements for all safety related' check valvesto ensure that the specified tests are.adequate to provide assurance of proper reverse flow check operabilit (3) The licensee identified that the following IST program changes were being evaluated and would be implemented within the next six months:
a)
Station Technical will complete an engineering review to develop new test techniques to allow more valves to be tested during-Mode 1 operatio b)
Station Technical will determine whether additional check valves warrant a quantitative leak chec c)
Station Technical will determine whether additional check valves which can not be readily tested warrant periodic disassembly and inspectio This is an open item (50-206/86-16-01). Exit Meeting On May 1,.1986, an exit meeting was conducted with the licensee representatives identified in Paragraph 1. The inspectors summarized the inspection. scope. and findings as described in this repor.
DETAILS. - PART 2 Inspector:
G. A. Brown, Emergency Prepardness Analyst (March 10-14, 1986) Persons Contacted R. Krieger, Operations Manager J. Schramm, Supervisor of Coordination G. Moore, Shift Superintendent R. Zarnonas, Nuclear Operations Assistant D.. Peacor, Supervisor Emergency.Preparedness D. Bennette, Emergency Preparedness
.
C...Wells, Program Coordination, Emergency Management Division, Orange County Fire Department'
T. Dailey, Fire Chief, City of San Clemente,,.California J. Stubb,:Emergency Planning Officer.City of San Clemente, California C. Ferguson, Emergency Planning Officer, Public Works Department, City of San Juan Capistrano, California' Background Emergency Preparedness-Related Events Prior to Reactor Trip The regular shift Control, Room crew was actively involved in tracing the origin of a ground fault along the electrical system supplied throughBus C. It becameapparent to the crew earlyin.the proceedings that Bus iC might have to be de-energized to locate the groun Since this bus supplied safety-related equipment, its de-energization would involve the declaration of an Unusual Event in accordance with their emergency plan. To expedite handling of this anticipated Unusual Event, the.Shift Superintendent (SS) had directed that, to-the extent possible, necessary paperwork be completed in advance of the declaration. He also directed members of his.-crew, such as the Nuclear Operations Assistant (Shift Communicator), to review applicable portions of the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs Additionally, the Shift Superintendent's (SS) immediate superior, the Supervisor of Coordination, was also present to assist in preparation Thus, prior to the2event, the licensee had a reinforced crew available, that was. already preparing for the declaration of an Unusual Event, although it was not the event that actually occurre Emergency Preparedness-Related Events After the Reactor Trip At the time of the reactor trip, five operators were in the Control Roo The Supervisor of Coordination had left the Control Room prior tothis occurrence but immediately returned when he heard the sounds of the reactor shutdown. He arrived at the Control Room before the lost power was restored. He.observedthat Control Room personnel were engrossed in mitigating the event and felt that any attemptson his part to actively participate would cause confusio '
among the crew members. He remained passive, observing the actions of the crew. He did take part in frequent conferences with :the SS and others about proposed actions.. This decision of the Supervisor of Coordination to remain passive, 'while proper, gave the SS the erroneous impression that the Supervisor of Coordination was fully informed on the plant status when he(SS) requested theSupervisor of Coordination to relieve' him of'his responsibilities as-the Emergency Coordinato Shortly after power was restored, the Supervisor of Coordination, at the request of the SS, assumed the responsibilities of Emergency Coordinator, with.a minimal turnover. The Emergency Coordinator's primary function is to direct the 'implementation of applicable provisions of'the emergency plan and EPIPs. His first actions were to declare the Unusual Event and begin notification of offsite authoritie Chronological Sequence of Emergency Preparedness Events Time Event 0450 Loss of power. Reactor manually trippe Initial Licensee's contact,.via ENS, with NRC Operations Center 0501 Second licensee contact, via ENS, with NRC Operations Cente Unusual Event declared 0507 Began notifying offsite authorities. Ring-down phones fail. Begin sequential notification using commercial phone'syste Notified dispatcher of Unusual Event 0525 Completed notification of offsite authorities 0532 NRC Resident Inspector contacted by licensee. He had already been advised of situation by NRC Headquarter Third licensee contact, via ENS, with NRC Operations Center 0558 Open-line communications established with.licensee, NRC Headquarters, and NRC Region V 0620 (Approximate) Licensee notifies NRC of Unusual Event 0640 Emergency Coordinator responsibilities SII
transferred to the Plant Manager from the Supervisor of Coordination. *Basis of Unusual Event classification' change.
Closed Unusual Event Evaluation of Plant Performanc Program Basis In compliance with 10 CFR 50.47.and 10 CFR 50.54(q), the licensee is required to maintain an approved emergency response plan that provides reasonable assurance-that adequate protective measures can, and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. The licensee's emergency plan addresses the duties and responsibilities of each member of the emergency response organization. It also provides for a standard emergency classification and emergency action level scheme. These Emergency Action Levels (EALs) provide criteria for. the standard classification of the severity of an emergency. Each level invokes specific response actions by the licensee's emergency organization as well as local, State and Federal agencies. During this occurrence, the least severe classification, Notification of Unusual Event, was declare Actions in response to this level of severity require only notification of offsite agencies and the NRC. Licensee actions toward the mitigation of the event are discussed elsewhere in this repor The following areas of the licensee's response were addressed during this special inspection:
(1) Emergency Detection and Classification (2) Notifications and Communications (3) Knowledge and Performance of Duties Event Related Aspects (1) Emergency Detection and Classification Pursuant to 10 CFR 54.47(b)(4) and 10.CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Sections IV.B and IV.C, this area was inspected to determine whether the licensee used and understood the standard emergency classification and action level scheme during this even The'inspector interviewed Control Room personnel and reviewed logs and other documents to determine the licensee's response to the event. The interviews and records examined showed that the licensee.promptly and properly classified the event using the appropriate classification procedures. However, the following adverse.actions related to the event were -noted:
The SS did not refer to the emergency classification procedure SO1-VIII-1 when he-made the initial status report to the NR In that report (the second ENS call), the SS alluded to the
possibility of an Alert declaration. This information was based on his own personal assessment of the situation and was given prior:to any reference to the EALs. This action'-was not consistent with the licensee's Procedure SO1-VIII-1 which re quires the SS, within 15 minutes of recognition of off normal conditions, to review the Event Category Tabs (EALs). The requirement implied that this review be done prior to making any attempts at classifications. Procedure S01-VIII-1 was revised to clearly require comletion of a notification form -for use in making notifications. The licensee also added coverag of this process to the EP training progra No violations were identified in this are (2) Notifications and Communications Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and (6) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D, this area was inspected to determine whether the licensee's ability to notify and communicate with its own personnel, offsite agencies and Federal authorities was adequat The inspector reviewed the licensee's notification procedures and records of notification... Representatives of offsite local government agencies were interviewed and their records pertaining to the event were examined to determine if they were in agreement with those of the license Notification of STA. The.licensee's Emergenicy.Operating Procedure (EOP) No. S01-1.0-11, in connection with an emergency declaration, requires the SS to verify the resence of the Shift Technical Advisor (8TA), or, if not present, to notify him of the event...
The STA is then required to report to the Control Room within 10 minutes. Contrary to this provision in the EOP, the SS did not notify the STA as required. However, the STA reported to the Control Room of his own volition in about 11 minutes of the event.. It was noted -that the requirement to notify the. STA was located in an obscure position.'in the EOP. The licensee revised this EOP to provide higher visibility and priority for'notification of the ST This procedure revision relocated the STA notification requirement to the first step after the completion of immediate actions. The notification requirementwas also added to the EOP at steps where the procedure could be terminated. This corrective action appears adequat General Announcement of. Emergency Coordinator Change. *A provision in the licensee's EPIP No. S0123-VIII-10 requires that a general announcement be made to all personnel notifying them when a change in Emergency Coordinators occurs. The Supervisor of Coordination did not make this announcement when he assumed the responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinato His failure to make this announcement resulted in confusion regarding the identity of the Emergency Coordinator. For
example, the station log erroneously indicated that the Station Manager relieved the SS as Emergency Coordinator, when, in fact,-it was the Supervisor of Coordination who was relieved.,
This will be examined during a future inspection (Followup Item No. 50-206/86-16-02).
NRC Notification of Unusual Event Classification. -It was determined that offsite notifications were made in a timely manner. The content of the emergency messages was reviewed and discussed with.licensee representatives as well as representatives of local government agencies. The messages met the guidance of NUREG-0654, Sections II.E.3 and II. However, the NRC was not specifically made.aware of the Unusual Event declaration within the time require CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i) and 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3) require that the licensee notify the NRC of the declaration of any emergency class immediately after notification of appropriate State and local agencies, and not later than one hour after'the time the licensee declares one-of the Emergency Classes. The Unusual Event was declared at 0506, but it was after 0615 before the words "declared an Unusual Event" were spoken to the NR However, since the NRC was cognizant of the plant status through open-line communications established'at 0558 and had been apprised of the licensee's situation on three prior communications, the only action lacking was providing the official statement of Unusual Event. This lack of formal'
statement was not construed as a violation of the requiremen 'It was-noted, however, that had the licensee.adhered t provisions in the EPIPs, the NRC would have been properly notified of the declaration in a timely manneras a matter of course., As corrective action, the licensee revised Procedure S0123-VIII-30.1, "Shift Communicator Duties," to make the shift communicator responsible for the.initial' NRC notification (of change in emergency classification) immediately following notification of offsite authorities. This corrective action is considered appropriat Training provided to members of the emergency response organi zation was also 'reviewed. It was noted that the.licensee's program provided a great deal of training which addressed the more serious emergency'events, but relatively*little training in handling the levels of emergency which personnel are more likely to encounter, e.g., the Unusual Event and Alert level emergencies. This was addressed by improvements in the licensee's EP training progra (3) Spurious Ringing of ENS Phones Loss of power at the onset of the event initiated spurious ringing of the Emergency Notification System telephones at both the site and NRC Headquarters. This spurious.ringing initiated communications prematurelybetween the site and NRC, before the licensee had an opportunity to assess the situation. This premature contact resulted in confusion for both parties during
the early stages-'of the event. An investigation by the licensee for the cause of this spurious ringing revealed that it was due to a.Lorain inverter cycling. When main power was interrupted, the inverter could take up to 700 milliseconds't cycle through and transfer to the battery power source. The inverter is activated only after a drop to 10 volts from the normal 120 volts. The Lorain inverter normally cycles-in 14-22 milliseconds, however, if a longer time span-occurs during cycling,.such as during a transformer shift, the signalling frequency tone will drop to an abnormally low level, causing the phone to inadvertently ring. The licensee has corrected this problem by switching the main power source to DC power and using AC power as';its back-up'source.. This corrective action by the licensee appears adequate to prevent recurrenc '(4)
Emergency Notification Ring-Down Phones-Because three.separate emergency notification systems failed, The licensee was forced to rely on individual sequential telephone calls.over the commercial system to make the required offs-ite notifications. These failures caused.a delay. in completing. the notifications.' Notifications to -the counties were completed within 15 minutes and to all offsite agencies within an"Acceptable 19"minutes of the declaratio However, had.the ring-down' systems been operable, notification <could have' been completed sooneir. -The.icensee must ensure that emergency notification ring-down phone'systems 4re reliable after 'loss of power events. This' will, be tracked as 'Followup Item No. 50-206/86-16-0 No violations were identified in this are (5) Knowledgi and Performance of Duties '
Pursuant to 10,CFR 50.47(b)(15)'and 10 CFR Part50,' Appendix E,Section IV.F, this area-was inspected to' determine'whether emergency response personnel understood their.emergency response roles and performed their assigned functions eduring this even The inspector examined jogs and documents relating to this event and conducted interviews with selected key members of the emergency organization during this event. The inspector concluded that, in general, the individuals-performin emergency response 'roles during this event were" familiar-with emergency procedures and equipment. However, the following adverse actions related to the event were noted:
The SS and the Supervisor of Coordination did not follow the
- procedure.in transferring the responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator position. Attachment 2 to Procedure. SO123-VIII-10,
"Turnover Status", requires that the plant status be recorded at the time of the turnover. Failure to follow this procedure
resulted in an inadequate turnover to the Supervisor of Coordination with subsequent inaccurate information being provided to the NRC regarding plant condition This concern was.addressed:by revision of procedure S01-VIII-1 as discussed in paragraph 3.b('1).
(6) Documentation A review of the licensee s documentation and recordkeeping during the event revealed several instances of erroneous and conflicting data. For example:
(a) There was no indication in either the Station Log or the Shift Superintendent's Log that the Supervisor of Coordination had ever assumed' the duties of Emergency Coordinator. "In fact, the Station Log erroneously indicated that the SS was acting as the Eme.rgency Coordi nator up until the.time he was relieved by the Plant Manage (b) The Emergency Coordinator's Log conflicts with the Station Log and.the-Shift.'Superintendent's Log regarding the time of transfer of the Emergency Coordinator s duties to the Plant Manager. The Emergency Coordinator's Log indicates that the' transfer took place at 0640 while the' other two logs indicate that it occurred at 0702 hour0.00813 days <br />0.195 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.67111e-4 months <br /> (c) 'Message No. 4 to offsite authorities contained conflicting and confusing time It indicated-that it was issued at 0850, but its purpose was to.close out the event at 0941, 51 minutes in the futur (d) The Shift Communicator Log'was maintained alternately by several unidentified individual No means is provided for identifying which individual made a particular entr This makes reconstruction of an event difficult when a particular entry.needs,'clarificatio No violations were identified in this area. However, the following should be considered for program improvement:
Place more emphasis in proper record keeping' in the training progra.
Exit 'Interview At the conclusion of the March 11-14, 1986 special inspection a summary of the findings was presented to the licensee.. Messrs. D. Peacor and Bonnette represented'the licensee. The licensee was informed that none of the findings appeared to be violations of NRC regulations.,