IR 05000361/1998007
| ML20236V609 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236V599 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-98-07, 50-361-98-7, 50-362-98-07, 50-362-98-7, NUDOCS 9808040081 | |
| Download: ML20236V609 (17) | |
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EtLCLOSURE 2
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 4 Docket Nos.: 50-361 50-362 License Nos.: NPF-10 NPF-15 )
l Report No.: l 50-361/98-07 3 50-362/98-07 Licensee: Southern California Edison C Facility; San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 Location: 5000 S. Pacific Coast Hw San Clemente, California Dates: June 7 through July 11,1998 Inspectors.- J. A. Sloan, Senior Resident inspector H. A. Freeman, Resident inspector J. G. Kramer, Resident inspector J. J. Russell, Resident inspector Approved By: Howard J. Wong, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch E ATTACHMENT: SupplementalInformation i
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9808040081 980722 i
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY !
l San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unik 2 and 3 NRC inspection Report 50-361/98-07; 50-362/98-07 i k
This routine, announced inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. This report covers a 5-week period of resident inspectio t Qp_crations
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Operators adequately assessed a Unit 2 condenser off-gas radiation monitor alar However, validation of the alarm was weak in that the validation instrument listed in the alarm response procedure was available, but not used, and the alarm response procedure was not clear on whether use of the listed validation instrument was required k or merely informational (Section 01.2).
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An unresolved item was opened to review the licensee'a seismic analysis and evaluate the licensee's corrective actions of an incorrectly racked out 480 volt circuit breake The initiallicensee evaluation of the cause and consequences of the condition was not thorcegh in that it did not include a seismic evaluation of the breaker found in a condition not previously analyzed. Plant operators missed opportunities to identify the incorrectly racked out breaker during operator rounds (Section O2.1).
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A nuclear plant equipment operator's performance during routine rounds was good in that the operator monitored equipment status beyond what was required to be logged, documented equipment deficiencies, and corrected minor housekeeping problems. The operator displayed in-depth knowledge of the plant equipment (Section 04.1).
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+ l L! censed opetator simulator training was effective and relevant during the one scenario observed. Crew actions in response to various failures, with the reactor at low power during a startup, were good. Crew supervisors and instructors provided good coaching in manual feedwater control and in the crew response to various decision points. The use of a low power scenario, given various low power industry events, was good (Section 05.1).
A violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, was identified as the result of the licensee's abnormal operating instruction for severe weather being inadequate. The procedure did not differentiate between various disaster or weather conditions, did not establish entry conditions for severe weather that were consistent with the weather classifications that were used by the National Weather Service (NWS), and did not prioritize or require accomplishment actions within an appropriate time period. This
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resulted in operator uncertainty during implementation of the procedure when funnel clouds were sighted over the water near the facility on March 31,1998. Additionally, Operations management and shift supervision demonstrated weak attention to the review of a proposed procedure change in that a question for screening the change to r
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-3-determine if a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was required was not correctly answered (Section 08.1).
Maintenance
An Operations crew's performance during a control element assembly (CEA) quarterly operability test was good in that the evolution was properly supervised, operator distractions were minimized, and attention to detail effectively ensured compliance with the surveillance requirement without entering Technical Specification (TS) action requirements (Section M1.3).
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Good plant material condition was being maintained, although three isolated minor deficiencies were identified (Section M2.1).
The identification of a flow instrument tubing fitting deficiency by instrument and Control (l&C) personnel demonstrated good awareness of conditions outside the scope of their immediate assignment. Although the Boiler and Condenser (B&C) technicians who had installed the new tubing had identified a problem with the 3-way valve threading at the fitting location, they were not knowledgeable of the specific thread engagement requirement for the fitting (Section M4.1) .
Plant Sucoort
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A noncited violation of TS 3.7.9 (effective prior to August 5,1996) was identified as the result of a fire damper having been omitted from a listing in a surveillance procedure following a 1993 design modification. The damper had failed a drop test in February 1996, and the omission was identified during an internal licensee audit in December 1997. The corrective actions from previous missed surveillance issues would not reasonably have identified or prevented this violation. The licensee's corrective l actions were prompt and thorough (Section F8.1).
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Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 2 operated at essentially 100 percent power from the beginning of this inspection period until July 11,1998, when power was reduced to approximately 80 percent to support heat treatment of the circulating water and saltwater cooling systems. The unit ended this inspection ;
period opereting at 80 percent powe Unit 3 operated at essentially 100 percent power throughout this inspection period, except for reducing power to C0 percent on June 13-14,1998, to support heat treatment of the circulating water and saltwater cooling system l. Operat19nt 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
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The inspectors observed routine and nonroutine operational activities throughout this inspection period. Some of the activities observed included:
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Responding to burned relay in blowdown processing system (Unit 2)
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Responding to annunciator for turbine building sump high radioactivity (Unit 3)
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Realigning charging pumps (Unit 3)
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Diluting the reactor coolant system to control the axial shape index during a xenon transient (Unit 2)
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Shift turnovers (Units 2 and 3)
Operators were thorough and methodical in preparing for and conducting routine evolutions. Close management and supervisory oversight of operational activities were
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evident. Procedure use and operator communications were consistent with licensee '
management expectations. Specific comments on activities are discussed belo '01.2 Ooerator Alarm Resoonse - Unit 2 Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors reviewed Unit 2 control operator fogs and observed that on May 11,1998, at 12:30 a.m., the Unit 2 main condenser off-gas wide range gas Monitor 2RE7870 alarmed for about 10 minutes. The inspectors reviewed the operator response to this alarm and the cause of the alarm.
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Radiation Monitor 2RE7870, in conjunction with the main steam line and steam generator blowdown radiation monitors, is the primary indication of steam generator tube leakage. On April 30,1998, operators generated Action Request (AR) 980402681 when Radiation Monitor 2RE7870 displayed unexpected increases in release rate. The monitor did not alarm, but was displaying occasional iacreases in release rate that were not reflected in any of the other radiation monitors referenced above. Radiation Monitor 2RE7818A, main condenser off-gas wide range gas monitor (a wide range gas monitor that is not environmentally qualified, but measures essentially the same parameters as Radiation Monitor 2RE7870), did not indicate any elevation in activit Since April 28,1998, Radiation Monitor 2RE7870 had exhibited four unexplained elevations in activity, but none had reached the alarm set point. The alarm set point was two decades above the normal reading. The radiation monitor was declared operable throughou The operators compared the Radiation Monitor 2RE7870 readings to the other radiation monitors described above and verified that no significant tube leakage was present. In the past, leakage from the radioactive waste system, not caused by steam generator tube leakage, had caused elevated Radiation Monitor 2RE7870 reading Radiation Monitor 2RE7870 alarmed for about 10 minutes on May 11,1998, then drifted back to the normal reading over approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The inspectors reviewed Alarm Response Procedure SO23-15-60.A2, Window 60A46, " Secondary Radiation Hi," and observed that the procedure required validating the reading. The validation instrument listed in the procedure was a grab sample, although the procedure did not explicitly require that a grab sample be taken. The procedure stated that, when verifying alarm validity, all available indications and information sources should be used. On May 11, 1998, operators did not direct that a grab sample be taken, but instead relied on other j indications, concluding that the alarm of Radiation Monitor 2RE7870 was invalid. The I inspectors considered the failure to use the primary validation instrument listed in the alarm response procedure to be a performance weakness, although the operators'
overall assessment of the alarm was adequat The operators took sufficient actions to ensure that no significant steam generator tube leakage was present. Potential paths for the release of radioactive gas to the environment were being monitored and recorded by the licensee, in accordance with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Actions to monitor and record offsite releases were !
independent of the failure to perform the grab sampl l The Operations plant superintendent stated that the procedure was unclear on whether the listed validation instrument was information only or was a required validation instrument. He stated that he would clarify the expectation for the operators. He considered that the operators had acted conservatively in assessing the alarm.
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-3-1.ater, on May 11,1998, Radiation Monitor 2RE7870 was declared inoperable and removed from service for maintenance. Although no definitive equipment deficiency was identi'ied, an aluminum sheath that protected the radiation monitor photoelectric tube from ligid and the process flow was replaced, and, when the radiation monitor was returned to servie on May 14,1998, the unexplained high readings stopped. Licensee system engineers sucected that the aluminum sheath had allowed moisture intrusion into the electronics, causir.g faulty readings. However, these faulty readings would not prevent the monitor from respoi ding to actual process flow radioactivit Conclusions Operators adequately assessed a Unit 2 condenser off-gas radiation monitor alar However, validation of the alarm was weak in that the validation instrument listed in the alarm response procedure was available, but not used, and the alarm response procedure was not clear on whether use of the listed validation instrument was required or merely informationa O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Circuit Breaker Racked Out Incorrectiv - Unit 3 Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors performed a walkdown of the electrical switchgear room and observed an incorrectly racked out 480 volt breaker. The inspectors discussed the observation with the shift superintendent (SS). The inspectors reviewed Procedure SO23-6-3.1,
"lTE 480 Volt Air Circuit Breakers," Revision 5, and ARs 970701611 and 98060329 Observations and Findinos On June 27,1998, the inspectors observed that Breaker 380418 (control room emergency air conditioning Unit E418 feeder from Unit 3) was incorrectly racked out in the disconnect position; the racking shutter was not in the lowered position. The inspectors informed the SS about the breaker position and the breaker was subsequently racked in approximately one-half turn to get the shutter to drc On June 27, the licensee initiated AR 980603290 to document the condition. The AR included an Event Record-Level 4 assignment that was intended to capture trend information only. On July 2, the inspectors questioned the licensee about the need to perform a seismic evaluation of the breaker in the as-found condition. On July 8, the l licensee revisited the AR and subsequently generated a deportability assignment that willinclude a seismic evaluatio Procedure SO23-6-3.1, precaution Step 4.10, and the caution prior to Step 6.1.1 state, in part, that the racking shutter window is indexed to close in the disconnect, test, and connect positions. The shutter window must be closed in all positions when racking
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l-4-operations have been completed. The inspectors observed that the operator that racked out the breaker did not perform the required actions of the procedure. The intent of the cautions was to ensure the circuit breakers were left in a seismically qualified position This issue was considered an unresolved item pending NRC evaluation of the l licensee's seismic analysis and corrective actions (URI 362/98007-01).
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On July 9,1998, the inspectors discussed the condition with the Operations manage The manager indicated that the breaker was racked out on May 26,1998, and that was probably when the shutter was left open. The nuclear plant equipment operators pecrformed shiftly rounds that included the switchgear rooms. The operators did not identify the incorrectly racked out breaker during these round Conclusions An unresolved item was opened to review the licensee's seismic analysis and evaluate the licensee's corrective actions of an incorrectly racked out 480 volt circuit breake The initiallicensee evaluation of the cause and consequences of the condition was not thorough in that it did not include a seismic evaluation of the breaker found in a condition not previously analyzed. Plant operators missed opportunities to identify the incorrectly racked out breaker during operator round Operator Knowledge and Performance (71707)
04.1 Ooerator Rounds - Unit 3 On June 30,1998, the inspectors accompanied a nuclear plant equipment upwtor (Position 33) during rounds and observed the operator's performance. The operator appropriately logged the required parameters. The operator's performance during routine rounds was good in that the operator monitored equipment status beyond what was required to be logged, documented equipment deficiencies, and corrected minor housekeeping problems. The operator displayed in-depth knowledge of the plant equipmen Operator Training and Qualification 05.1 Ooerator Recualification Trainina on Simulator - Units 2 and_.3 l Insoection Scoce (71707)
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On July 8,1998, the inspectors observed licensed operator requailification training conducted in the simulato Observations and Findinas The operators were given a simulator scenano that began at approximately 14 percent reactor power, the reactor fuel near end of life, and a plant startup in progress. Three l
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-5-separate failures were introduced that caused a loss of automatic steam generator feed (which the operators restored), an increase beyond programmed steam generator level of automatic steam generator feed, then a loss of the steam bypass control functio The operators were also given an initial core axial shape index that required adjustment, and the instructors provided training on the effects of boron and xenon while performing this adjustment. The operators effectively mitigated the failures introduced, when reasonably achievable, and manually tripped the reactor when appropriate. The instructors provided good coaching on manual steam generator feedwater control, and the crew supervision was active in using opportunities to coach crew members and to evaluste the crew response to various decision points. The use of a scenario that involved low power reactor operations was good, and appropriate actions at this power level were reinforced by a summary of various low power industry event Conclusions Licensed operator simulator training was effective and relevant. Crew actions in response to various failures, with the reactor at low power during a startup, were goo Crew supervisors and instructors provided good coaching in manual feedwater control and in the crew response to various decision points. The use of a low power scenario, given various low power industry events, was goo Miscellaneous Operations issues (90712,92901)
08.1 (Closed) Unresolved item 361: 362/98004-01: licensee response to funnel cloud sighting insoection Scoce
, This unresolved item involved assessment of both the process the licensee used to respond to severe weather conditions on March 31,1998, and the information prvided by the licensee in a letter to the NRC dated April 28,1998. The inspectors also reviewed Abnormal Operating Instruction (AOI) SO23-13-8, ' Severe Weather,"
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, Observations and Findinos l AOI SO23-13-3, " Natural Disaster / Severe Weather," Temporary Change Notice 4-2, l'
Entry Condition 5, states " Notification by the Generation Operations Center or Grid l Control Center of the following . . . Tornado (or waterspout) warning. On
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March 31,1998, the Grid Control Center notified the Units 2 and 3 control room of a special marine warning for waterspouts in the area. Consequently, the entry condition for AOI SO23-13-3 was met. The inspectors reviewed AOI SO23-13-3 and the procedure modification permit initiated on March 31,1998, allowing the SS to perform steps of the AO! at his discretion. As discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-361; 362/98-04, the inspectors found that the 10 CFR 50.59 screening criteria for use of the procedure modification permit had not been properly completed because a
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-6-question as to whether the procedure change would alter system performance or the design configuration was answered "no."
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's April 28,1998, letter to the NRC and had telephone discussions on May 7,1998, with an NWS Warning Coordinator Meteorologist for San Diego. The letter stated, in part, that based on NWS radar, the NWS determined that tornados would not develop over land. Based on the telephone discussion, the inspectors found that the NWS was tracking the weather system off the coast from the site and determined that the intensity of the system was weakening as it approached land. Based on this determination, a land-based tornado warning was not issued. The meteorologist also stated that there was no particular weather '
phenomenon that would have precluded formation of funnel clouds over land that day given a change in the weather patterns; however, no funnel clouds over land had been observed or reported. The inspectors found that this information had not been readily available to the control room operators during the morning of March 31,199 Consequently, the sighting of funnel clouds off the coast of the plant inferred the possibility of a tornado at the plant, and was a reasonable entry condition for AOI SO23-13- No abnormal winds were recorded at the site around the time of the funnel cloud sighting. However, normal wind speed at the site is not a condition that could preclude a tornado touching down at the sit AOi SO23-13-3 contained a note at the beginning of Attachment 4, " Severe Weather Preparations," which stated that severe weather notifications were usually issued 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to the impending condition. The inspectors found that, in general, AOI SO23-13-3 was written assuming that a 24-hour window of preparation would be available in advance of a hurricane or a tornado approaching the site. The AO.I required such actions as removing vehicles from the protected area and adjacent parking lots, supplementing watch stations with additional personnel, and placing nitrogen cylinders in the emergency diesel buildings for additional reserve starting air capacity. While the inspectors considered these actions to be conservative, the inspectors also found that the AO! made no differentiation between preparations for severe weather that approached the site without 24-hour advance notification and severe weather that approached with 24-hour advance notification. The AOI used the same preparatory actions for a tornado that may approach the site with short advance notice, and a hurricane system for which the site may have days of advance notice. The AO! also made no differentiation between actions described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to be taken to protect safety-related systems from high winds, and other actions that were conservative, but no: design basis of the plant. The inspectors found that AOI SO23-13-3 was awkward to imp:ement for severe weather with little I
l advance warning, during which design basis configuration actions should be prioritized before more conservative measures. In this respect, the AOI was not thoroughly validated prior to issue for use. Neither the AOi, nor the UFSAR, differentiated between low-energy and high-energy tornados or waterspouts, in terms of using the destructive potential of a storm system, to determine what actions were required to be performed.
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-7-The AOI was quality affecting, and performance of some of the steps of the AOI was necessary to meet the design basis requirements for missile barriers as stated in the UFSAR, Section 3.5.3, " Barrier Design Procedures," and Table 3.5-12, " Missile Barriers For Tornado Missiles."
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, states, in part, that " Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances." AOI SO23-13-3 was not appropriate for the circumstances in that they did not differentiate between various disaster or weather conditions, did not establish entry conditions for severe weather that were consistent with the weather classifications that were used by the National Weather Service, and did
not prioritize or require accomplishment actions within an appropriate time period, '
resulting in uncertainty during implementation of the AOI when funnel clouds were sighted over the water near the facility on March 31,1998. The AOl was quality affecting, and performance of some of the steps of the AOI was necessary to meet the design basis requirements for missile barriers, as stated in the UFSAR, Section 3.5.3,
" Barrier Design Procedures," and Table 3.5-12, " Missile Barriers For Tornado Missiles" (Violation 361; 362/98007-02).
The licensee corrective action was to issue revised AOI SO23-13-3, " Earthquake,"
Revision 3, and new AOI SO23-13-8, " Severe Weather," Revision 0. AOI SO23-13-8 clarified entry conditions and provided for greater flexibility of use, including prioritizing actions and more clearly directing which actions were required to be taken under varying weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed AOl SO23-13-8, Revision 0, and found that it provided adequate instruction to the operators. The inspector determineri that the corrective actions were acceptabl Conclusions A violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, was identified as the res, ult of the licensee's abnormal operating instruction for severe weather being inadequate. The procedure did not differentiate between various disaster or weather conditions, did not establish entry conditions for severe weather that were consistent with the weather ;
classifications that were used by the National Weather Service, and did not prioritize or I require accomplishment actions within an appropriate time period, resulting in operator uncertainty during implementation of the procedure when funnel clouds were sighted over the water near the facility on March 31,1998. Additionally, Operations j management and shift supervision demonstrated weak attention to review of a proposed ;
procedure change in that a question for screening the change to determine if a l 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was required was not correctly answere l 08.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 361/98-007-00: potential debris in containment
' l emergency sumps. This LER was a minor issue and was close '
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i-8-II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments Insoection Scope (62707)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activi+ies:
Clean, inspect, and adjust the closed limit switch for saltwater cooling Pump 3MP112 discharge isolation Valve 3HV6200 (Unit 3)
Clean and remove irregular metal from the flywheel on Emergency Diesel Generator 3G002 20-cylinder engine (Unit 3)
Calibrate Emergency Diesel Generator 3G002 20-cylinder engine lube oil high temperature Switch 3TSH5965A (Unit 3)
Calibrate saltwater cooling Pump 3MP113 seal water flow Instrument 3FISL6385 following replacement of tubing (Unit 3)
Rebuild auxiliary feed Pump 3MP504 hydrazine feed isolation Valve S31305MU554 (Unit 3)
Install a freeze seal on fire waterjockey Pumps MP223 and MP224 common miniflow line (Units 2 and 3) Observations and Findinas The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be thorough. All work observed was performed with the work package present and in active use. Technicians were knowledgeable and professional. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present whenever required by procedure. When applicable, appropriate radiation ,
controls were in plac In addition, see the specific discussion of maintenance observed under Section M4.1, belo M1.2 General Comments on Surveillance Activities l
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The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activity:
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Diesel generator fuel oil storage tank water accumulation surveillance (Units 2 and 3)
In addition, see the specific discussion of a surveillance activity observed under Section M1.3, belo Observations and Findinas The inspectors found all surveillance performed under these activities to be thoroug All surveillance observed were performed with the work package present and in active use. Technicians were knowledgeable and professional. When applicable, appropriate security controls were in plac M1.3 CEA Quarterly Operability Test - Unit 3 Insoection Scooe (61726)
The inspectors observed the operators perform the CEA quarterly operability test and reviewed Procedure SO23-3-3.5, "CEA/ Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker Operability Testing," Revision Observations and Findinas
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On June 27,1998, the inspectors observed the control room operators perform Procedure SO23-3-3.5, Attachment 1, "CEA Quarterly Operability Test." The control room staff appropriately minimized unnecessary distractions during the evolution. The operators used closed loop communications during the test. The control room '
supervisor directly monitored each CEA insertion and withdrawal. The operators moved the CEAs at least 5 inches as required by TS Surveillance Requirement 3.1.5.3, but not more than 7 inches from the group to ensure compliance with the TS limiting condition
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l Conclusions An Operations crew's performance during a CEA quarterly operability test was good in that the evolution was properly supervised, operator distractions were minimized, and attention to detail was used to ensure compliance with the surveillance requirement without entering TS action requirement I
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-10- I M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment I
M2.1 Beview of Material Condition Durina Plant Tours - Units 2 and 3 Insoection Scoce (62707)
During this inspection period, the inspectors conducted routine plant tours and evaluated plant material conditio Observations and Findinas Most equipment and plant areas appeared to be well maintaine On June 27,1998, the inspectors observed a cart with test equipment not seismically restrained in the Unit 3 control element drive mechanism control system room. The inspectors informed the SS of the situation and the SS contacted l&C personnel who subsequently secured the cart. Maintenance management indicated that leaving the cart unsecured during a lunch break was allowed by Procedure SO123-1-1.20, " Seismic Controls," and met managements expectations. The inspectors concluded that leaving the cart unsecured for extended periods of time was not a good seismic control practic On June 29,1998, the inspectors identified a section of an absorbent cleanup rag on the guard of the air start pinion for Emergency Diesel Generator 3G002. The inspectors informed the SS, who subsequently had the operators verify the cleanliness of the air start motors on the engines on both units. The licensee initiated an AR and assessed the engine as being operabl On July 5,1998, the inspectors observed a light chair left unsecured adjacent to t
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 3MP504. The inspectors considered that although the chair was adjacent to important safety equipment, it presented very little hazard because it was so light. The licensee promptly removed the chai Concluccqs Good plant material condition was being maintained, although three isolated minor deficiencies were identifie M4 Maintenance Staff Knuwiedge and Performance M4.1 Graft Knowledae of Tubino Fittina Requirements - Unit 3 Insoection Scoce (62707)
On July 7,1998, the inspectors observed an l&C technician calibrating the seal water flow instrument for saltwater cooling water Pump 3MP113.
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-11- .Qb.pervations and Findinas The calibration was a disposition step for a r,onconformance report. The previous
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disposition step, completed by B&C personnel on the preceding night shift, had been to
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replace the safety-related tubing between the root valves and the flow instrument 3-way
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valv Before actually beginning the calibration, the l&C technician and his foreman observed that a fitting for the new tubing at the low pressure connection on the 3-way valve was not engaged as fully as the fitting on the high pressure connection. The l&C foreman informed the day shift B&C foreman of the deficienc The night shift B&C foreman initiated AR 980700582 upon returning to work, documenting that the threads on the 3-way valve had been successfully repaired. The foreman informed the inspectors, however, that the B&C personnel had not been aware of guidance requiring that the threads of that type fitting be fully engaged. B&C personnel had subsequently tightened the fitting to fully engage the thread The acting Maintenance manager stated that the training of the B&C craft would be reviewed to ensure the fitting requirements were included, and that the applicable
. procedure would be reviewed to ensure adequate information was included. The
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inspectors considered these actions appropriat Conclusions The identification of a flow instrument tubing fitting deficiency by l&C personnel demonstrated good awareness of conditions outside the scope of their immediate assignment. Although the B&C technicians who had installed the new tubing had identified a problem with the 3-way valve threading at the fitting location, they were not l knowledgeable of the specific thread engagement requirement for the fittin IV. Plant Suonort F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection issues (92700)
F (Closed) LER 361/97-016-00: fire damper not in TS data bas This report regarded a fire damper that, on February 6,1996, was found not to be able to function properly and had also inadvertently been omitted from a listing of dampers in a surveillance procedure. This resulted in the damper not having been tested as required by Surveillance Requirement 4.7.9.2, which was in effect prior to August 5, 1996. The licensee had failed to add the damper to the listing in August 1993 after a design modification had been completed requiring a floor in the radioactive waste building to be credited as a fire barrier, subject to TS 3.7.9. The omitted damper is a penetration sealing device in that floor. The surveillance requirement was moved from the TS to the Licensee Controlled Specifications in August 1996. The omission from the e
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-12-surveillance procedure was identified by the licensee during an internal audit on December 2,1997, and the licensee successfully performed the required surveillance of the damper on the same date. The surveillance procedure was corrected, the audit was completed, and the event was reviewed with appropriate licensee personnel. The failure to have performed the required surveillance of the damper, or to implement the required actions for an inoperable damper, was a violation of TS 3.7.9. The inspectors reviewed the scope of corrective actions taken in response to other missed surveillance requirements since the implementation of the improved TS (in August 1996) and determined that those corrective actions would not reasonably have identified or prevented this violation. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NEG Enforcement Policy (NCV 361; 362/98007-03).
V. Management Mestinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the exit meeting on July 14,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie i
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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION l
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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Licensee i J. Fee, Manager, Maintenance G. Gibson, Manager, Compliance f D. Herbst, Manager, Site Quality Assurance M. Herschthal, Manager, Station Technical (Acting)
J. Hirsch, Manager, Chemistry l R. Krieger, Vice President, Nuclear Generation f
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i J. Madigan, Manager, Health Physics
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D. Nunn, Vice President, Engineering and Technical Services K. Slagle, Manager, Nuclear Oversight l T. Vogt, Plant Superintendent, Units 2 and 3 R. Waldo, Manager, Operations INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
! IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
! IP 62707: Maintenance Observations
! IP 71707: Plant Operations l
lP 92700: On Site LER Review l
IP 92712: Inoffice Review of LER IP 92901: Followup - Operations
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l ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
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Ooened 50-362/98007-01 URI circuit breaker racked out incorrectly Ooened and Closed 50-361; 362/98007-02 VIO licensee response to funnel cloud sighting l 50-361;362/98007-03 NCV fire damper not in technical specification data base
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Closed 50-361; 362/98004-01 URI licensee response to funnel cloud sighting 50-361/98007-00 LER potential debris in containment emergency sumps 50-361/98016-00 LER fire damper not in technical specification data base r
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2-LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AO! abnormal operating instruction AR action request B&C boiler and condenser CEA control element assembly I&C instrument and control LER licensee eveni report NWS national weather service PDR Public Document Room SS shift superintendent TS technical specifications UFSAR updated final safety analysis report URI unresolved item l
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