IR 05000361/1998006
| ML20236M180 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236M177 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-98-06, 50-361-98-6, 50-362-98-06, 50-362-98-6, NUDOCS 9807130329 | |
| Download: ML20236M180 (16) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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l Docket Nos.: 50-361
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50-362
License Nos.: NPF-10 l NPF-15 l Report No.: 50-361/98-06 50-362/98-06
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Licensee: Southern California Edison C l Facility: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 :
Location: 5000 S. Pacific Coast Hw San Clemente, California l Dates: April 26 through June 6,1998 l Inspectors: J. A. Sloan, Senior Resident inspector
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J. G. Kramer, Resident 5spector J. J. Russell, Resident inspector
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Approved By: Howard J. Wong, Chief, Branch E Division of Reactor Projects r -
ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information i
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I 9807130329 990630 l PDR ADOCK 05600361 l- G PDR
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l-2-l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I
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. San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3
NRC Inspection Report 50-361/98-06; 50-362/98-06 i L ; This routine announced inspection included aspects of licensee operations maintenance, ,
engineering, and plant support. This. report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
p, -Ooerations
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Operators were thorough and methodical in preparing for and conducting routine .
evolutions. Close management and supervisory oversight of operational activities was L evident.' Procedure use and operator communications were good (Section 01.1).
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~ identifying a small pressurizer level deviation prior to any annunciation. Operator -
actions in response to the deviation were well controlled and illustrated good diagnostic L
I skills (Section 01.2).
y Maintenance .
The licensee's preventive maintenance program was weak in that it did not provide for periodic inspection or maintenance of the gaskets on the electrolyte withdrawal assemblies on the Class 1E batteries. Many of the gaskets were degraded, although all -
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l and Maintenance's response to the inspector-identified gasket degradation was l: thorough and included comprehensive corrective actions (Section M2.1).
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The inspectors identified a weakness in procedural adherence during the performance and supervisory review of a surveillance test.' Electrical Maintenance technicians did not follow the p'roceduralized guidance in determining the desired (but not required)
accuracy of the' control room pressurizer heater ammeter and, thereforedid not identify
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an inaccurate ammeter. In addition, the electrical test supervisor's review of the heater capacity / operability verification data record missed the discrepancy (Section M4.1).'
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The week-by-week self-evaluation of maintenance activities, recently begun by .
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Maintenance personnel to improve efficiency, was comprehensive and self-critical -
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A noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.4.10 was identified as a result of pressurizer. safety valve setpoints being out of tolerance. The licensee's corrective
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actions, following discovery of the out-of-tolerance condition, were acceptable'
.-(Section M8.1).
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Enaineerina l
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A noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion lil, was identified as a result of the component cooling water (CCW) backup nitrogen system (BNS) design being inadequate. The design basis for the BNS was not correctly translated into design specifications, resulting in the operability of the BNS not assuring that sufficient pressure ;
j would remain in the CCW surge tanks under design basis conditions (Section E8.1). I
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Plant Sucoort
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The Operations manager demonstrated excellent leadership while acting as emergency coordinator in the technical support center (TSC) during an emergency preparedness drill. This was illustrated by high quality briefings of the TSC staff and timely and positive direction for personnel to anticipate future conditions and response plans
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(Section P5.1).
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A weakness in radiation worker knowledge of radiological conditions was identified by the inspectors during a site emergency preparedness drill. An inadequate Health Physics briefing of a Mechanical craft response team resulted in all the team members, l including a Health Physics technician, not knowing radiological limits for an assigned response activity (Section PS.1).
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hjL Report Details
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Summary of Plant Status l Unit 2 operated at essentially.100 percent reactor power during this inspection period except for l a reduction in power to 80 percent on May 29-30,1998, for heat treatment of the circulating water system.
) Unit 3 operated at essentially 100 percent reactor power during this inspection period except for i
a reduction in power to 80 percent on May 1-2,1998, for heat treatment of the circulating water system, l. Ooerations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
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The inspectors observed routine and nonroutine operational activities throughout this
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Routine shift turnover (Units 2 and 3)
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Realigning the CCW noncritical loop from Train A to Train B (Unit 3)
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- . Manual control of steam generator level during feed flow ca'ibration (Unit 2)
Operators were thorough and methodical in preparing for and conducting routine
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evolutions. Close management and supervisory oversight of operational activities was
. evident. Procedure use and operator communications were good. Specific comments on activities are discussed belo .2 Ooerator Resoonse to Pressurizer Level Deviation (Unit 2) Insoection Scoce (71707)
l The inspectors observed control room operators respond to pressurizer level deviating j from the automatic level control set poin Observations and Findinos On May 18,1998, the Unit 2 assistant control operator observing a control room chart recorder determined that pressurizer level was approximately 2 percent below the automatic level control set point of 50 percent. Pressurizer level control was in automatic and a deviation in level from set point would not cause annunciation until 6 percent below set point. The operators took manual control of the pressurizer level control valve in service, Valve LCV0110A, and raised pressurizer level back to 50 percent. By observing the trend recorder for the parameters, the operators (
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- determined that the demanded signal to Valve LCV0110A appeared correct in automatic, but that the valve had not been responding to the signal. When the valve was placed in automatic after restoring pressurizer level, the valve functioned normall The operators then placed pressurizer level on a control room trend recorder so as to alarm on relatively small deviations from the set point, and notified Station Technical and l Maintenance to investigate furthe Conclusions l
The assistant control operator displayed good awareness of control board indications by identifying a small pressurizer level deviation prior to any annunciation. Operator i actions in response to the deviation were well controlled and illustrated good diagnostic
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j- 08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700)
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08.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER)JD,1/97017: shift technical advisor respirator qualifications. This LER involved the licensee's finding that some of the shift technical advisors were not currently qualified for the use of a breathing respirator and some did not possess prescription glasses designed to be used with respirators. The licensee had identified an event described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, an earthquake coincident with a chemical accident, which described control room operators as being provided respirators to be able to work in the control room during this accident.
This LER was a minor issue and was closed.
l 11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments l
l Insoection Scoce (62707)
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The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities:
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Clean and inspect high pressure safety injection Pump 3P018 breaker (Unit 3)
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l- Replace Hi Log power bypass switch on Channel C remote control panel (Unit 3)
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Weld intake structure normal and emergency Fan 3A373 back draft damper (Unit 3)
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Repair saltwater cooling Pump 3P307 check valve (Unit 3)
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Repair watertight Door S2017 (Unit 2)
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e 3- Observations and Findinos The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be thorough. All work observed was performed with the work package present and in active use. Technicians were knowledgeable and professional. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present whenever required by procedure. When applicable, appropriate radietion controls were in plac In addition, see the specific discussion of maintenance under Section M2.1, belo M1.2 General Comments on Surveillance Activities Insoection Scoce (61726)
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Weekly 125 Voit Battery Bank 2D1 and Charger Operability Check (Unit 2)
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Weekly 125 Volt Battery Bank 3D1 and Charger Operability Check (Unit 3)
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Containment Emergency Fan 3E399 Feeder Breaker Agastat Test (Unit 3)
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Emergency Diesel Generator 3G002 Fast Start - Semi-annual Subgroup Relay Test (Unit 3) Observations and Findings l
The inspectors found all surveillance performed under these activities to be thoroug All surveillance observed were performed with the work package present and in active use. Technicians were knowledgeable and professional. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present whenever required by procedure. When applicable, appropriate radiation controls were in plac In addition, see the specific discussions of surveillance observed under Section M4.1, belo M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment l M2.1 Dearaded Class 1-E Batterv Gaskets (Units 2 and_31 Insoection Scoce (37551 and 71707)
The inspectors performed a routine plant walkdown and observed several degraded electrolyte withdrawal tube gaskets on the Class 1E battery banks. The inspectors
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- discussed the observation with Maintenance and Station Technical personnel and reviewed Action Requests (AR) 980501648,980502413, and 98060162 b. ' Observations and Findinas '
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On May 19,1998, the inspectors observed that gasket material had flaked off from several electrolyte withdrawal assemblies. 'A large piece of gasket material was missing from Cell 15 in Battery 3D1 The inspectors discussed the observations with the i
cognizant engineer and the Electrical Maintenance supervisor. The engineer initiated an AR to evaluate the degraded components. The licensee determined that the function of'
the gasket was to seat the mating surfaces to prohibit the escape of hydrogen gas and i seepage of acid due to weeping action. The licensee removed the withdrawal tube - '
assembly from a spare battery jar for further examination. The licensee observed that the inner gasket matericiin contact with the mating surfaces was in acceptable condition and would have performed its function. The outer exposed portion of the gasket was missing in areas and crumbling. Battery 3D1 Cell 15's lower gasket, though more significantly degraded, still provided a complete seal. The licensee concluded that the
= batteries were operable. The inspectors agreed with the licensee's assessmen As a result of the inspectors' _ observation, the licensee planned several corrective - 1
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. actions. The licensee initiated maintenance orders to have the degraded gaskets replacedc The licensee planned to revise Procedure SO123-1-2.3, "125 VDC Battery L Inspection," to include a step to check the gasket on the cell cap plug during the l- ]
. quarterly test of the specific gravity and planned to revise Procedure SO123-1-2.4, '
" Physical Inspection of Batteries," to include a step to check the gasket of the electrolyte withdrawal assembly during the annual battery inspection. The inspectors questioned
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the licensee about the vendor recommendation for inspection of the gaskets and the licensee indicated that there was no vendor guidance. The licensee also replaced the gasket on Battery 3D1 Cell 15 with a nonsafety-related gasket, and initiated a nonconformance report to accept the nonconforming gasket as is. The vendor indicated -
l that the nonsafety-related gasket was identical to the gaskets provided for safety-related
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withdrawal assemblies.
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' L Conclusions The licensee's preventive maintenance program was weak in that it did not provide for periodic inspection or maintenance of the gaskets on the electrolyte withdrawal assemblies on the Class 1E batteries. Many of the gaskets were degraded, although all the gaskets remained capable of performing their intended function. Station Technical u and Maintenance's response to the inspector-identified gasket degradation was l! thorough and included comprehensive corrective actions.
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, -5- I M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance M4.1 . Pressurizer Heater Caoacitv/ Operability Verification - Unit 3 i
, Insoection Scone (61726)
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The inspectors observed the performance of surveil!ance of the pressurizer heaters,
' ' reviewed Procedure SO23-ll-11.5, Revision 0, Temporary Change Notice 0-4, .
' Surveillance Requirement Class 1-E Pressurizer Heaters Capacity / Operability Verification," and discussed the technicians' performance with electrical maintenance supervision.
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On June 1,1998, the inspectors observed electricians perform a surveillance of the pressurizer heaters. The electricians obtained the voltage and current measurements from the energized heaters to evaluate pressurizer heater operability, in addition, the electricians obtained the control room ammeter reading from the operators to verify the control room ammeter was reading accurately. The inspectors observed that during the -
performance of the surveillance,- the electricians did not reference the details of L
Procedure S023-11-11.5 and only used the data record sheet. The inspector questioned the electricians about the method used to determine the accuracy of the control room ammeter. The electricians indicated that the accuracy was required to be within'
5 percent of the total meter span (5 percent of 300 amps), which was 15 amps. The electricians recorded that the local clamp-on ammeter indicated 249 ramps and the control room meter indicated 262 amps on the data record sheet. The technicians concluded that the control room ammeter was within the required specification.
i On June 4,1998, the inspectors performed 'a review of Procedure S023-11-11.5, and identified that the procedure requirement for control room ammeter accuracy was that the ammeter be within 5 percent of the clamp-on ammeter reading and not 5 percent of the full meter span as indicated by the technicians. The data record sheet stated, in .
. part, that the control room ammeter should read within i 5 percent of the Phase A current reading and to see the note at Step 6.2.3. The note prior to Step 6.2.3 stated, in part, that if the control room ammeter was not within * 5 percent of the clamp-on ammeter reading a maintenance order should be initiated to recalibrates or replace the ammeter as soon as possible and that the failure to meet the 5 percent criteria in itself does not cause the pressurizer heaters to be inoperable. The inspectors calculated the control room ammeter accuracy and determined that it was 'not within the specified
. 5 percent accuracy. In addition, the inspectors observed that the data had been reviewed and the calculations had besn verified by the electrical test supervisor. The
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failure. to implement procedure requirements for the control room ammeter accuracy constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement
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' electrician initiated AR 980600661 to have the control room ammeter repaired or .
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I-6-calibrated, and the supervisor initiated AR 980600712 to identify the causal factors and to provide corrective action !
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i The inspectors identified a weakness in procedural adherence during the performance l and supervisory review of a surveillance test. Electrical Maintenance technicians did not follow the proceduralized guidance in determining the desired accuracy of the control room pressurizer heater ammeter and, therefore, did not identify an inaccurate ammeter. In addition, the electrical test supervisor's review of the heater capacity / operability verification data record did not identify the discrepanc ll M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities M7.1 Licensee Self Evaluation of Maintenance Activities (Units 2 and 3) Insoection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors reviewed the results of the critique conducted on May 11,1998, for the I week beginning May 4,199 )
i Observations and Findinos j The licensee recently began a week-by-week review of the work control process. Each review, conducted by Maintenance personnel on a weekly basis, looked back at the previous week's maintenance activitie The review identified six items to be incorporated into the LER system for trending purposes, one item to be further evaluated for causes, and one item to be evaluated for programmatic enhancement. The programmatic issue was control of equipment installed on a temporary basis and temporarily environmentally qualified. The licensee identified there was no clear method of tracking this equipment so that permanent environmental qualification was facilitate Based on the number of event reports to be trended, the inspectors determined that the critiques were comprehensive. Based on the issue to be evaluated for programmatic enhancement, the inspectors also determined that the critiques were self-critical and detailed, Conclusions The week-by-week self-evaluation of maintenance activities, recently begun by Maintenance personnel to improve efficiency, was comprehensive and self-critica __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ -
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-7-M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902,92712)
i M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-362/97-003-00: pressurizer safety valve setpoints out of toleranc Following pressurizer safety valve setpoint testing in Unit 3, the licensee identified that the one pressurizer safety valve was out-of-tolerance high by 1.72 percent and the other was out-of-tolerance low by 3.72 percent. These setpoints exceeded the 2500 psia 11 percent tolerance allowable by Technical Specification 3.4.10. The licensee believed the cause to be setpoint drift. Following discovery, the licensee reset the safety valve setpoints within the allowable tolerance and evaluated the safety significance of the "as found" out-of-tolerance safety valves. A previously completed analysis confirmed that the technical specification values for acceptable out-of-tolerance conditions on the pressurizer safety valves could be expanded to +3 percent and -2 percent without impacting the design basis. However, because these expanded limits were also exceeded, the licensee completed a cycle-specific analysis and determined that plant conditions were bounded by the accident analyses in the updated final safety analysis report. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's corrective actions, following discovery of the out-of-tolerance pressurizer safety valves, were timely and thoroug The Licensing manager stated that the licensee plans to submit a license amendment request to broaden the allowable setpoint tolerances by the end of 1998. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-362/98006-01).
M8.2 (Closed) LER 361/98-001-01: turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump speed circuit collar loose. This issue was discussed in depth in NRC Inspection Report 50-361; 362/98-05. No significant new information was provided in the LE M8.3 (Ocen) LER 361/97-013-00: charcoal filter surveillance testing not current On September 8,1997, the licensee sampled the Unit 2 charcoal filter from the Train B fuel building post accident cleanup (PACU) units and submitted the sample for testin The test results, received on September 14, indicated that the filter efficiencies were below that allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.14. The licensee subsequently sampled the Train A PACU unit and it also failed the technical specification requiremen On October 10,1997, while reviewing AR assignments, the licensee recognized that the PACU filter surveillance test had not been performed prior to the implementation of the Technical Specification Improvement Program (TSIP). Therefore, the licensee did not have a current surveillance test for the PACU units during the Units 2 and 3 refueling outages. In addition, the licensee identified that the control room emergency air cleanup system (CREACUS) had a similar situation where the current surveillance test required by Technical Specification 3.7.11 had not been performe The licensee noted several opportunities for identification of the missed surveillance requirements. Station Technical evaluated the charcoal filter testing changes in June
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L-8-1996 and incorrectly concluded that the changes were not a new surveillance test and that the surveillance did not need to be performed. The aspect of the surveillance test that changed in the ventilation filter testing program was the requirement to test the filters at 30*C, The previous requirement tested the filters at 80*C. In October 1996 and January 1997, post-TS!P CREACUS filter surveillance tests were opportunities to identify that the CREACUS and PACU filter surveillance requirements were not current upon TSlP implementatio On January 13,1997, the licensee initiated a self-assessment to identify and resolve discrepancies associa'.ed with the implementation of technical specification surveillance requirements and to verify that both the current surveillance procedure and the current test of record were in verbatim compliance with the technical specification requirement and associated bases. The assessment was prompted as a result ofissues related to the surveillance testing of the emergency diesel generators. The licensee limited the r
' assessment scope and did not validate the adequacy of surveillance requirements that referenced programs. Both the CREACUS and PACU surveillance requirements were referenced in the ventilation filter testing program The licensee documented the results of the self-assessment in Engineering Assessment Report SEA 97-001, dated May 12, 1997.
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The licensee performed the required surveillance on the CREACUS and PACU units,
, and replaced the charcoal where necessary. In addition, the licensee reevaluated the scope of the initial assessment and reviewed the adequacy of programs referenced by surveillance requirements.
l The licensee evaluated the safety consequence of the missed surveillance. The licensee determined that the failed CREACUS filter efficiency was 96 percent, which was above the 95 percent efficiency assumed in the accident analysis. The minimum
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PACU filter efficiency was 88.8 percent, and although the PACU filters reduce the consequences of a fuel handling accident in the fuel handling building, the filters were not credited for mitigation. Therefore, the licensee concluded that the safety consequences were minima The inspectors reviewed the licensee's self-assessment and the LER and concluded that the licensee could have reasonably identified the CREACUS and PACU unit missed surveillance requirements prior to October 1997. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's corrective actions were appropriate. The LER will remain open to evaluate the appropriate enforcement actio M8.4 (Closed) LER 362/84-045-00: dose equivalent iodine in excess of technical specification limits in February 1998, the licensee identified that on July 19,1984, the Unit 3 reactor coolant system activity reached the reportable occurrence level and that a report was not submitted to the Commission as required by the Technical Specifications. In June 1986, the reporting requirement was removed from the Technical Specifications. The licensee conducted an investigation to determine why a report was not submitted, but due to the i
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- licensee's actions to identify the cause were thorough. The failure of the licensee to report the occurrence was a violation of theTechnical Specifications. This violation is being treated as a violation of minor significance that is not subject to formal enforcement actio lil. Enaineerina E8 Miscellaneous Engineering lasues (92700)
i E (Closed) LER 361/97012: CCW BNS inadequate design.
w i This LER involved the licensee's finding that if CCW surge tank level cycling occurred, due to normal system leakage during an event, then there may not have been sufficient bottled nitrogen to maintain the CCW surge tanks pressurized for 7 days. Backup
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nitrogen supply (BNS) is the safety related source of CCW surge tank pressurizatio This issue was discussed in Inspection Report 50-361; 362/97-19, in which the inspectors concluded that this finding demonstrated good attention to detail on the part
. of Nuclear Engineering Design. As of the end of this inspection period, the licensee had i increased the upper pressure restrictions on the CCW surge tanks, and had stopped the use of the abnormal alignment (Log Number 2/3-97-136) described in Inspection Report 50-361; 362/97-19. The inspectors found that these corrective actions were satisfactory.' j 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria lil, states, in part, that measures shall be - ,
established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are _l correctly translated into specifications. Units 2 and 3 Technical Specification 3.7.7 basis - 1 states, in part, that BNS operability ensures that both CCW surge _ tanks will be
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j pressurized for at least 7 days following a design basis event _without changing out the bottles. Contrary to this, the design basis of the BNS was not correctly translated into -
- specifications, because, as described in this LER, BNS operability may not have ensured that both CCW surge tanks would be sufficiently pressurized for 7 days following a Design Basis Event without changing out the bottles. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Poliev (NCV 361; 362/98006-02).
E8.2 (Closed) LER 361/98-003-01: inoperable valve due to grit in line starter mechanis This issue was discussed in depth in NRC Inspection Report 50-361; 362/98-05. . No
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-10-IV. Plant Support P5 Training' and Qualification in' Emergency Preparedness
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P Site Emeroency Preparedness Drill-L
'b Ipsoection Scone (71750)
On May,13l1998,- the inspectors observed portions of a site emergency preparedness l
' drill. The inspectors observed from the TSC and accompanied one rapid dispatch team -
that had been assigned duties from the operations support cente Observations and Findinos L The drill scenario was a steam generator tube rupture, followed by an apparently leaking ! main steam safety valve. When attempts were made to gag the safety valve shut, the l
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~ safety valve cracked causing a main steam line break from the ruptured generato Finally,' a loss of offsite power and failure of both emergency diesel generators to start caused a station blackout, declaration of a general emergency, and a site evacuation of nonessential personne The Operations manager acted as the emergency coordinator in the TSC.L Status ;
briefings given by the emergency coordinator to the TSC staff were concise, accurate, and timely. The emergency coordinator also provided direction to the TSC staff -
conceming evaluating various possible future conditions and response plans, as well as present conditions. Consequently, the inspectors found that, for the portions of the TSC
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operation observed, the emergency coordinator was proactive and provided good .
leadership to the TSC staf The inspectors observed briefings of, and accompanied a rapid response team l dispatched from the Operations Support Center to the apparently stuck open main
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steam safety valve. The team was directed to gag the safety valve shut. The team consisted of three Boiler and Condenser mechanics and one Health Physics technician.
l After the team had been briefed by Mechanical and Health Physics supervision, the
., inspectors asked the three mechanics, and then the Health Physics technician, what their dose limit for this response was. The team members had been issued alarming dosimetry, but the alarm set points on the dosimetry were different than the back-out dose (an amount of dose that would require the team to exit an area and reassess conditions) and total dose allowable for this emergency response. None of the team members, including the Health Physics technician, knew their dose limits. Dose limits were not covered in briefings given before the team was dispatched. The limit was
- 4 rem for the response, with a back-out criteria of 1 rem. The alarming dosimetry was set to alarm at about 80 millirem. The inspectors found that, in this instance, briefing of ,
the team regarding dose limits was less than adequat The licensee initiated AR 980502626 to perform an assessment of the rapid dispatch
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-11-briefing requirements and methods, and communications of rapid dispatch process to the team member c. Conclusions The Operations manager demonstrated excellent leadership while acting as emergency coordinator in the TSC during an emergency preparedness drill. This was illustrated by high quality briefings of the TSC staff and timely and positive direction for personnc! to anticipate future conditions and response plan A weakness in radiation worker knowledge of radiological conditions was identified by the inspectors during a site emergency preparedness drill. An inadequate Health Physics briefing of a Mechanical craft response team resulted in all the team members,-
including a Health Physics technician, not knowing radiological limits for an assigned response activit V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the exit meeting on June 17,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT l
. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION !
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED LiG2asit
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J. Fee, Manager, Maintenance G. Gibson, Manager, Compliance M. Herschthal, Manager, Station Technical (Acting) i R. Krieger, Vice President, Nuclear Generation J. Madigan, Manager, Health Physics D. Nunn, Vice President, Engineering and Technical Services !
T. Vogt, Plant Superintendent, Units 2 and 3 R. Waldo, Manager, Operations INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations i IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 92700: On Site LER Review l
lP 92712: Inoffice Review of LER IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Ooened and Closed 362/98006-01 NCV pressurizer safety valve setpoints out of tolerance 361; 362/98006-02 NCV CCW BNS design inadequacy
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Closed i
361/97-017-00 LER shift technical advisor respirator qualifications 362/97-003-00 LER pressurizer safety valve setpoints out of tolerance 361/98-001-01 LER turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump speed collar loose 362/84-045-00 LER dose equivalent iodine in excess of technical specification limits 361/97-012-00 LER CCW BNS 361/98-003-01 LER inoperable valve due to grit in line starter mechanism ( Discussed 361/97-013-00 LER charcoal filter surveillance testing not current u__-_-_____-______-_-__ __ _ . _ _ .
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-2-Acronyms
.AR action request j BNS backup nitrogen system CCw component cooling water CREACUS . control room emergency air cleanup system LER . licensee event report
'PACU post-accident cleanup TSC technical support center TSIP Technical Specification Improvement Plan
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