IR 05000206/1986026
| ML13323B167 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1986 |
| From: | Ivey K, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13323B166 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.C.1, TASK-1.D.2, TASK-2.E.1.1, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-2.K.3.05, TASK-TM 50-206-86-26, 50-361-86-20, 50-362-86-20, GL-82-28, GL-83-10D, GL-85-12, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, IEIN-85-091, IEIN-85-91, NUDOCS 8606250020 | |
| Download: ML13323B167 (9) | |
Text
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos. 50-206/86-26, 50-361/86-20, and 50-362/86-20 Docket Nos. 50-206, 50-361, and 50-362 License Nos. DPR-13, NPF-10, and NPF-15 Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company P.O. Box-800 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name:
San Onofre Nuclear-Generating.Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection at:
San Clemente, California Inspection Conducted:
June 2 -
6, 1986 Inspectors:R c
o
- Viey'- jr., Reactor s-rDate Signed Approved by:6 T. Y6ung, Jr.,
ef, E g n ing Section Date Signed Summary:
Inspection during the period of June 2-6, 1986 (Report Nos. 50-206/85-26)
50-361/86-20, and 50-362/86-20)
Areas Inspected:
A routine unannounced inspection of the implementation of Unit 1 TMI Action Items, follow-up of previously identified items, licensee actions on 10 CFR Part 21 Reports, and follow-up of IE Bulletins and Information Notices. The inspection involved 41 hours4.74537e-4 days <br />0.0114 hours <br />6.779101e-5 weeks <br />1.56005e-5 months <br /> by one NRC inspector on Module Nos. 30703, 92701, 92702, 92703, 36100, and 2556 Results: No violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000206
-_____
___
-_ DR -
DETAILS Persons Contacted:
H. E. Morgan, Station Manager J. Reeder, 'Unit 1 Plant Superintendent M. P. Short, Unit 1 ProjectManager W. K. Barney, Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) Engineer M. Barr, Compliance Engineer N. B. Bloom, Maintenance Engineer C. A. Couser, Compliance Engineer G. T. Gibson, Supervisor, Compliance V. A. Gow, Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer J. F. Grosshart, QA Engineer D. A. Herbst, ISEG Supervisor M. J. Kirby, Nuclear Training Administrator W. M. Lazear, QA Supervisor T. A. Mackey, Jr., Compliance Supervisor S. W.. McMahan, Maintenance Engineering Manager D. H. Peacor, Station Emergency Preparedness Manager D. E. Shull, Jr., Manager, Maintenance~
M. A. Wharton, Deputy Site Manager W. G. Zinti, Manager, Compliance Various other personnel All personnel listed.wbere in attendance at the exit meeting on June 6, 198.
TMI Action Plan Reqirements,(Unit')
this section includes th status of TMI Action Items as determined by the inspector' througireyiew of documentation and.discuss icsion with responsible licensee personne.-C
."l (OPEN~j 6nrt-Term Accident and Procedures Review ICCAjransientsand Accidents".
idt
'e ir sensees to perform analyses of transients and pepare emergency procedure guidelines, ugae.mrec procedures, in luding procedures for operating with natural circulation cohditionsand to conduct operator retrainin.iSupplement 1 to NUREG-0737 (Generic Letter No.- 82-33), dated December 17, 1982, requires that each applicant submit a Procedure Generation Package,(P6P),at least three months before the date of formal operator training. orfthe upgraded procedure Additional clarification was provided in NUREG-0578 and NJREG-069 :2 Findings:
The licensee's Emergency Operating Instructions (EOIs) have been revised based on the Westinghouse Owner's Group. (WOG) Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGs). -The ERGs were found acceptable for implementation as stated in an NRC letter, Eisenhut to Sheppard, dated June 1, 1983. The overall upgrades of the EOIs were completed in November, 1984, as stated in a letter to NRC dated April 12,.
198 The inspector reviewed a sample of the EOIs in comparison with the WOG emergency reponse guidelines and concluded thatthey appear.to be consistent in'content with one another. The inspector also'
reviewed training.records from two different courses given on the EOIs sincethe revisions. The inspector concluded that. the licensee had met the requirements of NUREG-0737. This item will remain open pending the results of the formal NRR review of-the licensee's April 12, 1985 submitta No violations or deviations were identifie I.D.2 (OPEN)"Safety Parameter Display System".
NUREG-0737 Position: Each licensee' shall install a safety parameter display system (SPDS).that will display to operating personnel a minimum set of parameters-which define.the safety status of the instrumentationalready in place. Detailed requirements are provided in NUREG-0737, Supplement By letter dated April 23, 1985 (Medford, SCE to Thompson, NRR), the licensee committed to'the following actions (1)' Development of SPDS design criteria by October 10, 198 (2) Submittal of finalized SPDS design criteria to NRRby January 9, 198 (3) Submittal of.SPDS upgrade plans to NRC by May 1, 198 The licensee is continuing their work on the SPDS and expect to meet these commitment No violations or deviations were identifie c.-
II.E.l.l..2' (OPEN) Long-Term Auxiliary Feedwater (AW)
System Modifications The remaining NUREG-0737 requirements to be completed for SONGS 1 are: (1) the'upgrade of the two trains of control grade auxiliary feedwater tosafety grade by the end of the -cycle 9 outage and; (2)
the installation and upgrade (to safety grade) of a third train of auxiliary feedwater by the end of the cycle 10 outag Findings:
The licensee is presently working to upgrade the two trains for cycle 9 and expects to complete the actions prior to startup from the outage. The-changes are being worked in Design Change Package (DCPs) 3006, 3066, and 3174. DCP 3006 replaces the.AFW flow control valve positioners, transducers, and airsets and will be completed following testing of the system. DCP 3174 replaces the relief valve for the turbine driven train and will be complete following testin The lice'nsee'has installsd the third train of AFW and expects to upgrade it'in accordance wihthe Cycle 10 committment dat Novaoidtions orde ations.Vere identifie II.F.2.13.B (OPEN) Level Instrumentation for Detection of inadequate Core Goofin g
'-
NUREG-0737-P6sitioh:
Licensees shall.provide a description of any addtional instrumentation, or controls (primary or backup) proposed for the plant'to s'upplement.existing instrumentation (including primary coolant saturation. monitors) in order to provide, an unambiguous, easy-to-interpret indication of inadequate core cooling In association with this item, GL-.82-28 requested that licensees submit a reactor coolant inventory design and evaluate the current ICC instrumentation at their plant Findings:
The licensee plans to submit a letter to the NRC by the end of June, 1986, which will provide:
(1) an assessment of the current ICC instrumentation capability; (2) plans for any required upgrades to the existing instrumentation; and'(3) a justification for relief from the requirement to install a reactor vessel level measurement syste The inspectors discussion with responsible licensee personnel indicated that the licensee considered the installed subcooling monitor and improvements made to the core.exit thermocouple system provide an adequate system for 1CC consideration No violations or deviations were identifie II.K.3.5 (OPEN) Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps During Loss-of-Coolant Accident NJREG-0737 Position:
Tripping of the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs)
in case of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) is not an ideal solution. Licensees should consider other solutions to the small break LOCA problem..(for example, an increase in safety injection flow rate).
On February 8, 1983, Generic Letter (GL)83-10d was issued to provide criteria for resolution of this TMI Action Item, and subsequently on June 28, 1985, GL 85-12 was issued to provide guidance concerning implementation of the RCP trip criteri The GL 85-12 Position:
We have determined that the information provided by the Westinghouse Owner's Group (WOG) in support of the alternative RCP trip criteria was acceptable on a generic basis. It stated that a suitable reactor coolant pump trip criterion can be selected by each licensee tominimize reactor coolant pump trip during steam 'generator tube ruptures and non-LOCA events, while still providing RCP trip for small break LOCAs. The GL also requested that licensees select and implement an appropriate RCP trip criterion based upon the WOG methodolog Findings:
In, two letters, dated October 10, 1985, and January 21, 1986, the licensee submitted their response to Generic Letters83-10d and 85-12. The response included the results of a Westinghouse (W)
evaluation of RCP' restart criteria. The-submittals provided the following conclusions:
The evaluation 'has indicated an acceptable plant response to
- a SBLOCA-regardless'of RCP statu Therefore, the RCP trip on safety injection caused by low reactor coolant system pressure will' be remove The evaluation recommended revisions to the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) emergency operating instruction (EOI) and they are being incorporated into the procedur,The inspector verified the procedure changes were being made in accordance with the Westinghouse recommendations and training has been given on the change This item remains open pending NRR acceptance of the licensee submittal No violations or deviations were identifie.
Licensee Action on 10 CFR Part 21 Reports (Closed) Raychem Auto-Trace 20PTVI Electrical Heat Trace (RV Item 85-17-80)
A June 24, 1985 letter from Raychem Corporation to the NRC described a problem with the subject heat trace in that it may have a slightly lower than specified power output. For applications where the heat trace is on continuously this may mean a lower maintenance temperature. For other applications it could mean a higher duty cycl The licensee's review of this item found that all of the suspected heat tracing at the site was located in the Unit 1 maintenance warehouse and had not been issued for application. The licensee has
quarantined the heat tracing and stated that it will not be issued for application until it has been evaluated and approve This item is considered closed for Units 1, 2, and No violations or deviations were identifie (Closed) BBC Brown Boveri, Inc. Voltage Balance Relay (ITE-60)
(RV Item 84-00-P)
On October 29, 1984, the NRC received a letter from BBC Brown Boveri, Inc. describing a problem with the subject relays in that testing had indicated that the relays were outside of published specifications for operating tim The licensee performed a review of the relays in use in the plant and concluded that degraded operating times would have no adverse effects. However, all of the relays are being returned to the manufacturer for factory modification to meet the specification This item is considered closed for Units 1, 2, and No violations or deviations were identifie.
Licensee Actionon tIE Bulletins and. Information Notices (OPEN) Bulletin 85-03-Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due To Improper Switch Settings Thisitem was examined andpartially closed for Unit 2 in inspection
%report.50-361/86-16. -The licensee's response, issued May 19, 1986, provided.the results of a-review of the design bases for the operation of each valve. This.satisfied action "a" of the bulleti Remaining actions to be performed include "b" review.of the design bases, "c" changes to individual valve settings, and "d" revisions to procedures to ensure correct switch setting The licensee has scheduled to complete-actions "b" through "d" prior to startup from:
o Maintenance outage ending June 1987 for Unit 1 o Refueling outage ending June 1986 for Unit 2 o Refueling outage ending March 1987 for Unit 3 This item will remain open pending inspection of the complete action No violations or deviations were identifie *
b. (Closed) Informat'on Notice 85-91 Lo ad Sequencers For Emergency Diesel Generators The notice advised licensees of potential design deficiencies that Could bypass load sequencers' thereby causing the loss of redundant emergency diesel generators' (EDGs).
The licensee~rvee h
Theicens reviewed the design of their electric power system and concluded that the same event could not occur due to a different transformer to bus load design. However, 'the licensee is reviewing the possibility that other voltage soures could feed Ithe bus causing a similar event to occu This item is Closed based upon the licensee's action to date and their system for information-notice review'
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Licensee Actions On Previously Identfe* tm (CLOSED) Enforcement Item 84-28-01 Moisture Seals On Solenoid Valve Operators Previous Inspection Inspection report 50-206/8428 identified that no' seals 'were installed in the electrical conduit/cable connections to the solenoid 0p 0 0,torsor the reactor head and pressurizer vent valves SV-2401,' 02,0, 04i; and 3401, 02,.03, and 0 This condition was in violation of regulatory requirementsa As a result o'f'this violation' the licensee Committed to replace the existing seal'material with CONAX electrical connection seal assemblie e This Inspection d The ifspectorched disa issijons with licensee personnel and reviewed andttostedoCNXcsalsnclude that the licensee has installed and tested CONAX s 'I s ' on'the subject valve ei n'h neP ca (DcP) Nov'3066.12 hh ws ujetvls.Design Change Package the installato ofhich-waslapproved on October 2, 1985, completed the i N h
. Ithe seas for valve nos. 0 W-240, 2402, 340 er an'd 302.- -'The reanii~
Ie (S-2403, 2404, 3403, and.304 were'
cmpletiDwRk561 on m
DCP remains open pending the wrothe osufeton aitems nonrelated to these valve All 'of the work on
~
th uj:c av'
ha's becoptdtested, and documented. Therefore, this itee is close t d
No violations or deviatibns were identifie b (OPEN) Enforcement Ite 85-37-0f As-Found Main Steam Safety Settings Previous Inspection This item involved a violation for failing to record the as-found condition of the Main Steam Safety Valve settings during testing as required by plant procedure This Inspection In response to this violation, the licensee committed to revise the test procedures to specifically require the as-found condition to be recorded. Also, due to questions regarding the accuracy.of the test data and the present valve settings, the licensee committed to re-test all ten of the valves prior to entry into Mode 2 during restart from the current outag The inspector reviewed the procedures (501-1-2.4, S01-I-6.64 and others) and noted that they had been revised to require that the initial test lift.be recorded as the as-found value on the data sheet. This item remains open, however, until the completed tes data can be reviewed to ensure the correct settings At the exit meeting, the licensee committed to provide the test results to the NRC Resident Inspector's Office upon completion of the testin No violations or deviations were identifie (OPEN) Unresolved Item 85-37-02 Calibration of Equipment Used to Test the. Main Steam Safety Valve Settings Previous Inspection During the inspection resulting in enforcement item 85-37-01, the inspector also questioned whether two test calibration requirements had been met. The first question was whether the hydroset device (used to perform the safety valve test) had been calibrated as unit within 24 months of the test as recommended by the manufacturer. The second question was whether,the hydraulic test gauges were within calibration during the required gauge recalibration after the.tes This Inspection The inspector reviewed calibration-data for the hydroset device dated August 29, 1984 and concluded that the hydroset device had been calibrated 'within 24 months of~the test. Therefore, the 'first question was resolved'
Concerning the second question, ASME Section.XI requirements of Power Test Code (PTC) 19.2-1964, "Pressure Measurement Instruments and Apparatus", for yalves covered by the Inservice Inspection (ISI)
program, states in part "....Gauge correction tests shall be made within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> before and within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after a test, with no pressure applied in the intervals'."
Thi 'licensee initiated a Corrective Action Request (CAR) no. SO-P-914 which.concluded that in the case of both gauges used in the testing, the correction test was not performe This deficiency was identified in an April, 1985 licensee review of the testing procedures and the licensee initiated procedure changes to specifi'cally require the correction test to be performed' The revised procedures were inrouting for review when the NRC concerns were 'identified. The procedures were issued on December 14, 1985..,
The'refore, the ':inspector concluded that the licensee had identified the deficiency ad taken the appropriate corrective actions to resolve it prior to the, NRC,,inspectio Hpwever,.as part of CAR. SO-P'914'the licensee is reviewing their records to identify any'other ISI valves that were tested with the subject gauges so a review of the data can be performed to determine the accuracy of the te tresults. At the exit meeting, the licensee committed to provide th6!ins ector with the results of this revie "This 'item will remaid open' pending the' NRC review of the result No violations or deviations-were identifie.
Exit Meeting On June 2, 1986, an,exit meeting was held with the licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1. The findings as documented in this report was discussed.