IR 05000361/1986019

Insp Repts 50-361/86-19 & 50-362/86-19 on 860501-0705.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Monthly Surveillance Activities,Operational Safety Verification, Plant Trips & Events,Ler Review & Refueling Activities

ML20214H304
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	07/25/1986
From:	Dangelo A, Huey F, Johnson P, Stewart J, Tang R, Tatum J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214H301	List: IR 05000361/1986019 ML20214H298
References
50-361-86-19, 50-362-86-19, IEIN-86-003, IEIN-86-3, NUDOCS 8608130085
Download: ML20214H304 (9)

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U.S.~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report.No /86-19, 50-362-86-19 Docket No , 50-362 License No NPF-10, NPF-15

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Licensee: Southern California Edison Company P. O. Box 800, 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 i Facility Name: San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Inspection at: San Onofre, San Clemente, California i Inspection conducted: May 1 through July 5,1986 i Inspectors: M C kF. R. Il ey, Senior Resident Date Signed Inspe r, Units 1, 2 and 3 Q. t/ewart Resident Inspector

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4 Approved By: ~

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WM W. I The inspectors also contacted other licensee _ employees during the cours of the inspection, including operations shift superintendents, control s ' room supervisors, control room operators, QA and QC engineers, compliance engineers, maintenance craftsmen, and health physics engineers and technician . Operational Safety Verification

The inspectors performed several plan't tours and verified the operability - 1 l of selected emergency systems, reviewed.the Tag Out log'a'nd verified '

proper return to service of affected components. Particular attention-was given to housekeeping, exa'mination for potential fire. hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibration, and. verification that maintenance; requests had been initiated for equipment in~ need of maintenance.- .;

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' Following the Unit 2 refueling outage, .the inspector T toured > the Unit 2 containment following the containment close out inspect' ion. conducted by the licensee. In general, housekeeping was~goodf with?only a few' examples of gear adrif Ofta'mor'e' serious nature, there were.several examples of degraded material conditions which wereinot corrected during ' the refueling outage. The following example's-of, poor housekeeping and degraded material conditions were noteworthy: -

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Electric hoist near the elevator on the 45 foot level was not i secure * An exit sign was lying in Class 1E cable tray BPAJA3 on the 45 foot leve * Penetration isolation valve 2HV-7258 had a loose plug in the side of the valve bod * HPSI drain valves 1204-MR-239 and 1204-NR-47 at penetration #3 appeared to be leakin * LPSI 8-inch check valve 1204-MU-074.at penetration 50 appeared to be leaking borated water from the pressure seal gaske HPSI high point vent valves 1204-MR-37 and 1204-NR-227 at penetration #3 were missing handwheel .

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A control valve associated with 2HV-9437 was missing a handwhee * Valve 2HV-9340 had I broken cap screw and 1 loose cap screw in the limit switch compartment cove * Valve 1415-MU-075 was leaking approximately 50 drops per minut * Valve 1203-NR-511 was leaking approximately 60 drops per minut * Feedwater check valve 1305-MU-036 appeared to have inadequate thread engagement for a bolt-on the hinge pin cover plate.'

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The licensee's programs to identify'and resolve degradingtplant conditions and housekeeping deficiencies will be'" examined during future inspections (50-361/86-19-01). .

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3. Evaluation of Plant Trips and Events , ,'; ., , Reactor Trip on June 4, 1986'(Unit.2) , *

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  , . .. N While making preparations for conducting 11ow power physics testing, the reactor tripped due to Reactor Coolant: System Low ~ Flow. Oil had dripped on reactor coolan* pump (RCP) P004 and the-oil was smoldering. With shutdown rods partially withdrawn,'RCP-P004 was ..

secured and the reactor tripped. (The oil was cleaned up from around the pump and the licensee continued making preparations for start-up testia Reactor Trip on June 10, 1986 (Unit 2).

< At 2208 on June 10, 1986, the reactor tripped just after entering Mode The trip occurred just after placing the feedwater control ; system in automatic. Due to sluggish operation of the control I system, the steam generator water levels reached the reactor trip setpoint. The licensee made adjustments to the feedwater level control system and commenced a reactor start-up on June 11, 198 J

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   .3 Reactor Trip on June 19, 1986 (Unit 2)

At 1355 on June 19, 1986, the reactor tripped from 83% power. The licensee was conducting a surveillance on control element assembly calculator (CEAC) #1 when porer was interrupted to CF.AC #2 due to a shorted capacitor in vital bus inverter Y003. With both CEACs inoperable, the core protection calculators (CPCs) tripped the reactor. The licensee has replaced the capacitor and the unit was returned to service on June 21, 1986.~ No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Activities Unit 2 The licensee conducted 18 month surveillance testing of the Emergency Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) following the Unit 2 refueling outage. The inspector observed a simulated Safety Injection Actuation on Train A with diesel generator 2G002 operating in test mode. Testing was conducted in accordance-with procedure S023-3-3.1 The inspector reviewed the ESFAS test results with the licensee, and the documentation indicated that there were no significant equipment failures during the tes The inspector reviewed the 18 month surveillance which was performed ou Core Protection Calculator (CPC) channel C. The ' surveillance was conducted in accordance with procedure S023-V-12.2.1. The inspector

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verified that the CPC addressable constants were entered correctly following completion of the surveillanc Unit 3 The inspector observed the 31 day and the 91-day surveillances that i were being conducted on channel A of the Qualified Safety Parameter Display System (QSPDS). These surveillances were being' conducted i concurrently, and procedures S023-V-12.10.1-- and S023-V-12.10.6 were

being used to control these activitie *

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The inspector observed the weekly turbine- overspeed trip test. The surveillance was well controlled'and: conducted *in accordance with procedure S023-3-3.3 , No violations or deviations wer'e identified'.

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    * Monthly Maintenance Activities '
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. Unit 2 Maintenance related activities to correct material condition deficiencies associated with several'Limitorque motor operate valves were observed. Work was done.in accordance with the
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' licensee's procedures. Additional discussion of this subject is included in paragraph 8b of this repor On May 14, 1986, the inspector observed corrective maintenance that was being conducted on a section of the Unit 2 E field perimeter-i protection system. The inspector verified _that a security guard had been posted while the E field was out.of service. The maintenance j activity was being conducted in accordance with maintenance order

86050628 and procedure S023-I-4.42. The inspector had the following ,

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The prerequisites had not been signed off prior to starting the work activit , The Sonalert motion meter that was being used was out of-

calibration and was not listed on the maintenance data-record i form,~ the meter was lost calibrated on November 15, 1985.

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A Simpson multimeter was being used, but it was not included in-i the licensee's M&TE calibration program. It also did not have a surveillance sticker and was not listed on the maintenance data record for * The procedure that was being used by the technician, , j S023-I-4.42, had been marked up in an informal manner such tha , the TCN process was bypassed.

4 The inspector discussed these observations with the licensee, and ! the licensee has issued corrective action request S0-9-956.for i resolution. This is an open item (50-361/86-19-03).

i Unit 3  % ! During the Unit 2 refueling outage, the licensee inspected check , valves 1301-MU-003 and 1301-MU-005-located in the-steam supply

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piping to the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump. ; Based 'on the inspection, the licensee found that the' hinge' pins in the' check

valves had worn to the point of pin failure,i The licensee had " installed orifices in the steam supply ~ lines downstream 3f the check valves to provide for continuous water' drainage so'that water hammer l events could be avoided. The orifices' caused fluctuation in the steam pressure which caused the discs in the check' valves;to , continuously oscillate and wear away .the hinge pins. The valves are . r

4 inch Anchor Darling tilted disc check l valves. The hinge pins are carbon steel and wear in stellite bushings.'iTo correct the hinge l pin wearing problems, the licensee has' desig'n ed' a stellite . overlay area into the replacement pins wh'ich will wear'in the stellite '

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! bushings. It took approximately- 12~ months for ,the pin failure to occu The licensee immediately conducted an inspection of the check valve

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l l 1301-MU-003 on Unit 3. The hinge pins were worn, but they had not worn to the point of failure. The licensee installed new hinge pins

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j i with the stellite overlay. The licensee-plans ~to inspect.

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1301-MU-005 on Unit 3 during the next monthly surveillance of the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The inspector observed portions of this maintenance activity and found that it was being well controlled. The valve was placed back into service, and no other deficiencies were identifie No violations or deviations were identifie . Engineered Safety Feature Walkdown Prior to return to servicet following the second refueling o'utage on Unit

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2, the inspector verified that the containment penetration isolation valves inside containment were in their required positions.for the Safety Injection System, Containment Spray System, Fuel Pool Cooling System, Chemical and Volume Control System, Reactor Coolant System, Emergency HVAC, and Hydrogen Purge Supply and Exhaust System. 'The inspectors also walked down the containment cooling system inside containmen No violations or deviations were identified; Post Refueling Initial Criticality and Startup Testing (Unit 2) During this inspection period, Unit 2 completed low power physics testing and entered Mode 1 on June 10, 1986. The second refuellng outage'was completed at 1024 on June 12, 1986,-when the generator /vas synchronized to the grid. The inspector observed the initial criticality in the control room following the refueling at 0935 on June 5, 1986. Portions of the following physics tests were also observed: S023-V-1. Criticality Following Refueling S023-V-1. Boron Endpoint Determination S023-V-1. Control Element Assembly Worth by Exchange No violations or deviations were identifie . 8. ' Independent Inspection - Core Protection Calculator Modificatior.s;

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The licensee implemented the core protection calculator (CPC) software improvements which were developed through the Core Protection Calculator Improvement Program (CPCIP). The NRC gave generic approval of the CPCIP to Combustion Engineering (CE) by a letter dated March 12, 1986. -The inspector observed portions of the software implementation', and it

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appeared to be well planned and controlled.- The,CPC modifications provide for the following: ,

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With one control element assembly calculator (CEAC) out of service (00S), a time delay of about 10 seconds is imposed on the other CEAC to account for spurious ind,ication ' o

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j With'one CEAC 00S, three auto restarts are allowed on the operating CEAC to eliminate spurious reactor trip , i

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A variable over power trip (V0PT) has been added to the CPCs to ! allow for greater safety during longer fuel cycle * The flow projected DNBR calculation has been eliminated and the-reactor coolant pump speed trip is used for the loss of flow ! protectio l

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i The Asymmetric Steam Generator Transient-(ASGT) algorithm has been ! ' modified to use the long term average cold' leg temperature as the l reference, s '

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Modifications to improve the axial' shape fitting late in the fuel

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No violations or deviations were identifie '

! Follow-up on IE Information Notice ,
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IE Information Notice 86-03, Potential Deficiencies in Environmental

Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve +0pe"rato'r Wiring (0 pen).,!The inspector examined the environmental" qualifications (EQ)3forethe internal jumpers on several Limitorque motor operated valves (MOVs). " Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) assisted in-this inspection effort under contract to the NRC. The EQ packages for the' MOVs were' reviewed to determine the qualifications of the internal jumpers, and a' sampling of . the EQ valves was selected for visual inspection. . Based on discussions

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with the vendor and manufacture dates of the valves used on Units 2 and 3, the licensee believes that' the jumpers received with the valves were initially qualified as required. Additionally, since the maintenance procedures required that only EQ wire be used'for, replacement, the licensee is confident that the MOVs have EQ jumpers. In order to provide objective evidence that all of the internal jumpers are qualified, however, the licensee has implemented a program to replace all of the internal jumpers with Rockbestos switchboard wire which is labeled on the insulation to give traceability. This task is planned to be completed by-the end of the third refueling outage on Units 2 and Af ter visually inspecting the internal jumpers on some of the EQ MOVs, the inspectors -identified two instances where an internal jumper looked questionable. In one case, a short jumper was found in valve 2HV-0516 which looked slightly different than the other jumpers. The licensee stated that the lugs used on the jumper indicated that the jumper was installed by Limitorque, and since the valve was manufactured after 1974, the jumper should be acceptable because Limitorque was using EQ wire after 1974. In the other case, the inspector noticed that the jumpers used for the internal heaters on valves 2HV-5803 and 2HV-0516 were substantially different than the other internal jumpers. The licensee is currently evaluating the acceptability of the heater jumper wire Aside from the qualification of internal jumpers, during the visual inspections of the Limitorque MOVs, the inspectors identified the following material condition deficiencies: .

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. Valve 2HV-5803 had a field run cable which was taped with electrical t?pe. The field run cable had been smashed during installation of the limit switch compartment cove *

A heater terminal on valve 2HV-516 was taped with electrical tape, evidently to prevent shorting the terminal to the motor housin * Two of the cap screws that are used to secure the limit-switch compartment cover on valve 2HV-9340 were deficient. One of the cap screws'was broken off, and the other was not threaded in all of the wa ~

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Several examples of chafed and nicked wires were found inside the limit switch compartment. On the smaller Limitorque valves that do not have hinged covers, the internal wiring is packed in so tightly that damage to the insulation can result during cover installatio The weaknesses in the material condition _of the Limitorque MOVs have been discussed with the licensee, and corrective actions are being take Additional follow-up inspection will be conducted regarding material condition and EQ of the Limitorque MOVs on Unit No violations or deviations were identifie . Follow-up of Previously Identified Item

{ Closed) Open Item (50-361/85-31-01) Reactor Trips at Low Power Due to High Negative Axial Shape Index (ASI) Core Protection Calculator (CPC)

Trip

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions,to eliminate ~ unnecessary reactor trips at low power levels due to,high negative ASI' values induced due to Xenon transients. The --licensee *m'odified ' operating instruction S023-5-1.3.1, " Plant Startup from Hot Standby'to~ Minimum Load", to allow the use of Group 5 CEAs to aid 'in controlling: ASI. Step ~1.2 in attachment 3 (TCN 11-2) of S023-5-1,.3.1 contains the additional ASI guidelines which describe the'use of.Gr'oup 5 CEAs at' low' power level In addition, some CPC softwa're changes lhave been made which should also

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help to resolve the problems experienced with ASI. -This is " discussed in paragraph 8.a of this report. .This-item is closed.~ 11. Exit Meeting On June 27, 1986 an exit meeting was conducted with the licensee representatives identified in Paragraph 1. .The Senior Resident Inspector summarized the inspection scope and findings as described in this repor . I ( }}