IR 05000361/1998017
| ML20198C771 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 12/14/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198C765 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-98-17, 50-362-98-17, NUDOCS 9812220166 | |
| Download: ML20198C771 (13) | |
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ENCLOSURE :
' U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,
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REGION IV
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Docket Nos.: 50-361 50-362 '
License Nos.: NPF-10 NPF-15 Report No.: .50-361/98-17 !
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50-362/98-17 l:
Licensee: Southern California Edison C Facility: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 i , Location: 5000 S. Pacific Coast Hw '
l San Clemente, California
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l Dates: October 4 through November 14,1998 Inspectors:
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J. A. Sloan, Senior Resident inspector J. G. Kramer, Resident inspector
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J. J. Russell, Resident inspector -
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Gregory A. Pick, Acting Chief, Branch E Division of Reactor Projects
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!. ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information i
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY j San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 NRC Inspection Report 50 361/98-17; 50-362/98-17 ,
I This routine announced inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. This report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectio Operations
- Operators (licensed and nonlicensed) demonstrated minor weaknesses in control board ,
and equipment awareness. Operators were unaware of the dilution batch counter not i being set to zero and had not noted oscillation of the reactor coolant pump upper seal pressure indicator. A nuclear plant equipment operator did not identify a low charging pump oillevel. Operators had installed a valve locking device on an auxiliary feedwater- l bypass valve that would have allowed operation of the valve and would not have l indicated tampering if the valve was manipulated (Section O4.1).
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- Refueling engineef s' and maintenance's performances during new fuel assembly inspection were good. The refueling engineers were thorough and methodicalin the assembly inspection. Maintenance handling of the fuel assemblies was slow and cautious (Section E2.2).
Maintenance i
- Licensee performance during auxiliary feedwater pump testing was good. A nuclear plant equipment operator provided direct supervision of a trainee performing pump checks and equipment manipulations. Operators used formal communications throughout the evolution and good cross-checking of switch manipulations. Station technical and maintenance both displayed strong knowledge of the tests they performed dunng the evolution (Section M1.4).
- The performance of maintenance activities on the chill water systems was weak. The maintenance resulted in unplanned trips of the normal and then emergency chiller and twice resulted in a loss of cooling to the control room (Section M1.5).
- Although most plant areas were well maintained with good material condition, a slight decline was observed based on the higher than normal discrepancies (Section M2.1).
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l * Station technical provided aggressive and excellent support of inservice testing of valves
! during a Unit 2 forced outage. Twenty-six cold shutdown interval valves were tested in a I 10-day period. Additional, nonrequired refueling intervalleakage testing of some of j these cold shutdown interval valves was performed. All valves met acceptance criteria
(Section E2.1).
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Licensed operator performance during the simulator portion of the emergency preparedness drill was weak. The shift manager was overly involved in the earthquake abnorrnal operating instruction instead of providing oversight and entering the !
emergency plan implementing procedures. When ultimately entering the emergency plan implementing procedure, the shift manager incorrectly classified the emergency level of the event (Section 05.1).
. Overall, licensee performance during the emergency preparedness drill was good in that l the emergency coordinator was deliberate and methodical in evaluating and making ;
protective action recommendations. The licensee performed a self-critical assessment of the drill objectives (Section P5.1).
- Maintenance personnel demonstrated poor attention to detail by not blocking open a watertight door to a component cooling water room, as required by the impairment. The applicable safety evaluation required the door to be open to prevent flooding of the components in the room while a potential for flooding existed. The door was not closed but was not blocked open as required (Section P8.1).
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Report Details Summary of Plant Status Both units operated at essentially-100 percent power during this inspection period, except that on October 25,1998, Unit 3 decreased power to 90 percent to support a heat treatment of the circulating water system. The unit returned to 100 percent power later that same da I. Operations 01- Conduct of Operations 01.1 : General Comments (71707]
The inspectors observed routine and nonroutine operational activities throughout this inspection period. Some of the activities observed included:
Control of volume control tank level (Unit 2)
Calibration of excore nuclear instrumentat;on (Unit 3)
Shift turnover (Units 2 and 3)
Startup of Train A component cooling water (CCW) and saltwater cooling (Unit 3)
Operators were thorough and methodical in preparing for and conducting routine evolutions. Close management and supervisory oversight of operational activities were evident. Specific comments on activities are discussed belo Operator Knowledge and Performance 0 Operator Awareness of Indications and Eauioment - Units 2 and 3 Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors performed numerous walkdowns of the control room and equipment areas during this inspection perio Observations and Findinas On October 6,1998, the inspectors observed that Unit 3 Valve 3MU1411, Steam Generator 3E089 to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump bypass valve, was closed but not properly locked. Procedure SO23-0-17, " Locking of important to Safety
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Critical Valves and Breakers," Temporary Change Notice 12-2, Attachment 4, " Auxiliary Feedwater System Locked Valves," required Valve 3MU1411 to be locked closed. A lock was installed on the handwhoel for Valve 3MU1411; however, the chain securing
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the lock had excessive slack such that Valve 3MU1411 could be fully opened without l damaging the chain or the lock and without showing any evidence of tampering. This manner of locking Valve 3MU1411 did not meet the intent of a locking or sealing devic The inspectors verified that the remaining Unit 3 and the equivalent Unit 2 bypass valves were properly locked closed.
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i-2-In response to the inspectors' concern, cperators positioned the chain to properly secure Valve 3MU1411 and generated Action Request (AR) 981001458. The licensee revised Procedure SO23-0-17 to establish requirements,in terms of handwheel movement, for lock installation. The inspectors determined that the failure to properly lock Valve 3MU1411 was an isolated occurrence, and that the licensee responded appropriately. However, the failure to follow Procedure SO23-0-17 was a violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.1.1.a. This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement actio On October 15, the inspectors observed that the Unit 3 batch dilution counter was set to 50 gallons, with no dilution in progress. Normally, this counter was set to zero unless a dilution was commencing. In that case, the counter would be set to the amount of water to be added to the volume control tank. When the makeup mode selector switch was set to " dilute," the counter would then count down to zero, as the preset gallons of water were added to the volume control tank. Control room operators were unaware that the counter was set to 50 gallons. With volume control tank level control set to automatic, the setting on the dilution counter did not affect plant operation. However, the setting of the counter was controlled by Procedure SO23-3 2.2, " Makeup Operations,"
Revision 12. For no dilution in progress, the setting should have been zero. The inspectors found that, in this instance, operators demonstrated poor control board awarenes On October 25, the inspectors observed that the Unit 3 Reactor Coolant Pump 3P001 upper seal pressure indication was oscillating approximately 25 pounds both above and below 850 psig. When questioned, control room operators were unaware of the oscillations. The inspectors determined, since the other reactor coolant pump seal pressures indicated constant pressure and computer trends of Reactor Coolant Pump 3P001 upper seal pressure remained constant, that this was an indication deficiency and not an actual seal pressure oscillation. The inspectors found, however, that in this instance, operators demonstrated poor control board awarenes On October 26, the inspectors performed a walkdown of Unit 2 Train A Charging Pump 2MP190, which was in operation. The inspectors observed oil splashing into the sight glass and running into the sump with no visible level in the sight glass. The inspectors informed the control room of the observation. With recommendation from the cognizant engineer, operators stopped the charging pump and subsequently added 2 gallons of oil. The licensee initiated AR 981001654 to evaluate the as-found condition of the charging pump. The AR documented that, after the pump was stopped, the oil level returned to the bottom of the sight glass and the pump had always been operabl The nuclear plant equipment operator had observed the oil level earlier that day and judged the oil level to be acceptable. However, the inspectors concluded that, although the nuclear plant equipment operator noted oil splashing into the sight glass, the individual did not properly monitor the sight glass to ensure the oil level was correct with the pump in operation.
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! Conclusions Operators (licensed and nonlicensed) demonstrated minor weaknesses in control board ( and equipment awareness. Operators were unaware of the dilution batch counter not being set to zero and had not noted oscillation of the reactor coolant pump upper seal pressure indicator. A nuclear plant equipment operator did not identify a low charging i pump oillevel. Operators had installed a valve locking device on an auxiliary feedwater l bypass valve that would have allowed operation of the valve and would not have l indicated tampering if the valve was manipulate !
05 Operator Training and Qualification l l
05.1 Licensed Operator Trainino - Units 2 and 3 a. Insoection Scoce (71707. 71750)
The inspectors observed operator, evaluator, and simulator setup during an emergency preparedness drill. The inspectors discussed the observations with a training specialist and Operations management. The inspectors reviewed Procedures SO23-13-3,
" Earthquake," Revision 5; SO23-12-9, " Functional Recovery," Revision 18; and SO123-Vill 1," Recognition and Classification of Emergencies," Revision 1 b. Ob'servations and Findinos On October 28,1998, the inspectors observed operator performance during an emergency preparedness drill. Approximately 2 minutes after the unit experienced a reactor trip because of a seismic event, the shift manager obtained and implemented Procedure SO23-13-3 for earthquakes. The inspectors concluded that entering the abnormal operating instruction for earthquakes distracted the shift manager from performing his oversight function and from initiating the emergency plan implementing procedures. The shift manager ultimately entered Procedure SO123-Vill-1 to classify the procedure but incorrectly classified the event as an unusual event instead of an cier The inspectors identified that, during the drill scenario, the operators had used an old revision of Procedure SO2312-9. Af ter the scenario, the inspectors informed a training specialist about the out-of-date functional recovery procedure. The specialist determined that three copies of unauthorized licensed or erator training materials were left in the simulator, which included the functional .ecovery procedure used by the cre The specialist removed the three unauthorized documents from the simulator. Neither the operating crew nor the training staff recognized that the functional recovery procedure used was out of date.
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! Licensed operator performance during the simulator portion of the emergency preparedness drill was weak. The shif t manager was overly involved in the earthquake
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abnormal operating instruction instead of providing oversight and entering the emergency plan implementing procedures. When ultimately entering the emergency plan implementing procedure, the shift manager incorrectly classified the emergency level of the even I II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments - Insoection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities: I
= Drill and tap tube plugs in CCW Heat Exchanger 2ME001 (Unit 2)
= Repair saltwater cooling Pump 2P114 discharge flange pitting (Unit 2)
= Disassembly of CCW Pump 3P025 for overhaul (Unit 3)
= Repair Check Valve MUO39, Fire Water Pump MP222 discharge check, (Units 2 ;
end 3) l Observations and Findinas The inspectors foun'd the work performed under these activities to be thorough. All work
- observed was performed with the work package present and in active use. Technicians were knowledgeable and professional. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present whenever required by procedure. When applicable, appropriate radiation controls were in plac M1.2 General Comments on Surveillance Activities Inspection Scoce (61726)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities:
- Channel D excore nuclear instrumentation biannual channel calibration (Unit 2)
= Train B Emergency Diesel Generator 2G003 monthly slow start (Unit 2) Observations and Findinas The inspectors 'found all activities performed under these surveillances to be thorough.
l All surveillances observed were performed with the . work package present and in active L use. Technicians were knowledgeable and professional. The inspectors frequently l observed supervisors and syster, engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control
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personnel were present whenever required by procedure. When applicable, appropriate radiation controls were in place.
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-5-M1.3 Batterv Charae: Voltmeter Calibration - Unit 2 Inspection Scope (62707)
On October 30,1998, the inspectors observed electrical test technicians calibrate the ,
installed voltmeter for Unit 2 Battery Charger 2B004. The inspectors reviewed l Procedure SO123-ll-15.3, Attachment 1," Terr.porary System Alteration and l Restoration," Temporary Change Notice 7-2, being used to record jumpers and lifted leads during the calibratio Observations and Findinas The electrical test technicians used the alteration and restoration form (Attachment 1 referenced above) to record installation and removal of jurnpers and to record lifting and reterminating leads. The inspectors reviewed the alteration and restoration form with the voltmeter calibration in progress and determined that the voltmeter leads had been attached to the voltmeter circuit. The technicians had filled in the alteration and restoration form with the voltmeter listed, but the form did not have initials indicating installation of the leads. The voltmeter had been installed about 10 minutes prior to the inspectors' observation, and work had progressed since installation of the voltmeter leads. The electrical test technicians updated the form. The inspectors considered that using the form for voltmeter leads was a strength because the voltmeter leads were readily visible, facilitating removal at the appropriate time. However, failing to update the alteration and restoration form, while progressing with the calibration after the voltmeter leads were landed, was contrary to licensee management expectation, as expressed both in Procedure SO123-ll-15.3 and verbally by the Electrical Test superviso Conclusiens Electrical test technicians demonstrated poor attention to detail. During a battery charger voltmeter calibration, voltmeter leads were attached and recorded on the jumper and lifted lead form, but not initialed until prompted by the inspectors and, therefore, were not being kept current with the work in progress. The technicians were, however, using the form for tracking a voltmeter used in the calibration, which was conservativ M1.4 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumo Testina - Unit 3 Inspection Secoe (61726. 71707)
The inspectors observed operators perform a test of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
- Pump 3P140. The inspectors reviewed Procedures SO23-2-4," Auxiliary Feedwater
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System Operation," Revision 15; SO23-3-3.43.30, "ESF Subgroup Relays K-112A, K-625A, and K-725A Semiannual Test," Revision 1; SO123-l-9.30, " Motor Operated Valve and Test System," Revision 2; and Maintenance Order 9810051 . . __ __ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . __ . _ . . .. .
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l-6-b. Observations and Findinas On October 21,1998, the operators performed n prejob briefing to discuss the two tests l performed on Pump 3P140. The first test included a start of the pump for l motor-operated valve diagnostics and speed tracing, and the next test was a subgroup l relay test. The prejob briefing included the significant steps of the tests.
l j The inspectors observed the first start of Pump 3P140 locally at the pump. Operations i used the test as a training evolution for a nuclear plant equipment operator not qualified l to operate the pump. Under the direct supervision of a qualified operator, the trainee
- correctly performed the prestart and poststart checks of the pump and performed a l manual trip of the pump as directed by Procedure SO23-2-4.
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The inspectors observed the second test from the control room. The operators used good communications and cross-checking when initiating a test signal that started the pump at an engineered safety features actuation systems cabinet. In addition, operations management supervision was evident in the control room.
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The inspectors discussed the speed tracing with the cognizant Station Technical l
engineer. The engineer explained the results of the speed trace and indicated that the l speed trace was used as a diagnostic tool and for troubleshooting. The speed trace indicated no pump abnormalities. The licensee had initiated the use of speed tracing as an action item of AR 961201410 to monitor the performance of the turbine oil since the licensee had previously switched to a high temperature lubricating oi The inspectors reviewed the results of the motor-operated valve diagnostics with an
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electrical general foreman who demonstrated good knowledge of the diagnostic results.
l The diagnostics indicated satisfactory valve performance.
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l c. Conclusions Licensee performance during auxiliary feedwater pump testing was good. A nuclear plant equipment operator provided direct supervision of a trainee performing pump checks and equipment manipulations. Operators used formal communications throughout the evolution and good cross-checking of switch manipulations. Station technical and maintenance both displayed strong knowledge of the tests they performed during the evolution M1.5 Emeroency and Normal Chiller Trios - Units 2 and 3 a. Inspection Scope (62707. 717071 During routine control room inspection, the inspectors observed trips of the emergency and normal chillers. The inspectors discussed the results of the trips with operations, j engineering, and maintenance. The inspectors reviewed AR 981000756 and Maintenance Orders 98013259000,98080581001, aoJ 98090069000.
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-7-b. Observations and Findinas On October 13,1998, Train A Normal Chiller E330 (common to Units 2 and 3) tripped I while instrumentation and control technicians installed jumpers for dynamic testing, i causing a loss of cooling to the control room. Operators were informed that a fuse had !
blown in the chiller. The operators decided to start one of the emergency chillers to provide control room cooling. The Train A emergency chiller had been removed from service for maintenance on a Unit 2 cabinet area emergency cooling unit. Operators did not want to start the Train B emergency chiller because, if the chiller malfunctioned, Unit 2 would be placed in a TS Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.3 conditio Therefore, since technicians had not yet accepted the maintenance order, operators backed out of the planned maintenance of the Train A emergency chiller by releasing the clearance on the chiller. Subsequently, operators started the Train A emergency chiller to provide coolin After running for several minutes, Chill Water Pump P162 and the Train A emergency chiller tripped. The operators attempted to restart the chill water pump from the control room, but it would not start. By this time, maintenance had replaced the blown fuses in the normal chiller and operators restarted the normal chiller to provide cooling to the '
i control roo The licensee suspected that the emergency chiller trip resulted from the restoration from the calibration of chill water Flow Transmitter 2/3FT9874-1, which maintenance indicated should have had no effect on the emergency chiller. The operators declared the emergency chiller inoperable and initiated an AR to investigate the cause of the tri The licensee determined tnat the sensing lines for Flow Transmitter 2/3FT9874-1 were tubed parallel with the emergency chill water pump Low Flow Trip 2/3FCL9870-1 and shared common root valves. The licensee attempted to recreate the emergency chiller trip by performing testing; however, the license could not recreate the event. Further evaluation bv Station Technical concluded that the emergency chiller remained operable ;
during the e cent since the chill water low flow trip is bypassed during an emergency star Conclusions The performance of maintenance activities on the chill water systems was weak. The maintenance resulted in unplanned trips of the normal and then emergency chiller and l twice resulted in a loss of cooling to the control roo M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tours - Units 2 and 3 Inspection Scoce (62707)
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b. Observations and Findinas On October 8,1998, the inspectors observed that instrument Air Compressor C001 intercooler shell Relief Valve 2/3PSV5390 was leaking air or lifting, with Compressor C001 in standby and not operating. The licensee generated AR 981000587 to repair Valve 2/3PSV539 On October 21, during a monthly surveillance, the inspectors observed that the Unit 2 Train B Emergency Diesel Generator 2G003 Engine 1 Cylinder 11 blowdown valve packing was leaking oil, and other blowdown packing glands were leaking air or ga The blowdown packing glands contained the inspection ports for the engine cylinder The packing glands were not sealed to the combustion chamber; the inspection ports were. Consequently, glands leaking oil were not indicative of oil in the combustion chamber. The licensee generated AR 981001453 to repair the blowdown packing gland On October 25, during a Unit 3 main circulating water heat treatment, the inspectors observed that Main intake Gate 4 position indication on Panel L-111 did not respond to gate movement. The Panet L-111 indication read closed, with Gate 4 indicating 95 percent open locally. Also, other local gate indicat ons differed from actual gate position by cpproximately 10 percent. The operator performing the gate manipulations at Panel L-111 used gate position to determine that automatic gate reversal was accomplished and to manually manipulate gates in accordance with pre-established positions during the course of the heat treatment. The licensee generated AR 981001604 to repair the Gate 4 Panel L-111 indicatio On October 27, the inspectors observed the status of the fire protection syste Several components contained equipment deficiencies. Fire Water Pump MP222 was out of service for repair of a discharge check valve. Jockey Pump MP223 was out of service because of back flow through the discharge check valve, and Unit 1 crosstie Valves MUO34 and MUO35 were inoperable because of valve problems. The licensee had documented the deficiencies in AR On October 28, the inspectors observed that liquid containers were placed above electronic equipment in the Units 2 and 3 postaccident sampling system room. Plastic containers of water and cleaner were located on a beam directly above a computerized liquid sample energy spectrum analyzer, and a plastic bag of water was stored above an energy spectrum detector. The plastic bag was connected to a burette used to dilute reactor coolant grab samples. None of the liquid containers were secured to prevent falling on the electronic equipment either inadvertently or during a seismic event. Health physics personnel removed the liquids above the analyzer. The licensee was considering a method of securing the water used to dilute the reactor coolant sample at the end of this inspection perio During this inspection period, two saltwater cooling pumps developed pin hole leaks in l
the discharge flange. On October 19, Pump 2P112 developed a leak and on October 28, Pump 3P112 developed a leak. The licensee initiated ARs 981001197 and
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ASME Section XI weld repaire Conclusions Although most plant areas were well maintained with good material condition, a slight decline was observed based on the higher than normal discrepancie Ill. Enoineerina E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E Inservice Testino of Cold Shutdown interval Valves - Unit 2 'Insoection Scope (37551)
The inspectors reviewed records of inservice testing of valves performed from I September 19-27,1998, during a Unit 2 forced outage. The inspectors also reviewed portions of ASME Section XI, Article IMV-3000,1989, which contains requirements for inservice testing of valves; and portions of Procedure SO23-V-3.5," Inservice Testing of Valves Program," Revision 17, which contained the licensee program for implementing the ASME Code requirement bi Observations and Findinas The ASME Code requires, in general, that applicable valves be inservice tested during plant operation every 3 months. If movement of the valve is not practical during plant operation, the valve shall be inservice tested during shutdowns. For forced outages of limited duration, Procedure SO23-V-3.5 required that inservice testing of applicable -
valves commence within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of achieving Modes 3,4, and 5 and continue until all testing was complete or the plant was ready to return to powe The inspectors observed that Unit 2 entered Mode 3 on September 18, at 11:15 a.m.,
and that inservice testing of cold shutdown interval valves commenced within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> The testing continued until September 27, and Unit 2 entered Mode 2 on September 2 All 26 of the cold shutdown interval valves tested, met the stroke exercise test L acceptance criteria. Some of the valves were listed in TS Surveillance Requirement 3.4.14.1, which requires, in part, valve leakage testing for reactor coolant system pressure isolation valves within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> following valve actuation. The licensee-tested the applicable valves and all the valves met the acceptance criteria.
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The licensee also performed refueling interval inservice testing of 17 valves and all met the acceptance criteria. The refueling interval testing was generally seat leakage testing
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, Conclusions Station Technical provided aggressive and excellent support of inservice testing of valves during a Unit 2 forced outage. Twenty-six cold shutdown interval valves were tested in a 10-day period. Additional, nonrequired refueling intervalleakage testing of some of these cold shutdown interval valves was performed. All valves met acceptance criteri . E2.2 New Fuel Insoection - Unit 2 Insoection Scoce (3755_1_)
l The inspectors observed the new fuel inspection and discussed the inspection process with refueling engineers. The inspectors reviewed Procedure SO23-X-6.1," Receipt, Unpacking and Inspection of New Fuel Assemblies and Fuel Assembly inserts,"
Revision Observations and Findinas l On November 5,1998, the inspectors observed refueling engineers and a fuel vendor representative perform a visual inspection of the new fuel assemblies stored in the new fuel racks. Maintenance used care when grappling the new fuel assemblies and used slow speed movement when initially starting and stopping fuel movement. The engineer followed the inspection requirements of Procedure SO23-X-6.1, Step 6.3.9. The engineer and fuel representative simultaneously inspected the fuel assembly as maintenance slowly lifted the assembly with the new fuel cran Conclusions Refueling engineers' and maintenance's performances during new fuel assembly inspection were good. The refueling engineers were thorough and methodical in the assembly inspection. Maintenance handling of the fuel assemblies was slow and cautiou IV. Plant Support P5 Staff Training and Qualification in Emergency Preparedness P Emeraency Preparedness Drill - Units 2 and 3 Inspection Scope (71750)
The inspectors observed the emergency preparedness drill and discussed overall performance of the licensee staff with the emergericy preparedness superviso ,
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-11- Observations and Findinas On October 28,1998, the inspectors observed portions of the emergency preparedness drill from the simulator and the emergency operations facility (operator and simulator observations are documented in Section 05.1). During the drill, several off-site agencies were recommending that the protective action recommendations be changed based on the potential of change in wind direction. The emergency coordinator (Station Emergency Director) assembled the licensee experts to evaluate the consequences of changing the protective action recommendations and the potential for a wind shift. The inspector concluded that the emergency coordinator was deliberate and methodical in making the protective action recommendation The inspectors discussed the overall performance of the drill with the emergency preparedness supervisor. The supervisor indicated that 6 of the 32 objectives were not met and explained the criteria and reason for each failure. The inspectors concluded that the licensee was self-criticalin evaluating the dril Conclusions Overall, licensee performance of the emergency preparedness drill was good in that the emergency coordinator was deliberate and methodical in evaluating and making protective action recommendations. The licensee performed a self-critical assessment
- of the drill objective P8 Miscellaneous Emergency Preparedness issues P Watertioht Door Not Blocked Open - Unit 3 inspection Scope (71750)
On October 9,1998, the inspectors walked down portions of the Unit 3 CCW pump rooms. The inspectors reviewed Safety Evaluation Record 2117, Revision 1, which evaluated removing a floor plug located above Swing CCW Pump 3MP02 Observations and Findinas Pump 3MP025 was inoperable for overhaul of the rotating element. The inspectors
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observed that the floor plug for Room 007, the swing CCW pump room, was removed l
and that the watertight door leading into the space was open approximately 1 - 2 feet.
l No work activities or licensee personnel were present in the area.
- Impairment 96070074, posted on the wall adjacent to the watertight door (Door S3005 l for Room 007) required maintenance to block Door S3005 open to prevent closure; i however, no blocking device had been installed. The inspectors informed operations
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generated AR 981000592.
} The inspectors reviewed the safety evaluation for removing the Room 007 floor plug and blocking the door open. The door was required to be blocked open to ensure that
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12-flooding from the area above (because of postulated line breaks) would drain from I Room 007. If Door S3005 was shut, flooding would cause components from the operable CCW trains located in the swing pump room to become submerged. The postulated flood would force the watertight door open and, consequently, as long as the door was not dogged shut, the inspectors determined that the analysis remained vali However, since the licensee was not monitoring this door hourly, the blocking device was to be a barrier to inadvertent shutting of the door, as required by the impairment j program. Failure to follow Impairment 96070074 was a violation of TS 5.5.1.1.a. This
! failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement actio Conclusions Maintenance personnel demonstrated poor attention to detail by not blocking open a watertight door to a CCW room, as required by the impairment. The applicable safety l- evaluation required the door to be open to prevent flooding of components in the room
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while a potential for flooding existed. This failure indicated a violation of minor l- significance, since the door was not closed and is not subject to formal enforcement action.
l I l V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Moe ng Summary l
l The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the exit meeting on November 13,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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r ATTACHMENT-SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
, Licensee D. Brieg, Manager, Station Technical 6 J.-Fee, Manager, Maintenance
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D. Herbst, Manager, Site Quality Assurance
, -J.; Hirsch, Manager, Chemistry
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l R. Krieger, Vice President, Nuclear Generation
, J. Madigan, Manager, Health Physics
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D. Nunn, Vice President, Engineering and Technical Services A. Scherer, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs T. Vogt, Plant Superintendent, Units 2 and 3 R. Waldo, Manager, Operations INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering ,
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities ,
IP 92700: On Site Licensee Event Report Review LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AR action request CCW component cooling water
! CFR Code of Federal Regulations
- LER licensee event report NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PDR Public Document Room l
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TS Technical Specification
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