ML20206S521

Insp Repts 50-369/86-29 & 50-370/86-24 on 860811-15.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Fire Protection/Prevention & Followup of Previously Identified Insp Items

ML20206S521
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	09/10/1986
From:	Conlon T, Madden P, Mcelhinney T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206S492	List: IR 05000369/1986024 ML20206S521
References
50-369-86-24, 50-370-86-24, NUDOCS 8609220252
Download: ML20206S521 (16)

See also: IR 05000369/1986029

Text

I

. UNITED STATES

.

f qn Recoq*o

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[' n REGION 11

101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

g j

• 2 ATL ANTA. GEORGI A 30323

%,*..**/

Report Nos.: 50-369/86-24 and 50-370/86-24

Licensee: Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242 , i

Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17

Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: Augtst 11-15 1986

Inspector s' 9 /4

(. P..M. Ma .

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T. F. fjcElhipey '

Date' Signed

Approved by: & M /8 // 9 c/7/

T. E. Ccnlon, Section Chipff Date Signed

Plant Systems Section, Engineering-Branch

Division of Reactor Safety ,

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site in the areas

of Fire Protection / Prevention and followup on previously identified inspection

items.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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REPORT DETAILS

1.- Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

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J. Almond, Safety Supervisor

• H. Brandes, Analytical Engineer. Fire Protection

L. Cook,'IAE Supervisor

E. Estep, Project Services Engineer

G. Gilbert, Operations' Engineer

• S. Grier, IAE Nuclear Production Engineer

• R. Hunning, Mechanical Maintenance

T. McConnell, Station Manager

• E. McCraw, Compliance Engineer

• S. McInnis, Compliance', Nuclear Production Engineer

• J. Oldham, Design Engineer Fire Protection

D. Simmons, Maintenance / Planning

• C. Taylor, Safety / Training Coordinator

B. Travis, Superintendent Operations

S. Van Malssen, Mechanical Engineer Supervisor

L. E. Weaver, Superintendent Station Services

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and. findings were summarized on August 15, 1986, with

those persons indicated in the paragraph 1 above. The inspectors describad

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the areas inspected and discussed-in detail the inspection findings. No

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dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

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a. Inspector Followup Item (369/86-24-01 and 370/86-24-01), Improper Fire

Fighting Equipment Deployment and Techniques Utilized by the Fire

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Brigade - Paragraph 5.e(4)

b. Inspector Followup Item (364/86-24-02 and 370/86-24-02), Inadequate -

Mechanical Protection Provided for Battery Room Sprinkler Systems -

4 Paragraph 5.f.(3)

c. Inspector Followup Item (369/86-24-03 and 370/86-24-03), Deteriorating

Raceway Fire Barrier Enclosures in the Turbine Driven Auxiliary

Feedwater Pump Rooms - Paragraph 5.f.(4)

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided

to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

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3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

a. (Closed) Unresolved Item (370/80-07-02), Battery Powered Emergency

Lighting Requirements for Safety Related Pump Rooms. In order to

support safe shutdown capabilities, emergency lighting has been

installed in the associated switchgear rooms which control safe

shutdown related pumps on elevations 733'-0" and 750'-0". Therefore,

this item is closed.

b. (Closed) Deviation Item (370/80-80-15-08), Fire Suppression Systems for

the Reactor Building Do Not Meet NRC Single Failure Criteria. On

September 27 and 28, 1978, the licensee met with NRC/NRR to resolve the

reactor building fire suppression system single failure issue. On

October 3,1978, the NRC issued a summary of this meeting and concluded

that the use of a remote manually operated control valve which can be

operated from the control room for the containment hose stations and

sprinklers was acceptable. This item is closed.

c. (Closed)DeviationItem(369/83-12-02), Failure to Inspect and Test the

Fire Detection and Actuation Systems for the Unit 1 Diesel Generator

and Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rooms Halon Systems. The licensee has

implemented Test Procedure PT/0/A/4600/16B which verifies the

operability of the heat detectors that actuate the diesel generator and

the auxiliary feedwate pump room Halon Suppression Systems. This test

is conducted on a semi-annual basis. In addition, the licensee has

implemented test procedures PT/1/A/4450/10A and PT/1/A/4450/13A. Which

direct the perfonnance of the annual operability tests on the halon

suppression systems in the Unit 1 diesel generator rooms and auxiliary

feedwater pump room. Therefore, this item is closed.

d. (Closed) Deviation Item (369/83-12-03 and 370/83-16-03), Unprotected

Floor Ceiling Penetrations Provided Between the 695, and 716, 716 and

733 and 750 and 767 Foot Elevations. The licensee in their 1984

McGuire fire protection review analyzed the unprotected floor ceiling

openings which were identified by this inspection item. The licensee's

fire protection review concluded that a fire originating on one level

of the plant and spreading to another level would not affect the

ability to bring the unit to a hot standby condition. This item is

closed.

e. (Closed) Deviation Item (370/83-16-05), Failure to Include the Battery

Powered Emergency Lighting Units Under a QA/QC Program. The licensee,

during the design process, evaluated the need to include the emergency

lighting units under the fire protection QA program. Consequently, the

licensee determined that the emergency lighting units were manu-

facturer's standard and that the application of a QA program would not

have improved the performance or reliability of the emergency lighting

system. Therefore, this item is closed.

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f. (Closed) Deviation Item (369/83-12-08 and 370/83-16-08), Failure to

Provide a Procedure Requiring Permit Approval for All Operations

Involving Ignition Sources Within the Operating Plant. All cutting,

welding, grinding and open flame operations are required to follow

maintenance procedure MP/0/B/7650/09. This procedure under certain

circumstances requires that ignition sources (i.e., welding, grinding,

cutting, open flame) be controlled by a permit system. This item is

closed,

g. (Closed) Violation Item (369/84-20-01 and 370/84-17-01), Failure to

Perform Periodic Test of the Standby Shutdown System. The licensee, on

August 16, 1984, implemented the surveillance requirements of proposed

Technical Specifications 3/4.7.14. Therefore, this item is closed.

h. (Closed) Unresolved Item (359/84-28-02 and 84-25-02), Inadequate Fixed

Fire Suppression System Provided for the Cable Spreading Room and

Battery Room. On January 15, 1980 and July 28, 1980, NRR advised NRC

Region II that the cable spreading room and the battery room fixed

water suppression capabilities provided were found to be acceptable.

In addition, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 13 and 15

code discrepancies for these systems were not pertinent since the plant

can achieve and maintain hot standby conditions independently of these

areas. Therefore, this item is closed.

1. (Closed) Deviation Item (369/84-28-05 and 370/84-25-05), Failure to

Provide Battery Powered Hand Lanterns in the Control Room. The

licensee, on September 28, 1984, installed two battery powered hand

lanterns inside the control room. This item is closed.

j. (Closed) Unresolved Item (364/84-28-08 and 370/84-25-08), Adequacy of

Power Supplies for Fire Pumps A, B, and C. Upon loss of electrical

power, the licensee will provide diesel generator power in accordance

with the Technical Specifications to the Train "C" fire pump. The

lineup to the blackout diesel generator is performed in accordance with

procedure AP/1/A/5500/07, Loss of Electrical Power. This item is

closed.

k. (Closed) Deviation Item (369/84-28-09 and 370/84-25-09), Failure to

Provide Adequate Radio Communications Between Local Control Stations

and Standby Shutdown Facility. On November 8,1984, the licensee

issued Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) MG1716 to upgrade the on-site

emergency / fire brigade radio communication system. The emergency radio

system upgrade was completed and fully operational on February 19,

1986. Therefore, this item is closed.

1. (Closed) Violation Item (369/84-28-11), Inadequate Appendix R Section

III.G. Fire Protection Features and Separation Provided for Redundant

Trains. Cabling to the valve operators for the Safe Shutdown System

(SSS) Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump suction valves

1CA-161C and ICA-162C located within the Unit 1 pipe chase and

mechanical penetration room and control cables for both the Unit 1

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Train "A" and "B" centrifugal charging and auxiliary feeuwater pumps

located within the Unit 1 Train "B" switchgear room are enclosed in a

three hour fire rated enclosure. Full compliance with 10 CFR 50

Appendix R,Section III.G.2. within the subject areas was achieved on

September 28, 1984. This item is closed.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.

5. Fire Protection Prevention Program (64704)

a. The inspector reviewed the following Fire Prevention / Administrative

Procedures:

Procedure No. Title

Station Directive 2.11.3, Control of Combustible Materials

Revision 8, 1/23/85

Station Directive 3.11.0, Housekeeping and Cleanliness

Revision 9, 9/21/84

Station Directive 2.11.2, Fire Protection and Surveillance

Revision 8,1/29/85

Maintenance Procedure Cutting and Welding Safety

MP/0/B/7650/09,

Revision 5, 6/3/85

Based on this review, it appears that the above procedures meet the

minimum guidelines of the document entitled " Nuclear Plant Fire

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Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls, and

Quality Assurance," dated June 1977 and the licensee's fire preven-

tion / administrative control commitment's documented in the March 1986

revision to the McGuire Fire Protection Review.

Based on the review of Station Directive 2.11.3, Control of

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Combustibles, the inspector observed that this procedure was lacking

guidance with respect to plastic materials and that the licensee should

consider placing more emphasis on the control of this type of material

in safety related areas. This will be reviewed duiing a subsequent

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inspection.

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b. Fire Protection Surveillance Procedures

The inspector reviewed the following Fire Protection System Surveil-

lance Procedures:

Procedure No. Title

PT/0/A/4600/15 Rev. 8 Fire Detection System Monthly Test

PT/0/A/4400/15 Rev. 2 Fire Protection Annunciator

Functional Test.

PT/0/A/4400/01A Rev. 4 Fire Protection System Periodic Flow

Test

PT/0/A/4440/01D Rev. 12 Fire Pump Operability Test

PT/0/A/4400/01F Rev. 5 Sprinkler Alarm System Semi-Annual

Test

PT/0/A/4400/018 Rev. 4 Automatic Mulsifyre system Annual

Test

PT/0/A/4400/02 Rev. 17 Monthly Visual Inspection of Fire

Hose Stations

PT/0/A/4250/03 Rev. 5 18 Month Fire Hose Inspections

PT/2/A/4450/20 Rev. 2 Unit 2 Auxiliary Feed Water Pump

Turbine Halon Fire Protection System

Monthly Check

PT/0/A/4250/04 Rev. 8 Fire Barrier Inspection

The above surveillance procedures were reviewed to determine if the

various test outlines and inspection instructions adequately implement

the surveillance requirements of the plant's Fire Protection Technical

Specification. In addition, these procedures were reviewed to

determine if the inspection and test instructions followed General

Industry Fire Protection Practices, NRC Fire Protection Program

Guidelines and the Guidelines of the National Fire Protection

Association (NFPA) Fire Codes. Based on this review, it appears that

the above procedures are satisfactory.

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c. Fire Protection System Surveillance Inspections and Tests

The inspector reviewed the following surveillance inspection and test

records for the dates indicated:

PT/0/A/4600/15 Fire Detection System Monthly

Tests: from 7-9-85 through 7-20-85

PT/0/A/4400/15 Fire Protection Annunciator

Functional

Tests: 8-13-84, 4-11-85, 10-29-85, 4-29-86

PT/0/A/4400/01A Fire Protection Periodic Flow Test:

Tests: 12-15-82, 4-3-84, 10-2-85

PT/0/A/4400/01D Fire Pump Operability Test

Weekly Tests: from 5-15-86 through 7-31-86

PT/0/A/4400/01B Automatic Mulsifyre System

Annual Test: 1-4-84, 1-3-85, 12-16-85

PT/0/A/4400/01F Sprinkler Alarm System Semi-Annual

Test: 4-9-84 through 5-6-86

PT/0/A/4400/02 Monthly Visual Inspection of Fire

Hose

Stations: 11-25-85 through 8-4-86

PT/2/A/4450/20 Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

Turbine Halon Fire Protection System Monthly Check: 9-25-85

through 7-29-86

PT/0/A/4250/04 Fire Barrier Inspection 18 month

Inspection: 10-5-82, 3-1-83, 5-4-83, 6-8-84, 6-14-84, 9-10-85,

3-6-86

The surveillance test record data and testing frequency associated with

the above fire protection system surveillance test / inspections were

found to be satisfactory with regard to meeting the requirements of the

plant's Fire Protection Technical Specifications.

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d. Fire Protection Audit

The most recent audit reports of the McGuire Fire Protection Program

were reviewed. These audits were:

October 30, 1985, Departmental Annual Fire Protection Prcgram Audit,

NP-85-17 (MC)

September 19, 1983, QA Audit of Fire Protection and Implementation

Procedures, NP-83-17 (MC)

November 10, 1983, Triennial Audit Fire Protection, NP-83-17

These audits identified several fire protection program discrepancies

and unresolved items, and recommended several program improvements.

The licensee has either implemented the corrective actions associated

with these audit findings or a scheduled date for completion of the

correction actions had been established. The licensee appears to be

taking the appropriate corrective actions on these audit findings.

e. Fire Brigade

(1) Organization

The Plant brigade is composed of approximately 114 personnel from

the operations, maintenance, technical and station services

staffs. The brigade leader is normally one of the unit super-

visors and the remaining fire brigade members are composed of four

nuclear equipment operators. The inspector reviewed the on duty

shifts for the following dates and verified that sufficient

qualified fire brigade personnel were on duty to meet the

provisions of Technical Specification 6.2.2:

August 11, 1986

August 12, 1986

August 13, 1986

In addition, the inspector verified that sufficient personnel were

assigned to each shift to meet the minimum operating and fire

brigade staff requirements of the Technical Specifications.

Therefore, it appears based on the review of the duty rosters

associated with the above dates, that there was sufficient

manpower on duty to meet both the operational and the fire brigade

requirements of the plant's Technical Specifications.

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(2) Training

The inspector reviewed the training and drill records for three

(3) brigade leaders and four (4) brigade members for the 1985

calendar year.

The records reviewed indicated that each of these leaders and

members had received an annual medical review, attended the

required training and participated in the required number of

drills. The inspector also verified that a fire brigade drill had

been conducted each quarter of 1985 for each brigade shift. The

fire brigade training records which were inspected were found

satis factory.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's initial fire

brigade training program to verify that the following training

topics are being covered:

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Indoctrination of the plant fire fighting plan with specific

identification of each individual's responsibilities.

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Identification of the type and location of fire hazards and

associated types of fires that could occur in the plant.

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The toxic and corrosive characteristics of expected products

of combustion.

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Identification of the location of fire fighting equipment for

each fire area and familiarization with the layout of the

plant, including access and egress routes to each area.

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The proper use of available fire fighting equipment and the

correct method of fighting each type of fire. The types of

fires should include fires in energized electrical equipment,

fires in cables and cable trays, hydrogen fires, fires

involving flammable and combustible liquids or hazardous

process chemicals, fires resulting from construction or

modifications (welding), and record file fires.

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The proper use of communication, lighting, ventilation and

emergency breathing equipment

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The proper method for fighting fires inside buildings and

confined spaces

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The direction and coordination of the fire fighting

activities (fire brigade leaders only)

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Detailed review of fire fighting strategies and procedures

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- Review of the latest plant modifications and corresponding

changes in fire fighting plans

Based on this review, it appears that the licensee's initial . fire

brigade training program covers the above required training

topics. In addition, it appears that the licensee's fire brigade

training program repeats the basic fire fighting skills oof the

initial program to qualified fire brigade members every two years.

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(3) Fire Brigade Fire Fighting Strategies

The inspectors reviewed the following plant fire fighting

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strategies:

Residual heat removal pump rooms, auxiliary building

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elevation 695'-0", fire strategy 1-1

-- Auxiliary feedwater pump rooms, auxiliary building elevation

716'-0" fire strategy 1-2

- Diesel -generator Room IB, auxiliary building elevation

733'-0", fire strategy 1-5

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Electrical penetration room 702, auxiliary building elevation

733'-0", fire strategy 1-10

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- Electrical penetration room 713, auxiliary building elevation

i 733'-0", fire strategy 1-10

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- 4Ky Switchgear room 1ETB, 600v MCC room 705, auxiliary

j building elevation 733'-0" fire strategy 1-11

Based on this review, the inspectors determined that the above

fire fighting strategies adequately addressed the fire hazards in

the area, the type of fire extinguishants to be utilized, the

direction of attach, systems in the room / area to be managed in

order to reduce fire damage, heat sensitive equipment in the

room / area, and specific fire brigade duties with regard to smoke

control and salvage.

The inspectors noted that the licensee's fire brigade strategies

i didn't specifically identify the electric power requirements of

the smoke removal equipment or the locations of the closest

available power receptacle which is not affected by the fire.

This concern will be inspected in a subsequent NRC inspection.

(4) Fire Brigade Drill

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During this inspection, the inspectors witnessed an unannounced

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fire brigade drill. The drill fire scenario was a fire in the

service building lube oil storage room 209.

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The minimum'five (5) fire brigade members responded to the pending

fire emergency. Initially, three (3) fire brigade members

assembled outside the lube oil storage room without their rdquired

personnel protective fire fighting equipment (i .e. , turnout

clothing and self. contained breathing apparatus) and advanced two

11 inch attack fire hose lines from hose caoinets IRF 32 and 30 to

the door of the storage room. Approximately nine (9) minutes

after the initial fire notification, the two (2) remaining fire

brigade members arrived on the fire scene in full protective fire

4 fighting turncut clothing and self contained breathing apparatus

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and manned one attack line. These individuals advanced the hose

line into the room and attacked the fire. The fire' was placed

under control in approximately 15 minutes. '

Based on the observation made during the drill, the inspectors

expressed the following concerns:

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Three fire brigade members responded to and performed fire

fighting operations at the fire scene without personnel

protective equipment (i.e., turnout clothing and self

containedbreathingapparatus)

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The two fire brigade members which donned personnel fire

fighting equipment did not do it properly (i.e., boots not

pulled up properly, turnout coat collars not . pulled up,

helmet ear flaps not pulled down and breathing apparatus

donning problems) with respect to affording optimum

protection.

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No fire fighting foam capabilities were' utilized by or

directly available to the brigade during the drill exercise.

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No spare air cylinders were available to the fire brigade

during the drill exercise.

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- The fire brigade did not check for fire extension on the back

side of the lube oil storage room.

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The fire brigade did not implement search and rescue

techniques.

The above fire brigade operational concerns are identified as

Inspector Followup Item (369/86-24-01 and 370/86-24-01) Improper

Fire Fighting Equipment Deployment and Techniques Utilized by the

Fire Brigade.

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f. Plant Tour and Inspection of Fire Protection Equipment

(1) Inspection of Fire Brigade Manual Fire Fighting Equipment.

The inspectors performed an inspection of the Fire Brigade

Equipment, consisting of fire hose, nozzles, tools, and miscel-

laneous equipment which is stored at the fire brigade equipment

response locations located in the Unit 1 and 2 turbine buildings

and the control room.

A total of 17 complete sets of turnout gear (coats, boots, helmets

etc.), nine sets of self contained breathing apparatus, and 27

spare air cylinders are stored at the fire brigade equipment

response locations.

Based on this ' inspection, some of the designated fire brigade

equipment stored at the fire brigade equipment response locations

appeared not to be properly maintained (i.e., straps on breathing

apparatus not fully extended, hose on hose racks not rolled

properly, equipment inventories not properly maintained, fire

fighting equipment not kept in a clean condition). The overall

readiness of the fire brigade manual fire fighting equipment will

be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.

(2) Outside Fire Protection Walkdown

The inspectors visually inspected the following fire protection

system components associated with the underground fire water

distribution system and the outside fire fighting equipment:

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Fire pumps

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Fire main sectionalizing valves IRV 356, 341, 340, 339,

370, 79, 29, 28, and 13

- Fire hydrant hose houses 1, 3, 11, and 13

- Hose carts 2, 3, and 4

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Foam carts 1 and 2

The inspectors found the three station fire pumps in service, the

above fire main sectionalizing valves aligned in the proper

position and the sampled outside fire fighting equipment to be

functional and properly equipped.

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(3) Permanent Plant Fire Protection Features

A plant tour was made by the . inspector. During the plant tour the

following safe shutdown related plant areas and their related fire

protection features were inspected:

- Unit 1 and 2 Motor driven and turbine driven auxiliary

feedwater pump rooms - fire areas 2, 2a, 3, and 3a

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- Unit 1 and 2 Diesel generator rooms - fire areas 5, 6,'7, and

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- Unit I and 2 battery room area - fire area 13 ,

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Unit 1 and 2 Train "A" and "B" switchgear rooms - fire areas -

11, 12, 17, and 18

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- Unit 1 and 2 Cable spreading rooms - fire areas 19 and 20

The inspector visually inspected the fire / smoke detection

capabilities, the manual firefighting equipment (i.e., portable

extinguishers, hose stations, etc.) and the fire barrier walls

associated with the above plant areas. In addition, the inspector

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visually inspected the fixed suppression systems associated with

the Unit 1 and 2 turbine and motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump

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rooms, diesel generator rooms, battery room cable areas and the

cable spreading rooms. Based on this visual inspection, it

appears that the fire protection features associated with the

above plant areas were properly maintained and fully functional

except for the battery room cable area sprinkler system on

elevation 733'-0" (fire area 13). The sprinkler protection is

provided over the floor pipe trenches at the east and west ends of

the battery room complex. The inspectors identified that several

of the sprinkler heads installed on this system were mechanically

damaged. Several of the water discharge deflectors which develop

the sprinkler spray patterns were bent. ~ This is identified as

Inspector Followup Item (369/86-24-02 and 370/86-24-02), Inadequate

Mechanical Protection Provided for Battery Room Sprinkler Systems.

This will be inspected during a subsequent NRC inspection.

The plant tour also verified the licensee's implementation of the

fire prevention administrative procedures. The control of

combustibles and flammable materials, liquids and gases and the

general housekeeping was found to be satisfactory in the areas

inspected.

(4) Appendix R Fire Protection Features

The inspectors visually inspected the fire rated raceway fire

barriers required for compliance with Appendix R,Section III.G.2

in the following plant areas:

Three-hour fire rated raceway fire barrier enclosure

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Unit 1 "B" train switchgear room

- One-hour fire rated raceway fire barrier enclosure Unit 1

turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room

- One-hour fire rated raceway fire barrier enclosure Unit 2

' motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump room

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- One-hour fire rated raceway fire barrier enclosure , Unit 2

turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room

Based on the inspectors observations of the above raceway fire

barrier enclosures, it appears that the raceway fire barrier

integrity was being properly maintained except for the raceway

fire barrier enclosures in the Unit 1 and 2 turbine driven

auxiliary feedwater pump rooms. The fire barrier design in the

turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump rooms is a fire resistive

pillow design sewn together by a fire resistive thread type cord.

The inspectors identified that the cord was deteriorating and

breaking in several locations along the raceway fire barrier joint

seams. During the inspection, the licensee agreed that the

deteriorating conditions of these barriers warranted corrective

actions. The licensee during the inspection corrected this

deteriorated condition in the Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary

feedwater pump room by utilizing stainless steel banding to secure

the fire barrier fire resistive material to the raceway. In

addition, the licensee intends to review the Unit 2 turbine driven

auxiliary feedwater pump room raceway fire barrier enclosure

design and correct the identified condition. Therefore, this is

identified as Inspector Followup Item (369/86-24-03-and

370/86-24-03), Deteriorating Raceway Fire Barrier Enclosures in the

Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumn Rooms.

The inspectors also visually inspected the one-hour fire rated

barriers separating the following mechanical equipment:

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- Nuclear Service Water Pumps

- Unit 1 Component Cooling Water Pumps

Based on this inspection, the inspectors determined that the

one-hour fire resistive integrity associated with the above

equipment fire barriers was being properly maintained in a

satisfactory condition.

The inspectors mada a walkdown of the Appendix R related sprinkler

protection in the following plant areas:

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4 - Unit 1 and Unit 2 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rooms

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Nuclear Service Water Pump Area - Auxiliary Building

Elevation 716'-0"

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Unit 1 Component Cooling Water Pump Area - Auxiliary Building

Elevation 733'-0"

- Unit-1 Component Cooling Water Pump Area - Auxiliary Building

l Elevation 733'-0"

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Unit 2 Component Cooling Water Pump Area - Auxiliary Building

Elevation 750'-0 ,

Based on this walkdown, the inspectors determined that the

sprinkler protection in the Unit 1 and 2 motor driven auxiliary

, feodwater pump rooms was adequate with respect to controlling an ,

exposure type fire. However, the sprinkler systems protecting the

component cooling water pumps and the nuclear service water pumps

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were found to be inadequate due to the overhead obstructions

(i.e., cable trays, conduits, piping . etc.).

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This condition,

which could impact the effectiveness of the existing sprinkler

system protecting the nuclear service. water and component cooling

water pumps to control a fire, was initially identified during NRC

inspection 369/84-?8 and 370/84-25. The licensee has committed to

correct the sprinkler system obstructions and has initiated

~ nuclear station modification - (NSM) MG-1-1777. Therefore, this

condition will be inspected during a subsequent NRC inspection.

Within the fire protection / prevention program areas inspected,.no violations

or deviations were identified.

6. Inspector Followup Items

a. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (370/80-07-03), Additional Fire

Detector for Reactor Building and Diesel Generator Building. Fire-

detection drawings MC-1762-01.00-10 Rev. 3, MC-1762-01.00-11, Rev.-1,

MC-1762-01.00-14, Rev.1 and MC-1762-01.00-15, Rev. 2 reflect the

"as-built" conditions of the fire detection system in the Unit 1 and

Unit 2 reactor building annulus space. The detectors utilized in the

annulus are ionization and rate of rise type and based on the fire

hazards identified in the McGuire fire protection review it appears

that these detectors are adequate with respect to providing early

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warning. In addition, the licensee replaced the ionization detectors

in the diesel generator building with fixed temperature rate compen-

sated detectors.- This item is closed.

b. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (370/83-16-04), Curbs Required to

Control Sprinkler System Water Discharge at 716'-0" , 733 '-0" and

750'-0" foot Elevations. The inspectors varied that the curbs have been

installed on elevations 716'-0", 733'-0", and 750'-0" to control the

i component cooling water and nuclear service water pump sprinkler system

i discharge water runoff. Therefore, this item is closed.

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c. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (369/83-12-06 and 370/83-16-06),

Licensee to Reevaluate the Design and Location of Bulk Hydrogen Storage

. Facility to Assure Compliance with NRC Guidelines. The licensee

performed an integrated systems analysis, Report No: 83-09/ File

i MC-1513.03, which analyzed a hydrogen storage tank failure causing an

explosion and tank rocketing. The licensee's analysis concluded that

! if the tank, acting as a missile, struck into either the turbine,

! reactor, auxiliary or diesel generator buildings that this accident

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condition would not compromise this plants ability to shutdown. This

item is closed.

d. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (369/83-12-07 and 370/83-16-07),

Licensee to Revise Procedure to Require Quarterly Fire Drills for Each

Operating Shift. The licensee's station directive 2.11.1, fire brigade

organization and program, revision ,16 dated .8/11/86 reflects the .

. quarterly fire drill requirements, therefore, this item is closed.

e. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (369/84-20-02 and 370/84.-16-02),

Calibration Records not Available for SSF Steam Generator Level

Instrumentation.- The licensee's nuclear station work request

1-13088-0PS, which was completed on May 10, 1983, initially calibrated

the Unit 2 SSF steam generator C and D level instruments. .This item is

closed.

f. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (369/84-28-06 and 370/84-25-06),

Inadequate Surveillance Testing Procedures for Emergency Lighting. The

licensee revised periodic operational testing procedures PT/1/B/4350/09

Unit 1 Emergency Lighting Test and PT/2/B/4350/09 Unit -2 Emergency

Lighting Test to incorporate procedure steps to assure that the light

beams are pointed in the correct direction to illuminate all proper

j pieces of shutdown related equipment and access / egress path-ways to the

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equipment. In addition, the licensee corrected - the procedure to

incorporate the manufacturer's recommendations with respect to test

4 frequency and method of test. Therefore, this item is closed.

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