ML20206S521
| ML20206S521 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 09/10/1986 |
| From: | Conlon T, Madden P, Mcelhinney T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206S492 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-86-24, 50-370-86-24, NUDOCS 8609220252 | |
| Download: ML20206S521 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1986029
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
2
ATL ANTA. GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.: 50-369/86-24 and 50-370/86-24
Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242 ,
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Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370
License Nos.:
Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: Augtst 11-15 1986
Inspector
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P..M. Ma
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T. F. fjcElhipey
Date' Signed
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Approved by:
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T. E. Ccnlon, Section Chipff
Date Signed
Plant Systems Section, Engineering-Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
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SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site in the areas
of Fire Protection / Prevention and followup on previously identified inspection
items.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS
1.-
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
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J. Almond, Safety Supervisor
- H. Brandes, Analytical Engineer. Fire Protection
L. Cook,'IAE Supervisor
E. Estep, Project Services Engineer
G. Gilbert, Operations' Engineer
- S. Grier, IAE Nuclear Production Engineer
- R. Hunning, Mechanical Maintenance
T. McConnell, Station Manager
- E. McCraw, Compliance Engineer
- S. McInnis, Compliance', Nuclear Production Engineer
- J. Oldham, Design Engineer Fire Protection
D. Simmons, Maintenance / Planning
- C. Taylor, Safety / Training Coordinator
B. Travis, Superintendent Operations
S. Van Malssen, Mechanical Engineer Supervisor
L. E. Weaver, Superintendent Station Services
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and. findings were summarized on August 15, 1986, with
those persons indicated in the paragraph 1 above. The inspectors describad
the areas inspected and discussed-in detail the inspection findings.
No
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dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
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a.
Inspector Followup Item (369/86-24-01 and 370/86-24-01), Improper Fire
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Fighting Equipment Deployment and Techniques Utilized by the Fire
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Brigade - Paragraph 5.e(4)
b.
Inspector Followup Item (364/86-24-02 and 370/86-24-02), Inadequate
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Mechanical Protection Provided for Battery Room Sprinkler Systems -
Paragraph 5.f.(3)
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c.
Inspector Followup Item (369/86-24-03 and 370/86-24-03), Deteriorating
Raceway Fire Barrier Enclosures in the Turbine Driven Auxiliary
Feedwater Pump Rooms - Paragraph 5.f.(4)
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided
to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (370/80-07-02), Battery Powered Emergency
Lighting Requirements for Safety Related Pump Rooms.
In order to
support safe shutdown capabilities, emergency lighting has been
installed in the associated switchgear rooms which control safe
shutdown related pumps on elevations 733'-0" and 750'-0".
Therefore,
this item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Deviation Item (370/80-80-15-08), Fire Suppression Systems for
the Reactor Building Do Not Meet NRC Single Failure Criteria.
On
September 27 and 28, 1978, the licensee met with NRC/NRR to resolve the
reactor building fire suppression system single failure issue.
On
October 3,1978, the NRC issued a summary of this meeting and concluded
that the use of a remote manually operated control valve which can be
operated from the control room for the containment hose stations and
sprinklers was acceptable. This item is closed.
c.
(Closed)DeviationItem(369/83-12-02), Failure to Inspect and Test the
Fire Detection and Actuation Systems for the Unit 1 Diesel Generator
and Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rooms Halon Systems.
The licensee has
implemented Test Procedure PT/0/A/4600/16B which verifies the
operability of the heat detectors that actuate the diesel generator and
the auxiliary feedwate pump room Halon Suppression Systems. This test
is conducted on a semi-annual basis.
In addition, the licensee has
implemented test procedures PT/1/A/4450/10A and PT/1/A/4450/13A. Which
direct the perfonnance of the annual operability tests on the halon
suppression systems in the Unit 1 diesel generator rooms and auxiliary
feedwater pump room. Therefore, this item is closed.
d.
(Closed) Deviation Item (369/83-12-03 and 370/83-16-03), Unprotected
Floor Ceiling Penetrations Provided Between the 695, and 716, 716 and
733 and 750 and 767 Foot Elevations.
The licensee in their 1984
McGuire fire protection review analyzed the unprotected floor ceiling
openings which were identified by this inspection item. The licensee's
fire protection review concluded that a fire originating on one level
of the plant and spreading to another level would not affect the
ability to bring the unit to a hot standby condition.
This item is
closed.
e.
(Closed) Deviation Item (370/83-16-05), Failure to Include the Battery
Powered Emergency Lighting Units Under a QA/QC Program. The licensee,
during the design process, evaluated the need to include the emergency
lighting units under the fire protection QA program. Consequently, the
licensee determined that the emergency lighting units were manu-
facturer's standard and that the application of a QA program would not
have improved the performance or reliability of the emergency lighting
system. Therefore, this item is closed.
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f.
(Closed) Deviation Item (369/83-12-08 and 370/83-16-08), Failure to
Provide a Procedure Requiring Permit Approval for All Operations
Involving Ignition Sources Within the Operating Plant.
All cutting,
welding, grinding and open flame operations are required to follow
maintenance procedure MP/0/B/7650/09.
This procedure under certain
circumstances requires that ignition sources (i.e., welding, grinding,
cutting, open flame) be controlled by a permit system.
This item is
closed,
g.
(Closed) Violation Item (369/84-20-01 and 370/84-17-01), Failure to
Perform Periodic Test of the Standby Shutdown System. The licensee, on
August 16, 1984, implemented the surveillance requirements of proposed
Technical Specifications 3/4.7.14. Therefore, this item is closed.
h.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (359/84-28-02 and 84-25-02), Inadequate Fixed
Fire Suppression System Provided for the Cable Spreading Room and
Battery Room.
On January 15, 1980 and July 28, 1980, NRR advised NRC
Region II that the cable spreading room and the battery room fixed
water suppression capabilities provided were found to be acceptable.
In addition, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 13 and 15
code discrepancies for these systems were not pertinent since the plant
can achieve and maintain hot standby conditions independently of these
areas. Therefore, this item is closed.
1.
(Closed) Deviation Item (369/84-28-05 and 370/84-25-05), Failure to
Provide Battery Powered Hand Lanterns in the Control Room.
The
licensee, on September 28, 1984, installed two battery powered hand
lanterns inside the control room. This item is closed.
j.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (364/84-28-08 and 370/84-25-08), Adequacy of
Power Supplies for Fire Pumps A, B, and C.
Upon loss of electrical
power, the licensee will provide diesel generator power in accordance
with the Technical Specifications to the Train
"C" fire pump.
The
lineup to the blackout diesel generator is performed in accordance with
procedure AP/1/A/5500/07, Loss of Electrical Power.
This item is
closed.
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(Closed)
Deviation Item (369/84-28-09 and 370/84-25-09), Failure to
Provide Adequate Radio Communications Between Local Control Stations
and Standby Shutdown Facility.
On November 8,1984, the licensee
issued Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) MG1716 to upgrade the on-site
emergency / fire brigade radio communication system. The emergency radio
system upgrade was completed and fully operational on February 19,
1986. Therefore, this item is closed.
1.
(Closed) Violation Item (369/84-28-11), Inadequate Appendix R Section
III.G. Fire Protection Features and Separation Provided for Redundant
Trains.
Cabling to the valve operators for the Safe Shutdown System
(SSS) Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump suction valves
1CA-161C and ICA-162C located within the Unit 1 pipe chase and
mechanical penetration room and control cables for both the Unit 1
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Train "A"
and "B" centrifugal charging and auxiliary feeuwater pumps
located within the Unit 1 Train "B" switchgear room are enclosed in a
three hour fire rated enclosure.
Full compliance with 10 CFR 50
Appendix R,Section III.G.2. within the subject areas was achieved on
September 28, 1984. This item is closed.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.
5.
Fire Protection Prevention Program (64704)
The inspector reviewed the following Fire Prevention / Administrative
a.
Procedures:
Procedure No.
Title
Station Directive 2.11.3,
Control of Combustible Materials
Revision 8, 1/23/85
Station Directive 3.11.0,
Housekeeping and Cleanliness
Revision 9, 9/21/84
Station Directive 2.11.2,
Fire Protection and Surveillance
Revision 8,1/29/85
Maintenance Procedure
Cutting and Welding Safety
MP/0/B/7650/09,
Revision 5, 6/3/85
Based on this review, it appears that the above procedures meet the
minimum guidelines of the document entitled " Nuclear Plant Fire
Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls, and
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Quality Assurance," dated June 1977 and the licensee's fire preven-
tion / administrative control commitment's documented in the March 1986
revision to the McGuire Fire Protection Review.
Based on the review of Station Directive 2.11.3, Control of
Combustibles, the inspector observed that this procedure was lacking
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guidance with respect to plastic materials and that the licensee should
consider placing more emphasis on the control of this type of material
in safety related areas.
This will be reviewed duiing a subsequent
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inspection.
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b.
Fire Protection Surveillance Procedures
The inspector reviewed the following Fire Protection System Surveil-
lance Procedures:
Procedure No.
Title
PT/0/A/4600/15 Rev. 8
Fire Detection System Monthly Test
PT/0/A/4400/15 Rev. 2
Fire
Protection
Functional Test.
PT/0/A/4400/01A Rev. 4
Fire Protection System Periodic Flow
Test
PT/0/A/4440/01D Rev. 12
Fire Pump Operability Test
PT/0/A/4400/01F Rev. 5
Sprinkler Alarm System Semi-Annual
Test
PT/0/A/4400/018 Rev. 4
Automatic Mulsifyre system Annual
Test
PT/0/A/4400/02 Rev. 17
Monthly Visual Inspection of Fire
Hose Stations
PT/0/A/4250/03 Rev. 5
18 Month Fire Hose Inspections
PT/2/A/4450/20 Rev. 2
Unit 2 Auxiliary Feed Water Pump
Turbine Halon Fire Protection System
Monthly Check
PT/0/A/4250/04 Rev. 8
Fire Barrier Inspection
The above surveillance procedures were reviewed to determine if the
various test outlines and inspection instructions adequately implement
the surveillance requirements of the plant's Fire Protection Technical
Specification.
In addition, these procedures were reviewed to
determine if the inspection and test instructions followed General
Industry Fire Protection Practices, NRC Fire Protection Program
Guidelines and the Guidelines of the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) Fire Codes.
Based on this review, it appears that
the above procedures are satisfactory.
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c.
Fire Protection System Surveillance Inspections and Tests
The inspector reviewed the following surveillance inspection and test
records for the dates indicated:
PT/0/A/4600/15
Fire Detection System Monthly
Tests:
from 7-9-85 through 7-20-85
PT/0/A/4400/15
Fire
Protection
Functional
Tests:
8-13-84, 4-11-85, 10-29-85, 4-29-86
PT/0/A/4400/01A
Fire Protection Periodic Flow Test:
Tests:
12-15-82, 4-3-84, 10-2-85
PT/0/A/4400/01D
Fire Pump Operability Test
Weekly Tests:
from 5-15-86 through 7-31-86
PT/0/A/4400/01B
Automatic Mulsifyre System
Annual Test:
1-4-84, 1-3-85, 12-16-85
PT/0/A/4400/01F
Sprinkler Alarm System Semi-Annual
Test: 4-9-84 through 5-6-86
PT/0/A/4400/02
Monthly Visual Inspection of Fire
Hose
Stations:
11-25-85 through 8-4-86
PT/2/A/4450/20
Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
Turbine Halon Fire Protection System Monthly Check:
9-25-85
through 7-29-86
PT/0/A/4250/04
Fire Barrier Inspection 18 month
Inspection:
10-5-82, 3-1-83, 5-4-83, 6-8-84, 6-14-84, 9-10-85,
3-6-86
The surveillance test record data and testing frequency associated with
the above fire protection system surveillance test / inspections were
found to be satisfactory with regard to meeting the requirements of the
plant's Fire Protection Technical Specifications.
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d.
Fire Protection Audit
The most recent audit reports of the McGuire Fire Protection Program
were reviewed. These audits were:
October 30, 1985, Departmental Annual Fire Protection Prcgram Audit,
NP-85-17 (MC)
September 19, 1983, QA Audit of Fire Protection and Implementation
Procedures, NP-83-17 (MC)
November 10, 1983, Triennial Audit Fire Protection, NP-83-17
These audits identified several fire protection program discrepancies
and unresolved items, and recommended several program improvements.
The licensee has either implemented the corrective actions associated
with these audit findings or a scheduled date for completion of the
correction actions had been established.
The licensee appears to be
taking the appropriate corrective actions on these audit findings.
e.
Fire Brigade
(1) Organization
The Plant brigade is composed of approximately 114 personnel from
the operations, maintenance, technical and station services
staffs.
The brigade leader is normally one of the unit super-
visors and the remaining fire brigade members are composed of four
nuclear equipment operators.
The inspector reviewed the on duty
shifts for the following dates and verified that sufficient
qualified fire brigade personnel were on duty to meet the
provisions of Technical Specification 6.2.2:
August 11, 1986
August 12, 1986
August 13, 1986
In addition, the inspector verified that sufficient personnel were
assigned to each shift to meet the minimum operating and fire
brigade staff requirements of the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, it appears based on the review of the duty rosters
associated with the above dates, that there was sufficient
manpower on duty to meet both the operational and the fire brigade
requirements of the plant's Technical Specifications.
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(2) Training
The inspector reviewed the training and drill records for three
(3) brigade leaders and four (4) brigade members for the 1985
calendar year.
The records reviewed indicated that each of these leaders and
members had received an annual medical review, attended the
required training and participated in the required number of
drills.
The inspector also verified that a fire brigade drill had
been conducted each quarter of 1985 for each brigade shift.
The
fire brigade training records which were inspected were found
satis factory.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's initial fire
brigade training program to verify that the following training
topics are being covered:
Indoctrination of the plant fire fighting plan with specific
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identification of each individual's responsibilities.
Identification of the type and location of fire hazards and
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associated types of fires that could occur in the plant.
The toxic and corrosive characteristics of expected products
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of combustion.
Identification of the location of fire fighting equipment for
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each fire area and familiarization with the layout of the
plant, including access and egress routes to each area.
The proper use of available fire fighting equipment and the
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correct method of fighting each type of fire.
The types of
fires should include fires in energized electrical equipment,
fires
in cables and cable trays, hydrogen fires, fires
involving flammable and combustible liquids or hazardous
process chemicals, fires resulting from construction or
modifications (welding), and record file fires.
The proper use of communication, lighting, ventilation and
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emergency breathing equipment
The proper method for fighting fires inside buildings and
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confined spaces
The direction and coordination of the fire fighting
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activities (fire brigade leaders only)
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Detailed review of fire fighting strategies and procedures
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Review of the latest plant modifications and corresponding
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changes in fire fighting plans
Based on this review, it appears that the licensee's initial . fire
brigade training program covers the above required training
topics.
In addition, it appears that the licensee's fire brigade
training program repeats the basic fire fighting skills oof the
initial program to qualified fire brigade members every two years.
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(3) Fire Brigade Fire Fighting Strategies
The inspectors reviewed the following plant fire fighting
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strategies:
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Residual heat removal pump rooms, auxiliary building
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elevation 695'-0", fire strategy 1-1
Auxiliary feedwater pump rooms, auxiliary building elevation
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716'-0" fire strategy 1-2
Diesel -generator Room IB, auxiliary building elevation
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733'-0", fire strategy 1-5
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Electrical penetration room 702, auxiliary building elevation
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733'-0", fire strategy 1-10
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Electrical penetration room 713, auxiliary building elevation
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733'-0", fire strategy 1-10
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4Ky Switchgear room 1ETB, 600v MCC room 705, auxiliary
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building elevation 733'-0" fire strategy 1-11
Based on this review, the inspectors determined that the above
fire fighting strategies adequately addressed the fire hazards in
the area, the type of fire extinguishants to be utilized, the
direction of attach, systems in the room / area to be managed in
order to reduce fire damage, heat sensitive equipment in the
room / area, and specific fire brigade duties with regard to smoke
control and salvage.
The inspectors noted that the licensee's fire brigade strategies
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didn't specifically identify the electric power requirements of
the smoke removal equipment or the locations of the closest
available power receptacle which is not affected by the fire.
This concern will be inspected in a subsequent NRC inspection.
(4) Fire Brigade Drill
During this inspection, the inspectors witnessed an unannounced
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fire
brigade drill.
The drill fire scenario was a fire in the
service building lube oil storage room 209.
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The minimum'five (5) fire brigade members responded to the pending
fire emergency.
Initially, three (3) fire brigade members
assembled outside the lube oil storage room without their rdquired
personnel protective fire fighting equipment (i .e. , turnout
clothing and self. contained breathing apparatus) and advanced two
11 inch attack fire hose lines from hose caoinets IRF 32 and 30 to
the door of the storage room.
Approximately nine (9) minutes
after the initial fire notification, the two (2) remaining fire
brigade members arrived on the fire scene in full protective fire
fighting turncut clothing and self contained breathing apparatus
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and manned one attack line.
These individuals advanced the hose
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line into the room and attacked the fire. The fire' was placed
under control in approximately 15 minutes.
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Based on the observation made during the drill, the inspectors
expressed the following concerns:
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Three fire brigade members responded to and performed fire
fighting operations at the fire scene without personnel
protective equipment
(i.e.,
turnout clothing and self
containedbreathingapparatus)
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The two fire brigade members which donned personnel fire
fighting equipment did not do it properly (i.e., boots not
pulled up properly, turnout coat collars not . pulled up,
helmet ear flaps not pulled down and breathing apparatus
donning problems) with respect to affording optimum
protection.
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No fire fighting foam capabilities were' utilized by or
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directly available to the brigade during the drill exercise.
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No spare air cylinders were available to the fire brigade
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during the drill exercise.
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The fire brigade did not check for fire extension on the back
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side of the lube oil storage room.
The fire brigade did not implement search and rescue
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techniques.
The above fire brigade operational concerns are identified as
Inspector Followup Item (369/86-24-01 and 370/86-24-01) Improper
Fire Fighting Equipment Deployment and Techniques Utilized by the
Fire Brigade.
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f.
Plant Tour and Inspection of Fire Protection Equipment
(1)
Inspection of Fire Brigade Manual Fire Fighting Equipment.
The inspectors performed an inspection of the Fire Brigade
Equipment, consisting of fire hose, nozzles, tools, and miscel-
laneous equipment which is stored at the fire brigade equipment
response locations located in the Unit 1 and 2 turbine buildings
and the control room.
A total of 17 complete sets of turnout gear (coats, boots, helmets
etc.), nine sets of self contained breathing apparatus, and 27
spare air cylinders are stored at the fire brigade equipment
response locations.
Based on this ' inspection, some of the designated fire brigade
equipment stored at the fire brigade equipment response locations
appeared not to be properly maintained (i.e., straps on breathing
apparatus not fully extended, hose on hose racks not rolled
properly, equipment inventories not properly maintained, fire
fighting equipment not kept in a clean condition).
The overall
readiness of the fire brigade manual fire fighting equipment will
be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.
(2) Outside Fire Protection Walkdown
The inspectors visually inspected the following fire protection
system components associated with the underground fire water
distribution system and the outside fire fighting equipment:
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Fire pumps
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Fire main sectionalizing valves IRV 356, 341, 340, 339,
370, 79, 29, 28, and 13
Fire hydrant hose houses 1, 3, 11, and 13
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Hose carts 2, 3, and 4
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Foam carts 1 and 2
The inspectors found the three station fire pumps in service, the
above fire main sectionalizing valves aligned in the proper
position and the sampled outside fire fighting equipment to be
functional and properly equipped.
(3) Permanent Plant Fire Protection Features
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A plant tour was made by the . inspector. During the plant tour the
following safe shutdown related plant areas and their related fire
protection features were inspected:
Unit 1 and 2 Motor driven and turbine driven auxiliary
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feedwater pump rooms - fire areas 2, 2a, 3, and 3a
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Unit 1 and 2 Diesel generator rooms - fire areas 5, 6,'7, and
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Unit I and 2 battery room area - fire area 13
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Unit 1 and 2 Train "A" and "B" switchgear rooms - fire areas -
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11, 12, 17, and 18
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Unit 1 and 2 Cable spreading rooms - fire areas 19 and 20
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The inspector visually inspected the fire / smoke detection
capabilities, the manual firefighting equipment (i.e., portable
extinguishers, hose stations, etc.) and the fire barrier walls
associated with the above plant areas.
In addition, the inspector
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visually inspected the fixed suppression systems associated with
the Unit 1 and 2 turbine and motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump
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rooms, diesel generator rooms, battery room cable areas and the
cable spreading rooms.
Based on this visual inspection, it
appears that the fire protection features associated with the
above plant areas were properly maintained and fully functional
except for the battery room cable area sprinkler system on
elevation 733'-0" (fire area 13).
The sprinkler protection is
provided over the floor pipe trenches at the east and west ends of
the battery room complex.
The inspectors identified that several
of the sprinkler heads installed on this system were mechanically
damaged.
Several of the water discharge deflectors which develop
the sprinkler spray patterns were bent. ~ This is identified as
Inspector Followup Item (369/86-24-02 and 370/86-24-02), Inadequate
Mechanical Protection Provided for Battery Room Sprinkler Systems.
This will be inspected during a subsequent NRC inspection.
The plant tour also verified the licensee's implementation of the
fire prevention administrative procedures.
The control of
combustibles and flammable materials, liquids and gases and the
general housekeeping was found to be satisfactory in the areas
inspected.
(4) Appendix R Fire Protection Features
The inspectors visually inspected the fire rated raceway fire
barriers required for compliance with Appendix R,Section III.G.2
in the following plant areas:
Three-hour fire rated raceway fire barrier enclosure
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Unit 1 "B" train switchgear room
One-hour fire rated raceway fire barrier enclosure Unit 1
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turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room
One-hour fire rated raceway fire barrier enclosure Unit 2
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motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump room
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One-hour fire rated raceway fire barrier enclosure , Unit 2
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turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room
Based on the inspectors observations of the above raceway fire
barrier enclosures, it appears that the raceway fire barrier
integrity was being properly maintained except for the raceway
fire barrier enclosures in the Unit 1 and 2 turbine driven
auxiliary feedwater pump rooms.
The fire barrier design in the
turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump rooms is a fire resistive
pillow design sewn together by a fire resistive thread type cord.
The inspectors identified that the cord was deteriorating and
breaking in several locations along the raceway fire barrier joint
seams.
During the inspection, the licensee agreed that the
deteriorating conditions of these barriers warranted corrective
actions. The licensee during the inspection corrected this
deteriorated condition in the Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary
feedwater pump room by utilizing stainless steel banding to secure
the fire barrier fire resistive material to the raceway.
In
addition, the licensee intends to review the Unit 2 turbine driven
auxiliary feedwater pump room raceway fire barrier enclosure
design and correct the identified condition.
Therefore, this is
identified as Inspector Followup Item (369/86-24-03-and
370/86-24-03), Deteriorating Raceway Fire Barrier Enclosures in the
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumn Rooms.
The inspectors also visually inspected the one-hour fire rated
barriers separating the following mechanical equipment:
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Nuclear Service Water Pumps
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Unit 1 Component Cooling Water Pumps
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Based on this inspection, the inspectors determined that the
one-hour fire resistive integrity associated with the above
equipment fire barriers was being properly maintained in a
satisfactory condition.
The inspectors mada a walkdown of the Appendix R related sprinkler
protection in the following plant areas:
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Unit 1 and Unit 2 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rooms
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Nuclear Service Water Pump Area - Auxiliary Building
Elevation 716'-0"
Unit 1 Component Cooling Water Pump Area - Auxiliary Building
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Elevation 733'-0"
Unit-1 Component Cooling Water Pump Area - Auxiliary Building
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Elevation 733'-0"
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Unit 2 Component Cooling Water Pump Area - Auxiliary Building
Elevation 750'-0
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Based on this walkdown, the inspectors determined that the
sprinkler protection in the Unit 1 and 2 motor driven auxiliary
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feodwater pump rooms was adequate with respect to controlling an
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exposure type fire. However, the sprinkler systems protecting the
component cooling water pumps and the nuclear service water pumps
were found to be inadequate due to the overhead obstructions
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(i.e., cable trays, conduits, piping . etc.).
This condition,
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which could impact the effectiveness of the existing sprinkler
system protecting the nuclear service. water and component cooling
water pumps to control a fire, was initially identified during NRC
inspection 369/84-?8 and 370/84-25. The licensee has committed to
correct the sprinkler system obstructions and has initiated
~ nuclear station modification - (NSM) MG-1-1777.
Therefore, this
condition will be inspected during a subsequent NRC inspection.
Within the fire protection / prevention program areas inspected,.no violations
or deviations were identified.
6.
Inspector Followup Items
a.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (370/80-07-03), Additional Fire
Detector for Reactor Building and Diesel Generator Building.
Fire-
detection drawings MC-1762-01.00-10 Rev. 3, MC-1762-01.00-11, Rev.-1,
MC-1762-01.00-14, Rev.1 and MC-1762-01.00-15, Rev. 2 reflect the
"as-built" conditions of the fire detection system in the Unit 1 and
Unit 2 reactor building annulus space.
The detectors utilized in the
annulus are ionization and rate of rise type and based on the fire
hazards identified in the McGuire fire protection review it appears
that these detectors are adequate with respect to providing early
warning.
In addition, the licensee replaced the ionization detectors
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in the diesel generator building with fixed temperature rate compen-
sated detectors.- This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (370/83-16-04), Curbs Required to
Control Sprinkler System Water Discharge at 716'-0" , 733 '-0"
and
750'-0" foot Elevations. The inspectors varied that the curbs have been
installed on elevations 716'-0", 733'-0", and 750'-0" to control the
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component cooling water and nuclear service water pump sprinkler system
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discharge water runoff. Therefore, this item is closed.
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c.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (369/83-12-06 and 370/83-16-06),
Licensee to Reevaluate the Design and Location of Bulk Hydrogen Storage
Facility to Assure Compliance with NRC Guidelines.
The licensee
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performed an integrated systems analysis, Report No:
83-09/ File
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MC-1513.03, which analyzed a hydrogen storage tank failure causing an
explosion and tank rocketing.
The licensee's analysis concluded that
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if the tank, acting as a missile, struck into either the turbine,
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reactor, auxiliary or diesel generator buildings that this accident
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condition would not compromise this plants ability to shutdown.
This
item is closed.
d.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (369/83-12-07 and 370/83-16-07),
Licensee to Revise Procedure to Require Quarterly Fire Drills for Each
Operating Shift. The licensee's station directive 2.11.1, fire brigade
organization and program, revision ,16 dated .8/11/86 reflects the
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. quarterly fire drill requirements, therefore, this item is closed.
e.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (369/84-20-02 and 370/84.-16-02),
Calibration Records not Available for SSF Steam Generator Level
Instrumentation.-
The licensee's nuclear station work request
1-13088-0PS, which was completed on May 10, 1983, initially calibrated
the Unit 2 SSF steam generator C and D level instruments. .This item is
closed.
f.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (369/84-28-06 and 370/84-25-06),
Inadequate Surveillance Testing Procedures for Emergency Lighting. The
licensee revised periodic operational testing procedures PT/1/B/4350/09
Unit 1 Emergency Lighting Test and PT/2/B/4350/09 Unit -2 Emergency
Lighting Test to incorporate procedure steps to assure that the light
beams are pointed in the correct direction to illuminate all proper
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pieces of shutdown related equipment and access / egress path-ways to the
equipment.
In addition, the licensee corrected - the procedure to
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incorporate the manufacturer's recommendations with respect to test
frequency and method of test. Therefore, this item is closed.
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