IR 05000333/1986007

Insp Rept 50-333/86-07 on 860617-19.No Violations Noted. Major Areas inspected:partial-scale Annual Emergency Exercise Conducted on 860618

ML20204F015
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	07/25/1986
From:	Lazarus W, Thomas W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20204F013	List: IR 05000333/1986007 ML20204F007
References
50-333-86-07, 50-333-86-7, NUDOCS 8608040052
Download: ML20204F015 (5)

Text

.

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /86-07 Docket N License No. DPR-59 Priority -

Category C Licensee: New York Power Authority P.O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility Name: James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At: Scriba, New York Inspection Conducted: June 17-19, 1986 D //

Inspector: //,

'

9 f/g .

W. V. Thoriias, EmWg'en~cy Wepare'pness ' date Specialist NRC Team Members G. Arthur, Sonalyst R. Traub, PNL W. Lazarus, Region I A. Luptak, Region I

! D. Van Niel, EPB, Approved by: /4<< h _ 7 J~ 4 T. 'J.(yzaryrJ, SectionThief, date

, Emergency Treparedness Section l

l

'

Inspection Summary: Inspection on June 17-19, :9_B6 (Report No. 50-333/86-07 Areas Inspected: Routine announced amergency :,reparedness inspection and observation of the partial-scale annual emergency exercise conducted on June 18, 198 Results: No violations were identifie The licensee's emergency response actions demonstrated during this exercise were adequate to provide appropriate i

protective measures for the health and safety of the publi G Ohh05000333 PDR l

l _ _ . _ . , _ _ .

_ _ _ , . . _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - - - - - _ - -

.

.

DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted

• N. Avrakotos, Emergency Planning Coordinator

• R. Converse, JAF Resident Manager

• W. Fernandez, JAF Operations Superintendent

• T. Teifke, JAF Security Superintendent

• J. Prokop, QA Engineer

• B. Sullivan, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Engineer

• R. Chase, Information Officer

• E. Mulcahey, Radiological & Environmental Services Superintendent W. Robinson, QA Engineer

• J. Reiff, Associate Radiological Engineer

• R. Liseno, Maintenance Superintendent

• B. Baker, Technical Service Superintendent

• C. Faison, Corporate Emergency Planner

• A. Zaremba, Emergency Planning Coordinator The inspectors also interviewed several licensed operators, health physicists, administrative and training personne * Denotes those present at the exit intervie . Emergency Exercise The James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant partial-scale emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on June 18, 198 Pre-Exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives had telephone discussions and met with licensee representatives to review the scope and content of the exercise scenario, As a result of these discussions, revisions were made to the scenario and supporting data sheet The NRC observers and licensee observers and controllers attended a scenario briefing on June 17, 1986. The emergency response actions expected during the various phases of the scenario were discusse The scenario included the following events:

Initial conditions: Plant operating at full power, "B" RHR Pumo out of service for maintenance, and surveillance procedure F-ST-3A in progres *

Fire occurs on the 10500 emergency bus, which results in the complete loss of the bu . - _ _ _ _ _ __

. .-.

.

.

A ground fault on the MOD 10017 cross-tie results in the loss of offsite reserve powe *

Main generator #9 exciter bearing high vibration alarm occurs followed by a turbine trip, resulting in a reactor scram. Group I isolation occurs. HPCI and RCIC auto start. "B" and "D" diesels start but tri *

Indications on the main control board show that safety relief valve 71A failed to completely close after operatio *

HPCI/RCIC isolate on low steam pressur * Offsite power is restore The above events caused activation of the licensee's emergency response facilities and also permitted limited local government response for training purpose. The emergency exercise did not in-volve an offsite release of radioactive material, however dose assessment projections were performed based on potential for a releas E. Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; activation of emergency response facilities; and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:

Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario events;

Direction and coordination of emergency response; Notification of license personnel and offsite agencies of per-tinent information;

Assessment and projection of radiological (dose) data;

Recommendation of protective actions;

Provisions for in plant radiation protection; Performance of offsite, onsite, and in plant radiological surveys;

Maintenance of site security and access control;

Performance of technical support; _ . - - - _ _ -

.

.

Performance of repair and corrective actions; Communications /information flow, and record keepin The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; activation of the emergency response facilities; and actions and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing proce-dures. The team also noted the following positive aspects of the licensee emergency response that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:

The control room operators demonstrated excellent knowledge of the plant emergency operating procedure *

The development of plant actions by control room personnel to effectively mitigate the consequences of the accident were excellen *

The TSC contained an excellent document library, which was well used as a resource throughout the exercis The activation of the TSC was timely and plant condition briefings by the Site Emergency Director (SED) were frequen The activation of the OSC was timely and frequent briefings were held to update personnel on plant condition Good control over the OSC in plant teams and good  ;

communications with the teams were demonstrated throughout the exercis The OSC team members demonstrated a thorough knowledge of sound health physics practice *

The licensee adequately demonstrated the capability to provide offsite dose projections based on potential for offsite radio-logical materiel release *

The EOF was staffed and activated in a timely manne Discussion among the EOF staff concerning the consequences of possible plant degradation was effective.

l Status boards were kept current and used effectivel *

!

The excellent facilities in the E0F were utilized effectively and contributed to the attentiveness and enthusiasm of the

! exercise players.

I

.

-

. 4

.

One area was identified which requires evaluation by the licensee for corrective actio At one point during the exercise the Emergency Director ordered the turbine high vibration trip to be jumped or bypassed, to preclude loss of the turbine (offsite power had already been lost) due to the increasing exciter bearing vibratio The turbine trip occurred before the action could be carried out. The inspectors identified that the licensee presently has no policy or guidelines for what equipment modifications can be made or by who's authority, during emergency situations. The licensee agreed to address this issue and develops such a policy- The licensee's action in this reoard will be

'

reviewed in a subseauer.t insnection (50-333/86-07-01). _

3. Exit Meeting The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique during which strengths and improvement items were presented on June 19, 1986. Follow-ing the critique, the NRC team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise as detailed in this repor At no time during the inspection was any written material provided to the licensee by the inspector _ __ __ _ __ _ _ _