IR 05000333/2005002

IR 05000333-05-002 on 03/14-18 and 28-31/05 for Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Fire Protection

ML051300224
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	05/10/2005
From:	Rogge J NRC/RGN-I/DRS/EFPB
To:	Ted Sullivan Entergy Nuclear Northeast
References
IR-05-002
Download: ML051300224 (20)

Text

SUBJECT:

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 0500333/2005002

Dear Mr. Sullivan:

On March 31, 2005, the NRC completed a triennial fire protection team inspection at the James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed at an exit meeting on March 31, 2005, with Mr. K. Mulligan and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions regulations and with the conditions of your license. The purpose of the inspection was to evaluate your post-fire safe shutdown capability and fire protection program. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ADAMS.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

John F. Rogge, Chief Electrical and Fire Protection Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59

Enclosure:

Inspection Report No. 05000333/2005002

Mr. Theodore Sullivan 2

REGION I==

Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59 Report No. 05000333/2005002 Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Facility: James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant Location: 268 Lake Road Lycoming, New York Dates: March 14-18 and 28-31, 2005 Inspectors: R. Fuhrmeister, Sr. Reactor Engineer, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

J. Bobiak, Reactor Inspector, DRS D. Werkheiser, Reactor Inspector, DRS S. Lewis, Reactor Inspector, DRS Approved by: John F. Rogge, Chief Electrical and Fire Protection Branch Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000333/2005002 on 03/14-18 and 28-31/05, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., James A.

Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Fire Protection The report covered a two-week triennial fire protection team inspection by regional specialist inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

NRC-Identified Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

None ii

REPORT DETAILS

Background This report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection conducted in accordance with the February 18, 2005, revision of NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T, Fire Protection. The objective of the inspection was to assess whether Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) has implemented an adequate fire protection program and that post-fire safe shutdown capabilities have been established and are being properly maintained at the James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant (Fitzpatrick or JAFNPP). The following target fire areas were selected for detailed review based on risk insights from the JAFNPP Individual Plant Examination (IPE) and Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE):

@ Fire Area CR-1

@ Fire Area RR-1

@ Fire Area RB-1E

@ Fire Area BR-2

@ Fire Area CT-2

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems

1R05 Fire Protection

Shutdown From Outside Main Control Room

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed AOP-43, Plant Shutdown from outside the Control Room, to determine what equipment was credited for post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) and what shutdown methodology was used. The inspectors also walked down the alternate shutdown panels in the field to evaluate accessability, habitability, and access/egress path lighting. The team evaluated selected safe shutdown components and their power and control circuits to determine whether proper alternate power sources were provided for those components and to verify whether alternate shutdown control would be affected by fire-induced circuit faults. The team reviewed the electrical isolation capability of selected equipment needed for post-fire safe shutdown to ensure that such equipment could be operated locally or from the alternate shutdown panels, if needed.

In addition, the team also reviewed the surveillance test procedure and test records of the five Remote Shutdown Panels to ensure that the functionality of the panel switch functions had been adequately demonstrated and to evaluate compliance with the JAFNPP licensing basis for fire protection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed AOP-28, Operation During Plant Fires, the JAFNPP Fire Hazards Analysis, Safe Shutdown Analysis, and FSAR to determine the strategies and equipment intended for Safe Shutdown for the target fire areas. The team evaluated selected safe shutdown components and their power and control circuits to determine whether proper separation and fire protection were provided for those components and to determine if the design requirements satisfy Section III.G of 10CFR50 Appendix R, and other JAFNPP licensing basis documents. The target fire areas were walked down by the team to verify the field configuration and status of selected cable routes and components with respect to their documented condition.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3. Passive Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The team walked down accessible portions of the target fire areas to observe material condition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries, fire doors, and fire dampers. The team reviewed surveillance and functional test procedures for selected items. The team also reviewed licensee submittals and NRC safety evaluation reports (SERs) associated with fire protection features. Additionally, the team reviewed the inspection history of selected barriers.

During tours of the facility, the team observed the storage of permanent and transient combustible materials and control of ignition sources. The team also reviewed the procedure that controls hot-work activities at the site. Additionally, the team reviewed a sample of hot work permits.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. Active Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

During tours of the facility, the team observed the material condition of fire protection systems and equipment. The team reviewed the adequacy of the fire detection and suppression systems in the target fire areas. This included a walkdown of the systems and review of the type of installed detectors as shown on equipment location drawings.

The team observed portable extinguishers to determine the material condition of the manual fire fighting equipment and verify locations as specified in the pre-fire plans and fire protection program documents. Additionally, the team reviewed fire detection and suppression surveillance procedures to determine the adequacy of the component testing and to ensure that the systems would function as required.

The team inspected the fire brigades protective ensembles, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), and various fire brigade equipment to determine operational readiness for fire fighting. The team reviewed pre-fire plans for the target fire areas to determine if appropriate information was provided to fire brigade members and plant operators to identify safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation, and to facilitate suppression of a fire that could impact safe shutdown. The team reviewed fire brigade training course material to verify appropriate training was being conducted for the station fire fighting personnel. Additionally, the team reviewed selected fire drills and critiques to ensure that drills were being conducted in risk significant areas. The team reviewed the qualifications of several fire brigade leaders and members to ensure that they had met and maintained the requirements to be fire brigade leaders and members.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

5. Operational Implementation of Post-Fire Shutdown Capability

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed post-fire shutdown procedures, Simulator Exercise Guides and Job Performance Measures to verify procedure adequacy, that plant operators were provided appropriate training for post-fire shutdown activities, and that the required activities were feasible. The team compared the activities in post-fire shutdown procedures for the target areas to the fire protection safety evaluation reports to determine whether JAFNPP relied on any unapproved manual operator actions in lieu of protection of equipment.

The team performed a walkdown of the contingency actions specified in Attachment 11 to AOP-28 in order to verify feasability of the actions and that the areas would be accessible following the postulated fire. The team also verified the availability of special tools and necessary safety equipment.

The team also reviewed the surveillance test procedure and test records of the five Remote Shutdown Panels to ensure that the functionality of the panel switch functions had been adequately demonstrated.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

6. Circuit Analyses

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the JAFNPP Safe Shutdown Analysis and verified that, for each target fire area, a post-fire safe shutdown analysis was performed and components required for SSD were identified. The JAFNPP analysis assessed the impact on SSD from various failures and addressed each circuit individually. Cable failure modes were reviewed for the following components:

(1) Loop B RHR HX Bypass 10MOV-66B,

(2) Head vent solenoid valves 02SOV-17 & 18, and

(3) RHR inboard isolation valve 10MOV-25B.

The team reviewed cable routing for post-fire SSD components to confirm that cables subject to fire damage in the five target fire areas were identified and adequately addressed. The team also performed a walk-down of cable raceways for a sample of components required for SSD to verify that cables were routed as described in the cable routing matrices.

The team reviewed circuit breaker coordination studies to ensure equipment needed to conduct post-fire safe shutdown activities would not be impacted due to a lack of protective device coordination. The team also reviewed the JAFNPP Multiple High Impendence Fault Analysis for selected feeder buses and MCCs for components important to SSD to verify continuity of power under fire damage conditions. The team confirmed that coordination studies had addressed multiple faults due to fire.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

7. Communications

a. Inspection Scope

During the walkdown of the alternate shutdown panels and the Contingency actions specified in Attachment 11 to AOP-28, the team verified that multiple means of communication were provided for the use of operators during post-fire shutdown activities.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

8. Emergency Lighting

a. Inspection Scope

The team observed the placement and coverage area of eight-hour emergency lights throughout the target fire areas to evaluate their adequacy for illuminating access and egress pathways and any equipment requiring local operation for post-fire safe shutdown. The team also reviewed preventive maintenance procedures and completed surveillance tests, to determine if adequate surveillance testing and periodic battery replacements were in place to ensure reliable operation of the emergency lights. The team observed portions of an eight-hour discharge test.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cold Shutdown Repairs

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed post-fire shutdown procedures, and the safety evaluation reports related to fire protection to identify cold shutdown repairs. The team chose to verify cold shutdown repair activities specified in Attachment 11 to AOP-28. The team performed an inventory of the equipment, and observed a walkthrough of the repair by plant operators to verify feasability, and appropriate equipment and tools were available.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Corrective Actions for Fire Protection Deficiencies

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed selected condition reports for fire protection issues and the recent fire protection program system health report to evaluate the prioritization for resolving fire protection related deficiencies and the effectiveness of corrective actions. The team also reviewed a recent quality assurance audit and self-assessments of the fire protection program to determine if the licensee was identifying program deficiencies and implementing appropriate corrective actions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

The team presented their preliminary inspection results to Mr. K. Mulligan and other members of the Entergy staff at an exit meeting on March 31, 2005.

No proprietary information was included in this inspection report.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

K. Mulligan, General Manager of Plant Operatoins

J. Pechacek, Manager of Design Engineering

J. Gerety, Manager of Programs and Component Engineering

D. Wallace, Manager of Quality Assurance

M. Durr, Manager of System Engineering

D. Johnson, Manager of Operations

T. Raymond, Manager of Information Technology

D. Koelbel, Fire Protection System Engineer

S. Reininghouse, Training Supervisor

R. Locy, Operations Project manager

R. Jennings, Fire Protection Specialist

D. Stokes, Fire Protection Engineer

D. Spindler, Shift Manager

Constellation Generation Group, LLC

G. Cooper, Fire Safe Shutdown Engineer

NRC

J. Lubinski, Acting Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety

J. Rogge, Chief, Electrical and Fire Protection Branch, Division of Reactor Safety

L. Cline, Senior Resident Inspector

D. Dempsey, Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

NONE Open and

Closed

NONE

Closed

NONE

Discussed

NONE