IR 05000333/1986018
| ML20207P953 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1987 |
| From: | Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207P949 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-86-18, NUDOCS 8701200461 | |
| Download: ML20207P953 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
DCS Nos.
50333-032786 50333-090386 50333-090486 50333-093086 Report No.
86-18 Docket No.
50-333 License No.
DPR-59 Category C
Licensee:
Power Authority of the State of New York P.O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility:
J.A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Location:
Scriba, New York Dates:
September 30 - November 24, 1986 Inspectors:
A.J. Luptak, Senior Resident Inspector G.W. Meyer, Project Engineer, DRP 2C P.K. Eapen, Chief, Quality Assurance Section, DRS Approved by:
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.. Linville
'fef, Reactor
/ Dat'e rejects Se n 2C, DRP Inspection Summary:
Inspection on September 30 - November 24, 1986 (Report No.
50-333/86-18)
Areas Inspected: Routine and reactive inspection during day and backshift hours by one resident inspector and 2 region based inspectors (171.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />) of licensee event report review, operational safety verification, surveillance observations, maintenance observations, Recirculation Pump Trip System, an't review of periodic and special reports.
Results: During this inspection no violations were noted. The Recirculation Pump Trip system was found to be properly maintained and tested with no recorded failures. One failure has occurred on the Main Generator Field Breaker which is a GE AK-F-2-25.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted During this inspection period, the inspector interviewed or neld discussions with operators, technicians, and maintenance, contractor, engineering, administrative and supervisory personnel.
2.
Summary of Plant Activities This inspection period began with the plant shutdown conducting a ten day scheduled maintenance outage to replace control rod drive mechanisms, install modifications, and conduct preventive and corrective maintenance.
A plant startup was conducted on October 9, 1986. The plant operated near full power until October 17, 1986 when following a power reduction for control rod adjustments a failure in the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP)
system required maintaining power at 92%. On October 31, 1986, following approval of a procedure providing an alternate method of performing a full core Local Power Range Monitor calibration with the inoperable TIP channels, power was restored to approximately 97%, which was the maximum achievable for 100% flow. The power coastdown continued until November 21, 1986 when power was reduced to 60% due to removal of one of the reactor feed pumps from service caused by a seal failure.
Power was rastored to the maximum achievable on November 23, 1986. At the end of this inspection period, the plant was operating at 90% power.
3.
Licensee Action on Pravious Inspec* ion Findings (Closed) Violation (81-04-01):
Discrepancies between FM and OP drawings.
The inspector reviewed the drawings on which the discrepancies were identified and confirmed that the errors had oeen corrected. Also, the inspector compared FM and OP drawings on randomly sampled safety systems and found no drawing discrepancies.
Further, during the safety system walkdowns performed during the inspections of the past year, no discrepan-cies were noted between FM and OP drawings. The inspector noted that the improvement in drawing accuracy resulted in large measure from the licensee's system walkdown efforts, which were completed following the violation.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation (81-04-02):
Discrepancies regaraing modifications annotated on drawing copies and aperture cards. The inspector reviewed the drawing copies and aperture cards for 16 FM and 20 FE drawings in the Technical Support Center. The inspector found the annotations to be generally correct and consistent, and the few minor discrepancies were corrected by the licensee. The inspector concluded that the conditions had been corrected and that this item is closed.
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(Closed) Violation'(82-08-07): As-butit condition of HPCI not properly
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The.. inspector. reviewed the HPCI drawings, OP-15-1, Rev.
10 and OP-15-2,_Rev. 5, and the valve. checkoff list of the HPCI operating.
procedure to verify that the valves identified as missing had been'
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included.
Further,'the HPCI System was walked down in 1984, as reported.
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in-Inspection _ Report 84-22, and no discrepancies were found.' This item is closed.
--(Closed)' Violation (82-10-04): Trash and combustibles in.the West Cable Tunnel. During discussions with the inspector,-the licensee stated that a periodic plant cleaning program has been instituted by the Maintenance Department to prevent the accumulation of trash.and combustibles that had occurred. On October 29 the inspector toured the East and West Cable Tunnels in particular and the plant in general and found the general condition of housekeeping to be good with no accumulations of trash. The cable tunnels were particularly clear of any stored combustible materials.
This item is closed.
(Closed)_ Violation (82-15-09):
Failure to periodically rev_iew procedures.
A' periodic maintenance procedure was used which had not been reviewed biennially. The inspector found that the particular procedure has been
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superseded. The Maintenance Department has instituted a computerized listing of maintenance procedures, which is used to maintain the status of procedure reviews and_to. highlight upcoming procedure reviews. The inspector reviewed the Maintenance Procedure Index, dated October 2,1986, and found no procedures overdue for review. Also, the inspector sampled the master file of maintenance procedures and found the index to be accurate. This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation (82-22-01):
Lack of detailed instructions in surveil-lance procedures. An inspector had found that Test Procedure F-ST-240 did not have detailed instructions for the simulation of-a low Condensate Storage Tank (CST) level, thereby leaving the simulation to the technician's discretion.
The licensee has taken action to correct the particular error and to ensure that periodic reviews of surveillance test procedures confirm proper instructions. The inspector reviewed Test Procedure F-ST-240, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Subsystem Automatic Isolation Logic System Functional Test, Revision 1, to ensure that the error had been corrected, and reviewed procedures F-ST-2H and F-ST-4E, which test LPCI and HPCI, respectively, to ensure that no similar errors existed in these procedures. This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation (82-28-03):
Inadequate QC coverage of maintenance work due to poor coordination of inspection hold points between maintenance procedure and the QC checklist.
The licensee has taken corrective action including providing consistent hold points and incorporating the QC checklists into the maintenance procedures. The inspector reviewed 10 maintenance procedures to verify that the hold points were properly coordinated. The inspector noted that the QC checklists were incorporated I
into the maintenance procedures with either the hold points signed off as
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procedure steps or a separate QC summary checklist attached to the main-tenance procedure and referenced when hold points were applicable. The inspector reviewed 13 completed work packages and found the QC documenta-
_ tion of hold points to be acceptable. Also, maintenance procedures were reviewed in Inspection Raport 85-26 and found to be acceptable. This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation (83-12-01):
Inadequate weld rod control. An inspector had found. weld rod used in the field without proper portable oven storage and without being returned to the storage area after the shift. The licensee has issued a Site Welding Manual as of July 30, 1986 to properly control site welding activities, including weld roos. The inspector reviewed procedure WAP-03, Weld Filler Metal Control, and found it to adequately control issuance, field storage, and return of weld rods.
Based on the improved welding procedures and the lack of any additional weld rod problems following the violation, this item is closed.
(Closed) Violation (83-28-06): Modification of installed equipment design without a safety evaluation. An inspector had found that the motor on a motor-operated valve had been changed in 1977 to a different design without the modification approval process or a safety evaluation. At the time of the violation a previous review of_ maintenance work after January 28, 1978 had already been completed. Based on the violation the licensee reviewed all maintenance work prior to January 28, 1978 to determine whether any unapproved modifications had occurred. This review covered 933 work packages and did not find any unapproved modifications. The inspector reviewed documentation of this review.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation (84-15-01):
Failure to notify the NRC Operations Center of an event. Although the licensee took corrective action for this violation, it was not fully effective as a repeat violation with two examples was issued in Inspection Report 85-31. Accordingly, this item is being closed administrative 1y, and the corrective action will be tracked under item 85-31-01.
(Closed) Violation (85-02-01):
Inoperable torus vacuum breakers due to improper installation of scaffolding.
In August 1985 the licensee issued Plant Standing Order #51, Erection of Scaffolds near Safety-Related Equip-ment, which requires the approval of a construction engineer prior to and following installation of scaffolding to ensure safety-related equipment is not affected. The inspector reviewed the Scaffold Status Report of October 30, 1986 and inspected four scaffolding installations to verify proper installation. This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item (86-04-01): The inspector reviewed the licensee's investigation into the cause of the stroke change in #4 Turbine Stop Valve which resulted in a reactor trip on April 4,1986. Upon disassembly during the recent maintenance outage, the eight bolts which keep the pressure seal head in place were found to be loose and had backed out approximately one-half inch. The pressure seal head provides a back-seat for the valve stem; therefore its freedom of movement allowed for a
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longer valve stroke in the cold condition. When the plant was operating, the force resulting from steam pressure maintained the pressure seal head seated and therefore shortened the valve-stroke. The licensee's review of the trip completed on April 22, 1986 postulated this as a possible cause of the change in valve stroke and determined there were no adverse affects from operating in that condition.
The licensee found the pressure seal head bolts on the three remaining turbine stop valves to also be loose, however they had not backed out to the degree of #4 TSV. The bolts were torqued ~and staked to prevent recurrence. This item is closed.
-4.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review The inspector reviewed LERs to verify that the details of the events were clearly reported.
The inspector determined that reporting requirements had been met, the report was adequate to assess the event, the cause appeared accurate and was supported by details, corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause, the form was complete, and generic applicability to other plants was not in question.
During this inspection period, the following LERs were reviewed:
LER 86-14 reported the failure of the High Pressure Coolant Injection Torus Suction Valve Operator. Details of this event are discussed in section 7 of Inspection No. 50-333/86-13.
LER 86-15 reported the automatic isolation of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System caused by air trapped in the transmitter sensing line.
Details of this event are discussed in section 7 of Inspection No.
50-333/86-13.
LER 86-17 reported seven reactor scrams while in a cold shutdown condi-tion. These scrams were caused by dirty, wet, or broken connectors on neutron monitoring instrumentation.
LER 86-18 reported a potential common mode failure of medium voltage circuit breakers due_to the failure of the breaker's charging motor.
Inadequate thread engagement allowed the motor to come free from it's mounting and break the power leads rendering the breaker inoperable.
LER 86-08-01 is a supplemental report concerning additional setpoint drifting of ASCO pressure switches.
5.
Emergency N'tification System Reports The inspector reviewed the following events which were reported to the NRC via the Emergency Notification System as required by 10 CFR 50.72. The review included a determination that the reporting requirements were met, that apprapriate corrective actions had been taken, and that the event had been evaluated for possible generic implication.
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_The following reports were reviewed:
Event Date Subject September 30, 1986 Reactor trip occurred in cold shutdown with all rods fully inserted due to failure of a Local Power Range Monitor.
October 1, 1986 Three reactor trips occurred in cold shutdown with all rods fully inserted due to spiking on the "G" Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument.
October 3, 1986 A reactor trip occurred in cold shutdown with all rods fully inserted due to a spike on the "G" Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument.
October 4, 1986 Two reactor trips occurred in cold shutdown with all rods fully inserted due to spiking on the "G" Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument.
November 11, 1986 The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System automatically isolated due to false high steam flow signal caused by a technician performing testing.
6.
Operational Safety Verification a.
Control Room Observatiens Daily, the inspector verified selected plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with limiting conditions for opera-tion of the plant Technical Specifications. Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken. The inspector observed shift turnovers biweekly to ensure proper control room and shift manning. The inspector directly observed the operations listed below to ensure adherence to approved procedures:
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Plant startup on October 9, 1986.
Routine power operations.
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Issuance of RWP's and Work Requests / Event / Deficiency forms.
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The inspecto. focused his attention on the. control room environment.
The licensed operators generally conduct operations in a disciplined, business-like manner.
Recent removal of Security's Secondary Alarm
. Station has aided in making the control room an uncluttered area. No radios, extraneous reading material,. or other distractions exist.
The licensee has drastically reduced the amount of traffic and other distractions to the operators in the control room by establishing a work control center.
In addition, curtains have been installed at entrances into the control area to further limit unnecessary traffic.
With only minor exceptions, the operators exhibit an excellent-knowledge of plant status and display a questioning attitude.
Overall, the licensee has demonstrated a professional attitude towards plant operations.
No violations were identified.
b.
Shift Logs and Operating Records Selected shift logs and operating records were reviewed to obtain information on plant problems and operations, detect changes and trends in performance, detect possible conflicts with Technical Specifications or regulatory requirements, determine that records are being maintained and reviewed as required, and assess the effective-ness of the communications provided by the logs.
No violations were identified.
c.
Plant Tours During the inspection period, the inspector made observations and conducted tours of the plant. During the plant tours, the inspector conducted a visual inspection of selected piping between containment and the isolation valves for leakage or leakage paths. This included verification that manual valves were shut, capped and locked when required and that motor operated valves were not mechanically blocked.
The inspector also checked fire protection, housekeeping /
cleanliness, radiation protection, and physical security conditions to ensure compliance with plant procedures and regulatory require-ments.
No violations were identified.
d.
Tagout Verification The inspector verified that the following safety-related protective tagout records (PTR's) were proper by observing the positions of breakers, switches and/or valves:
-- PTR 861506 on Residual Heat Removal Syste..
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-- PTR 861393 on Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Control Units.
-.PTR 861525 on "B" and "D" Emergency Diesel Generator Systems.
-- PTR 861595 on "A" Standby Liquid Control System.
-- PTR 861788 on "B" Standby Gas Treatment System.
No violations were identified.
e.
Emergency System Operability The inspector verified operability of the following systems by ensuring that each accessible valve in the primary flow path was in the correct position, by confirming that power supplies and breakers were properly aligned for components that must activate upon an initiation signal, and by visual inspection of the major components for leakage and other conditions which might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirements:
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"B" Standby Liquid Control System.
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"A" Standby Gas Treatment System.
During the two week maintenance outage, the inspector also visually inspected components which are normally inaccessible, verified the positions of normally inaccessible valves for various systems prior to startup and verified proper valve alignment for the shutdown condition.
No violations were identified.
7.
Surveillance Observations The inspector observed portions of the surveillance procedures listed below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, the work was performed by qualified personnel, limiting conditions for operation were met, and the system was correctly restored following the testing.
POT-02-3 B, Preoperational Test of Analog Transmitter Trip System
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cabinets 09-92 and 09-94 following wiring changes, Rev. O, dated
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October 4, 1986, performed October 6, 1986.
F-ISP-202, Main Steam Line High Flow Transmitter Calibration and
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Channel Functional Test, Rev. O, dated March 27, 1985, performed October 6, 198.
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POT-25E, Redundant Fusing and Replacement Isolation Switch Modifica-
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tion Preoperation Test Rev. O, dated September 24, 1986, performed October 7, 1986.
IMP-14.1 Core Spray System Channel "A" Instrument Maintenance, Rev.
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4, dated February 26, 1986, performed October 7,1986.
F-ST-7C One Circuit of Standby Gas Treatment System Inoperable Test,
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Rev. 6, dated June 19, 1986, performed November 21, 1986.
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F-ISP-125A, High Pressure Coolant Injection Auto Isolation Instrument Functional Test / Calibration, Rev. 4, dated March 5, 1986, performed November 3, 1986.
The inspector also witnessed all aspects of the following surveillance test to verify that the surveillance procedure conformed to technical specification requirements and had been properly approved, limiting conditions for operation for removing equipment from service were met, testing was performed by qualified personnel, test results met technical specification requirements, the surveillance test documentation was reviewed, and equipment was properly restored to service following the test.
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F-ST-11, Main Steam Isolation Valves Limit Switch Instrument Func-tional Test, Rev. 7, dated March 26, 1986, performed October 8, 1986.
No violations were identified.
8.
Maintenance Observations a.
The inspector observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to determine that redundant components were operable, that these activities did not violate the limiting conditions for opera-tion, that required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the work, that approved procedures were used or the activity was within the " skills of the trade," that appropriate radiological controls were properly implemented, that ignition / fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and that equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to service.
b.
During this inspection period, the following activities were observed:
WR 00/25107, installation of modification F1-86-055, rewiring
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of Analog Transmitter Trip System panels.
WR 93/38120, flush of the cooling system for "B" and "D"
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WR 00/37017, inspection of various containment motor operated valves limit switch compartment.
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WR 03/44316, replace control rod drive mechanism 22-31.
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WR 02/43232, replace Main Steam Line High Flow transmitter,
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WR 01-125/44787, replace charcoal filters for "B" Standby Gas Treatment System.
No violations were identified.
9.
RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM a.
Design Recirculation pump trip (RPT) at FitzPatrick is accomplished using a
"one-out-of-two" sensor logic for reactor level and/or pressure for each pump. The trip from each logic is applied to a single trip coil of the Motor Generator (MG) set drive motor breaker (General Electric AMH 4.76kv). Two redundant level and pressure sensors are used to provide the required signals. The Technical Specification limits for the reactor high pressure are less than or equal to 1120 psig and the reactor low-low water level is given as greater than or equal to 126.5 inches. Either of these trip signals will activate a relay and complete the trip circuit. This trip circuit is powered from the station battery (125v DC bus). Two 35 amp fuses are used to isolate this trip logic from the station batteries.
The level and pressure are the same as those used in reactor protec-tion system.
Slave Trip Units are used to trip the recirculation pumps.
These sensors are environmentally qualified and maintained on the licensee's Q list.
The logic and control for RPT can be tested on line. The breakers are tested when the reactor is off line. The selection of trip set points is such that inadvertent actuations will be minimized.
The facility emergency operating procedure provides the necessary guidance to the operator in the event that the recirculation pump fails to trip upon receipt of an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) or other trip signals. The emergency operating procedures instruct the operators to runback the recirculation pumps if the main turbine is still on line.
If the power is less than 2.5%, the opera-tors are required to trip both recirculation pumps manually.
However, the manual runback, at present, requires unlocking of the scoop tube positioner. This action was to preclude spurious movement of the scoop tube positioner.
The transients from the tripping of one and two recirculation pumps are analyzed in the facility Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
The consequences of these transients are well within limiting tran-sients analyzed in the FSAR.
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The reactor protection trip system design at FitzPatrick is consis-tent with applicable requirements of 10 CFR 50.62 (ATWS rule). This design is also consistent with General Electric Company Report NEDE-31096-P recirculation pump trip requirements.
b.
Use of GE AK-F-2-25 Breakers
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The licensee uses GE-AK-F-2-25 breakers for the recirculation MG set field breakers; however, these are not part of the'RPT system.
In addition, the licensee had used a GE-AK-F-2-25 for the Main
. Generator field breaker. This breaker was eliminated with a design modification, after the breaker had failed to trip on March 3, 1984.
The breaker failure was attributed to cracking of the eccentric bushing. The recirculation MG set field breakers were inspected after the failure made was determined, no cracks were found. No failures of the MG set field breakers have been recorded. A design change is currently being considered to replace the MG set field breakers during a future outage.
c.
Surveillance In accordance with the Technical Specifications, the transmitters are calibrated once per operating cycle. The formal program is established in procedure F-ISP-275, Reactor Drywell Pressure Transmitter Calibration and Channel Functional Test, and F-ISP-276, Reactor Level Transmitter Calibration and Channel Test. The Technical Specifications also require once a month functional test of the trip functions and semi-annual calibration of trip units. This Technical Specification requirement is accomplished using the formal procedure, F-ISP-175, Reactor and Containment Cooling Instrument Functional Test / Calibration. The Instrument and Control group performs the above surveillance test. Because of recent transmitter drifting due to oil problems, the licensee has initiated a trending and tracking program for-all Rosemount 1153 8 transmitters. The licensee and the transmitter manufacturer worked closely on this problem. Corrective actions included replacement of problem transmitters and statistical study of failures.
d.
Maintenance The licensee has a formal program for requesting maintenance for the RPT system.
Both preventative and corrective maintenance for the RPT breakers are performed using procedure MP-54.1 "4.16 kv Magne-Blast Breaker".
The preventive maintenance is conducted on a three (3)
year cycle.
In addition, the itcensee ships their breakers for overhaul and update every ten (10) years. The licensee has no recorded failures for the breakers. Recently, however, a failure was reported in a similar breaker.
The mounting bolts for the charging motor had inadequate thread engagement. As a result, this motor became loose and broke the electrical leads. This failure caused the
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g-plant.to' enter an action statement.in the Technical Specifications.
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Licensee's investigation identified two more breakers _with loose k
mounting bolts for.the charging motor. The licensee's corrective i
action was to use11onger length bolts and to apply a specified
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torque. The maintenance on RPT is performed by the on-site mainte-
. nance group.
,,e The licensee maintains equipment history files for.the RPT breakers.
No major problems were noted.in their records. The preventive rz h-tenance for the instrumentation;that provides' signals to the RPT is conducted using pro'cedures.F-ISP-275, F-ISP-276, and F-ISP-175.
. Corrective and preventive maintenance is controlled using Work Request Forms. Other than.the Sensor problem discussed in Paragraph
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The operators do' daily checks for their instruments.
Unacceptable observations are followed using Work Request Forms.
e.
Reliability
' The trip signals are provided using slave trip units from those safety related instruments that provide signals to safety function.
The RPT breakers are not safety.related. However, through routine preventive maintenance, the licensee.is able to maintain their breaker reliability. As stated in their letter dated October 11,
.1985, the' licensee considers that the RPT is adequately performing its intended design function and intends no further modification to improve reliability.
10. Review of the Standby Gas Treatment System The inspector reviewed the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system for sus-ceptibility to. single failures. The SBGT system at FitzPatrick consists of two redundant trains. The trains are independent; however, they are cross-connected at the suction of the fans. The cross-connection is used for decay heat removal from the charcoal filters. Major valves in the system are motor operated, receiving power from separate emergency busses.
The valves in the cross-connect line are manually operated.
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'The inspector determined that the SBGT system is not susceptible to single F
failures and in particular to single failures identified at another BWR
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facility which utilized air operated dampers. The presence of manually
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operated valves in the cross-connect line permits isolation of the trains
from each other.
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In reviewing FitzPatrick's design, the inspector noted that the deluge system for the SBGT charcoal filters is a manually actuated system. A i
temperature sensor, located in the charcoal filter area, provides an
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anr.unciator in the Control Room indicating a high temperature. The alarm
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response for this annunciator directs the operator to start the other train of SBGT, secure the train with the high temperature ensuring the
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decay heat cooling lineup, and check the fire panel. The fire protection system provides a temperature detector on the ceiling of the SBGT room directly above the charcoal filters.
The inspector pointed out that no direction was given to operators concerning the initiation of the deluge system. The licensee changed the annunciator. response procedure to-provide direction to the operator concerning the deluge system.
11.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special reports. The review included the following: inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report informa-tion.
The following periodic reports were reviewed:
September 1986 Operating Status Report, dated October E,1986.
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October 1986 Operating Status Report, dated November 10, 1986.
12.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings. On November 24, 1986,.the inspector met with licensee represen-tatives and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are described in this report.
Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussions held with licensee representatives during the exit meeting, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restric-tions.