IR 05000333/1987024
| ML20149L716 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1988 |
| From: | Lazarus W, Tuccinardi T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149L704 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-87-24, NUDOCS 8802240404 | |
| Download: ML20149L716 (7) | |
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V. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No. 50-333/87-24 Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59 Priority Ca tegory C
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Licensee:
Power Authority of the State of New York James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Lycoming, New York 13093 d
Facility Name: James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant inspection At: Oswego, New York Inspection Conducted: December 14-16, 1987
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Inspectors:
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/ 1. E. Tuccinardi, Team Leader date
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EP&RPB, DRSS
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E. Fox, RI S. Merwin, P!/L C. Gordon, RI i
A. Luptak, SRI i
i Approved by:
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W. L,a,23ru s, @ie f
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j Emergency Preparedness Section laspection Summary:
Inspection on December 14-16, 1987 (Inspection Report No. 50-333/87-24)
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Areas Inspected:
A routine energency preparedness inspection of the licensee's back-shift unannounced emergency exercise, with full participation L
by the State of New York and affected counties, was perforced December 14-16, 1987. The inspection was perforced by a team of five NRC regional, resident and contractor personnel.
Results: No violations were identified.
The licensee's emergency response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective reasures for the health and safety of the public.
8802240404 880210
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PDR ADOCK 05000333
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l Detalls l
1.0 Persons Contacted l
R. Converse, Resident Manager W. Fernander, Superintendent of Power l
F. J. Catella, Manager of Nuclear Training D. Lindsey, Operations Superintendent R. A. Ourns, Vice President, Nuclear Operations J. Murphy, Manager of Press Services R. A. Heath, Fire Protection Supervisor T. Teifke, Security and Safety Superintendent J. Haley, Security Supervisor l
J. Hamblin, Technical Training Specialist E. Mulcahey, Radiological and Environmental Services Superintendent H. N. Keith, I&C Superintendent B. Baker, Maintenance Superintendent M. Chaubard, Emergency Planning A. Zaremba, Emergency Coordinator The above listed persons were present at the exit meeting.
In addition, other licensee personnel were contacted, interviewed and observed during the inspection.
2.0 Emergency Exercise The James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) unannounced backshift exercise was conducted on December 15, 1987, from 1:15 to 9:45 a.m.
i 2.1 Pre-exercise Activities The exercise objectives, submitted to hRC Region ! on August 12, 1987, were reviewed and determined to adequately test the licensee's Emergency Plan. On September 22, 1987, the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation. Region !
representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario. As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario which allowed adequate testing of major portions of the Energency Plan (EP) and the implementing procedures, and also provided the opportunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action.
NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on December 14, 1987.
Suggested NRC changes to the scenario were made by the licensee in the areas of technical support and radiological data. The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent disruption to nonnal plant operation _ _ _ _ _
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2.2 Scenario The exercise scenario included the following key events:
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Increased drywell leakage and increased primary coolant activity, 2.
Loss of ADS control power, 3.
TechnicalSupportCenter(TSC),OperationsSupportCenter (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) activation,
"A" side feedwater flow signal failure causing rapid feed pump speed increase with a high level turbine trip and subsequent reactor scram, 5.
Partial failure of "A" LPCI injectien line weld, 6.
HPCI oil line rupture resulting in fire in the enclosure, 7.
Fuel uncover, 8.
Atmospheric relecse, 9.
Use of Post Accident Sampling System, 10.
In-Plant, onsite and offsite radiological monitoring, 11.
Dispatch of onsite teams, 12.
Formulation of Protective Action Recomendations.
2.3 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise NRC team members made detailed observations of the emergency response organization activation and augmentation, the emergency response facilities (ERFs) activation and operations, and the actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the ERFs. The following activities were observed.
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Recognition of initiating conditions, correlation of these with Energency Action Levels (EALs), selection and use of emergency operating procedures; and completion of notification to offsite governmental authorities.
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Staffing and activation of ERFs, 3.
Comunication between and within ERFs,
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Formulation of Protective Action Recomendations, i
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Perfortnance of technical support, simulated repair and corrective actions, j
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Capability of the Health Physics organization to maintain radiological controls, i
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Communications with Oswego County and New York State Emergency l
Operations Center, 8.
Interaction between Emergency Director and state and county j
representatives in the E0F.
j 3.0 Exercise Observation i
3.1 The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation f
of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response i
facilities, and use of the facilities, were generally consistent
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with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The i
team also noted the following actions of the licensee's emergency
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response organization that were indicative of their ability to cope
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with abnormal plant conditions.
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Procedures, including use of activation check lists, were l
l adequately used in the E0F (except as noted in paragraph 3.2.2 l
below).
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Good information flow within the EOF was exhibited.
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3.
Good technical discussion between staff and personnel manning plant facilities and between emergency response facilities was observed.
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Good communications, use of procedures, and technical specifications between the control room TSC and EOF were noted
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in the control room. Reliable voice comunications were
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established and maintained throughout the drill.
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The Energency Director, Radiological Support Coordinator, and i
other EOF personnel worked effectively to ensure that emergency l
i worker doses offsite and inplant were well controlled, j
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Good upkeep and use of status boards.
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Offsite air sampling data was effectively used in the EOF to l
analyze the iodine content of the release.
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Timely activation and responses by electricians, instrument and calibration technicians, and other maintenance personnel was observed.
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Good tracking and management of inplant teams regarding task l
assignments, exposure, briefing, and time of dispatch and
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return was noted.
3.2 The NRC identified the following exercise weaknesses which need to
be evaluated and corrected by the licensee. The licensee conducted i
an adequate self critique of the exercise that also identified some i
of these areas.
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In the area of dose assessment in the EOF, there was an apparent lack of organization and oversight during the
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J exercise. Though sufficient personnel appeared to be t
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available, the lack of organization hindered a coordinated
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effort to provide accurate and timely data as exemplified by i
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the following:
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Due to personnel being pressed for time in developing PARS.
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confirmatory calculations were sometimes made after the
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fact.
Although PARS were reviewed by appropriate personnel, f
j reviews were often made hastily due to recommendations being received later than desired.
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Forms such as the Airborne Worksheet (EAP-18.1) and the I
l Radiological Assessment Data Fonn were of ten filled out
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either incompletely or inaccurately.
For example,
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integrated doses on the Radiological Assessment Data Form.
which was transmitted at 9:07 a.m., contained integrated I
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doses that were several orders of magnitude too low. These l
l types of errors were apparently a result of haste.
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j These examples identify a lack of organizational oversight and j
control in the area of dose assessment. This area will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.
(50-333/87-24-01)
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Clearly defined procedures and training for obtaining t
meteorological forecast data were not in evidence during the
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exercise. Two rethods of obtaining the data were available.
t Although one method (the National Weather Service) was primarily used, a dedicated cemputer was available for use but
was not running until 6:00 a.m.
Once running, the computer
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provided real tire cata in lieu of scenario data, which i
confused licensee, state and county exercise participants.
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Persons in dose assessment assigned to obtain meteorological l
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infomation were initially unaware that the computer was I
i available and exhibited a lack of training when attempting to
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j use the equiprent.
This area will be reviewed in a subsequent
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(50-333/87-24-02)
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- 3.3 Other Areas Requiring Follow-up 1.
Personnel exiting the site, bound for the EOF, should not be unduly delayed by accountability.
(During the turnover of staff and responsibility from the TSC to the EOF one individual was delayed until the security supervisor was consulted.)
Since the travel time to the EOF is lengthy, delays should be minimized.
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Implementing procedures should be evaluated to consider badging all NRC responsa personnel for high radiation area access upon arrival at the site. During the exercise, when an NRC inspector requested to accompany a repair team, the request caused a 45 minute delay due to administrative requirements.
3.
An air sample obtained in a turbine building electrical bay in support of a repair team simulating work in the area, was not taken sample size of 25 ft.gtes. Therefore, it appears the air volume for the full five min could not have been achieved in accordance with station practice and prework briefing.
Proper dose reduction consideration was not given for repair teams since five personnel were sent to backseat a valve in a high radiation area when it appeared fewer could have been sent.
5.
The Emergency Director (ED) briefed the New York State liaison i
officer In the EOF on Protective Action Recommendations. However.
l he excluded the Oswego County Liaison Officer in the EOF from these briefings. The ED did then brief the County Director for Emergency Management and Organization over the telephone.
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Since it is a county responsibility for protective actions for county residents until a State declaration of disaster, the
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County Liaison Officer should be kept informed of plant status if he is to be utilized effectively,
Questions asked by the county concerning dose assessment t
infonnation received from the licensee's EOF were not addressed adequately. County cotanicators were repeatedly keep on hold, answers when available were not adequate, and in one case no answer was given at all.
4.0 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items 1.
(Closed) 50-333/87-20-01 IFI Emergency Coordinator (EC) position has remained open for two years in spite of Quality Assurance (QA) audit report findings indicating this condition unacceptable. The Assistant EC has been promoted to the position of EC. Based on this promotion, this item is closed.
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(0 pen) 50-333/87-20-02 IFl I
Placement of QA auditors as observers during exercises, and the l
control of comments generated by the QA auditors during exercises, is the responsibility of the emergency preparedness organization.
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The inspector observed that QA auditors operated during the 1987 annual exercise independently of the exercise controllers.
This item will be reviewed upon receipt of a copy of an independent audit of the exercise and verification of independent tracking of identified findings, or in a subsequent inspection.
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3.
(0 pen)50-333/87-20-03IF1 Oswego County was not on the distribution list for the 1986 audits, i
This item will be' reviewed in a subsequent inspection upon receipt f
of verification that Oswego County received a copy of the 1987 (
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annual audit.
t 5.0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique l
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The licensee was informed no violations were observed. Although there are areas of concern identified, the NRC team determined, that within the scope and limitation of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated they could implement their Emergency Plan and emergency procedures in a manner that would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated they would evaluate them and take appropriate action regarding the items identified.
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