IR 05000333/1987026
| ML20196C582 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/1988 |
| From: | Jerrica Johnson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196C573 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-87-26, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, NUDOCS 8802160181 | |
| Download: ML20196C582 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
87-26 Docket No.
50-333 License No.
DPR-59 Licensee:
Power Authority of the State of New York P.O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility:
J.A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Location:
Scriba, New York Dates:
December 1,1987 - January 11, 1988 Inspectors:
A.J. Luptak, Senior Resident Inspector C.S. Marschall, Resident Inspector Approved by:
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R. Johnson, Chief, Reactor Date Projects Section 2C, DRP Inspection Summary:
Areas Inspected:
Routine and reactive inspection during day and backshift hours of Licensee Event Report review, operational safety verification, surveillance observations, maintenance observations, followup of a plant trip, IE Bulletin followup, review of missed surveillance tests, followup of an Engineered Safety Feature actuation, and review of periodic and special reports. This involved a total of 134 inspection hours which included 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> of backshift on December 15, 1987 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of weekend inspection coverage on December 13 and 22, 1987.
.Re sul t s :
Two violations were identified by the licensee during this inspection period.
Notices of Violations were not issued based upon the NRC review confirming that the violations met the requirements of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, V.A for self-identification and correction.
The violations involved the failure to perform Technical Specification required surveillances on the Standby Gas Treatment System and monitoring drywell leakage (sections 9 and 10).
The discovery of improper assembly of two Control Rod Drive Mechanisms supplied by the vendor is discussed in section 7 b.
An Engineered Safety Feature actuation (Reactor Water Cleanup isolation) occurred due to an inadequate bolt torquing procedure discussed in section 11.
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DETAILS
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Summary of Plant Activities
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The inspection period began with the plant operating at full power.
On December 9,1987, the reactor tripped from full power due to a false low reactor vessel level indication caused by surveillance testing.
The plant was restarted on December 10 and returned to full power operation on December 14.
The plant remained at full power until January 9,1988, when a normal plant' shutdown was conducted to begin a scheduled two-week j
maintenance outage.
Major wo-k activities scheduled during this outage
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include replacement of control rod drive mechanisms, inspection of the torus coating, electrical equipment preventive maintenance, recirculation scoop tube modifications, and reducing the backlog of corrective maintenance items.
This inspection period ended with the plant in cold shutdown and the outage maintenance in progress.
2.
Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (82-03-09):
Repair Offgas System and Containment Atmosphere Analyzer. Modification F1-83-11 for the Offgas System removed many of the sources of system leakage and included several measures to reduce moisture loading on the system driers. Since the modification was installed, Offgas System reliability has improved greatly.
The B Containment Atmosphere Analyzer has also performed reliably as a result of the installation of heat tracing and other system improvements, This item is closed.
(Closed) VIOLATION (86-01-01):
Failure to perform surveillances.
The following documents were reviewed for compliance with the licensee's commitment to long term corrective action in reply to the Notice of Violation:
AP 4.1, Procedure for Department Surveillance Tests,
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Revision 5, dated May 16, 1986.
MDS0-8, Maintenance Department Surveillance Test
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Program, Revision 0, dated June 11. 1986.
RES-50-6, Radiological and Environment Services
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Department Standing Order Number 6 - Surveillance Schedule and Review, Revision 3, dated July 29, 1987.
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1C50-13, Instrument Surveillance Test Program, Revision 0, dated July 2, 1986.
IC50-14, Instrument Surveillarce Test Audit, Revision 2,
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dated July 7, 1987.
0D50-25, Surveillance Test Program, Revision 2, dated
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December 15, 1986.
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F-ST-998, Functional Surveillance Test Audit, Revision 0,
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dated May 6, 1986.
In addition, implementation of these procedures was reviewed with responsible department personnel to ensure the corrective action is adequate to prevent recurrence.
This item is closed.
(Closed) VIOLATION (86-13-03):
Failure to comply with procedures.
In response to this violation, the licensee committed to conduct training to emphasize the importance of attention to procedural detail to members of all operating departments, and to revise RTP-11. Training records, RTP-11, New Fuel Radiological Survey Procedure, Revision 2, dated February 28, 1987, and RPOP-3, Picking Up, Receiving and Opening Radioactive Packages, Revision 1, dated November 1, 1984 were reviewed for implementation of the licensee's commitment, and to ensure adequate corrective action to prevent recurrence.
This item is closed.
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3.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review The inspector reviewed LERs to verify that the details of the events were clearly reported. The inspector determined that each report was ade p te to assess the event, the cause appeared accurate and was supported by details, corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause, and generic applicability to other plants was not in question.
During this inspection period, the following LERs were reviewed:
LER 87-18, reported a reactor trip due to high neutron flux caused by the erratic operation of the B Reactor Water Recirculation Pump speed controller.
Followup of this event was discussed in Inspection Report 50-33/87-22.
LER 87-19, reported missed surveillance testing of the Standby Gas Treatment System due to a Technical Specification (TS) misinterpretation (see section 9).
LER 87-20, reported a reactor trip due to a false low reactor vessel water level signal due to personnel error during surveillance testing (see section 8).
LER 87-22, reported a missed surveillance test of computing drywell leakage due to operator oversight (see section 10).
I No deficiencies were identified.
4.
Emergency Notification System Reports (ENS)
The inspector reviewed the following events which were reported 'a the NRC l
via the Emergency Notification System as required by 10 CFR 50.72.
The review included a determination that the reporting requirements were met, that appropriate corrective actions had been taken, and that the event had
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been evaluated for possible generic implications.
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December 9, 1987-Reactor trip due to a low reactor vessel signal caused by surveillance testing (see section 8).
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December 13, 1987
'An Engineered Safety Feature actuation
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1[g occurred when a gasket failed on the B RWCU pJnp seal cooler (see section 11).
fio c.eficiencies, vere identified.
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5.
Operatiool Safety Verification e
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Cofif.rol RLam Observations w
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' ' Jaily the inspectcV verified selected plant parameters and equipment
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avtitability tp jnsure compliance with Technical Specifications
J imiting concitfony for operation.
Selected lit annunciators were
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discussed srth concrol room operators to verify that the reasons for j
them were dnderstood and corrective action, if required, was being
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taken, the inspector observed shift turnovers biweekly to ensure proper control room and shif t manning. The inspector directly
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obs,e'rved the operations listed belo.< to ensure adherence to approved
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I p;6cedures:
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Routine power operations.
Issuance of Radiation Work Permits and Work Request / Event /
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Deficiency forms.
During this inspection period, the licensee changed the control room labeling based on Control Room Design Review requirements.
The changes included new label plates for all equipment which standardized the labeling and nomenclature, improved mimicing of systems, demarkation of systems, and new annunciator windows which incorporate standard nomenclature and format.
These changes have made the control room more standardized and gives a more professional appearance.
tio violations were identified.
b.
Shift Logs and Ope-ating Records Selected shift logs and operating reccrds were reviewed to obtain information on plant problems and operations, detect changes and trends in performance, detect possible conflicts with Technical Specifications or regalatory requirements, determine that records are
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being maintained a'nd reviewed as' required, and assess,the effective-ness'of.the communications provided by the logs.
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No violations were identified.
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c.
Plant Tours
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During the inspection period, the inspector made tours of control-rooms and. accessible' plant areas to monitor station activities and.to make 'an inde;,endent assessment.of equipment status, radiological conditions, safety and adherence.to regulatory requirements.
No violations were identified.
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d.
Tagout Verification.
-The inspector verified that the following safety-related protective tagout records (PTR's) were proper by observing the positions of breakers, switches and/or valves:
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PTR 872303 on Reactor Building Ventilation System.
PTR 872354 on Hydraulic Control Unit 22-39.
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PTR 880057 on A Residual Heat Removal System.
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No violations were identified, e.
Emergency System Operability The inspector verified operability of the following systems by ensuring that each accessible valve in the primary flow path was.in I
the correct position, by confirming that power supplies'and breakers
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were properly aligned for components that mJst activate upon an l
initiation signal, and by visual inspection of the major components which might prever.t fulfillment of their functional requirements:
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Standby Liquid Control System.
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Emergency Diesel Generator Systenis.
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A Battery Ventilation System.
No violations were identified, 6.
Surveillance Observations p
The inspector observed partions of the surveillance procedures listed l
below to verify that, the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, L
approved procedures were used, the work was perfermed by qualified o
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personnel' ~ limiting conditions for operations were met, and.the system was:
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. correctly' restored following the testing.
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F-ST-20K, Control Rod Exercise / Venting, Rev. 3, dated August. 17, 1984, L-performed December 9, 1987.
I F-ST-13A, Main Stack Radiation Mon ir Functional Test, Rev.
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June 11, 1936,' performed December 116, 1987.
F-ST-98, Emergency Diesel Generator Full Load-Test and Emergency
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Service Water Operability Test, Rev. 23, dated September 9, 1987,
. performed December 29, 1987.
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The inspector also witnessed all aspects of the following surveillance test to. verify that the surveillarice procedure conformed to specification requirements and had been properly approved, limiting conditions for operation for removing equipment from service were met, testing was performed by qualified personnel, test results met technical specification requirements, the surveillance test documentation was reviewed, and equipment was properly restored to service following the test:
F-ST-48, High Pressure Coolant Injection Flow Rate / Pump Operability /
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Valve Operability Tests, Rev. 31, dated September 23, 1987,. performed January 6,1988.
.No violations were identified.
7.
Maintenance Observations a.
The inspector observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to determine that redundant components were operable, that these activities did not violate tiie limiting conditions for' operation, that required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the work, that approved procedures were used or the activity was within the "skills of the trade," that appropriate radiological controls were properly implemented, that ignition / fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and that equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to service, b.
During this inspection period, the following activities were observed:
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WR 72/55648, repair the B Battery Ventilation Air Handling Unit.
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WR 03/5461, leak test Control Rod Drive Mechanisms.
WR 10/45477, hydrostatic test of the A Residual Heat Removal
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System.
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During observation of leak rate testing of new Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRD), the inspector was informed and witnessed the failure of 2 of the 25 CRDs to meet the leak rate specifications. The failure occurred in the leak path between the inlet and outlet ports on the CRDs. Mechanical seals in the drive piston are used to seal the flow path between these two ports and assist in operating the drive.
Leakage is required to be less than 0.2 gallons per minute and was found to be approximately 4 gallons per minute in both cases.
Upon disassembly, the licensee found these seals had been installed backwards and therefore were allowing water to pass by them in the wrong direction.
If installed correctly, the r,eals would stop flow for inward rod motion and allow flow to pass for outwa d rod motion.
Although the drive mechanisms are tested at the manufacturer, they must be disassembled and dried prior to reassembly and shipping.
The vendor has concluded that this condition was not safety signifi-cant.
The rod would still have inserted on a scram.
The normal rod insertion times would have been slow and a faster withdrawl time would occur.
The vendor is forwarding their report to the licensee for additional review.
Further review of this event will be conducted by the Vendors Program Branch.
No violations were identified.
8.
Followup o_f a Plant Trip At 9:13 a.m. on December 9, 1987, the reactor tripped from full power due to a low reactor vessel level signal.
The low level signal occurred due to a personnel error during surveillance testing of reactor vessel level instrumentation. Actual vessel level was normal n the time of the trip.
The inspector arrived in the control room witnin minutes of the scram and observed the operator response to the event. The inspector also reviewed the process computer alarm printout, the post trip log, various chart recorders and the completed data sheets for procedure No. PS0 53, "Post Trip Evaluation".
Based on these observations and reviews, the inspector determined that the operator actions were proper and in accordance with approved procedures, and that the plant responded as designed.
The low reactor water level trip occurred during surveillance testing of the instrumentation (02-3-LIS-1010) which trips the High Pressure Coolant Injection Turbine due to high reactor water level. This instrumentation shares a common header with the level instrumentation (LT-101C & LT-1010)
which supplies the trips for the Reactor Protection System.
Based upon the performance of the surveillance test relative to the trip, the Instrument and Control (I&C) General Superviscr's immediste review of the event and followup testing to repeat the conditions using the same.
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personnel, the licensee concluded one or bothsof the isolation valves for LIS-101D were not tightly closed. As a result, when a test valve was opened on LIS-1010, a hydraulic transient occurred in.the common piping-which'resulted in the false low level signals of LT-101C and LT-1010 which supply different divisions of the Reactor Protection System.
The technician performing;the surveillance test was an apprentice under the supervision of another technician. The apprentice technician"is experienced in valve manipulations including instruments of this type but had not previously operated the valves-on this particular instrument. 'The apprentice was being closely monitored during the evolution including a procedure walkthrough and observation of.the experienced technician during__
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testing on LIS-1018.
In addition, it was noted that these valves are original plant equipment and do require a slightly larger amount of torque to fully close.
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Immediately following the trip, an I&C supervisor investigated the actions concerning testing of the level instrument in progress. No valve
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manipulations.had been conducted following the trip.
Following discussion with.the technicians during testing, the supervisor concluded there had
.been proper procedural compliance. However, upon checking the instrument
. isolation valves, the supervisor was able to move the valves slightly-
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(approximately 1/16 of a turn), indicating the valves were not fully closed. Additional testing demonstrated level spikes on LT-101C and D when the isolation valves for LIS-1010 were not tightly closed.
The licensee's corrective actions include counselling of the technician involved, counselling of all technicians which supervise apprentice techn1cians, additional guidance for monitoring of apprentice technicians, and replacement of the instrument valves during the January 1988 mainten-ance outage.
No violations were identified.
9.
Missed Surveillance of the Standby Gas Treatment System During a review of procedures involving testing of the Standby Gas Treatment System, the licensee identified a required Technical Specifica-tion (TS) surveillance test which has not been previously performed.
TS 4.7.B.1.b requires "at least once during each scheduled Secondary Contain-ment leak rate test, whenever a filter is changed, whenever work is performed that could effect the filter system efficiency, and at intervals not to exceed six months between refueling outages, it shall be demonstrated that: (1) the removal efficiency of the particulate filters is not less than 99 percent based on a 00P test per ANSI N100-1-1972 paragraph 4.1 (2)
the removal efficiency of the charcoal filters is not less than 99 percent based on a Freon test."
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The efficiency tests discussed above have been performed at~six month'
. intervals, following filter changes,land following work.which could effect the filter system: efficiency.
However, the test has never been performed-during.a Secondary Containment leak rate test. This was due to a licensee
. interpretation that testing at a -six month interval satisfied:this requirement.
Efficiency tests performed at the six month interval have been satisfactory.
The licensee did not identify any basis'for the
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surveillance requirement.
The--failure to' perform efficiency. testing on the Standby Gas Treatment System filter during the leak _ rate test is a violation of TS 4.7.B.1.b.
As provided for by 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, V. A, a Notice of Violation is not being issued for this event in that: it was properly identified by the licensee; it.was reported; it was of no safety significance; corrective action will be taken;_and this was not a violation that could have been corrected by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violation.
(87-26-01)
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However, the plant has operated for over twelve years misinterpreting this TS and.this has never been detected during operations reviews or Quality Assurance Audits.
The licensee has taken action to perform the required test until such time as a TS amendment is processed.
10. Missed Surveillance of Drywell Leakage On December 10, 1987, at 8:00 p.m., the licensed control room operator determined that the 4:00 p.m. computation and recording of drywell leakage rates had not been conducted. Technical Specification 4.6.0 requires that
"Reactor Coolant leakage rate inside'the primary containment shall be monitored and recorded once every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> utilizing the Primary Containment Sump Monitoring System (equipment drain sump monitoring and floor drain sump monitoring)."
The specification is met by the operator pumping down both drywell sumps and recording ~ readings from pump flow integrators.
The leakage rate is then calculated using'the integrator reading obtained and integrator reading taken 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> previously. Completing this action is solely dependent upon the control room operator remembering to take the readings.
Upon assuming the duties of control room operator at approximately 3:00 p.m., the licensed operator noted the drywell leakage was very low based upon the rate of rise recorders in the control room which monitor to the drywell sumps. The operator became involved in preparations for a reactor startup which began at 5:06 p.m.
During his performance of duties preparing for the startup, the operator overlooked formally computing the
drywell leakage at 4:00 p.m. as required.
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-10-At 8:00 p.m. while taking readings for the drywell leakage, -the operator recognized the' missed reading and informed the Shift Superviso'r.
Calculation of ~drywell leakage over the eight hour period determined the unidentified;1eakage to be 0.1 gallons per minute and the identified Lleakage'to be 1.28 gallons per minute.
Technical Specifications require the unidentified leakage to be.less than 5 gallons per minute and identified leakage to be less~than 25 gallons per minute.
In addition to the manual calculation of drywell-leakage rates, 2 drywell 1.eakage recorders are installed in the control room.
Each.of these recorders monitor and display the unidentified and the identified drywell-sump levels and rate of. rise. Templates installed.on these recorders correlate the rate'of rise-to a. leakage. rate. Also, timing circuits ~
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monitor valve cycling and pump running times.and annunciate if these conditions indicate an abnormal leakage.
The licensee corrective actions include counselling of shift operators
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identified leakage sump to eliminate the need.
The failure to -perform monitoring and recording of reactor coolant leakage rates inside the drywell every four hours is a violation of TS 4.6,0.
As provided for by 10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix C, V.A, a Notice of Violation is not being issued for this event in that; it was properly identified by the licensee; it was reported; it was of minor safety significance; corrective actions have or will be taken; and this was not a violation that could have been corrected for a previous violation. (87-26-02)
11.
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation On December 13, 1987, a Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) 5"stem isolation L
occurred due to high RWCU pump room temperatures.
The isolation signal is part of:the Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System and therefore an Engineered Safety Feature.
The high temperature was the result of a leak due to a failed gasket of l
the B RWCU pump seal cooler flange.
The 1/2 inch pipe flange is located L
at the discharge of the pump to the seal cooler which supplies flow to a L
mechanical seal. The failure was the result of an inadequate bolt torquing l-p acedure which failed to consider secondary effects such as thermal I
expansion, flange alignment, and normal vibration. The leak occurred shortly after the pump had been replaced.
l The high temperature condition in the pump room initiated an alarm in the l
Control Room about 2 minutes before the isolation. Operators were in the process of investigating the high temperature and taking action to manually isolate the system when the actuation occurred. All systems functioned as designed during the occurrence.
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The inspector will review the Licensee Event Report and further licensee corrective actions in a future inspection. No violations were identified.
12.
I&E Bulletin 87-02 - Fastener Testing To Determine Conformance With Agp_licable Material Specifications The inspector reviewed the licensee's methodology and process used in selection of the sample of ten safety related fasteners and ten nonsafety related fasteners and the nuts used with these fasteners.
The licensee utilized a computer printout listing all fasteners in stock from which_the selection was drawn. The licensee selected bolts which were procured to meet the characteristics which were of particular interest to the NRC identified in the Bulletin.
The fasteners selected were roughly in portion to the in plant use based upon the properties of interest.
The inspector accompanied the licensee individual during the actual selection of material from the warehouse and storeroom.
During the selection process, the inspector noted several fasteners which either had no markings or had manufacturer markings which were of particular interest to the NRC.
The licensee included these fasteners in the sample selection.
The inspector verified each fastener was individually tagged and bagged with the appropriate purchase order number and certification number to assure material traceability.
Further review of the actions required by the bulletin will be conducted in a future inspection (50-333/BU-87-02).
No deficiencies were noted.
13. Annual Emergency Preparedness Exer.:ise On December 15, 1987, an unannounced, off-normal hours, annual emergency preparedness exercise was conducted.
This exercise included participation by state and local agencies and was also observed by Federal Environmental Management Agency (FEMA). The licensee's activities were observed by a team from Region I and the senior resident inspector.
No significant deficiencies were observed by the NRC during the exercise.
It was concluded that_ the New York Power Authority demonstrated their ability to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an emergency.
Details of the observations made during the exercise will be discussed in Inspection Report 50-333/87-24.
14. Training Program Accreditation On December 10, 1987, the National Academy for Nuclear Training completed the accreditation of all the training programs at the FitzPatrick facility.
These ten programs include training for licensed and non-licensed operators, maintenance and Instrument and Control personnel, radiological and engineering personnel.
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15. Assurance of Quality This section is included to provide assessment of management oversight and effectiveness in ensuring activities are conducted in a manner which assures quality.
As noted in section 9, the licensee has operated for over twelve years without performing a Technical Specification surveillance requirement due to misinterpretation. Although the inspector agrees there appears to be little or no technical justification for the requirement, and the failure to recognize the requirement and take actions to correct it indicates a lack of thoroughness in reviewing Technical Specifications, this appears to be an isolated case.
Actior,s taken by Instrument and Control Department personnel to quickly identify and confirm the cause of a plant trip were considered to be prudent.
16.. Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special reports.
The review included the following: inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportabil4ty and validity of report information.
The following periodic reports were reviewed:
November 1987 Operating Status Report, dated December 4, 1987.
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December 1987 Operating Status Report, dated January 8, 1987.
No unacceptable conditions were noted.
17.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.
In addition, at the end of the period, the inspector met with licensee representatives and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are described in this report.
Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussions held with NYPA representatives during the exit meeting, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions.