IR 05000333/1987022
| ML20149D974 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1987 |
| From: | Jerrica Johnson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149D951 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-87-22, NUDOCS 8801130180 | |
| Download: ML20149D974 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
87-22 Docket No.
50-333 License No.
DPR-59 Licensee:
Power Authcrity of the State of New York P.O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility:
J. A. Fit: Patrick Nuclear Power Plant Location:
Scriba, New York Dates:
October 21 - November 30, 1987 Inspectors:
A.J. Luptak, Senior Resident Inspector C.S. Marschall, Resident Inspector J.A. Golla, Reactor Engineer e11,kd 12-lli l t ?
Approved by:
. John \\Jn, Chief, Reactor Date Projects Section 2C, DRP Inspection Summary:
Areas Inspected:
Routine and reactive inspection during day and backshift hours of Licensee Event Report review, operational safety verification, surveillance observations, maintenance observations, followup of a plant trip, followup of scram discharge instrument volume capability, review of diesel generator air start notor tubrica+ ion, and review of periodic and special reports. This involved a totu f 214 inspection
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hours which included 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of backshift on November 21, 1987 and 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of weekend inspection coverage on November 8 and 22, 1987.
Results:
During this inspection period no violations were identified. Areas which require licensee attention are specific housekeeping items discussed in paragraph 5.c, and a lack of a detailed procedural review by maintenance personnel discussed in paragraph 7 b.
Items of noteworthy performance were the radiological practices displayed by Instrument and Control technicians discussed in paragraph 6.
8801130180 871223 PDR ADOCK 05000333
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DETAILS 1.
Summary of Plant Activities The inspection period began.--
the plant operating at full power.
On November 5, 1987, power was reduced to near 60% to repair the B reactor feed pump. While in the process of increasing power, the reactor tripped from 80% power on November 8, 1987.
The scram was caused by a high neutron flux resulting from a recirculation pump speed controller failure.
A plant restart was conducted on November 9, and the plant reached fuli power on November 12.
The plant remained at full power through the end of the inspection period.
2.
Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (83-06-04): Review of implementation of revised training procedure ITP-5 requirements for maintenance of staff licenses.
Procedure ITP-5, Licensed Operator Requalification, Rev. 8, dated November 21, 1987, memorandum J0P-87-145, and documentation of watchstanding by staff license holders were reviewed for indications that staff license holders were meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 55.
Documentation of the required on-shift time existed for all staff license holders as required oy memorandum J0P-87-145 and 10 CFR 55.
This item is closed.
(Closed) VIOLATION (86-13-01): Failure to make an ENS call.
Procedure AP 8.2, Reporting Variations From Normal Plant Operations & 10 CFR 21 Requirements, Rev. 14, dated August 19, 1987, was reviewed to confirm incorporation of changes committed to by the licensee.
These changes were
made to provide guidance for shift personnel in determining reporting requirements.
In addition, the licensee has made all required notifica-tions since this violation.
This item is closed.
3.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review The inspector reviewed LERs to verify that the details of the events were
clearly reported.
The inspector determined that each report was adequate to assess the event, the cause appeared accurate and was supported by j
details, corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause, and generic applicability to other plants was not in question.
During this inspection period, the following LERs were reviewed:
LER 87-17 reported a reactor scram due to low reactor vessel level caused the tripping of a raactor feed pump.
Followup of this event was discussed in Inspection Report 50-333/87-21.
No deficiencies were identified.
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4.
Emergency Notification System Reports (ENS)
The inspector reviewed the following events which were reported
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to the NRC via the Emergency Notification System as required by 10 CFR 50.72.
The review included a determination that the reporting requirements were met, that appropriate corrective
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actions had been taken, and that the event had been evaluated for possible generic implications.
The following reports were reviewed:
Event Date subject November 8, 1987 Reactor scram due to high neutron flux (see section 8).
November 23, 1987 Significant loss of offsite notification system due to seven emergency sirens out of service as a result of an automobile accident.
No deficiencies were identified.
5.
Operational Safety Verification a.
Control Room Observations
Daily the inspector verified selected plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with Technical Specifications limiting conditions for operation.
Selected
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lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken.
The inspector observed shif t turnovers biweekly to ensure proper control room and shift manning.
The inspector directly observed the operations listed below to ensure adherence to approved procedures:
Routine power operations.
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?lant startup on November 9, 1987.
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Issuance of Radiation Work Permits and Work Request / Event /
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Deficiency forms.
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b.
Shift Logs and Operating Records Selected shift logs and operating records were reviewed to obtain information on plant problems and operations, detect changes and trends in performance, detect possible conflicts with Technical Specifications or regulatory requirements, determine that records are being maintained and reviewed as
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required, and assess the effectiveness of the communications
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provided by the logs.
No violations were identified.
c.
plant Tours During the inspection period, the inspector made tours of control rooms and accessible plant areas to monitor station activities and to make an independent assessment of equipment status, radiological conditions, safety and adherence to regulatory requirements.
The following were observed:
Although most plant surfaces were painted and free of dust and dirt, articles such as tape, tools, rolls of paper and plastic bags, and other remains of completed work were found throughout the plant.
It was apparent that Buildings and Grounds personnel are cleaning the plant efficiently, but that supervisors are not always ensuring that work sites are picked-up at job completion.
Oily rags, placed to absorb lubricating oil leaks, were observed around equipment in several locations in the plant.
Many of the rags had evidently been in place for an extended period of time. Buckets and cans of oil were also observed in several locations.
Plant management was informed and some of the rags were quickly replaced with clean rags, while other rags remained unchanged, and the cans of oil were not removed.
Upon further discussions with the licensee, these items were corrected.
During tours of the control room and relay rooms, the inspector noted several cabinet doors which were open.
These doors appeared to have c.,perable fasteners but were not shut after being opened for equipment access. After discussing this item with licensee management the inspector noted improvement in this area.
These housekeeping items will continue to be reviewed during routine inspection of the facility.
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No violations were identifie '
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d.
Tagout Verification The inspector verified that the following safety-related protective tagout records (PTR's) were proper by observing the positions of breakers, switches and/or valves:
PTR 872092 on B Control Rod Hydraulic System.
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PTR 872115 on A Standby Gas Treatment System.
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PTR 872209 on A Standby Liquid Control System.
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No violations were' identified.
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e.
Emergency System Operability The inspector-verified operability of the following systems by ensuring that each accessible valve in the primary flow path was in the correct position, by confirming that power supplies and breakers were properly aligned for components that must activate upon an initiation signal, and by visual inspection of the major components which might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirements:
Standby Liquid Control System.
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Emergency Service Water Systems.
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Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System.
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During the walkdown of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) Hydraulic System, the inspector found the manual isolation valve (CRD-6B) for the Control Rod Dive pump suction relief valve open but not locked open as required.
The licensee immediately replaced the lockwire.
This valve is not safety related and is on a nonsafety portion of the CRD system.
This appears to be an isolated instance and is of minimal safety significance.
No additional deficiencies were identified.
6.
Surveillance Observations The inspector observed portions of the surveillance procedures listed below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, the work was performed by qualified personnel, limiting conditions for operations were met, and the system was correctly restored following the tescin.'
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F-ST-5N, Average Power Range Monitor Instrument Functional
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Test (Refuel, Startup, Shutdown Mode), Rev, 8, dated July 9,
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1987, performed November 8, 1987.
F-ISP-8, Core Spray Differential Pressure Instrument
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Functional Test, Rev.11, dated February 21, 1986, performed November 17, 1987.
F-ST-39A, Type "B" Leak Rate Test (Air Locks), Rev.11,
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dated January 7,1987, performed November 25, 1987.
F-ISP-1008, Reactur Protection System and Primary
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Containment Isolation System Instrument Functional
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Test / Calibration, Rev. 4, dated April 17, 1987, performed November 30, 1987.
The inspector also witnessed all aspects of the following surveillance test to verify that the surveillance procedure conformed to specification requirements and had been properly approved, limiting conditions for operation for removing equipment from service were r,iet, testing was performed by qualified personnel, test results met technical specification requirements, the surveillance test documentation was reviewed, and equipment was properly restored to service following the test:
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F-ISP-66-4, Scram Discharge Instrument Volume Level
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Transmitter Calibration, Rev. 6, dated April 24, 1987, performed November 5, 1957.
During observations of ISP-66-4, Scram Disenarge Instrument Volume Level Transmitter Calibration, on November 5,1987, the Instrument and Control technicians displayed thorough knowledge and careful observation of applicable radiation protection procedures, and implemented ALARA practices whenever possible.
It was also noted that performance of the surveillance required the technician to spend prolonged periods in close proximity to hot spots with exposure rates exceeding 2000 mrad /hr on contact.
The technician received approximately 470 mrem while performing the surveillances in the east and west Scram Discharge Instrument Volume (SDIV) enclosures.
The licensee was aware of the high exposure rates, had performed an ALARA review, and is considering ways to reduce exposure rates in the SDIV enclosures.
No violations were identified.
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7.
Maintenance Observations a.
The inspector observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to determine that redundant components were operable, that these activities did not violate the limiting conditions for operation, that required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the work, that approved procedures were used or the activity was within the "skills of the trade," that appropriate radiological controls were properly implemented, that ignition / fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and that equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to service, b.
During this inspection period, the following activities were observed:
WR 03/56060, overhaul the B Control Rod Drive Hydraulic
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Pump.
WR 01/55527, repair leaks on Standby Gas Treatment
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System ducting.
WR 11/56185, replace accumulator on.A Standby Liquid
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Control Pump.
WR 11/4679, lubricate A Standby Liquid Control Pump.
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While observing the maintenance activities on the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System the inspector noted that procedure MP 101.09, Lubrication of the Standby Liquid Control Pumps, Rev. 2, dated November 27, 1985, indicated it had expired on November 27, 1985.
This was an administrative error and should have read November 27, 1987.
In addition, it was noted that the prerequisites of procedure MP 11.4, Standby Liquid Control Accumulator Repair, were not followed since the suction valve of the A SLC pump was not shut and tagged. The valves to be shut and tagged are given as a guideline for system isolation in this procedure. When discovered, work had already begun on the accumulator replacement.
The mechanic immediately had the system isolation changed to include shutting and tagging the suction valve.
Although neither of these findings were in themselves of major safety significance, they indicate a lack of detailed procedural review by maintenance personnel.
The licensee is reviewing methods in which to emphIsize detailed procedural adherence by personnel, No violations were identifie.?
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8.
Followup o_n Plant Trig
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At 7:34 p.m. on November 8, the reactor scrammed due to high neutron flux (120'4) while the operators were in the process of increasing power from approximately 80*..
The rapid power increase occurred when the operator unlocked the scoop tube on
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the B recirculation pump and the pump immediately began to increase in speed.
The operator attempted to halt the transient by immediately locking the scoop tube. Witnessing speed continuing to increase, the operator reduced the controller to minimum and unlocked the scoop tube to try and reduce the pump speed.
During the operator's actions, the scram occurred.
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The inspector reviewed the process computer alarm printout, the post-trip log, various chart recorders, and the completed data sheets for procedure No. PSO 53, "Post Trip Evaluation".
Based on these reviews, the inspector determined the operator's actions during the event were proper and in accordance with approved procedures and the plant responded as designed.
The cause of the rapid increase in speed of the B recirculation
pump was determined to be a faulty controller.
The speed demand controller was found to be operating erratically due to a faulty selector switch within the controller.
The original controller was replaced with a spare unit and the faulty selector switch replaced on the original unit.
Since 1979, the licensee has operated with the recirculation
motor generator scoop tube speed controls locked up (with a few i
exceptions for short periods).
The scoop tubes have been locked to prevent power spikes resulting from a scoop tube oscillations.
The licensee has attempted numerous repairs and modifications to
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the system, which have failed to correct all of the oscillation
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problems. An additional modification is plannu to be installed in January 1988 to eliminate the feedback signal of the flow control circuit. This modification has been successful at other utilities in correcting similar problems at those facilities.
Following this trip, the licensee decided not to unlock the scoop tubes during routine power change with recirculation flow. A switch for each recirculation pump is located in the control room which will lock and unlock the scoop tubes. With the scoop tubes locked, a licensed operator in communication with the control room will take control of the scoop tubes locally to make any recirculation flow change.
If necessary, the scoop tubes can be unlocked from the control room to allow for rapid power reduction using the flow controller or if a recirculation runback signal occurs. The inspector will continue to review the licensee's corrective actions concerning the recirculation pump scoop tubes.
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No violations were identified.
Details regarding the licensee's process for conducting a safety evaluation concerning operation with the scoop tubes locked are described in Inspection Report 50-333/87-21.
9.
Followup of Licensee's Implementation of Multiplant Action Item b-58, Scram Disenarge Instrument volume Capability A review of documents and a Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) walkdown were conducted, as described below, to ensure SDV capabilities in accordance with licensee long-term commitments concerning Multiplant Action (MPA) Item B-58.
a.
Scram Discharge Header Size Review of Modification Package, F1-82-18 revealed that the
licensee installed an 8 inch diameter SDV header with a 10
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inch diameter cross-tie line and a 10 inch diameter drain
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line sloped to the Scram Discharge Instrument Volume (SDIV).
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Installation was confirmed during a system walkdown on November 4, 1987.
b.
Automatic Scram on High SDV Level
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Review of Technical Specification 3.1.A, and plant drawing
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FM-278, confirmed that an automatic scram function exists
for high instrument volume water level.
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c.
Instrument Taps Not on Connected Piping
During the system walkdown on November 5, 1987, inspectors conf wmed that instrument taps were located on the SDIV only and not on connected piping above or below the SDIV.
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is reflected in current plant drawings.
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Detection of Water in the SDIV I
Review of drawing FM-278 and system inspection on November 5, 1987 and November 6, 1987 were used to determine that each instrument (two float and two differential pressure switches for each SDIV) was attached to the SDIV through its own tap.
The system redundancy and diversity ensures a single failure such as instrument line plugging will not
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prevent the detection of water in the SDIV.
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Vent a_nd Drain Valve System Irterfaces e.
n The inspectors reviewed documentation for modification l
F1-82-18 to confirm that the licensee's analysis considered
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water backup into the SDIV caused by the drain configuration
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or interface to other systems.
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Vent and Drain Valves Close on Loss of Air Inspection of the redundant vent and drain valves revealed that the valves are air to open and spring to close, and will fail closed on loss of air.
g.
Operator Aid During inspection of control roen annunciators, it was determined that a "Scram Discharge Volume Not Drained" alarm exists, and that procedures exist which direct operator action in response to the alarm.
h.
Active Failure in Vent and Drain Lines During the system walkoown on November 5, 1987, the inspectors confirmed that redunaant vent and drain valves exist for each SDIV so that a single active failure will not prevent isolation of the SDIV.
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Periodic Testing of Vent and Drain Valves Procedure F-ST-20L, Scram Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Valves Full Stroke Test, Revision 3, dated November 11, 1984, tests operability of the SDIV vent and drain valves as required by T.S. 4.3.A.2.f.
The acceptance criteria requires that valve closure occurs in less than 3D seconds.
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Periodic Testing of Level Detection Instrumentation Procedure ISP-66-1, Scram Discharge Instrument Volume High Water Level Instrument Functional Test / Calibration, Rev. 18, dated June 11, 1986, and procedure ISP-66-4, Scram Discharge Instrument Volume Level Transmitter Calibration, Rev. 6, dated April 24, 1987, are used to test the level alarm trip instrumentation in place.
The inspector observed
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performance of procedure ISP-66-4 on November 5,1987.
Procedure F-ISP-93, Instrument Valve Lineup Second Verification, Rev. 8 dated 5/27/87 includes a requirement
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for second independent verification of system restoration for each Instrument Surveillance Procedure, including ISP-66-1 and ISP-66-4.
The inspector observed performance of ISP-93 following completion of ISP-66-4.
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Periodic Testing of the Entire System Procedure F-ST-299, Integrated Scram System Test, Revision
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3, dated June 5, 1985, is used to demonstrate scram
instrument response and valve function at pressure and temperature with 50% control rod density, as required by T.S. 4.3.A.2.g.
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The inspector had no further questions.
No deficiencies were identified.
10.
Diesel Generator Air Stert Motor Lubrication Followup Fit: patrick has four Ge,eral Motors (GM) Electro-Motive Division (EMD) diesels, each equipped with four Ingersol Rand air start motors. The inspector interviewed licensee personnel and determined the following:
a.
The licensee had not received the GM advisory dated July 13, 1937. Although maintenance personnel were familiar with the lubrication requirements stated in the Technical Manual prior to issuance of the advisory (three drops per minute with air flow),
the in-line needle valve was adjusted so that a normal diesel start would produce an observable oil residue at the exhaust of the air start motor.
Procedure F-ST-98, EDG Full Load Test and ESW Pump Operability (IST],
requires operators to verify that the residue exists beneath the air start motors after each surveillance.
The licensee indicated that adjusting the in-line needle valve to permit one to two drops per second oil flow was not possible.
No practical method exists to quantify oil flow through the needle v41ve upon normal operation of the air start motors during a diesel start (approximately three seconds).
This was confirmed by the vendor technical representative during a telephone conversation on November 23, 1937.
The vendor technical representative stated that the purpose of oil flow through the air start motors is to displace moisture and coat internal surfaces with oil.
The technical representative further stated that an observable residue at the exhaust of the motors was adequate indication that tnis purpose was being met, b.
An inspection of some of the air start motors was performed during the 1987 refueling outage.
Although the inspected motors had been in service since 1979, minimal wear was detected.
The inspector had no further questions.
No deficiencies were identified.
11.
1987 Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT) Results E,aluation The inspector reviewed the licensee's April 1937 CILRT results documented in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Appendix J paragraph V.B.3.
These results were summarized in a technical document entitled "Reactor Containment Building Integrated Leak Rate Test" and attached to the licensee's letter dated July 2, 1937 to the NRC.
The report contains a general test description.
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a discussion of Type A test prerequisites and procedures, presentation of Type A, 8, and C test results, and information on 1987 primary containment boundary modifications.
Both mass point and total time calculation methods were employed for the April, 1987 CILRT.
The mass point calculation method of ANSI /ANS 56.8-1931 is required by JAFNPP Technical Specifications.
The total time method is used as a comparison and is consistent with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J requirements.
The purpose of the test was to demonstrate that leakage through the primary containment building and systems penetrating containment do not exceed those allowed by plant technical specifications.
The test was conducted with containment isolation valves (CIVs) and containment pressure boundaries (CPBs) in an "As-Left" condition.
The "As-Found" test had previously been declared a failure by the licensee due to excessive local leakage.
The test was witnessed by an NRC regional inspector during a routine safety inspection and the inspection findings were documented in USNRC Region I Inspection Report No. 50-333/87-13.
The inspector concluded that, based on a review of the results, the containment has passed its acceptance criteria for the
"As-Left" condition.
Failure in the "As-Found" condition has already been acknowledged by the licensee.
No deficiencies were identified.
12. General Employ _e_e Training i
On November 3, 1987, the inspector attended a general employee training session and verified that the training was conducted as required by Indoctrination and Training Procedure No. 3, "General Employee Training," Revision 8.
The inspector verified that training was provided on: the plant organization and I
administration; station security and access; industrial safety; fire protection; quality assurance; radiation protection, including the contents of Regulatory Guide 8.13; and the emergency plan and implementing procedures.
The inspector noted that approved lesson plans were used to conduct the training and determined that the technical content of the lectures was adequate.
The inspector also noted that written examinations were administered during the training and that a grade of 80*4 was required to complete the training.
i No deficiencies were identified.
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13. Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special reports.
The review included the following: inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report informa-tion.
The following periodic reports were reviewed:
October 1987 Operating Status Report, dated November 4, 1987.
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No unacceptable conditions were noted.
15. Assu ance of Quality This section is included to provide examples of management oversight an( effectiveness in ensuring that activities are conducted in a mai 1er which assures quality.
As noted in paragraph 7.b, procedural deficiencies of minor significance were observed.
In addition, during a system walkdown a valve was found without a locking device, which was required.
These items indicate a need for management oversight to assure activities are being properly performed.
The inspector noted that the licensee management demonstrated effec +.iveness in determining the cause of a reactor trip and stressing a controlled approach to the plant restart (for additional details see paragrapn 8 above).
14.
Exit Interviuw At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.
In addition, at the end of the period, the inspector met with licensee representatives and
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summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are described in this report.
Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and disc;ssions held with NYPA representatives during the exit meeting, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions.
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