IR 05000333/1993020

Insp Rept 50-333/93-20 on 930905-1009.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Maintenance, Engineering & Plant Support

ML20059K479
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	11/05/1993
From:	Eselgroth P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059K463	List: IR 05000333/1993020 ML20059K461
References
50-333-93-20, NUDOCS 9311160073
Download: ML20059K479 (16)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No.: 93-20 Docket No.: 50-333 License No.: DPR-59 Licensee: New York Power Authority P.O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Location: Scriba, New York Dates: September 5,1993 through October 9,1993 Inspectors: W. Cook, Senior Resident Inspector J.Tappert, Resident Inspector Approved by:

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//d'/8-Peter W. Eselgroth, {pdf Date Reactor Projects Secfon IB, DRP INSPECTION SUMMARY: Routine NRC resident inspection of plant operations, maintenance, engineering and plant suppor RESULTS: See Executive Summary 9311160073 931105 PDR ADDCK 05000333 0 PDR

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SUMMARY OF FACILITY ACTIVITIES

- NYPA Activities At the beginning of the assessment period, the plant was operating at.100% power. On September 11, FitzPatrick commenced a downpower to 50% to repair condensate pumps and perform flux tilt testing. The plant resumed 100% power operations on September 14. On September 21, the plant developed a ground on the A station battery. The ground was localized to the electro-hydraulic control (EHC) system. In preparation for further troubleshooting, on September 23 a power reduction was commenced and the turbine was .

taken offline. On September 24, the reactor scrammed on high pressure due to bypass valve

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closure which was inadvertently caused by the EHC troubleshooting. The ground was repaired and the unit was restarted on September 26, reaching 100% power on September 3 FitzPatrick's spent fuel pool cleanup project continued throughout this assessment perio Add:tionally, NYPA filled two management vacancies during this period. Joseph Sipp became the radiological and environmental services manager and Floyd Edler assumed the duties of the technical services manage .2 NRC Activitin A region based inspector conducted a review of FitzPatrick's security program during the week of September 20,199 A region based inspector conducted an inspection of the site's chemistry program during the week of September 20,199 A region based inspector conducted a followup inspection on issues related to FitzPatrick's electrical distribution system during the week of September 20,199 A region based inspector conducted a review of the site's radwaste and transportation program during the week of October 4,199 A region based team commenced an Operational Safety Team Inspection during the week of October .4,199 The inspection activities during this report period included inspection during normal,-

backshift and weekend. hours by the resident staff. There were 43 hours4.976852e-4 days <br />0.0119 hours <br />7.109788e-5 weeks <br />1.63615e-5 months <br /> of backsbift -

. (evening shift) and 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> of deep backshift (weekend, holiday and midnight shift) '

inspections during this period. There were 311 hours0.0036 days <br />0.0864 hours <br />5.142196e-4 weeks <br />1.183355e-4 months <br /> on site during this inspection perio ...

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2 PLANT OPERATIONS (71707,71710,93702,40500,62703) Followup of Events Occurring During Inspection Period 2.1.1 ENS Call Retractiori On August 19, NYPA notified the NRC Headquarters Duty Officer that they were retracting an earlier 10 CFR 50.72 notification made on July 23,1993. The July 23 notification identified a condition where a non-safety related pressure regulator was connected to the drywell safety related nitrogen supply. The failure of the non-safety pressure regulator could potentially compromise the operability of the drywell nitrogen supply system in a post-LOCA environment. After further review and analysis by the pressure regulator vendor, architect / engineer, and NYPA engineering staffs, the failure of the pressure regulator was determined (under worst case conditions) to not impact the safety function of the drywell nitrogen supply system. A gross failure of the regulator (maximum 30 scfm nitrogen leakage-pathway) was still within the makeup capacity (100 scfm) of the safety related drywell nitrogen supply syste Inspector review of the analysis concluded that NYPA's basis for determining the regulator failure did not impact the system's safety function was well founded. The inspector verified the makeup capacity of the nitrogen system and the adequacy of nitrogen tank resupply for long term system operability. In review of the reasonable assurance of safety (RAS) and supporting documentation for this event and a previously identified containment instrumentation nitrogen supply system problem, the inspector noted that the RAS did not specif;cally state that in order to establish the 100 scfm raakeup capacity operator action was needed. This operator action is directed in accordance with the annunciator response procedure (ARP) 09-4-2-23, and calls for placing a second pressure control valve (PCV) in service and opening the PCV bypass valve, if necessary, to maintain system header pressur Station management acknowledged the inspector's observation and stated the RAS would be reviewed to determine if revisions for clarity and completeness would be appropriate. The -

inspector had no further observations in this are .1.2 Reactor Scmm On September 20, FitzPatrick developed a groand on the A station battery. Initial troubleshooting isolated the ground to the electro-hydraulic control system (EHC). Prior to continuing with the troubleshooting on the EHC system, NYPA management decided to reduce power and take the main turbine offline. On September 23, at 4:00 p.m., NYPA -

commenced a downpower. At 5:00 a.m. on September 24, the turbine was offline, reactor power was approximately 17%, turbine bypass valves wem being used for pressure

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regulation and troubleshooting in the EHC cabinet commenced. The troubleshooting consisted of sequentially lifting leads to various loads and observing the station battery ground detector to determine the effect on the ground. When no effect was noted, the leads were reterminated. At approximately 6:57 a.m., leads were lifted which changed the

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colarity of the ground from approximately +20 VDC to -15 VDC. A lead remained lifted g while the next course of action was being discussed. At approximately 7:09 a.m., the turbine bypass valves began closing, reactor pressure began increasing, and at approximately 7:10 a.m. the reactor scrammed on high reactor pressur The plant responded normally to the scram. The level transient was mitigated by'the low initial power level and no emergency core cooling systems actuated. Operators took all appropriate actions in accordance with Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP)-1, Reactor Scram. The plant remained in a hot condition (>212 degrees F) while determining the source of the ground and the cause of the reactor scram. The ground was located on a cable ,

which detected the position of the main generator disconnect in the switchyard. The scram was caused by a loss of pressurc regulation due to a lifted lead while troubleshooting the EHC system. With the ground repaired, on September 26 at approximately 1:00 a.m., the reactor mode switch was taken to STARTUP and the unit restarte Overall, the operators responded well to the event. The power reduction which minimized the plant transient was a positive initianve. However, the inspector concluded that even

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though instrument and controls supervisors and maintenance engineers were actively participating in the troubleshooting, the troubleshooting was conducted without fully

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assessing the impact that lifting leads would have on the EHC system. In response to the reactor scram and this assessment, the general manager of maintenance suspended all "at power" intrusive troubleshooting in the EHC system until more appropriate troubleshooting methodology and corrective actions could be identifie .2 Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown The inspector conducted partial control room and in-plant walkdowns of the following systems:

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• A and C emergency diesel generators e A and B core spray i

• A and B standby liquid control  ;

No discrepancies were noted during the inspection walkdown of the above system f Previously Identified Items ,

2.3.1 (Closed) Violation (93-14-02h Licensed Operator Physical Status Violation This violation was issued because on two occasions, the physical status of licensed operators -

changed without the required notifications being made to the NRC in accordance with 10 :

CFR 55.25. In response to this violation, NYPA has strengthened their administrative l t

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controls over licensed operator physicals. The inspector verified that Indoctrination and i Training Procedure (ITP)-5, Licensed Operator Requalification; ITP-4, Licensed  :

Operator / Senior Licensed Operator Replacements; and Operations Depanment Standing Order (ODSO)-30, NRC License Maintenance have all been revised to provide additional i guidance to the operators, training department, and occupational health nurse. Additionally, Security / Safety Department Standing Order 99-12, Medical Certification Process for ^

Licensed Operators, was issued on June 28,1993 and delineates responsibilities and procedural guidance for the scheduling of physicals and the review and reponing of changes '

in physical status. The inspector reviewed the new procedures, as well as, selected medical files to verify their proper implementation. The additional administrative controls were j

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found to be adequate to prevent recurrence. This violation is close ;

2.3.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (91-08-02)

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This unresolved item identified a sampling of administrative and other safety related~

procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33 which may not have received an appropriate quality assurance review and verification. Areas and procedures of concern included:

equipment control; procedure adherence; shift turnover; log entries and record retention; and bypassing safety functions and jumper control. This item was left unresolved pending a broad NYPA review of the adequacy of the controls over Technical Specification 6.8 safety related administrative procedure ;

Effective October 6,190, NYPA implemented a broad program change to the methods by .;

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which station procedures are developed, reviewed, approved and maintained. This program revision was accomplished per Administrative Procedure AP-02 04, Control of Procedure AP-02.04 applies to all procedures generated and used at the site, with the exception of ,

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Emergency Operating, Emergency Plan, and Quality Assurance procedures. Two noteworthy

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aspects of the new program are: 1) responsible procedure owners (RPOs) are clearly defined '

. and made responsible for a specific set of procedures; and 2) AP-02.04 provides a :

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consolidated and consistent program for the control of all site procedures. The inspector notes that in supprm; of AP-02.04, a controlled copy Responsible Procedure Owner (RPO) !

Matrix was developi which details by procedure number the responsible department and individual, classification and type, level of use and issuance / periodic review dates for each ;

site procedur '

The inspector verified using the RPO Matrix and by reviewing the individual procedures, that the areas sampled by the previous inspector (and listed above) were properly captured la a Technical Specification required procedure. This unresolved item is close ;

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5 MAINTENANCE (62703,61726) Maintenance Observation The inspector observed and reviewed selected portions of preventive and corrective maintenance to verify compliance with codes, standards and Technical Specifications, proper use of administrative and maintenance procedures, proper QA/QC involvement, and appropriate equipment alignment and retest. The following activities were observed:

• Work Request 9301041, Replace West Crescent Sump Limit Switch,20LS-355, on October e Work Request 93-02350-01, Troubleshoot and Repair a Ground in B Offgas Dryer Towe The inspector reviewed the maintenance work package and post-work testing performed on a failed heater element in the B train (01-107D-6B) offgas dryer towe The inspector verified the failed heater element was properly jumpered in accordance with IS-E-07, Appendix D. Discussions with the responsible electrical maintenance supervisor confirmed the inspector's understanding of the post-work tesung conducted and its adequac * On September 8, portions of pre-operational test 12F, Reactor Water Cleanup Recirculation 12PI A Pump Replacement, were observed. Difficulties with test equipment and instrumentation were encountered and properly dispositioned using the temporary change process. The evolution was adequately controlled and conducte * On September 22, portions of maintenance work request 93-0175-00, A Recirculating Water Motor Generator (MG) Set Generator Brush Replacement, were observe This was a high risk evolution as it was done at 100% power with the MG set on line. NYPA prepared extensively prior to the execution of thisjob. The !cchnicians had practiced on mockups and the operators on shift trained in the simulator on the loss of a recirculation pump transient earlier in the week. During the performance of ~

the maintenance, the safety supervisor and maintenance engineer were present in addition to the electrical supervisor. The work was accomplished without incident due to excellent planning and executio Other than noted, no concerns were identified during inspector review of the above activitie .

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- Surveillance Observation ,

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The inspector observed and reviewed portions of ongoing and completed surveillance tests to assess performance in accordance with approved procedures and Limiting Conditions for Operation, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolution. The  ;

following tests were reviewe ST-23C, Jet Pump Operability Test for Two Imop Operation, on October l

- ST-39B, Type B and C IAcal Leak Rate Tests of Containment Penetrations, for  !

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Electrical Penetration X-103A on October 6,1993. The operators were very knowledgeable and the surveillance was well performe ,

No concerns were identified during inspector review of the above activitie ;

• ENGINEERING (37700,93702,92700,92701)

. Control Room Ventilation Sinele Failure Vulnerability (URI 93-14-03) Update On September 23, NYPA concluded that their control room ventilation system was outside its -

design basis and made the appropriate 10 CFR 50.72 notification. Specifically, NYPA - '

determined that if the ventilation system was in its normal lineup and subsequently placed in the emergency lineup, a single failure of the outboard supply or exhaust (motor operated butterfly valves) t, close would result in the control room exceeding its long term habitability radiation exposure requirements. A single failure of the outboard MOVs provides a flow a path to the control room because of previously undocumented locked open bypass dampers  !

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around the inboard supply and exhaust dampers. The licensee discovered this vulnerability on July 9,1993, while conducting an industry opemting experience review of an unrelated ,

control room ventilation issue, and placed the system in its emergency lineup (which shuts l

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the outboard MOVs and inboard dampers) and eliminated the potential failure mode. NYPA did not determine the system was outside its design basis until an engineering test was performed on September 22. The test revealed that a negative pressure is developed at the l outboard MOVs and therefore, unfiltered air would be drawn into the control room if these .

MOVs failed to clos ,

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Additionally, during the engin~ ring test on September 22, it was discovered that there were'  !

gaps along the seating surfaces of the outboard MOVs. Since this provides a pathway of  !

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unfiltered air to the control room with the MOVs shut, NYPA began to determine the operability of the system in its current (emergency lineup) configuration. NYPA' performed calculations to determine maximum allowable unfiltered ventilation to the control room and  ;

i actual leakage past the outboard MOVs. The maximum allowable leakage in the emergency lineup was determined to be- 335 scfm. This calculation assumes the ventilation starts out in its normal lineup and is reconfigumd to the emergency lineup 30 minutes after the IDC .

Since the system is currently in the emergency lineup, this figure is conservative. The

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measured leakage through the outboard MOV with uncertainties was 242 scfm. Additionally,

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' NYPA installed a temporary modification to place rubber packing material to seal the gaps in '

the damper seating surface. Based on the above actions, on September 25, NYPA determined that the control room ventilation system was operable and acceptable for restar j The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions and operability assessment and identified no i issues. However, this unresolved item will remain open to track NYPA's disposition of the inboard bypass dampers to allow for the return to the normal ventilation lineup. In addition, this unresolved item tracks NYPA's resubmittal of the NUREG 0737 response concerning control room habitability to include the inboard bypass damper and to correct some erroneous leakage informatio . Design inadecuacy of 10 MOV 25A and B On September 28,1993, NYPA made a four hour non-emergency report to the NRC statirig that a design deficiency related to the size of the motor operated valve (MOV) motor brake ,

could potentially lead to a loss of residual heat removal. Specifically, when in shutdown cooling a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) signal (low reactor vessel level or high drywell .

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pressure) generates a sealed-in closure signal to the low pressure en&mt injection (LPCI) '

inboard injection valves,10 MOV 25A(B). The closure signal is 6:ainated when a torque switch opens after the valve reaches its shut seat. Duc to a design deficiency related to the ,

under-sizing of the motor brake, the gear train may relax allowing the torque switch to reclose and reapplying the closure signal to the valve. The cycling of the valve in this manner leads to eventual motor failure due to repetitive starting currents. 10 MOV 25A

actually experienced this failure on July 22,1993, during the performance of Surveillance Test (ST)-34A, PCIS Group 2 Logic Functional and Simulated Automatic Actuation Test, when the isolation signal was applied to i :

i The automatic closure signal to these valves only occurs when a LOCA signa, . rceived I while in a shutdown cooling lineup. Therefore, when the unit is at power, this faihtte j i

mechanism cannot occur and LPCI is operable. However, as soon as shutdown cooling is initiated, NYPA will declare both trains of LPCI inoperable. In the cold condition with irradiated fuel in the reactor, FitzPatrick Technical Specifications require a minimum of one ,

operable emergency core cooling subsystem if no work is being performed with the potential l i

for draining the reactor vessel, and a minimum of two operable subsystems if such work is being performed. These requirements can be satisfied with the plant's two core spray system trains. Additionally, when shutdown cooling is first initiated, the plant must enter a 24-hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) to get below 212 F. This is typically accomplished within two hour The inspector determined that NYPA's review identified no other valves in the plant which were susceptible to this type failure mechanism. NYPA is still evaluating the long-term resolution to this problem. Preliminarily, NYPA is planning on replacing the MOV actuators -

with a different model that has a self-locking high ratio gear train during the 1995 refueling

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outage. This should prevent the gear relaxation phenomenon. To date, NYPA's evaluation of this issue has been thorough and comprehensive. The inspector did not identify any issue .3 Oualification of Potentially Submerced Cabks In October of 1992, an NRC inspector identified water in the West cable tunnel sump which contains several cables. In response to this observation, NYPA initiated adverse quality condition report (AQCR)92-332 on October 13, 1992. In the AQCR response, NYPA identified the cables in the sump. Further, NYPA stated that the conditions of submergence were fully enveloped by generic LOCA cable submergence testing and that there was, therefore, no safety or environmental qualification issue. The conditions in the cable tunnel are quite mild (Iow temperature and pressure, minimal radiation) compared to the conditions in the generic LOCA submergence testing. However, the inspector noted that the LOCA submergence testing progra'- did have some cabler ailures. Therefore, the inspector was concerned : hat there was insa.ficient justification for concluding there were no operabilit concerns, even though the cable tunnel is a significantly milder environmen The inspector subsequently learned that submergence studies in a mild environment had been conducted which demonstrated the long-term operability of the cables, but these studies were not presented in the AQCR response. Walkdowns by the inspector during this inspection period identified conditions in the East cable tunnel sump (which also has cables running through it) where visible moisture was seeping from the cable penetrations in the sump. The inspector concluded that, although the AQCR response was narrowly focused, the potentially submerged cable conditions in both East and West cable tunnel sumps was properly bounded by existing studies and cable EQ requirements and was not a safety concer .4 Previousiv Identified Items 4.4.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (91-22-05) and DEO.ENG.056 This Diagnostic Evaluation Observation (DEO) and subsequently assigned unresolved item identified an apparent lack of proper control of design / modification calculations in accordance with ANSI N45-2.11 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. The DEO identified that calculation Set No. 2 for Modification F1-85-038 " Station Battery Capacity Calculation", and calculation Set No. 89-JAF-94, " Control Room Heatup Analysis" were not included in a list of controlled electrical calculation Closer examination by the inspector determined that the identified calculations were adequately controlled in accordance with EDP-2, Procedure for the Administration of Site Engineering Calculations. Since the time this item was identified, NYPA has superseded EDP-2 by issuance of DCM-2, Preparation and Control of Calculations and Analysis. Unde EDP-2, all revised or new calculations associated with a plant modification were developed and maintained with the modification package. Until the modification package was closed,

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the associated calculations remained with and were controlled per the modification closeout procedure. The calculations were formally e itered into the electrical calculations computer data base upon completion of microfilming of the entire modification package, per procedure

MCM-19, Modification Closeou Per EDP-2, section 5.1.3(e) and 5.1.10, all miscellaneous calculations, such as No. 89-3AF- ;

04, were controlled and maintained in a formal log in one location within the Technical t

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Services Department. Per the recently implemented DCM-2, all calculations (those

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associated with plant modification and miscellaneous) are assigned a control number, tracked and processed through WPO Nuclear Generation Document Control. During off-hours, the ,

site document control staff may access the WPO computer data base for assignment of ,

calculation control numbers. However, the WPO document control staff still retains .

responsibility for the calculation control proces l The inspector verified the two identified calculations have been appropriately entered into the design calculation data base system (PRIME). The inspector also concluded the revised ' ,

calculation control procedure DCM-2 provides improved overall control of design calculations. DEO.ENG.056 and unresolved item 91-22-05 are close ;

4.4.2 (Closed) DEO.ENG.010 and DEO.ENG.014 These DEOs identified inconsistencies betweer controlled drawings used at the site. Two :

types of drawings, Figure OP and FM, were identifiNi as being inconsistent with respect to good configuration control. At the time of the inspection, station operating procedures contained controlled Figure OP drawings which were duplicative of controlled FM drawing ,

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However, examples were identified where the Figure OP drawings were not the same (different zalve labelling convendon, different system interface or reference drawings) as the ;

controlled FM drawings. These differences could lead to confusion when conducting system 1

walkdowns or valve line-up *

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Subsequent to the inspection, NYPA implemented a dawing improvement project. In addition to verifying the accuracy of plant controlled drawings (FM, FB, and FE types) the i

project was developed to eliminate the duplicative Figure OP drawings in operating procedures and replace them with reduced (size) FM drawings. This project is scheduled to j be completed by December 1993. The inspector determined during this inspection period, the project was nearly complete. The inspector also reviewed a sampling of the revised FM :

and FB drawings and identified no deficiencies. Several revised operating procedures were

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checked against the operating procedures drawing index and no discrepancies were note ;

The adequacy of site drawings and drawing controls continues to be periodically monitored in accordance with routine safety system inspections. For the purposes of this review, DEO.ENG.010 and DEO.ENG.014 are close :

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10 PLANT SUPPORT (64704,71707,83750,40500) Radiolocical Controls A new access control point from the new administration building to the radiologically controlled areas (RCAs) was opened. The transition to the new primary access was accomplished smoothly. The old access remains open for the operations staff and designated others. The inspectors noted no problems with implementation of the new RCA access control poin .2 Security A new access to the control room was established from the new administration buildin Administrative controls were put in place to limit the use of the control room vital area as a thoroughfare. The inspector concluded that NYPA's actions and control of this new vital area access were appropriat .3 Plant Housekeeping Routine tours of the plant facilities identified no significant housekeeping or fire protection combustible control problems. The inspector noted that the East Crescent, high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) pump room'was being painted and that appropriate controls were in place to ensure this activity did not adversely impact HPCI availabilit .4 Project Meeting On September 16, the inspector attended the month ( ' oject meeting. The project meetings

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are for corporate and station managers to periodica n meet together on site to discuss their current and planned workloads for the purpose of direct face-to-face communications and ensure appropriate coordination and prioritization of effort. The meeting was well-attended by both staffs, including the Executive Vice President and the majority of his direct report The inspector observed good discussions and broad participation by those in attendanc Topics of discussion and presentations made during the September 16 meeting included:

current plant status; October maintenance outage preparations; top technical issues; control room ventilation system concerns; January 1995 outage modifications; setpoint control program update; and effect of the fuel leaker on the remainder of the cyc1 The inspector noted that several options were being explored by the NYPA staff to address the one leaking fuel assembly. The insertion of five control rods in the area of the leaking assembly has, in addition to drastically reducing the neutron flux and thermal power output of the effected fuel assemblies, significantly impacted fuel cycle core performanc Additional reviews and economic considerations by NYPA management were planned prior

. to selecting the best option in dealing with the leaking fuel assembly. The neutron flux reduction in the vicinity of the leaking fuel assembly has resulted in a stabilization of the

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33 fission product migration from the leaking fuel assembly and actual reduction in detectable fission products in the coolant. No appreciable increase in radiation levels throughout the ]~

plant have been detected as a result'of this fuel leak. The inspectors continue to monitor

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licensee progress in resolving this issue, and had no unresolved questions at the end of this inspection report perio .0 REVIEW OF WRITTEN REPORTS (92700,90712,90713) LER Review

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The inspectors reviewed the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and found them to be well written, concise, accurate, and properly submitted for NRC staff review within the -

guidelines of 10 CFR 50.73:

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• LER 92-02, MOV deficiencies related to Generic Letter 89-10 testing, Revision 0, dated 2/4/92. This LER and subject matter was previously reviewed in team inspection report 93-80, section 2.9. A subsequent revision 92-02-01, dated 4/8/93 will be reviewed during a planned MOV followup inspectio '

• LER 92-04, Cable tunnel fire suppression sprays inoperable due to inadequate design and Appendix R revie * LER 92-05, Primary containment isolation valve remote manual closure design erro ;

• LER 92-06, Inadequate performance by fire watc j

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• LER 92-10, Roving fire watch patrols misse t (The inspector notes that LERs 92-06 and 92-10 were previously reviewed as referenced in inspection report 92-11, section 9.1.) t

• LER 92-08, PCIV stem packing not subjected to LLR ,

• LER 92-11, Fire door and spray curtain obstructed by scaffol * LER 92-12, Improper normal position of the residual heat removal minimum flow ,

valves resulting in potential RHR pump failur ;

• LER 92-14, Spurious trip of drywell high range radiation monito l

• LER 92-15, Appendix R reanalysis reveals safe shutdown analysis deficiencie '

• LER 93-02, Identification of relay room ventilation system single failure non-complianc ,

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• LER 93-05, Shutdown cooling isolation. This LER. describes two shutdown cooling isolation events. The issue of repeated shutdown cooling isolations is being tracked as unresolved item 93-10-0 LER 93-06, Inoperability of fire pumps. This event was reviewed in inspection

report 93-06 section 7.1.2. Inaccurate information was identiGed in the LER and was the subject of violation 93-06-02. The LER was subsequently revised and reissued as 93-06-01 and found to be satisfactor * LER 93-07, Average power range monitor thermal trip unit testmg incomplete due to procedural deficiency. This event was reviewed in inspection report 93-06, section ,

• LER 93-18, Incomplete functional testing of carbon dioxide fire suppression syste This event was previously reviewed and documented in inspection report 93-17, '

section 5. .0 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS (30702,71707) Exit Meetings At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings. In addition, at the end of the period, the inspectors met with licensee representatives and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are described in this report. The licensee did not take issue with any of the findings reviewed at this meetin !

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