IR 05000333/2021001
| ML21124A036 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 05/05/2021 |
| From: | Erin Carfang Division of Operating Reactors |
| To: | Rhoades D Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| Carfang E | |
| References | |
| IR 2021001 | |
| Download: ML21124A036 (18) | |
Text
May 5, 2021
SUBJECT:
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2021001
Dear Mr. Rhoades:
On March 31, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. On April 22, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Pat Navin and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, X /RA/
Signed by: Erin E. Carfang
Erin E. Carfang, Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety
Docket No. 05000333 License No. DPR-59
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000333
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-001-0106
Licensee:
Exelon Nuclear
Facility:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Location:
Oswego, NY
Inspection Dates:
January 01, 2021 to March 31, 2021
Inspectors:
E. Miller, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Dolecki, Senior Resident Inspector
J. England, Resident Inspector
S. Haney, Resident Inspector
F. Arner, Senior Reactor Analyst
J. Kulp, Senior Reactor Inspector
M. Patel, Senior Reactor Inspector
B. Sienel, Resident Inspector
G. Stock, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Erin E. Carfang, Chief
Projects Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Document a Technical Basis to Support Safety-Related Circuit Breaker Subcomponent Replacement Frequency Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000333/2021001-01 Open/Closed
[P.5] -
Operating Experience 71111.12 NRC inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1(a), Procedures, when Exelon failed to document a technical basis to support a 12-year replacement frequency for safety-related 4160-volt (V)
GE Magne-Blast circuit breaker subcomponents. As a result, on November 13, 2020, safety-related circuit breakers failed to operate in accordance with their design due to degraded GE microswitches, which rendered the D residual heat removal (RHR) and D RHR service water (RHRSW) pumps inoperable and unavailable.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
FitzPatrick began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On March 12, 2021 reactor power was lowered to 60 percent for routine testing and a rod sequence change. Power was restored to 100 percent on March 14, 2021. FitzPatrick remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident and regional inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week, increasing the amount of time on site as local COVID-19 conditions permitted.
As part of their on-site activities, resident inspectors conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk-significant activities; and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the inspection procedures.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems during elevated wind conditions on March 1, 2021.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)
'B' emergency diesel generator subsystem on January 25, 2021
- (2) Reactor building ventilation on February 24, 2021
- (3) Control and relay rooms heating and ventilation subsystem on March 24, 2021
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) West crescent area 227' and 242' elevations, fire area/zone XVIII/RB-1W on January 4, 2021
- (2) Turbine building 272' elevation, fire area/zone IE/TB-1, OR-2 on February 16, 2021
- (3) Pump rooms (screenwell), 255' elevation, fire area/zone XII/SP-1, XIII/SP-2, IB/FP-1, FP-3, on March 18, 2021
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed operations personnel during ST-9BA, EDG 'A' and 'C' Full Load Test Emergency Service Water Pump Operability Test on February 15, 2021; and during load drop activities on March 12-13, 2021.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed a simulator evaluation that included a standby liquid control system inoperability, a major earthquake, loss of non-safety-related bus, loss of feedwater, and anticipated transient without scram on March 16, 2021.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)4160 Volt (medium voltage) safety-related electrical circuit breakers
- (2) Reactor recirculation system motor-generator sets
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Elevated risk during planned maintenance on the 'A' battery room ventilation, on January 12-15, 2021
- (2) Emergent work on 'A' direct-current power system due to ground alarm, on February 3, 2021
- (3) Elevated risk during planned 'B' residual heat removal maintenance, on March 8-11, 2021
- (4) Elevated risk (Action Green) during planned reactor core isolation cooling maintenance, on of March 15-18, 2021
- (5) Emergent work on standby liquid control system due to loss of continuity indications in control room, on March 28-29, 2021
- (6) Emergent work on control room emergency ventilation air supply system due to loss of control power to vent supply fan 70FN-6B, on March 29-30, 2021
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Reactor core isolation cooling pump discharge valve, 13MOV-21, due to body-to-bonnet leak on January 26, 2021
- (2) Control room emergency ventilation due to failure to move temperature control valve, 70TCV-121A, on January 27, 2021 (3)
'D' residual heat removal pump due to 4160-volt breaker failure to charge after breaker was opened on February 11, 2021
- (4) Reactor protection system due to unexpected main control room indications during main turbine control valve, 94TCV-3, closure testing on March 13, 2021
- (5) High pressure coolant injection due degraded valves, 23HOV-2 and 23MOV-14, on March 29, 2021
- (6) Control room emergency ventilation air supply system due to control room vent exhaust fan 4B outlet isolation damper, 70MOD-108B, failed to shut on March 11, 2021
- (7) Containment isolation valves and plant chemistry due to trip of 'B' reactor water clean-up system pump, 12P-1B, on January 29, 2021
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Permanent Modification: Engineering Change 625087, 71T-4 Transformer Replacement
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
(1)
'B' emergency diesel generator subsystem following maintenance to rated speed setting, on February 8, 2021 (2)
'B' residual heat removal following planned preventive maintenance, on March 11, 2021
- (3) Reactor core isolation cooling following planned preventive maintenance, on March 18, 2021
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) SP-05.02, Chemistry Surveillance and Scheduling System Reactor - Reactor Water Sample, on January 6, 2021
- (2) ISP-75-1, Condensate Storage Tank Level Switch Quarterly Functional/Calibration, on January 27, 2021
- (3) ST-1LA, Main Turbine Control Valve Instrument Channel Check - Operability Check and Fast Closure Response Time Test, on March 13, 2021
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine drill involving unisolable leaks inside the drywell and reactor building, which led to elevated drywell radiation levels and a General Emergency declaration on March 9,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.01)===
- (1) January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020 IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2020 through December 31,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Document a Technical Basis to Support Safety-Related Circuit Breaker Subcomponent Replacement Frequency Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000333/2021001-01 Open/Closed
[P.5] -
Operating Experience 71111.12 NRC inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1(a), Procedures, when Exelon failed to document a technical basis to support a 12-year replacement frequency for safety-related 4160-volt (V) GE Magne-Blast circuit breaker subcomponents. As a result, on November 13, 2020, safety-related circuit breakers failed to operate in accordance with their design due to degraded GE microswitches, which rendered the D residual heat removal (RHR) and D RHR service water (RHRSW) pumps inoperable and unavailable.
Description:
Safety-related circuit breakers are relied upon to provide reasonable assurance that emergency equipment will operate when called upon to respond to an accident. Safety-related emergency alternating current distribution system breakers are classified within the Exelon fleet as critical components. At FitzPatrick, 4160 V General Electric (GE)
Magne-Blast breakers (breakers) supply power to safety-related equipment including emergency buses (10500 and 10600), RHR pumps, and RHRSW pumps. These breakers rely upon multiple components to perform their safety function, including GE microswitches.
On November 13, 2020, Exelon operators experienced two failures of their safety-related breakers during the performance of routine surveillance procedure ST-2AM, RHR Loop B Quarterly Operability Test (IST). First, the D RHR pump breaker (71-10640) failed to charge after the breaker was opened to stop the pump. Operations staff subsequently declared the D RHR pump inoperable and entered the limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.5.1, Condition A, 7-day action statement. Second, the D RHRSW pump breaker (71-10610) failed to close when staff attempted to start the pump. Operations staff subsequently declared the D RHRSW pump inoperable and entered the LCO 3.7.1, Condition A, 30-day action statement. Failure analysis of the 71-10610 and 71-10640 breakers determined the breakers failed to operate as designed due to degraded GE microswitches.
Exelon performed a work group evaluation (WGE) in issue report (IR) 04384096, and determined the apparent cause was the routine preventive maintenance (PM) scope for critical 4160V breakers does not include GE microswitch replacement. Specifically, Exelon determined the established PM strategy to perform a resistance check of the GE microswitches every 6 years in accordance with MP-054.01, 4.16 kV Magne-Blast Breakers, and to replace the GE microswitches every 12 years in accordance with work orders was not aligned with fleet guidance established within ER-AA-200, Preventive Maintenance Program, and the Exelon performance-centered maintenance (PCM)templates to replace the GE microswitches every 6 years.
Exelon uses procedure ER-AA-200 to plan and revise PM tasks and frequencies, such as those established in maintenance procedure MP-054.01 and work orders. Procedure ER-AA-200 directs the use of the Exelon fleet PCM templates to develop a maintenance strategy and to use as a baseline comparison to an existing maintenance strategy. The PCM templates identify specific tasks and frequencies recommended for components based on industry guidance, vendor recommendations, and operating experience. The PCM template applicable to the 4160 V GE Magne-Blast circuit breakers included required tasks of an inspection PM every 4 years and a breaker overhaul PM every 16 years.
The inspectors noted the Exelon PCM template for the 4-year inspection PM scope includes the replacement of parts known to be subject to wear-out such as the GE microswitches.
In June 2018, Exelon performed an evaluation within their preventive maintenance modification request process to justify an extension of the inspection PM frequency in the PCM template from every 4 years to every 6 years. The inspectors identified that the evaluation did not recognize operators performed the GE microswitch replacement separately from the breaker inspection PM procedure MP-054.01 and at a different frequency than the PCM template recommendation. Additionally, the inspectors identified that the Exelon evaluation was approved and a site-specific preventive maintenance modification request was issued without identifying or evaluating that their breaker subcomponent maintenance strategy deviated from the PCM template. As a result, GE microswitches within safety-related circuit breakers were installed for longer than the PCM template recommendation without an accompanying plant-specific technical basis. Subsequently, two of these circuit breakers, supplying the D RHR pump and the D RHRSW pump, failed in November 2020 after being installed for 12 years, 5 months and 11 years, 9 months, respectively.
The inspectors identified Exelon failed to appropriately identify and evaluate the breaker subcomponent maintenance strategy. The inspectors noted that WC-AA-120, PM Database Revision Requirements, requires comparison of PCM template task scope and frequency recommendations, recognition of deviations from PCM template recommendations, and ensuring planned preventive maintenance is technically sound. Additionally, ER-AA-200 directs documenting a technical basis for performing PM more or less than recommended by the PCM template.
As a result of the review, the inspectors determined the safety-related 4160V breakers maintenance strategy to be inadequate because it was not effective in maintaining the SSC capable of performing its intended safety function.
Corrective Actions: Exelon generated IR 04384093 following the 71-10640 breaker issue and IR 04384096 following the 71-10610 breaker issue. The breakers were removed from service and sent out for failure analysis. Exelon initiated actions to revise MP-054.01 to include GE microswitch replacement every 6 years. Exelon performed an extent of condition evaluation to compile a list of safety-related breakers with GE microswitches older than 10 years and to replace the GE microswitches at the next available opportunity, which was initially scheduled over a multiyear period. The inspectors determined this extent of condition evaluation and timeline was not commensurate with the risk significance and, as a result, Exelon revised their extent of condition actions. Specifically, Exelon has scheduled to replace GE microswitches older than 6 years (except breakers not required to be cycled to mitigate an accident) by June 2021.
Additionally, Exelon generated IR 04411552 to capture the inspectors identification that ER-AA-200, Step 4.3.6, does not specifically require documenting PCM template deviations for critical components. Exelon initiated a procedure change request to revise the step to explicitly include critical components.
Corrective Action References: IRs 04384093, 04384096, and 04411552
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that Exelons failure to document a technical basis to support a 12-year replacement frequency for safety-related 4160V GE Magne-Blast circuit breaker subcomponents was reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct and is a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The performance deficiency was evaluated against IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues," dated December 10, 2020. The inspectors determined this finding to be similar to examples 13.a and 13.b because the licensee failed to establish and perform appropriate preventive maintenance replacements that led to failures of circuit breakers, and the licensee failed to perform an engineering analysis to justify a deviation from PCM templates.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors utilized IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions under Section A, Mitigating SSCs and PRA Functionality. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, did not represent a loss of the PRA function of a single train technical specification (TS) system for greater than its TS allowed outage time, did not represent a loss of the PRA function of one train of a multi-train TS system for greater than its TS allowed outage time, did not represent a loss of the PRA function of two separate TS systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, did not represent a loss of a PRA system and/or function, and did not represent a loss of the PRA function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as risk-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than three days.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.5 - Operating Experience: The organization systematically and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely manner. The PCM templates are a compilation of operating experience and vendor recommendations used to inform maintenance strategies. Exelon failed to effectively evaluate and incorporate the operating experience included in the fleet PCM Templates into the PM strategy for their critical GE Magne-Blast medium voltage circuit breakers. As a result, two safety-related circuit breakers failed in November 2020 that had GE microswitches installed for longer than PCM templates recommended.
Enforcement:
Violation: Exelon Technical Specification 5.4.1(a), Procedures, requires in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities referenced in RG 1.33, Appendix A, November 1972. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Appendix A,Section I.1 states, in part, that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances.
RG 1.33, Appendix A,Section I.2 states, in part, that preventive maintenance schedules should be developed to specify inspection or replacement of parts that have a specific lifetime. ER-AA-200, Preventive Maintenance Program, directs the use of the Exelon fleet PCM templates for developing maintenance strategies. Form 2 of WC-AA-120, states Identify the PCM template recommendation. If there is a deviation, recognize the deviation, and ensure the planned PM Modification is technically sound. The PCM template applicable to the GE Magne-Blast 4160 V circuit breakers includes required tasks of an inspection PM every 6 years and included the replacement of parts known to be subject to wear-out. The licensee established procedure MP-054.01 and work orders to, in part, implement a maintenance strategy on breaker subcomponents and meet this regulatory requirement.
Contrary to the above, from June 2018 until January 2021, Exelon failed to document a technical basis to support a 12-year replacement frequency for safety-related 4160V circuit breaker subcomponents. Specifically, Exelons PM procedure for safety-related circuit breakers provided for inspection every 6 years but did not specify replacement of parts known to be subject to wear-out, such as GE microswitches. As a result, during the performance of a routine surveillance on November 13, 2020, safety-related circuit breakers failed to operate in accordance with their design due to degraded GE microswitches that had been installed for 12 years, 5 months and 11 years, 9 months, respectively, which rendered the D RHR and D RHRSW pumps inoperable and unavailable.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 22, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Pat Navin and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
04405726
Tipped Trailor
Procedures
Severe Weather
Drawings
Flow Diagram Control and Relay Rooms Heating and
Ventilation System 70
Flow Diagram Reactor Building Vent and Cooling System 66
Flow Diagram Emergency Service Water System 46 & 15
Procedures
Diesel Generator Emergency Power
Reactor Building Ventilation and Cooling System
Control Room Ventilation and Cooling
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
04410998*
NRC ID: WR Needed to Inspect or Replace 73FD-1C
Fusible Link
Fire Plans
Crescent Area-West/Elev. 227', 242' Fire Area/Zone
XVIII/RB-1W
December 7,
2018
Pump Rooms (screenwell)/Elev. 255' Fire Area/Zone XII/SP-
1, XIII/SP-2, IB/FP-1, FP-3
Turbine Building-North/Elev. 272' Fire Area/Zone IE/TB-1
Turbine Building-South/Elev.272' Fire Area/Zone IE/TB-1,
OR-2
71111.11Q Procedures
EDG A and C Full load and ESW Pump Operability Test
Work Orders
05118232
05118232
Corrective Action
Documents
04099170
JAF CMO Department Actions
282040
04341110
Aggregate RWR MG-set Ground Evaluation
04355734
A RWR MG Set Response to Speed Demand Changes
04369381
Heat Damage Found in Back of 'A' Recirc MG-Set Control
Panel
04369432
MG Set Gen A Field Ground Troubleshoot
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
04372008
71-10660 Breaker failed to close
04384093
RHR pump 10P-3D trip or control power loss ST-2AM
04384096
RHRSW PMP 10P-1D TRIP during ST-2AM
CR-JAF-2014-
05321
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
04411552
ER-AA-200, PM Program, Requires Clarification
Miscellaneous
Information Notice No. 95-02, Problems with General
Electric CR2940 Contact Blocks in Medium-Voltage Circuit
Breakers
Information Notice No. 97-08, Potential Failures of General
Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker Subcomponents
Information Notice No. 99-13, Insights from NRC Inspections
of Low-and -Medium Voltage Circuit Breaker Maintenance
Programs
Information Notice No. 2007-34, Operating Experience
Regarding Electrical Circuit Breakers
Medium Voltage Circuit Breakers Performance-Centered
Maintenance Template, Revision 7
09/18/2018
G080-0631 (G47)
Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker (Vendor Manual)
Procedures
Preventive Maintenance Program
Preventive Maintenance Program
Preventive Maintenance Program
Equipment Classification
Maintenance Strategy Analysis
PCM Templates
4.16 kV Magne Blast Breaker
4.16 kV Magne-Blast Breaker Overhaul
4160 V and 600 V Normal AC Power Distribution
Preventive Maintenance (PM) Database Revision
Requirements
Work Orders
00119557-01
Replace 52/SMLS, 52/IS, 52/CLMS, and 52/LC Switch
05/22/2008
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Assemblies
00119557-01
Replace 52/SMLS, 52/IS, 52/CLMS, and 52/LC Switch
Assemblies
05/22/2008
00176103-01
PM - Replace 52/SMLS, 52/IS, 52/CLMS, and 52/LC Switch
Assemblies
2/09/2009
00393687-01
71-10610 (10P-1D) BRKER Failed to Close When Placed in
Start
05098278
09-3-2-35 RHRSW PMP 10P-1D TRIP during ST-2AM
51690167-01
Replace 52/SMLS, 52/IS, 52/CLMS, and 52/LC Switch
Assemblies
01/29/2009
Corrective Action
Documents
04301895
SLC Squib Valve Continuity Loss
04400048
Unexpected Alarm for 09-8-1-21 'A' DC Ground
04412245
SLC Squib Valve Continuity Loss
04412368
70FN-6B Control Power Loss
Operability
Evaluations
ACT-1-21-0784
Operability Evaluation LCO Tracking for Control Room
Emergency Ventilation Supply Fan B, 70FN-6B
Procedures
DC Power System A Ground Isolation
Battery Room Ventilation
A LPCI MOV Independent Power Supply Test
Work Orders
04986086-01
Replace Lamp and Holder Assembly in 11AM-67B
Corrective Action
Documents
276858
70TCV-121A Failed to Move During ST-41FA
04340242
Troubleshooting 70MOD-108B
04374440
13MOV-21 Leaking from Bonnet Approx 2 Drops/3-4
Seconds
04380886
Unexpected Annunciator HPCI EXH DRN POT LVL HI
Alarmed
04381156
Suspected Leakage Past 23MOV-14
04397056
04397056
04398228
70TCV-121A Failed to Move During ST-41FA
04399064
04399064
04401931
Dual indication for 23HOV-2 HPCI Turbine Control Valve
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
04408073
70MOD-108B Filed to shut as required
04408651
Unexpected Results for TCV-3 Testing During ST-1LA
04413372
Issue WR to Inspect 70MOD-108A as EOC Review
04413373
Issue WR to Inspect 70MOD-109 as EOC Review
04413375
Issue WR to Inspect 70MOD-105 as EOC Review
04413376
Issue WR to Inspect 70MOD-100 as EOC Review
Miscellaneous
Design Basis Document for the Reactor Core Isolation
Cooling System
Operability
Evaluations
ACT-1-20-0744
Operability Evaluation LCO Tracking for D RHRSW Pump
Procedures
Reactor Water Clean-up System
Reactor Water Clean-up System
Main Turbine Control Valve Instrument Channel Check,
Operability Check and Fast Closure Response Time Test
HVAC A Control Valve Fail Position Test (IST)
Work Orders
04933646
05095215
05125609
Dual Indication for 23HOV-2 HPCI Turbine Control Valve
Corrective Action
Documents
04157418
New T-4 Does Not Meeting Requirements of RIS 2011-12
R1
Corrective Action
Documents
04409802
13AOV-34 Would Not Close During ST-24J
Procedures
RHR Loop B Quarterly Operability Test (IST)
EDG B and D Full Load Test and ESW Pump Operability
Test
Work Orders
04886078-01
05113477
05119334
Corrective Action
Documents
04408651
Unexpected Results for TCV-3 Testing During ST-1LA
Procedures
RCIC CST Low Water Level Switch Functional
Test/Calibration
Reactor Water Sampling and Analysis
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Main Turbine Control Valve Instrument Channel Check,
Operability Check and Fast Closure Response Time Test
HPCI Quick-Start, Inservice, and Transient Monitoring Test
(IST)
Work Orders
05086721
05097188
05100611-01
Procedures
Drill and Exercise Evaluation
3