IR 05000333/1988008

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Insp Rept 50-333/88-08 on 880516-18.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Exercise on 880516-18
ML20151A749
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/24/1988
From: Amato C, Lazarus W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151A727 List:
References
50-333-88-08, 50-333-88-8, NUDOCS 8807200109
Download: ML20151A749 (6)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /88-08 Docket N License N DPR-59 Priority -------- Category C Licensee: New York Power Authority P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility Name: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Inspection at: Oswego. New York Inspection Conducted: May 16-18, 1988 Inspectors: hhp ~

6[2//8'8 C. G. Amito, Regional Team Leader date'

EPS, FR$SB, DRSS C. J. Conklin, Sr. EPS, RI C. Z. Gordon, EPS, RI R. A. Plasse, RI, FitzPatrick Approved by: Id William J tLa d6Jhief 6 >/

' date Emergency P aredness Section, FRSSB Inspection Sumary: Inspection on May 16-18, 1988 (Report No. 50-333/88-08)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced, Emergenc Preparedness inspection of the licensee's Emergency Exercise conducted on Ma 16-18, 1988. The State of New York and Oswego County participated to a limi ed degree. The U. S. Federal Emergency Management Agency did not observe the exercis Results: No violations, deviations or unresolved items were identifie Emergency response actions were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi lgpagggg{gg G

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted The following James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant personnel attended ,

the exit meetin .N. Avrakotos, Assistant to the Superintendent for Planning E. Berzins, Public Information Officer W. Fernandez, Superintendent of Power General Supervisor, Maintenance H. Holiday Keith, $uperintendent, Instrumentation and Controls E. Mulcahe Superintendent, Radiological and Environmental Services M.Prarie,ydssociateEmergencyPlanningConrdinator W. Robinson, Associate Engineer, Quality Assurance Security and Fire Protection G. Teifke, Superintendent, Vargo, General Safetylolocical Supervisor, Rad Engineering R. Wiese, Assistant to the Superintencent of Maintenance A. Zaremba, Jr., Emergency Planning Coordinator The following personnel from the New York Power Authority Headquarters attended the exit meetin A. Grosjean, Nuclear Preparedness Engineer S. Horvath Associate Nuclear Preparedness Engineer B. Methe, dssociate Nuclear Preparedness Engiiieer C. Patrick, Director of Policy and Information The inspectors also observed the actions of, and interviewed, other licensee personne .0 Emergency Exercise The James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant announced, partial partici)ation, exercise was conducted on May 17, 1988, 7:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. T1e State of New York and Oswego County participated to a limited degre .1 Pre-Exercise Activities The exercise objectives submitted to NRC Region I on February 5,1988 were reviewed test the licenseeand,s Emergency Plan.following On March 11,revision, 1988 the determined licensee to be ade submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluatio Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's Emergency Pre content of the scenario.paredness As a resultstaff to discuss minor thewere revisions scope and to the made scenariowhichallowedadequatetestingofthemajorportionsofthe James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan and

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Implementing Procedures and also provided the opportunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective actio NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on May 16, 1988. Suggest-ed changes to the scenario made by the licensee were discussed during the biiefing. A licensee representative stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviations or disruptions of normal plant operation ,

The exercise scenario included the following event Cornbustion in the steam jet air ejector

- Explosion in the steam jet air ejector and failure of the Turbine Building (TB) to isolat Off-scale TB ventilation radiation monitor reading Reactor scram, feedwater pump trip, cracking of a feedwater pump seal and water hamme Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).

- Maintenance of reacter vessel water level using Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injectio Dry Well inertin TB ventilation isolatio I 2.2 Activities Observed l During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, the NRC team made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response Or Response Facilities (ganization ERFs (ER0), activation of the Emergency personnel during the opera) tion of the ERFs The followingand actions of elI activities were observed:  !

1. Recognition of symptoms; 2. Selection and use of Abnormal and Emergency Operating Procedures; )

3. Accident classification;

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4. Notification of offsite authorities; 5. Information flow within and among ERFs; 6. Command and control within ERFs; 7. Calculation of projected dose and dose commitment; 8. Site evacuation and accountability; 9. Use of evacuation time estimates (ETEs);

10. Development of Protective Action Recommendations (PARS);

11. Support of State and County representatives at the Emergency Operations Facility EOF);

12. Dispatch of teams from the Operations Support Center-(OSC);

13. Dose minimization control for OSC teams; 14. Frequent staff briefings by ERF managers;

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15. Control and critique of the exercis .0 Exercise Observations , License Strengths The NRC team noted the following licensee actions that provided positive indications of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:

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Timely and correct selection of Abnormal and Emercency i Operating Procedures; ,

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Correct accident classification and timely offsite '

notifications;

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Selection of an appropriate default sourse term model and I realistic iodine to noble gas ratios by the RAD Support Group 4 at thetoTechnical and use of this model and I ratio calculateSupport Center projected dose(TSC)

and dose commitments I resulting from the Turbine Building unmonitored release; i

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Evacuation of 231 unessential site personnel in 13 minutes I and location of three missing personnel in in auditional 10 i minutes;

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- Development of a conservative Protective Action Recommendation '

resulting in surface water clearance and sheltering on land;

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Very good press briefings by a knowledgeable spokesperso .2 Exercise Weaknesses The NRC identified the following areas that need to be evaluated by the 1:censee (the licensee conducted an adequate self critique of the exercise which also identified some of these areas). These itenis will be evaluated during a subseouent Emergency Preparedness Inspectio operation prior to the departure Technical SupportDirector of the Emergency Center (TSC)the for Emergency Operations Facility was disorganized. Adequate comand and control appeared to be lacking. Actions were rushed. Plant status, plant operating historyld and fie team data, when available, were consideredpossible source term individually and not considered in the aggregat j (50-333/88-08-01)

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A manual dose projection method was used when two computer ,

based systems were available even though Section 6.2.3 of the

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Emergency Plan specifies use of the computer dose assessment systems when available. (50 333/88-08-02)

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while at the TSC recommended The Einergency sheltering Director [ive Action followIng declaration of an as a Protec

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ALERT. No PAR should be made below a General Emergenc ;

(50-333/88-0803) l

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Form EAP-4 which  !

notusedintheTOrovidesinputforuseinProcedureEAP-18was C. While these Procedures were used at the l Emergency Operations Facility, the associated forms were were r.ot always completely filled out. (50-333/88-08 04)

l 4.0 Licensee Action On Previously Identified items Based on discussions with licensee representatives, observations of the !

exercise, and review of records the following items were not repeated or satisfactory corrective actions are in progress and the followNg are I close l

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(Closed IFI Quality Assem e observers were assigned) exerc(50-333/87-20-02)

ise observation locations by tne tmergency Prepared $e Program staf (Closed) IFI The Quality Assuranca report discussing the(50-333/87-20-03) adequacy of the governmental interface wa available to the Count ,

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(Closed IFI E0F dose) asses (50-333/87-24-01)

sment grou There was disorganization within the

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(Closed) IFI Procedures and training for weather forecasting we(re lacking.50-333/87-24-02)

5.0 Exit Peeting The Inspectors met with licensee personnel listed in Section I of this report at the conclusion c' the inspection.. The licensee was informed no violations, deviations or unresolved items were identifie The Inspectors also discussed areas for improvement. The licensee acknowledged these findin corrective actions as n .gs essary and agreed to evaluate and include them, institutive needed corrective actions in the James A. FitzPattick Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan. At no time during the course of the inspection did the inspector give the licensee written materia I l

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