IR 05000333/2006002
| ML061010792 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 04/10/2006 |
| From: | Cobey E Reactor Projects Branch 2 |
| To: | Ted Sullivan Entergy Nuclear Northeast |
| References | |
| IR-06-002 | |
| Download: ML061010792 (23) | |
Text
ril 10, 2006
SUBJECT:
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2006002
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
On March 31, 2006, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 6, 2006, with Mr. Kevin Mulligan and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web Site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Eugene W. Cobey, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-333 License No.: DPR-59 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000333/2006002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000333/2006-002; 01/01/2006 - 03/31/2006; James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant;
Routine Integrated Report.
This report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, and an announced inspection by a senior emergency preparedness inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649,
Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by Entergy, has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by Entergy have been entered into the corrective action program. The violation and corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
iii
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
The James A. FitzPatrick plant began the inspection period at full rated thermal power (RTP)and operated at or near full power for the entire report period, except for a brief power reduction to 45 percent due to an accumulation of frazil ice at the plant intake structure on March
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample. On February 17, the inspectors reviewed Entergys actions regarding the onset of sustained winds approaching 50 miles per hour. The inspectors verified that operators implemented actions and monitoring specified by Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) -13, High Winds, Hurricanes and Tornadoes, toured risk significant areas including the screenwell and emergency diesel generator buildings, and reviewed the electrical system lineup. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04 - 3 samples,
==71111.04S - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
==
Partial System Walkdown. The inspectors performed three partial system walkdowns, each constituting inspection program samples, to verify equipment alignment and to identify any discrepancies that could potentially increase risk, cause initiating events, or impact the system operability. The inspectors compared system lineups to system operating procedures (OPs), system drawings, and the applicable chapters in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The inspectors also verified the operability of critical system components by observing component material condition during the system walkdown and reviewing the maintenance history for each component. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:
- Train A and B emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and train B emergency service water (ESW) on January 18, while train A ESW was out of service for crescent area cooler preventive maintenance;
- The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system on February 7, while the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system was out of service for planned maintenance; and
- Train A core spray (CS) system on February 21, while train B CS was out of service for preventive maintenance.
Complete System Walkdown. The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the 125 volt direct current (DC) distribution system to identify any discrepancies between the existing equipment lineup and the required lineup. This walk down constituted one inspection sample. During the walkdown, system drawings and OPs were used to verify proper equipment alignment and operational status. The inspectors reviewed the open maintenance work requests (WRs) associated with the system for any deficiencies that could affect the ability of the system to perform its function. Documentation associated with unresolved design issues such as temporary modifications (TMs), operator work-arounds, and items tracked by plant engineering were also reviewed to assess their collective impact on system operation. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the condition report (CR) database to verify that equipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Quarterly. The inspectors toured eight areas important to reactor safety to evaluate conditions related to Entergys control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment and features; and the fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation. The inspectors used procedure ENN-DC-161, Transient Combustible Program, in performing the inspection. The areas inspected constituting eight inspection program samples included:
- East cable tunnel;
- West cable tunnel;
- Crescent area, East;
- Crescent area, West;
- Battery room complex;
- Emergency diesel generator building;
- Screenwell building; and
- Motor-generator set room.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
c. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one internal flooding inspection sample. The inspectors reviewed FitzPatricks Individual Plant Examination (IPE) and the UFSAR concerning internal flooding events and completed walkdowns of the reactor building crescent areas where flooding could have a significant impact on plant risk. The inspectors verified the validity of assumptions made in the IPE regarding flooding scenarios, the control of equipment and procedures needed to comply with the IPE analysis, and Entergys review of applicable industry operating experience. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the testing and evaluation results for the crescent area unit coolers performed during the weeks of January 16 and January 30, focusing on efforts to restore design flow to cooler 66UC-22K. Heat removal capability calculations were reviewed to verify that cooler performance was consistent with design calculations and the UFSAR.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
a. Inspection Scope
On January 25, the inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training to assess operator performance during several scenarios. The inspectors evaluated the performance of risk significant operator actions, including the use of emergency operating procedures (EOPs). The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications, the implementation of appropriate actions in response to alarms, the performance of timely control board operation and manipulation, and the oversight and direction provided by the shift manager. The inspectors also reviewed simulator fidelity to evaluate the degree of similarity to the actual control room. This observation of operator simulator training constituted one inspection program sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed performance-based problems involving selected in-scope structures, systems, or components (SSCs) to assess the effectiveness of the maintenance program. Reviews focused on: proper Maintenance Rule (MR) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65; characterization of reliability issues; changing system and component unavailability; 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications; identifying and addressing common cause failures, trending key parameters, and the appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified (a)(2) as well as the adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified (a)(1). The inspectors reviewed system health reports, maintenance backlogs, and MR basis documents. The following two maintenance rule samples were reviewed:
- Reactor building ventilation system; and
- Containment atmosphere monitoring system.
The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed risk assessments associated with five different work weeks during the inspection period, each constituting one inspection program sample. The inspectors verified that risk assessments were performed in accordance with AP-10.10, On-line Risk Assessment; that risk of scheduled work was managed through the use of compensatory actions and schedule adherence; and that applicable contingency plans were properly identified in the integrated work schedule.
The following work weeks and/or WRs were reviewed:
- The week of January 9, that included planned maintenance on west crescent area cooler 66UC-22E and preventive maintenance on hydraulic control unit 34-27 scram air valves;
- The week of February 6, during planned Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) maintenance on the RCIC system that included turbine inspection, valve, breaker, and inverter preventive maintenance, instrument and relay calibrations, and periodic rupture disk replacement;
- The week of February 13, that included emergent replacement of a rod select power switch;
- The week of March 6, that included emergent replacement of negative phase sequence relay 71-46-1UPRN05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Operator Performance During Non-Routine Evolutions and Events (71111.14 - 1
sample)
a. Inspection Scope
For the non-routine event described below, the inspectors reviewed operator logs, plant computer data, and strip charts to determine what occurred and how the operators responded, and to determine if the response was in accordance with plant procedures.
The inspectors observed operator actions in the control room and observed plant conditions in the screenwell.
On March 3, frazil ice formed on the intake bar racks which caused a lowering screenwell water level. Frazil ice forms under certain meteorological conditions and results in ice crystal formation on intake bar racks. The ice formation can restrict circulating water intake flow and lower the lake level measured in the screenwell. The inspectors observed that operators entered AOP-64, Loss of Intake Water Level, and carried out applicable portions of the procedure. Operators lowered reactor power to 45 percent and secured one circulating water pump. When conditions stabilized, the circulating water pump was restarted, and full reactor power was restored.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operability determinations to assess the acceptability of the evaluations; when applicable, the use and control of compensatory measures; and the compliance with TSs. The inspectors review included a verification that the operability determinations were made as specified by ENN-OP-104, Operability Determinations.
The technical adequacy of the determinations was reviewed and compared to the TSs, UFSAR, and associated design basis documents (DBDs). The following five evaluations were reviewed, and each constituted inspection program samples:
- CR-2006-00453, concerning environmentally qualified solenoid operated valves installed in the drywell beyond qualified life;
- CR-2006-00530, concerning inoperability of turbine building exhaust radiation monitors 17RM-431 and 17RM-432;
- CR-2006-00417, concerning accuracy of local power range monitor inputs to the average power range monitors;
- CR-2006-00979, concerning the reactor building to torus vacuum breaker isolation valve binding; and
- CR-2006-01149, concerning excessive leakage through main steam leakage collection system isolation valve 29MOV-200A.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed post maintenance test procedures and associated testing activities for selected risk significant mitigating systems to assess whether the effect of maintenance on plant systems was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design basis documentation; that test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application; and that tests were performed, as written, with applicable prerequisites satisfied. Upon completion, the inspectors verified that equipment was returned to the proper alignment necessary to perform its safety function.
The following five post maintenance test activities were reviewed, and constitute inspection program samples.
- WRs JF-030170100 and JF-030495400, which involved cleaning and chemical flushing of west crescent cooler 66UC-22E and were conducted during the week of January 16. The retest was performed using ST-8Q, Testing of the Emergency Service Water System (IST), and ST-19I, Crescent Area Unit Cooler Air Flow Verification Test.
- WR JF-021048100, which involved RCIC system preventive maintenance during the week of February 6. The retest was performed using MST-013.01, RCIC Turbine Mechanical Overspeed Trip Test and Adjustment, ST-24D, RCIC Automatic Isolation Logic System Functional and Simulated Automatic Actuation Test, ST-24R, RCIC Turbine Slow Roll Test (Mode 1), ST-24E, RCIC Logic System Functional and Simulated Automatic Actuation Test, and ST-24J, RCIC Flow Rate and Inservice Test (IST).
- WR JF-0524100, which involved replacement of the B standby gas treatment system fan rotating element and bearings and was conducted during the week of January 30. The retest verified proper air flow, vibration, and bearing temperatures.
- Engineering Request (ER)-JAF-06-12734, which involved modification of the sample points of turbine building ventilation radiation monitors 17RM-431 and 17RM-432 and was conducted during the week of February 27. The retest verified correct sample flows and monitor readings.
- WRs [[::JAF-06-14764|JAF-06-14764]] and [[::JAF-06-14989|JAF-06-14989]], which involved troubleshooting and repair of main steam leakage collection system (MSLCS) isolation valves 29MOV-202A and 29MOV-200A, respectively and were conducted during the week of March 20. The retest consisted of satisfactory performance of ST-1M, MSLCS Valve Exercise (IST), and diagnostic testing.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors witnessed performance of surveillance test procedures (STs) and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether the SSCs satisfied TSs, UFSAR, Technical Requirements Manual, and Entergy procedure requirements.
The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design basis documentation; that test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application; and that tests were performed, as written, with applicable prerequisites satisfied. Upon ST completion, the inspectors verified that equipment was returned to the status specified to perform its safety function. Seven STs were reviewed, and constitute inspection program samples:
- ST-2AL, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Loop A Quarterly Operability Test (IST);
- ISP-16, Drywell Floor Drain Sump Flow Loop Functional Test/Calibration, and IMP-22.11, Drywell Equipment Drain Sump Flow Loop Functional Test/Calibration;
- ST-6HA, Standby Liquid Control A Side Quarterly Operability Test (IST);
- ST-18A, Technical Support Center Ventilation Operability Test;
- ST-8G, Intake Deicing Heaters Feeder Ammeters Test;
- ISP-7-2, Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP) Shear Valve Explosive Actuating Cartridge Test/Replacement (IST); and
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed two temporary plant modification (TM) samples. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for the TM; that the installation was consistent with the modification documentation; that the drawings and procedures were updated as applicable; and that the post-installation testing was adequate. The following samples were reviewed:
- JAF-TA-05-047, Condenser Bay Envelope Free-Air Opening Reduction; Gates &
Turbine Deck Floor Openings; and
- JAF-TA-06-010, Removal of Manual Actuator Coupling Block From 27AOV-101A, Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness [EP]
1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing
a. Inspection Scope
An onsite review was conducted to assess maintenance and testing of Entergys alert and notification system (ANS). The inspector observed and interviewed a county staff member conducting a communication test of the siren system. The inspector also interviewed another county staff member regarding the tracking and distribution of tone alert radios within the emergency planning zone. Condition reports pertaining to the tone alert radios were reviewed for causes, trends, and corrective actions. The inspector interviewed Entergy personnel responsible for their portion of the ANS program. The inspector noted that Constellation Energy at Nine Mile Point plant assumes a majority of the responsibility for the siren portion of the ANS. Therefore, the inspector did not review CRs associated with the sirens during this inspection. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 02. Planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E were used as reference criteria.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Augmentation
a. Inspection Scope
A review of Entergys FitzPatrick ERO augmentation staffing requirements and the process for notifying the ERO was conducted. This was performed to ensure the readiness of key staff for responding to an event and for timely facility activation.
Records from call-in drills and one recent mustering drill were reviewed. The inspector reviewed procedures and CRs associated with the ERO notification system and drills.
The inspector interviewed personnel responsible for testing the ERO augmentation process. The inspector compared qualification requirements to the training records for a sample of ERO members. The inspector also verified that the EP department staff was receiving required training as specified in the emergency plan. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 03.
Planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E were used as reference criteria. This review constituted one inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
Prior to this inspection, the NRC had received and acknowledged the changes made to the FitzPatrick Emergency Plan and implementing procedures. These changes were made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), which Entergy had determined did not result in a decrease in effectiveness of the plan and concluded that the changes continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR 50. During this inspection and during an in-office review conducted on January 27, 2005, the inspector conducted a sampling review of the changes that could potentially result in a decrease in effectiveness. This review does not constitute an approval of the changes and, as such, the changes are subject to future NRC inspection. The associated 10 CFR 50.54(q)reviews for the changes were sampled by the inspector. Also, the NRC reviewed Entergys emergency action level (EAL) scheme for logic and consistency. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114,
4. The requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(q) were used as reference criteria.
This review constituted one inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies (71114.05 - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed self-assessments and audit reports to assess Entergys ability to evaluate its performance and programs. The inspector reviewed CRs initiated at FitzPatrick from drills, self-assessments, and audits. The review was conducted to evaluate the significance of the issues, to determine if repeat problems were occurring, and to assess the effectiveness of corrective actions. A list of the CRs reviewed are contained in the Attachment to this report. This inspection was conducted according to NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 05. Planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E were used as reference criteria. This review constituted one inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed simulator activities associated with the licensed operator requalification training graded scenario on January 25, 2006. The inspectors verified that emergency classification declarations and notification activities were properly completed as required by IAP-2, Classification of Emergency Conditions. This observation constituted one inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
Routine PI&R Program Review
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into Entergys corrective action program. The review was accomplished by accessing Entergys computerized database for CRs and attending CR screening meetings.
In accordance with the baseline inspection modules, the inspectors selected corrective action program items across the initiating events, mitigating systems, and barrier integrity cornerstones for additional follow-up and review. The inspectors assessed Entergys threshold for problem identification, the adequacy of the cause analyses, extent of condition review, and operability determinations, and the timeliness of the specified corrective actions. The CRs reviewed are noted in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Follow-up
(Closed) LER 05000333/2005006-00, Inoperable 115 kV Line in Excess of Technical Specifications Allowed Out of Service Time Between November 29 and December 19, 2005, 115 kV offsite power line 4 was inoperable due to an undetected failure of a bus bar connector. The condition exceeded the seven-day allow outage time specified by TS 3.8.1 for one offsite power source out of service. The violation occurred because Entergy did not have an effective means of monitoring the condition of the line. This event and NRC enforcement aspects of this violation are documented in section 1R13 of inspection report 05000333/2005006.
Entergy entered the event into its corrective action program as CR-2005-05289. This LER is closed.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On April 6, 2006, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Kevin Mulligan and other members of Entergy management. Entergy acknowledged that no proprietary information was involved.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation.
- Technical Specification 3.6.1.6 requires that if an open reactor-to-suppression chamber vacuum breaker is not closed within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> the plant be placed in the cold shutdown condition within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. Contrary to this, from February 23 to March 6, 2006, reactor-to-suppression chamber vacuum breaker 27AOV-101A was closed and the plant was not placed in the cold shutdown condition. The vacuum breaker was not in the full closed position although it indicated closed in the control room. The problem was identified in Entergys corrective action program as CR-2006-00979. This finding is of very low safety significance because it does not represent an open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Entergy Personnel
- T. Sullivan, Vice President, Operations
- D. Wallace, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance
- K. Mulligan, General Manager, Plant Operations
- N. Avrakotos, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- J. Costedio, Manager, Regulatory Compliance
- M. Durr, Manager, System Engineering
- J. Gerety, Manager, Design Engineering
- D. Johnson, Manager, Operations
- J. LaPlante, Manager, Security
- A. McKeen, Manager, Radiation Protection
- J. Pechacek, Manager, Programs and Components Engineering
- M. Jacobs, Manager, Training
- W. Rheaume, Manager, CA&A
- B. Sholler, Manager, Plant Maintenance
- D. Wallace, Director of Safety Assurance
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
Closed
- 05000333/2005006-00 LER Inoperable 115 kV Line in Excess of Technical Specification Allowed Out of Service Time (Section 4OA3)