IR 05000333/1997006
| ML20211B587 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 09/17/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211B575 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-97-06, 50-333-97-6, NUDOCS 9709250281 | |
| Download: ML20211B587 (30) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Region 1 License No.: ~
DPR 59 i
Report No.:
.97 06
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Docket No.:
50 333 Licensee:
New York Power Authority Post Office Box 41 Scriba, New York 13093 4-Facility Name:
James A. FitzPatrick
. ear Power Plant Dates:
June 29,1997 through igust 30,1997 Inspectors:
G. Huneos, Senior Resident inspector R. Fernandes, Resident inspector R. Barkley, Project Engineer J. Caruso, Operations Engineer
- E. King, Physical Security inspector D. Silk, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist Approved by:
John F. Rogge, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
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9709250281 970917 PDR ADOCM 05000333
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant NRC Inspection Report 50 333/97 06 Qperations
On July 19, one of three operating condensate pumps failed. Operators entered the abnormal operating procedure and lowered reactor power to 65 percent. Operator response to the transient was considered to be good.
- On August 6, control room operators received a standby gas treatment system (SGTS) low flow alarm and declared both SGTS trains inoperable. The cause was due to blockage of the SGTS discharge drain line which prevented water from draining from the SUTS discharge line. The licensee entered a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> shutdown limiting condition for operation (LCO) which required the plant to be placed in cold shutdown. Operator performance and the decision to enter the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO was appropriate and the response of the plant staff to restore the system to an operable status was good.
- An extensive NRC review of on shift control room activities was conducted during the week of June 23,1997. Generally the conduct of operations observed in the control roorn was good. The backlog of control room deficiencies, operation
department's procedure change request backlog, and operator work arounds appeared to be well managed. Three point communications, log keeping, turnovers between crews and crew pre shift briefings were acceptable with some minor problems noted.
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The refuel floor smoke detectors have been out of service since 1993. The licensee is in the process of completing an engineering analysis to possibly eliminate the smoke detectors. An inspector followup item was opened to review the issues regarding the refuel floor smoke detectors, The licensee identified that some operators did not complete all required licensed e
operator requalification training from 1994 through 1996. The cause was administrative error and the problem was limited. The failure by licensed operators to complete licensed operator requalification training was determined to be a non-cited violation. This violation will not be cited in accordance with Section Vil,B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy as the violation was licensee identified, non-recurring, promptly corrected and of low safety significance.
Maintenance
Overall, maintenance and surveillance activities were well conducted, with good adherence to both administrative and maintenance procedures.
- The inspector observed elements of the protective tagging, testing, preventive and corrective maintenance on the 115 KV transformer, T 3.
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e Executive Summary (cont'd)
Overall, the job was well coordinated with some areas for improvement, particularly regarding equipment prestaging. The inspector noted that the removal of this transformer, and the recent removal of transformer T 2, were the most risk significant LCO rnaintenance activities undertaken by the licensee. As a result, a number of additional administrative controls were imposed on this job (e.g.
obtaining weather predictions and establishing contingency plans to terminate the job in the event of any onsite or offsite power supply loss). These administrative controls were satisfactorily implemented.
Enaineerina e
Licensee event report (LER) 50-333/96015, Desig.1 Error Allows Bypass Flow Path Around Offgas isolation Valve, was reviewed and closed. The licensee corrected the design error by installing a permanent modification to prevent reverse flow of the steam jet air eJoctor effluent in the event the holdup volume is pressurized.
- On September 16,1996, a reactor scram was caused by personne! error. The reverse power relay operated which blocked the fast transfer of plant buses to reserve power resulting in the circulating water pumps to be de energized and consequentially a loss of condenser capability. Condenser back pressure increased until pressure increased above a point at which one of the low pressure turbine rupture discs and reactor feed pump rupture discs ruptured. The event was discussed in NRC Inspection report 50 333/96000. The response of the condenser to the event and the function of the low condenser vacuum main steam isolation valve (MSIVs) closure logic were determined to be an unresolved item until the licensee could analyze the transient. The licensee has concluded that the existing design is adequate although the licensoo is evaluating the potential for a plant modification which may reduce the likelihood of a rupture disc actuation. The issue will remain unresolved pending additional NRC staff review.
An untosolved item concerning 3D Monicore System software problems was
reviewed and closed.
Plant Suonort e
The licensee maintained an effective security program. Management support was evident based on the implementation of the security program as documented in this report. Alarm station operators were knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities and were not engaged with activities that would interfere with their response functions and audits were thorough and in-depth. Security training was being performed in accordance with the NRC approved training and qualification plan and the training records were well documented. One previously identified item, involving vital area access control of personnel, was closed. Additionally, the licensee's provisions for land vehicle control measures satisfy regulatory requirements and licensee commitments.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS CX EC UTIV E S U M M ARY............................................. il TABLE O F CO NT E NT S.............................................. iv S umm ary of Pla nt St a tu s............................................ 1 1. O PE R AT I O N S................................................... 1
Conduct of Operations.................................... 1
01.1 General Comments.................................
01.2 Inoperable Standby Gas Treatment System................ 1
01.3 Operational Safety Verification......
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Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment........,.......... 3 02.1 Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns
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Operator Knowledge and Perf ormance......................... 3 04.1 Control Room Observations (Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-3 3 3 /9 7 00 6 01 ).................................... 3
Operator Training and Qualification........................... 5 05.1 Missed Licensed Operator Requalification Training (Non cited Violation 50 33 3/97006 02)........................... 5
Miscellaneous Operations issues............................. 6 08.1 (Closed) LER 50 333/96010 01 O
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l l. M AI N T E N A N C E................................................. 7
M1 Conduct of Maintenance..................................
M1.1 General Commente.................................
M1.2 General Commenta on Surveillance Activities............... 7 M1.3 Conclusions on Conduct of Maintenance.................. 8 M1.4 T-3 Transformer Maintenance.......................... G M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities
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M7.1 Inspection of GE MagnaBlast 4160 V Breakers for the Degraded Conditions Noted in information Notice (lN) 97-08.... 9 111. E N G I N E E R I N G.................................................. 9 E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues............................ 9 E8.1 (Closed) LER 50 3 3 3 /9 6015........................... 9 E8.2 (Update) Unresolved item 50 333/9600G-02: Condenser Response Related to the September 16,1986 Reverse Power
Scram.........................................
E8.3 (Closed) URI 50 33 3/9 5 08 01........................ 12 IV. PLAN T S U P PO RT.............................................. 13 P3 EP Procedures and Documentation
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S1 Conduct of Security.and Safeguards Activities.................. 14 S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment
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S2.1 Alarm Stations and Communications.................... 14 iv
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Table of Centents (cont'd)
SS Security and Safeguards Statf Training and Qualification
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S6 Security Organization and Administration...................... 16 S7 Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities........... 16 S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safety issues..................... 17
S8.1 Vehicle Barrier System (VBS)
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SS.2 Bomb Blast Analysis
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S8.3 Procedural Controls................................ 19 S8.4 (Closed) IFl 50 333/97002 02
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S8.5 Review of Updated cinel Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)..... 10 F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection issues......................... 20
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F8.1 (Closed) VIO 50 333/95011 01
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V. MANAGEMENT MEETINGS.......................................
X1 Exit Mooting Summary................................... 20 X2 Review of UFSAR Commitments............................ 20 ATTACHMENTS Attachment 1 Partial List of Persons Contacted-Inspection Procedures Used ltems Opened, Closed, and Discussed
- 1.ist of Acronyms Used Attachment 2 - Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures Reviewed
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Etport Details Summarv of Plant Status The unit began this inspection period at 100 percent power. On July 19, reactor power was lowered to 05 percent following the loss of one of three operating condensate pumps, which had tripped due to an instantaneous ground overcurrent. A new condensato pump motor was procured and installed and the plant was returned to full power on July 25.
On August 6, a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> shutdown limiting condition for operation (LCO) was entered after the licensee determined that both trains of the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) were modo inoperable by water accumulation in the common discharge line. During the power reduction to 20 percent, the line was drained and the SGTS was returned to an operable status. On August 7, the LCO was exited and, on August 8, power was returned to 100 percent. The plant remained at 100 percent power through tho end of the inspection period, l. OPERATIONS
Conduct of Operations'
01.1 General Comments The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations, in general, operations were conducted well. On July 19 at 2:10 p.m., one of three operating condensato pumps f ailed. Operators entered Abnormal Operating Procedure 42, Feedwater Malfunction, and lowered reactor power to 65 percent. Operator response to the transient was considered to be good. Additional specific events and noteworthy observations are deta led below.
01.2 inoperable Standby Gas Treatment System a.
Insoection Scong On August 6, while attempting to purge the tcrus atmosphere, control room operators received a standby gas treatment system (SGTS) low flow alarm in the control room. Further investigation and attempts to perform a surveillance test (ST)
resulted in the licensee declaring both SGTS trains inoperable. The system is designed to maintain a minimum sub-atmospheric pressure of.25 inches of water at a flow rate of 6000 to 6100 standard cubic feet per minute (SCFM). While performing the ST, the maximum flow rate that could be established was 4400 SCFM. The licensee entered a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> shutdown limiting condition for operation (LCO), to place the plant in cold shutdown. The inspector cbserved the surveillance testing, maintenance work, and monitored control room activities during the power reduction.
' Topical headings such as 01, M8, etc.. are used in accordance with the NRC standardized reactor inspection report outline. Individual reports are not expected to address all outline topic.
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Qhtetyations and Findinag The standby gas treatment system consists of two independent trains that dischargo into a common 24 inch diameter pipe which traversos underground to the main stack. The SGTS discharge pipe also provides a drainage path for potentially contaminated water (collected from the stack sump, off gas system and stack drainage) back to the radwasto facilities via the reactor building floor sump and pump. A two inch drain lino is connected to the 24 inch discharge pipe, at a low point in the dischargo piping.
The liennsee had exporlenced a similar problem in 1000 and had postulated that, as in the previous event, the 24 inch dischargo lino had becomo rostricted by standing water due to the drain line being obstructed. The licensoo developed an action plan to pressurizo the two inch drain line with air to remove the obemetion. The line was cleared and approximately 1000 gallons of water was dreino.1 from the dischargo pipe to the reactor build;ng sump. Surveillanco testing was parformud successfully and the system was declared operable.
- During the troublo shooting activities and draining of the SGTS piping, the control room personnel remained focused on the plant shutdown. Good throo point communications were noted by the inspector and potential distractions during the of. going etivition with the SGTS woro kept to a minirnum. The licensco implomonted a daily survelliance test to verify, on increased frequency, the operability of the SGTS and is continuing to trend system performanco, c.
Conclusiong Operator performance and the decision to enter the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO was appropriato and the response of the plant staff to restore the system to an operablo status was good.
01.3 Operational Safety Verification The inspectors observed plant operation and verified that the facility was operated safely and in accordance with procedures and regulatory requirements. Regular tours were conducted of the plant with focus on safety related structures t.nd systems, operations, radiological controls and security. Additionally, the operability of engineered safety features, other safety related systems and on sito and off site power sources was veriflod. No safety concerns woro identiflod as a result of those tours.
The inspection activities during this report period included inspection during normal, backshift and weekend hours. Regular tours were conducted of the following plant areas:
Control room secondary containment building radiological control point
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electrical switchgear rooms emergency core cooling system pump rooms security access point protected area fence intake structure diesel generator rooms Control room instruments and plant computer indications were observed for correlation between channels and for cortformance with technical specification (TS)
requirements. Operability of engineered safety features, other safety related systems and onsite and offsite power sources was verified. The inspectors observed various alarm conditions and confirmed that operator response was tr>
accordance with plant operating procedures. Compliance with TS and implementation of appropriate action statements for equipment out of service was inspected. Plant radiation monitoring system indications and coolant stack traces were reviewed for unexpected changes. Logs and records were reviewed to determine if entries were accurate and identified equipment status or deficiencies.
These records included operating logs, turnover sheets, system safcty tags, and temporary modifications. Control room and shif t manning were compared to regulatory requirements and portions of shift turnovers were observed. Daily supervisor meetings were attended to assess personnel focus on risk significant items and p! ant priorities.
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns The inspectors performed a walk down of accessible portions of the following systems and performed general area tours:
eemergency diesel generator eintake structure semergency service water erosidual heat removal service water shigh pressure coolant injection areactor core isolation cooling Equipment operability, material condition and housekeeping conditions were good.
Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Control Room Observations (Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50 333/97006 01)
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inspection Scone An NRC inspector evaluated the James A. FitzPatrick (JA;, control room operations using NRC Inspection Procedure 71707, " Plant Operations" during the week of
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June 23,1097. The inspector evaluated general control room operations including controlling access, adherence to procedures, acknowledgment of control room annuncistors, crew communications, log keeping, crew turnovers and briefings. In addition, the inspector also evaluated thn contrnt of technical specification limiting conditions for operations (LCOs), the tacklog of control room deficiencies, the backlog of procedure change requests, and operator work-arounds, b.
Observations tind Findinos The inspector observed that control room operators were attentive in acknowledging control room annunciat a J, in consulting alarm response procedures, and in keeping the control room supervisors (CRSs) informed. CRSs and shif t managers (SMs) were attentive. Operators were knowledgeable of plant conditions. Peer checks were performed in most instances, it was also noted that a relatively clear annunciator board was maintained in the control room.
The inspector reviewed the backlog of control room deficiencies (39) and operator work arounds (18) and noted that the backlogs appeared to be well managed with no concerns identified. -Operation department's procedure change request backlog was also reviewed and determined to be acceptable with no concerns identified.
The operators, CRSs and SMs generally communicated well and kept each other informed, however, three-point communication was inconsistent and often times was incomplete. Other areas that were identified as areas for improvement included log keeping, turnovers, and pre-shift crew briefings. This observation was based primarily on the handling of a service water (SW) piping vibration problem that occurred on day shift. The performance of the day shift crew during the SW piping vibration was good. However, the documentation of the problem in the reactor operator's (RO) log was confusing and did not adequately describe the problem and the corrective actions taken by the crew at the time. This was brought to the attention of one of ROs on shift and the log entry was later clarified. The CRS log entry in comparison was much clearer but stilllacked specific details as to the location and extent of the SW piping vibration problems.
The pre shift briefing given to the next shift (on-coming relieving shift) by the swing shift CRS ic'entified that a standby heat exchanger was placeo in-service to reduce SW piping vibrations but did not brief the on-coming crew on all of the problema that occurred on the previous shift (For example, where and to what extent the SW piping vibrated. Also "B" SW pump was started and "C" SW pump was secured initially but the amps on "A" SW pump approached maximum allowable and the SW discharge pressure decreased without eliminating the vibration problem. The day shift crew then switched back to the initial pump combination of "A" und "C" pumps and placed a standby heat exchanger in-service which eliminated the vibration problem in conversations with the swing shift RO, the inspector determined that the RO was not aware of the problems the day shift crew had experienceo in using the "B" SW pump. In addition the swing shif t CRS was not aware of exactly where the SW piping vibrations had been most severe.
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Log kocping, turnovers, and crew briefings were satisfactory aside from the handling of the SW piping vibration problem. However, in the SW vibration instance the inspector judged that neither written (log entries) nor verbal (shif t turnover)
communications had been effective in detailing a problem and corrective actions taken so that relieving shifts were fully informed and could followup. Other aspects of an effective crew turnover were observed such as review and discussion of logs, and walkdown of panels.
The inspectcr also noted that minimal thoroughness was apparent when conducting temporary reliefs between the CRSs and SMs when the CRSs stepped out of the control room. The inspector noted that the SMs did not in most casus ask any questions regarding changes in plant status or activities in-progress before assuming the supervisory rer,ponsibility for directing the crew.
The inspector reviewed LCO logs and noted that the refueling floor smoke detectors had been out-of service since 1993. In conversations with the fire protection engineer on site, he indicated that an engineering analysis and safety evaluation was recently completed by an outside contractor and was under review. The contractor's draft report suggested that the smoke detectors could be eliminated;-
The inspector was concerned over the longstanding unresolved issues associated with smoke detectors and the possible elimination of the only fire detection system for the area. The inspector raised some questions as to the licensing bases for these detectors. The inspector's review of the contractor's draft report indicated that the smoke detectors had been identified in section 2.C(3), Amendment 47, to the JAF f acility license. The report further indicated that the licensee installed the detectors as required by the fire protection program safety evaluation report, dated August 1,1979. The status of the refuel floor smoke detectors will be IFl 50 333/97006-01.
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Conclusion Generally the conduct of operations observed in the control room was good. The backlog of control room deficiencies, operation department's procedure change request backlog, and operator work arounds appeared to be well managed with no concerns identified. Three-point communications, log keeping, turnovers between crews and crew pre-shif t briefings were acceptable with some minor problems noted. In addition, an inspector followup item was opened to review the issues regarding the refuel floor smoke detectors,
Operator Training and Qualification 05.1 Missed Licensed Operator Requalification Training (Non-cited Violation 50-333/97006-02)
a.
Insoection Scone The licensee reported to the NRC in a letter dated May 16,1997 (JAFP-97-0184)
that they had identified that licensed operators had missed some requalification
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training between 1994 and 1996 that previously went undetected due to administrative errors. The inspector reviewed and evaluated the extent of the problem, as well as the licensee's root cause and corrective actions.
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Observations and Findinnt The inspector reviewed the licensed operator training records for the period 1994 through 1996 and determined that the problem had not been widespread. For example in 1996, five inomdual licensed operators (out of a total population of 54)
missed a total of ten classroom lectures. The soot cause was administrative in nature and was due to ineffective second checking of data entry by the training staff. A new data collection system had since been implemented which provided more effective sorting and self checking features, in addition, the inspector determined that the licensee had taken effective corrective actions to investigate and correct the problem.
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Conclusion Failure to complete licensed operator training is a violation of 10 CFR 55.59 that requires each licensed operator to complete a requalification program developed by the f acility licensee. This violation will not be cited in accordance with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy as the violation was licensee identified, non-recurring, promptly corrected and of low safety significance (50 333/97006 02).
This issue is closed.
Miscellaneous Operations issues 08.1 (Closed) LER 50-333/96010-01: Plant Shutdown Due to Human Error inadvertently Connecting Two Terminals While Calibrating Protective Relay. On September 16, 1996, with the plant operating at 100% power, the UPS MG set removed for maintenance and protective relay calibration in progress, the screwdriver a technician was using slipped and inadvertently connected two terminals of a 24KV iso phase bus ground f ault protective relay. The short circuit simulated relay closure and caused the main unit output transformer load side circuit breakers to open which resulted in a generator load reject from 100 percent power. The short circuit also inhibited (by design) the fast transfer of station loads to the reserve power sources. The subsequent residual transfer resulted in a loss of circulating water flow and subsequent loss of condenser vacuum. Condenser pressurization resulted in actuation of rupture discs on a low pressure turbine hood and one of the feed pump turbino exhaust manifolds. The event was reviewed in NRC inspection report 50 333/96 06 dated September 28,1996. Open items associated with the event are being reviewed as unresolved items96-006 02 and 96-006-04 regarding the condensor rupture disc and the TIPS containment isolation valve response respectively. The corrective actions for the human performance issues will be reviewed to address violation 50-333/96006-01. For administrative purposes this LER is closed.
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11. MAINTENANCE M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments on Maintenance Activities a.
IDpoection Scone
'he inspectors observed all or poitions of the following work activities:
i ework request (WR) 97-4735 - Replace overload heaters per maintenance procedure (MP) 56.01 on 10 motor operated valve (MOV) 13B eWR 97 5722 - Control rod drive pump seat replacement eWR 97 4751 -Inspect and replace switches on 4160 KV breakers eWR 95-4502 - Perform 6 year preventive maintenance (PM) on reserve station transformer eWR 97 6233 - Disconnect line and clear pipe blockage in standby gas treatment system (SGTS) drain b.
Observations and Findinns The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be professional and thorough. Technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned task.
M1.2 General Comments on Surveillance Activities a.
Insoection Scoco The inspectors observed selected surveillance tests to determine whether approved procedures were in use, details were adequate, test listrumentatnn was properly calibrated and used, technical specifications were satisfied, testing was performed by knowledgeable personnel, and test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispcsitioned.
The inspectors observed portions of the following surveillance activities:
eST-?A SGT Manual Bypass Operation, Heater Capacity, Filter DP, and Downstream Piping Leak Test e ST-2AL RHR Loop A Pump and MOV Operability, inservice, and LPCI Keep-Full Level Switch Functional Test e ST-9D EDG,115KV Reserve Power, Station Battery, or ESW System inoperable Test e ST-10A Off Gas Line isolation Logic System Functional Test eST-76TD T-3 Transformer Deluge Test
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Observations and Findinas The licensee conducted the above surveillance activities appropriately and in accordance with procedural and administrative requirements. Good coordination and communication were observed during performance of the surveillance activities.
Operators had difficulty in locating the correct keys for testing the off gas radiation monitors due to lack of appropriate leboling. This was corrected on the spot by the control room staff.
The inspector observed the preparations for and conduct of the T-3 transformer
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deluge test following the LCO maintenance on the T-3 transformer on July 30-31, 1997. The inspector confirmed that an adequate pre-job brief was conducted, the protective tagging of the system was acceptable and the testing of the fire protection temperature sensors was successful. Good three-point communications existed between the operator observing the deluge spray, the operator monitoring the deluge valve station and the control room. The test was performed satisfactorily with no unacceptable conditions noted other than the failure to remove a hose connector from a drain as described in Section M1.4 of this report.
M1.3 Conclusions on Conduct of Maintenance Overall, maintenance and surveillance activities were well conducted, with good adherence to both administrative and maintenance procedures.
M1.4 T-3 Transformer Meintenance a.
[opoection ScoDJL The inspector observed elements of the protective tagging, testing, preventive and corrective maintenance on the 115 KV transformer, T-3.
b.
Observations and Findinas The entire evolution was planned to last about 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (34 huurs assuming oil draining would have been required) and was actually completed in just over 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />; the LCO for the transformer is 7 days. Most of the time cielay was attributable to a much longer than expected time to reinstall busbar conduc.(ors and the absence of a needed drain hose during the conduct of transformer deluge test.
In addition, when a drain hose was located and installed, operators failed to remove the hose connector from the drain after use, sealing off the drain; this oversight was later identified and corrected during closecut of the deluge test and the oversight entered into the deficiency event report (DER) system.
c.
Conclusions Overall, the job was well coordinated with some areas for improvement, particularly regarding equipment prestaging. The inspector noted that the maintenance of this transformer, and the recent maintenance of transformer T-2, were the most risk
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significant LCO maintenance activities performed by the licensee. As a result, a number of addit!onal administrative controls were imposed on this job (e.g.
obtaining weather predictions and establishing contingency plans to terminate the job in the event of any onsite or offsite power supply loss). These administrative controls were satisfactorily implemented during this LCO maintenance task.
M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities M7.1 Inspection of GE MagnaBlast 4160 V Breakers for the Degraded Conditions Noted in Inintmation Notice (lN) 97-08 The inspector observed the internal examination of a spare General Electric (GE)
MagnaBlast breaker (originally used for supplying a residual heat remova; pump which f ailed in February 1996 - see NRC inspection report 50-333/96001). The inspection was conducted to verify that the part deficiencies noted in IN 97-08 did not exist in this and other similar breskers. The inspector noted quality assurance (QA) oversight of the job and that knowledgeable, experienced electricians performed the inspections; no equipment problems were found. The licensee is currently incorporating these inspections into their preventive maintenance program.
Ill. ENGINEERING E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues E8.1 (Closed) LER 50-333/96015: Design Error Allows Bypass Flow Path Around Offgas isolation Valve. The offgas system is isolated by closure of the offgas outlet isolation valve in response to high radiation in the effluent. Closure of inis valve will result in pressurization of the 30 minute holdup volume due to continued steam jet air ejector operation removing non-condensibles from the condenser.
Pressurization could result in offgas flow bypassing the 30 minute holdup volume, offgas filters and the offgas outlet isolation valve through a previously unidentified flowpath. During power ascension following refuel outage 12 in December,1996, the licensee determined that a design deficiency existed in that steam jet air ejector effluent could bypass the 30 minute hold up volume and offgas filters when the system flow path downstream of the offgas drip pot was obstructed. The licensee corrected the design error, on December 17,1996, by installing a permanent modification utilizing a check valve in the common drain line of the steam packing exhauster / condenser air removal pump discharge piping. This modification will prevent reverse flow of the steam jet air ejector effluent in the event the holdup volume is pressurized.
The inspectors reviewed the modification installation at the time of the work and reviewed licensee memorandum RET-97119, Control Rod Drop Accident Without Main Steam isolation Valve (MSIV) Closure and With Offgas System Bypassed, which evaluated the significance of the original design error. The licensee's calculations determined that the potential radiation exposures were within the limits of 10 CFR 100 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 19, Control
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Room, in addition, the inspector discussed the event and Abnormal Operating Proceduro (AOP) 3, High Activity In Reactor Coolant or Of f Gas, with the control room operators and determined that their knowledge of the event and the associated AOPs was good. The inspector determined that the corrective actions were complete and did not identify any other concerns.
E8.2 (Updato) Unrosolved item 50 333/96006-02: Condonsor Responso Related to the September 16,1996 Roverse Power Scram a.
Insoection Scoco On September 16,1996, with the plant operating at 100% power, while performing maintenance on a ground protection relay the inadvertent shorting of contacts resulted in the outgoing power circuit breakers tripping open and initiating a generator load reject. The turbino control valves roccived a fast close signal and turbine bypass valvos opened to dump excess steam to the condensor. A reactor scram signal was initiated by the turbine control valvo fast closure signal. By design, the inadvertent operation of the reverso power relay operated additional relays which blocked the f ast transfor of plant busos to reserve power. A residual transfer occurred and the plant buses saw an interruption of power. With the initial loss of the electrica! bussos, the circulating water pumps were do-onergized. This resulted in the loss of condonsor capability and condensor inlet water temperaturos reached 225 degrees F. Condonsor back pressure increased until pressure increased above a point at which one of the 10w pressure turbino rupturo discs and reactor feed pump rupture discs ruptured. The discs ruptured approximately 9 minutes af ter the reactor scram. Due to the high temperature steam release, the fire protection system actuated in the turbine building. The event was discussed in NRC inspection report 50 333/96000. The response of the condenser to the event and the function of the low condensor vacuum main steam isolation valvo (MSIVs)
closuro logic were datormined to be an unrosolved item until the licensoo could analyze the transient. The inspector reviewed engineering report GENE A42 00114, Design Adoquacy Evaluation of September 16,1998 Rupturo Disc Actuation at J.A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, and safety evaluation, JAF SE-96-060, Evaluation of Operator Action to Facilitato Main Steam Isolation Valvo (MSIV) Isolation Under Specified Conditions, b.
Observations and Findings The licenseo's evaluation discussos the design adequacy of the plant which led to the ovent in which the rupturo discs actuated. The ovaluation discussos some of the background history and is described below:
The original boiling water reactor (BWR)- 4 design included a reactor scram, e
and automatic closure of turbino stop and bypass valves (TSVs & TBVs) on low condenser vacuum (LCV), with the original assumption that the turbina valve isolations would isolate the condensor from additional steam inputs.
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In 1967, a change was instituted to remove the condenser low vacuum
scram on the basis that it was redundant to the scram associated with a TSV closure.
In 1972, prior to plant start up, a low condenser vacuum isolation of the
MSIVs and drain line isolation valves at 7 inches Hg was in effect.
The original design had a closure of MSIVs on LCV unless a key bypass
switch was positioned to override the logic (start-ups). Rwtor protection system (RPS) logic was incorporated and required reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure to be greater than 600 psig, mode switch not in "run" and TSVs closed for the LCV switch to be in bypass.
Prior to initial plant start-up (1975), the 600 psig setpoint was raised to
1005 psig and the LCV bypass switches were removed. This allowed earlier reset of the RPS logic following a scram & allow pressurization of the RPV while MSIVs are closed.
In June of 1986, MS'V closure on (L2) low-low level was changed to
closure on low-low-low level (L1). The evaluation states that following this modification (M1-86-120) the closure of the MSIVs could not be assured because of HPCI & RCIC initiations maintaining level above the L1 trip setpoint.
The original design provided for a bypass of the automatic LCV MSIV
isolation if the reactor pressure was less than 600 psig and the mode switch was not in RUN. The purpose for this bypass was to allow opening of the MSIVs during startup, in February,1989 the LCV bypass switches were removed following an evaluation that indicated it was not necessary for reactor safety.
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in July,1993 the MSIV isolation on high main steam line (MSL) radiation e
was eliminated. The evaluation stated that while not directly related to the issue of condenser integrity, such integrity was assumed in the justification of the modification.
The current design has the MSIVs and MSL drains close at seven inches mercury vacuum with the mode switch in "run." However, it is the normal practice for the operators to take the mode switch to shutdown after a scram to prevent the MSIVs from automatically shutting at a reactor vessel pressure of 820 psig if the mode switch is in "run." If the mode switch were left in "run," it would unnecessarily eliminate the normal heat sink for most transients.
The licensee reviewed all anticipated operational occurrences (AOO) to determine if the lack of MSIV closure following a reactor scram and loss of vacuum impacts the event descriptions contained in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
Section 14.5.5.4, Loss of Auxiliary Power, describes a similar but more rapidly occurring event to that which occurred on September 16,1996. One of the
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assumptions in the UFSAR is that MSIVs would close during these events due to RPS motor generator (MG) set coast down and de-energization. During the September 16,1996 event, the RPS remained energized and therefore the MSIVs did not go shut until an operator, in error, de-energized the RPS buses. As stated in the evaluation, the UFSAR description does not reflect the current design. The evaluation states that while the off. site consequences are increased they are still below the 10 CFR Part 20 limits.
The inspector reviewed calculation JAF-CALC-RAD-00055, which evaluated the potential radiological consequences of the event under selected bounding conditions. This calculation was the second of two calculations and included primary coolant activity at the power uprate technical specification limit. The calculated dose determined in both calculations were well within the limits of 10 CFR Part 20 limits and for either scenario (old and new activity limits) the licensee determined that approximately four RCS coolant masses would have to be released to reach the 10 CFR Part 20 limit.
The inspector reviewed the safety evaluation which assessed the acceptability of manual action to close the MSIVs during specified anticipated operational occurrences which involve a loss of offsite power (LOOP) or a loss of power to station auxiliaries. The safety evaluation discusses design of the balance of plant steam lines with regards to the rupture disc actuation. The steam supply to the second stage reheaters taps off the main steam lines between the MSIVs and the BPVs. The two motor operated stop valves are intended to isolate the moisture separator reheater (MSR) during start-up and shut down and are normally open during plant operation. They are powered off of non-vital switch gear and hence closure is not feasible following a LOOP. Therefore with these valves open the evaluation states that the stearn paths were a major contributor to the rupture disc actuation and even if the MSIVs were closed at the beginning of the transient the integrity of the condenser could not be maintained.
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Conclusions The licensee initiated two action commitment tracking system (ACTS) items Nos.
22815 and 23893 to evaluate the transient response of plant systems and prepare a nuclear safety evaluation to prescribe actions required during loss of condenser vacuum. The ACTS items have been completed and concluded that the existing design is adequate and operator action to affect MSIV closure during AOO scenarios involving a LOOP, a loss-of-power to the station auxiliaries, or loss of circulating water will ensure the design criteria specified in the UFSAR are met. The safety evaluation further states that, while of economic interest, actuation of the rupture disc (s) is not a nuclear safety concern. The licensee is evaluating the potential for a plant modification which may reduce the likelihood of a rupture disc actuation. The issue will remain unresolved pending additional NRC staff review.
E8.3 (Closed) URI 50 333/95-08-01: 3D Monicore System software problems. During the return from the 1995 refueling outage, the licensee determined that the 3D Monicore program was not receiving traversing in-core probe (TIP) system data, in (
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order to permit the use of the computer program, which monitors and predicts certain core parameters, the licensee entered the TIP data manually, delaying the power ascension program several days although with no safety impact on the plant.
The licensee's root cause investigation determined that there was insufficient administrative control of the configuration of the system. Specifically, when a software upgrade to the system was performed in 1994,it removed certain
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directories that held needed information and the large memory requirements of the upgraded software challenged the capabilities of the computer system during certain routines, resulting in the program execution problems noted in 1995.
In response to this problem, the licensee implemented procedural requirements to check 3D Monicore changes in the cycle startup reactor physics test program.
Performance of the testing during the December 1996 startup demonstrated system acceptability. Responsibility for the configuration of the system was assigned to one work unit versus being shared among multiple work groups as occurred previously and the computer memory available was expanded. Also, the software quality assurance (SOA) program was applied to this system (i.e. the 3D Monicore software was installed before the SQA program was developed and new upgrades to this software were not captured by this program) and an SQA Coordinator assigned at FitzPatrick. An audit of the SQA program in early 1996 and the preliminary results of an external SOA audit in May 1997 were reviewed. The inspector noted that the latter audit identified a number of weaknesses in the SOA program which need to be addressed, but none that required immediate remedial action to meet NRC regulatory requirements or licensee commitments. The licensee is currently evaluating the recommendations posed in the external audit report, each of which are being tracked by multiple QA action items. Based on these findings, this unresolved item is considered closed.
IV. PLANT EyPPORT P3 EP Procedures and Documentation An in office review of revisions to the emergency plan (E-Plan) and implementing procedures submitted by the licensee was completed. Based on the licensee's determination that the changes do not decrease the overall effectiveness of the emesgency plan and after limited review of the changes, no NRC approval is required, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q). Implementation of these changes will be subject to inspection in the future to confirm that the changes have not decreased the overall effectiveness of the emergency plan. A list of the specific revisions examined during an in-office review of licensee procedure changes are included in Attachment 2 of this inspection report.
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S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities a.
Inspection Scone The security program was inspected during the period of August 25 28,1997 to determine whether the security program, as implemented, met the licensee's commitments in the NRC approved security plan (the Plan) and NRC regulatory requirements. Areas inspected included: a previously identified item: management support and audits; alarm stations and communications; training and qualification; and the vehicle barrier system, b.
Observations and Findinos One previously identified item (IFI), involving vital area access control of personnel, was closed based on the inspector's review of the corrective actions taken by the licensee to address the concern and discussions with security management.
Management support is ongoing as evidenced by adequate manning levels to permit effective program implementation and the allocation of resources in preparation of the upcoming Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) scheduled the week of September 15,1997. Alarm station operators were knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities and were not engaged with activities that would interfero with their response functions and audits were thorough and in depth. Security training was being performed in accordance with the NRC-approved training and qualification (T&O) plan and the training records were well documented.
Based on the inspector's observations and discussions with plant engineering and security management, the inspector determined that the licensee's provisions for land vehicle control measures satisfy regulatory requirements and licensee commitments.
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Conclusions The inspector determined that the licensee was conducting its security and safeguards activities in a manner that protected public health and safety and that the program, as implemented, met the licensee's commitments and NRC requirements.
S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S2.1 Alarm Stations and Communications a.
Insoection Scop _q The inspector reviewed licensee programs to determine whether the central alarm station (CAS) and secondary alarm station (SAS) cre: (1) equipped with apprnpriate alarm, surveillance and communication capability, (2) continuously manned by operators, and (3) use independent and diverse systems so that no single act can
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remove the capobility of detecting a threat and calling for assistance, or otherwise responding to the threat, as required by NRC regulations, b.
Observations and Findinas Observations t i CAS and SAS operations verified that the alarm stations were equipped with the appropriate alarm, surveillance, and communication capabilities.
-Interviews with CAS and SAS operators found them knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. The inspector also vedfied through observations and interviews that the CAS and SAS operators were not required to engage in activities that would interfere with the assessment and response functions, and that the licensee had exercised communication methods with the locallaw enforcement agencies as committed to in the Plan.
Additionally, the inspector evaluated the effectiveness of tite assessment aids, by
observing on closed circuit television (CCTV), a walkdown of the protected area.
The inspector determined that the assessment aids in.both alarm stations had excellent picture quality, c.
Conclusions The alarm rtations and communications met the licensee's Plan commitments and NRC requirements.
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SS Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification a.
Insoection Scope The inspector reviewed the licensee's security training program to determination whether members of the security organization were trained and qualified to perform each assigned security related job task or duty in accordance with the NRC-approved T&O plan, b.
Observations and Findinas On August 27,1997, the inspector met with tne security training coordinator and discussed training department enhancements and program initiatives implemented since the previous program inspection conducted in March 1997. In preparation of the OSRE scheduled for the week of September 15,1997, training has been actively involved in drill development, drill participation, and the development and performance of table top exercises to assist the security force members (SFMs) in their knowledge of tactical response and deployment. Additionally, many range improvement have been noted to enhance tactical weapons training.- On August 27,1997, the inspector observed a demonstration of the newly developed tactical weapons training course of fire and determined that the training would enhance the licensee's tactical response capability. Additionally, during the inspection, the inspector randomly interviewed a number of SFMs to datermine if
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thay possessed the requisite knowledge and ability to carry out their assigned duties, c.
Conclusions Security training was conducted in accordance with the T&O plan and was effective.
S6 Security Organization and Administration a.
inspection Scone The inspector reviewed selected areas of the security program to determine the level of management support for the licensee's physical security program.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed various program enhancements made since the last program inspection. These enhancements included extensive effort by plant management, and the operations, engineering, and maintenance departments to support the security depcrtment preparation for the September 1997 OSRE. Several of the enhancements included the procurement and installation of tactical response delay barriers, defensive positions, firing range improvements, and the procurement of new weapons for enhanced fire power.
The inspector reviewed the Security Manager's position in the organizational structure and reporting chain. The Security Manager reports to the General Manager Support Services, who reports to the Site Executive Officer. Additionally, the inspector noted that the access authorization and fitness for-duty (FFD)
programs, being safeguards related, report directly to the Security Manager, c.
Qonclusions Management support for the physical security program was effective. No problems with the orgsnizational structure that would be detrimental to the effective implementation of the security and safeguards programs were noted.
S7 Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities a.
Insoection Scoce The inspector reviewed the licensee's Quality Assurance (QA) report of the NRC-required security program audit to determine if the licensee's commitments as contained in the Plan were being satisfied.
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Observations and Findinag The inspector reviewed the 1997 QA audit of the security program, conducted May 27 - June 6,1997, (Audit No. A97-11J) and the 1997 QA combined audit of the access authorization (AA) and fitness for-duty (FFD) programs, conducted April 14 25,1997, (Audit No. A97-08J). The audits were found to have been conducted in accordance with the Plan and FFD rule.
The security audit report identified seven deviation / event reports (DERs) and six recommendations. One DER involved not documenting safegustds information training received by operations personnel, two DERs were related to preventive maintenance on security equipment and the remaining DERs were related to incorrect procedure classifications and record keeping practices. The combined AA/FFD audit identified four DERe. Two AA DERs involved failure to revise the
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and failure to input the required data into the PADS system and two FFD DERs were
= related to the notification and acknowledgement process for contractor information-and collection facility tweaknesses associated with privacy and confidentiality for the individuals being tested. The inspector determined that the findings were not indicative of programmatic weaknesses, and the recommendations would enhance program effectiveness. The inspector determined, based on discussions with security management and AA/FFD staff and a review of the responses to the findings, that the corrective actions were effective.
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Conclusions The QA audits were comprehensive in scope and depth, and the audit program was being properly administered.
S8 Miscellaneous Secuelty and Safety issues S8.1 Vehicle Barrier System (VBS)
a.
Insoection Scooq On August 1,1994, the Commission amended 10 CFR Part 73, " Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," to modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include the use of a land vehicle by adversaries for transporting personnel and their hand-carried equipment to the proximity of vital areas and to include the use of a land vehicle bomb. The amendments require reactor licensees to install vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems (VBSs), to protect against the malevolent use of a land vehicle. Regulatory Guide _5.68 and NUREG/CR 6190 were issued in August 1994 to provide guidance acceptable to the NRC by which the licensees could meet the requirements of the amended regulations.
A letter dated February 22,1996, from the licensee to the NRC forwarded Revision 17 to its physical security plan that detailed the actions implemented to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7),(8), and (9) and the design goals of
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-18 the " Design Basis Land Vehicle" and " Design Basis Land Vehicle Bomb." A NRC May,14,1996, letter advised the licensee that the changes submitted had been reviewed and were determined to be consistent with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and were acceptable for inclusion in the NRC approved security plan.
The inspector reviewed documentation that described the VBS and physically inspected the as-built VBS to verify it was consistent with the licensee's summary description submitted to the NRC.
This inspection, conducted in accordance with NRC inspection Manual Temporary Instruction 2515/132, " Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants," dated January 18,1996, assessed the implementation of the licensee's vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems, to determine if they were commensurate with regulatory requirements and the licensee's physical security plan, b.
- Observations and Findinos-The inspector's walkdown of the VBS and review of the VBS summary description disclosed that the as built VBS was consistent with the summary description and met or exceeded the specifications in NUREG/CR 6190.
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Conelyjliqa The inspector determiners that there were no discrepancies in the as-built VBS or the VBS summary description.
S8.2 Bomb Blast Analysis a.
Insoection Scope The inspector reviewed the licensee's documentation of the bomb blast analysis and verified actual standoff distances provided by the as-built VBS.
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Observations ?nd Findinos The inspector's review of the licensee's documentation of the bomb blast analysis determined that it was consisterit with the summary description submitted to the NRC.- The inspector also verified that the actual standoff distances provided by their as-built VBS were consistent with the minimum standoff distances calculated using NUREG/CR-6190. The standoff distances were verified by review of scaled drawings and actual field measurements.
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C_onclusion No discrepancies were noted in the documentation of bomb blast analysis or actual standoff distances provided by the as-built VBS.
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insoection Scope
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The inspector reviewed applicable procedures to ensure that they had been revised.
to include the VBS.
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- The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures for VBS access control measures,-
surveillance and compensatory measures. The procedures contained effe.ctive -
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controls to provide passage through the VBS, provide adequate surveillance and-inspection of the VBS, and provide adequate compensation for any degradation of the VBS.
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' Conclusions The inspector's review of the procedures applicable to the VBS disclosed no-
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' S8.4 : (Closed) IFl 50 333/97002 02: Licensee's control over vital area access to the control room. The inspector determined, based on discussions with security
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management and a review of records that contained status levels for control room access, that 70% of badged employees had vital area access for the control room.-
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During the discussions,-the licensee committed to review their vital area access
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control program and re-evaluate personnel access to all vital areas so that access is limited only to personnel who need to perform dut:'s in the specific areas.
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As of.this inspection, the inspector determined that the actions taken to reduce vital area personnel access only to personnel who need access to perform duties in
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specific areas _were' effective. The inspector noted that control room access had been reduced by 17% since the March 1997 inspection, and steps are being taken
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determined, that the corrective actions implemented by.the licensee to address the-above noted issue were reasonable, complete, and appeared to be effective.
= S8.5 LReview of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
A recent discovery _of a licensee operating its facility in a manner contrary to the UFSAR description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures, and parameters to the UFSAR description. : Since the UFSAR 'does not specifically include security program requirements, the inspectors
- compared licensee activities to the NRC approved physical security plan, which is
- the applicable document.- While performing the inspection discussed in this report,
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the inspe'ctor reviewed Section 6.2 of the Plan, Revision 18, dated December-3,1996, titled, " Surveillance." The inspector determined, by observations, that the assessment aids were installed and maintained as required la the Plan.
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F8 Miscelleneous Fire Protection issues F8.1 (Closed) VIO 50-333/95011-01: Inadvertent actuation of a fire protoction sprinkler in the 'A' reactor feed pump room. Inadequate procedure development and review led to the unanticipated actuation of a water sprinkler system over the reactor feed pump during fire protection system testing. The licensee determined that this violation was principally caused by a personnel error, with a significant contributor being the inadequate drawings in the system operating procedure (SOP) which did not reflect the as-built configuration of the systerr, due to a modification made to the system in 1988. The licensee subsequently revised the applicable procedures and the drawings in the SOP, performed a review of other equivalent procedures and eviewed the selection and certification of procedure reviewers. Their review of 10 percent of the modifications completed during the 1980-1989 time frame found no other drawings in the SOPS which were inaccurate. Senior management also met with all qualified procedure reviewers to reinforce management
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expectations regarding the thoroughness of reviews, procedure review philosophy and reviewer responsibilities. Based on these corrective actions and the isolated nature of this event, this violation is closed.
V. MANAGEMENT MEETINGS M1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspections results to members of the licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 16,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
X2 Review of UFSAR Commitments A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or parameters to the UFSAR description. While pe. forming the inspections discussed in this report, the inspector reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. An inconsistency was noted between the UFSAR wording and the observed plant practices, procedure and/or parameters and is described in section E8.2.
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ATTACHMENT 1 PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED kiG10121 M. Colomb, Site Executive Officer P. Brozenich, Operations Manager M. Leonard, Corporate Security Manager D. Lindsey, General Manager, Operations R. Korenski, Senior Elc.trical Engineer J. Maurer, General Manager, Support A. McKoen, Manager, Radiological and Environmental Services D. Ruddy, Director, Design Engineering T. Teiike, Security Manager D. Topley, General Manager, Maintenance D. VanDermark, Quality Assurance Manager A. Zaremba, Licensing Manager
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Attachment 1
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 37551 Onsite Engineering 62707 Maintenance Observations 61726 Surveillance Observations 71707 Plant Operations 71750 Plant Support 81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors Tl 2515/132 Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Onened
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50-333/97006-01 IFl Refuel floor smoke detectors have been out of service since 1993
50-333/97006-02 NCV Failure of licensed operators to complete all required licensed operator requalification training Closed 50-333/95008-01 URI 3D Monicore System software problems 50-333/95011-01 VIO Inadvertent actuation of a fire protection sprinkler in the 'A'
reactor feed pump room 50 333/96015 LER Design Error Allows Bypass Flow Path Around Offgas isolation Valvs 50-333/97002-02 IFl Licensee's control over vital area access to control room.
50-333/97006-02 NCV Failure of licensed operators to complete all required licensed operator requer.:ation training Discussed L
50-333/96006-02 URI Condenser response related to the September 16,1996 reverse power scram
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AA Access Authorization ACTS Action Commitment Tracking System ADO Anticipated Operational Occurrences AGP Abnormal Operating Procedure BWR Boiling Water Reactor CAS Central Alarm System CCTV Closed Circuit Television CFR Code of Federal Regulations CRS Control Room Supervisor DER Deviation Event Report E-plan Emergency Plan ESF Engineered Safety Feature FFD Fitness-Far Duty FR Federal Register GE General Electric IDS Intrusion Detection systems IFl inspection Followup Item IN information Notice IR inspection Report ISI Inservice Inspection IST Inservice Testing JAF James A. FitzPatrick LCV Low Condenser Vacuum LCO Limiting Condition for Operation LER Licensee Event Report LOOP Loss of Offsite Power MG Motor Generator MOV Motor Operated Valve MSL Main Steans Line MSIV Main Steam isolation Valves MSR Moisture Separator Reheater NCV Non-Cited Violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OSRE Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation PA Protected Area PADS Personnel Access Data System PM Preventive Maintenance QA Quality Assurance RCS Reactor Coolant System RO Reactor Operator RP&C Radiological Protection and Chemistry RPS Reactor Protection System SAS Secondary Alarm System
~SCFM Standard Cubic Feet per Minute SGTS Standby Gas Treatment System SFM Security Force Members SM Shift Manager SOP Standard Operating Procedure
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SQA-Software Quality Assurance -
ST Surveillance Test -
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Turbine Bypass Valve the Plan-NRC-Approved Physical Security Plan Tl?
Traversing in-Core Probe T&Q-Training' and Qualification TS Technical Specification
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- Turbine Stop Valve UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
-- VBS Vehicle Barrier System VIO Violation WR-
-Work Request
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ATTACHMENT 2 EMERGENCY PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES REVIEWED Document Document Title Revision Plan Appendix H
EAP 1.1 Offsite Notifications
EAP 8 Personnel Accountability
EAP 17 Emergency Organization Staffing
EAP-19 Emergency Use of Potassium lodide (KI)
EAP-42 Obtaining Meteorological Data
EAP-43 Emergency Facilities Long Term Staffing
SAP-3 Emergency Communications Testing
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