IR 05000333/1986099
| ML20154Q500 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 06/15/1988 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154Q489 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-86-99, NUDOCS 8810030418 | |
| Download: ML20154Q500 (55) | |
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ENCLOSURE 1 SALP BOARD REPORT (Amended)
i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPJIISSION
REGION I
SYSTEPATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-333/86-99 NEW YORK PCWER AUTHORITY JA"ES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ASSESSMENT PERIOD: December 1, 1986 to April 30, 1938 BOARD MEETIN3 OATE: June 15, 1988 bR ADObkbbOOOb33 O
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SUMMARY OF RESULT!
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A.
Overall Facility Evaluation
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The FitzPatrick facility continues to be operated in a conservative and
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safety conscious manner.
The site and corporate management have demonstrated their commitment to plant safety and reliability through the resources and programs directed at plant improvements.
These include new
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training facilities, a new plant computer system, a corporate engineering
reorganization, and preventive maintenance programs.
Throughout the plant
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staff, there exists a strong dedication, pride in ownership, and accountability for performance.
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Plant operations continues to be a strength. The lack of operator errors i
and the absence of plant trips caused by operators as well as a small l
number of lit annunciators is indicative of the safety perspective and
conscientious approach taken by operators.
The efforts to improve control i
room decorum and professionalism are noteworthy.
In the radiation prote: tion and chemistry areas significant program i
ieprovements were noted this period.
Following an extremity overexposure
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event early in the period (attributed to radiological program weaknesses),
i program oversight and adherence to procedures showed marked irprovement.
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j Program strengths noted were in the areas of respiratory protection and
training.
In the maintenance area licensee effort, to implement vendor manual updates and a preventive maintenance program are showing slow progress. Continued emphasis for timely implementation is necessary.
Increased attention is
j needed to improve work practices and procedural adherence in the maintenance i
area.
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The surveillance program satisfactorily implements a large number of test
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requirements to assure reliable equipment operation. Veaknesses continue i
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to be noted in the administration of testing programs.
In particular, the
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administrative controls for the Inservice Testing Program were found to be deficient due to limited staffing and lack of management attention.
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In the area of engineering support, limited staffing and lack of
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coordination of engineering ef forts have caused inconsistent performance.
Although actions have been taken to correct some of these deficiencies,
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continued management attention is required.
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The licensee continues to inplement a strong and effective security f
program.
The licensee's Emergency Preparedness continues to be of high i
quality; however, weaknesses identified in the areas of audits and j
protective action recce endations indicate a need for increastd in manage-t ment attention.
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In the licensing area, significant improvements have been noted. Manage-ment involvement has increased in this area and an improved attitude of cooperation was noted.
Increased attention is required to correct long standing deficiencies in the plant's Technical Specifications and assuring consistent technical quality of submittals.
A positive worker attitude and strong management commitment towards assuring quality have maintained the FitzPatrick facility on a positive
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performance trend.
Principal areas which require increased attention are engineering support, correcting discrepancies in Technical Specifications, and emphasis in the area of procedural control and adherence.
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Background i
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Licensee Activities The licensee began the assessment period with the facility operating at 90%
power, conducting an end of cycle power coastdown. On January 15, 1987, the plant was shut down for a scheduled three month refueling outage, which lasted until April 22, 1987.
During this outage, the licensee removed the i
recirculation loop discharge bypass lines, replaced the residual heat
removal-reactor water cleanup tee connection, replaced 6 neutron monitoring
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instrument dry tubes, replaced 18 power range neutron monitors, and replaced 20 control rod blades.
Following testing, a plant startup
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commenced April 22, 1987.
The plant returned to power operation on April
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30, 1987.
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Frcm the refueling outage until the next scheduled maintenance outage,
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normal power operation was interrupted by 6 unscheduled outages, lasting
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between one and four days.
The plant also operated at reduced power during
various periods due to equipment problems, low condenser vacuum, and t
restrictions while operating with 3 out of 4 main steam lines. On June 10,
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1987, the reactor tripped from 100% power due to the loss of 'A'
reactor i
feed pump. On July 10, 1937, power was reduced to near 70*4 to investigate
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12, 1937.
From July 13 - July 31,1987, the plant operated at reduced j
power (95-93*.) due to vacuum restraints caused by high lake temperatures.
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From August 1 - August 7, 1937, the plant operated near 75% due to the
availability of only 3 of the 4 main steam lines, due to a slow closing
time on one main steam isolation valve.
Power was raised to 8S% on August i
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7, 1937, following analysis of 3 steam line operation. After approval of
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an emergency Technical Specification Amendment, the plant returned to
normal 4 steam line operation on August 20, 1987, and subsequently returned
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to full power operation. On August 28, 1987, the reactor tripped following j
a turbine trip due to a generator load reject caused by a generator field
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ground fault. On September 7, 1937, the reactor tripped following a turbine trip due to a generator load reject, similar to the August 28
i event. On September 24, 1987, the reactor tripped due to a loss of the 'A'
reactor feed pump.
The plant restarted and operated near 60% power while
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troubleshooting the 'A' feedpump and returned to full power operation on
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October 11, 1987. On November 5, 1937, the plant reduced power to near 60*4
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to allow repair to 'B' reactor feed pump, In the process of increasing
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power af ter completion of the repair, the reactor tripped from 80*. power on November 8, 1937.
The trip was due to a recirculation pump speed controller failure. On December 9, 1937, the reactor tripped from 100%
power due to a false low reactor vessel level indication caQsed by
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personnel error during surveillance testing.
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The f acility was shutdown from January 9,1983, until January 23, 1983, for
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a scheduled r.aintenance outage. Major work accomplished during this outage involved replacement of sixteen control rod drive frechanisms, inspection of
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the torus coating, recirculation scoop tube modifications, and preventive
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maintenance on electrical equipment.
During the subsequent startup on January 23, 1988, a drywell inspection at 500 psig reactor pressure noted leakage from a reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system weld. -The plant was shut down, the RWCU system weld was satisfactorily repaired, and another reactor startup was conducted January 26, 1988.
The plant was operated at t
near full power throughout the remainder of the assessment period with a a
i reduction in power to near 60*; from March 14 - March 18,1987, to allow l
repairs to 'B' reactor feed pump.
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Section III.D provides a description (including NRC classification) of the
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cause of all reactor trips and unscheduled plant shutdowns during this
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assessment period.
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2.
Inspection Activities
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An NRC senior resident inspector was assigned for the entire assessment period; an additional resident inspector was assigned in December 1987.
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During a 17 month assessment period, the NRC expended a total of 3143 l
inspection hours equating to 2219 hours0.0257 days <br />0.616 hours <br />0.00367 weeks <br />8.443295e-4 months <br /> on an annual basis.
Functional
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area distribution of inspection hours is documented at the beginning of
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each individual functional area.
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During the period, three NRC team inspections were conducted in the
followine areas:
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Health Physics Appraisal i
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Environmental Qualification l
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Design Change / Modification, Maintenance, and QA/QC
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An NRC team also evaluated a routire, unannounced, full participation
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emergency exercise performed on December 15, 1937.
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Facility Performance _ Analysis Summary Last Period Dates:
12/1/85 - 11/30/86
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Present Period Dates:
12/1/26 - 4/30/88 Category Last Category This Recent Functional Area Period Period Trend
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Plant Operations 2, Improving
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Radiological Controls
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Maintenance
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Surveillance
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Engineering and Technical
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Security and Safeguards
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1 Declining
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8.
Training and Qualification
N/A Effect;veness'
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Licensing Activities 2. Declining
Improving
10. Assurance of Quality 2, Improving
Improving i
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I During the previous assessment period, training and qualification were
discussed unoer a separate functional area. During this assessment period, training will be evaluated in the appropriate functional areas and will not i
be considered as a separate area.
During the previous assessment period, this area com.bined Outage Management
and Engineering Supperi and was considered as a separate functional area.
During this assessment period, Outage Management will be evaluated in the
Maintenance functional area, and Engineering and Technical Support will be evaluated as a separate functional area.
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Unplanned Shutdowns, Plant Trips and Forced Outages Power Functional
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Date Level Description Cause Area 1.
06/10/87 100's Reactor trip Equipment Failure /:
Engineering due to reactor 6esign Problem Support vessel low Reactor Feed Pump level.
(RFP) A tripped (LER 87-08)
due to a seal failure while operating with the scoop tube positioners locked up.
06/10/87 Startup i
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03/28/87 100*4 Reactor trip
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N/A due to turbine Troubleshooting and trip caused by discussion with generator field vendor could not ground fault.
determine cause.
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(LER 87-12)
Following second
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event on 9/7, the phenomena discussed below was determined to be the cause. The ground was present
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only when the generator was on-line.
08/31/87 Startup 3.
09/07/87 1004 Reactor trip Aquipment Failure:
E N/A deposition of-t due to turbine trip caused by material on the generator field teflon insulation ground fault, tube of the exciter (LER 87-12)
rectifier bank for the turbine
generator resulted in a ground fault.
09/11/87 Startup
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UNPLANNED SHUTOOWNS, PLANT TRIPS AND FORCEO OUTAGES Power Functional No.
Date Level Description Cause Area
09/24/87 100%
Reactor trip Equipment Failure /:
Engineering due to reactor Design Problem Support vessel low Reactor feed Pump level.
(RFP) A tripped due (LER 87-17)
to high vibration while operating with the scoop tube
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positioners locked up.
09/25/87 Startup 5.
11/08/87 80%
Reactor trip Equipment Failure:
N/A due to Average High flux trip Power Range was initiated by Monitor (APRM)
a sudden Reactor High Flur Trip.
Water Recirculation (LER 87-18)
Sy: ten Pump speed increase caused by a random failure in the pump speed controller.
11/09/87 Startup 6.
12/09/87 100%
Reactor trip due Personnel Error:
Surveillance to a reactor While performing vessel low surveillance test level signal.
I&C Technician (LER 87-20)
trainee did not fully close reactor water level instrument isolation valve, resulting in a false reactor water low level transient.
12/10/87 Startup
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UNPLANNED SHUTDOWNS, PLANT TRIPS AND FORCED OUTAGES
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No Date Level Description Cause Area 7.
01/23/88 0%
During a startup Equipment Failure:
Engineering from a scheduled Installation Support maintenance outage deficiencies (within Construction a leaking weld on code requirements)
the Reactor Water plus cyclic stresses
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Cleanup System was were determined to found requiring a have caused a crack i
plant shutdown to in the weld.
repair.
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IV.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A.
Operations (1001 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00166 weeks <br />3.808805e-4 months <br />, 31.8%)
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Analysis During the previous assessment period, this functional area was rated as Category 2, improving. A marked improvement was noted in the plant operations with no significant personnel errors occurring during the period and two reactor trips from power. Other improvements were made in the area of control room professionalism and event critiques.
Poor performance on past replacement operator licensing exams was attributed to poor screening.
In addition, weaknesses were noted in the administration of the I
requalification program; however, this did not adversely affect plant operations.
Plant operations have continued to be a strength.
The operations staff l
continues to exhibit a safe and conservative approach to plant operations.
Management attention is highly evident and control room operators continue j
to demonstrate professionalism and dedication in the conduct of their duties. These are evidenced by the absence of plant transients caused by
operations personnel and the conscientious approach taken during plant l
startups and other evolutions.
t During this assessment, improvements continue to be made in this functional I
area.
Policies have been implemented to require formalized pre-shift briefings. Organization and control of work activities continue to be f
improved through better operation of the Work Control Center, which
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includes a computerized tagging system.
Changes to the control room, based
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on the Control Room Design Review, were implemented to improve the control t
room from a human factors standpoint.
These changes included new label (
plates for all equipment, which standardized the labeling and nomenclature,
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improved mimicking and demarkation of systems; and new annunciator windows, which incorporate standard nomenclature and format.
These changes have
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standardized the control room and nave given it a more professional appearance. A commendable effort to reduce the nutter of continuously lighted annunciators in the control room has resulted in having normally 3
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or 4 continually lit (out of a total of 800) in the control room. These initiatives are indicative cf the licensee's management commitment to l
improving plant operations, hone of the scrams which occurred during this period were caused by plant operators.
It was determined that the operators' actions to attempt to prevent scrams due to equipment malfunction were timely and correct.
Operators' actions during other operational events were also tirely, effective, and correct.
j During the previous period, procedures and procedural adherence were noted as being generally strong with minor exceptions that required plant management attention. Although improvements have been made, isolated cases of inar.tquate procedures or lack of procedural compliance were noted. Two
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examples involved a failure to follow procedures during radioactive liquid discharge and an inadequate procedure resulting in a recirculation pump trip during testing.
Continued emphasis in this area is warranted by plant management.
The operations department is staffed to its full complement, with a six shift rotation; there has been a low staff turnover rate. The operations staff works closely with other departments in recognizing, troubleshooting, and correcting deficiencies. A strong interface between departments provides for more efficient operations and good communications.
In addition, operations personnel take active roles in the review of modifications, implementation of inservice testing, and improvements in training.
Strong management involvement is evident throughout plant
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operations. Managers are involved in day-to-day operations, as well as
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plant problems.
Examples of managemant involvement include the identification of an unauthorized discharge during a log review and on-shift coverage during high activity periods, such as plant startup following maintenance outages, j
During this appraisal period LERs in general adequately described the major aspects of each event, failures contributing to the event, and the corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
The rcports were thorough, i
detailed, and easy to understand.
Sufficient details were given to provide
a good understanding of the event.
The licensee's review and corrective actions related to operational events were generally thorough and adequate to prevent recurrence.
In particular,
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the licensee displayed aggressive and conservative actions to test safety
relief valves following notification of a concern at another boiling water l
reactor. Detailed reviews and troubleshooting were conducted foll w t*g an
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unusual main generator ground fault problem which included an extei. ve i
startup testing phase to assure the cause had been identified following a second trip. Additionally, a detailed review was conducted following r
identification of a reactor water cleanup system weld leak to determine possible causes or other cracks.
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However, isolated examples of insufficient review or corrective actions
were noted. These involved the failure to fully determine the cause of a
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main steam isolation valve closure which occurred while the plant was shut
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down and ineffective corrective action to prevent a repeat of an emergency i
diesel generator actuation during transfer of house loads.
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Durtn; this assessment period, improvements continued in the training area.
t A r.ew training complex was nearly completed at the end of this assessment l
period. A rigorous program for simulator verification is in progress.
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addition, the licensee is incorporating recent detailed control room design
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review improvements, made to the main control rocm, into the simulator
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during construction.
The delivery of the simulator is scheduled for the sumer of 1933. An NRC requalification examination was administered to 10 operators to evaluate the requalification program based on previous weaknesses.
Six out of seven Senior Reactor Operators and one out of three w
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i Reactor Operators passed their respective requalification written
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examinations. All six Senior Reactor Operators and two out of three Reactor Operators passed their respective requalification operating examinations.
Based on the NRC criteria, the licensee requalification program is considered marginal, having six out of ten operators pass all portions of the examination. No generic weaknesses were identified. The licensee implemented corrective actions to address the specific deficiencies identified during the examination.
The good operating record of the plant is indicative of an effective requalification program.
One Fire Protection inspection was conducted during this SALP period. The licensee's Fire Protection program, including administrative controls, fire e
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brigade organi:ation, staff training, and surveillance and maintenance of Fire Protection equipment were found satisfactory. Associated records were
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well organi:ed and were easily retrievable.
Licensee audits of the station Fire Protection activities were conducted by trained and qualified individuals.
Concerns identified in the audits were properly dispositioned in a timely manner.
Housekeeping and material condition, in general, was considered above average, plant cleanliness was very good; however, equipment storage, scaf folding control, and control of equipment doors and covers were noted as needing improvement.
In sumnary, plant operations continue to be a strength. Operations eersonnel are knowledgeable, dedicated, and highly motivated toward safe
operations.
Licensee canagement promotes a safety conscious attitude and accountability for performance.
They are committed to improving plant performance as demonstrated by the importance placed in new training l
facilities and by inprovenents made to the control room.
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Conclusion i
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Board _Recengendations f
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1s 8.
Radiological Controls ad Chemistry (504 hours0.00583 days <br />0.14 hours <br />8.333333e-4 weeks <br />1.91772e-4 months <br />,16.0%)
1.
Analysis
i During the previous SALP assessment period, the radiological controls area l
was rated as Category 2.
Weaknesses included delayed responses to NRC i
findings and lack of management attention relative to conforming to i
radiation protection procedures.
During this assessment period, one health physics appraisal and three routine inspections were conducted.
Resident inspectors reviewed this area on a continuing basis. Three violations related to locked.high radiation
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area controls and audits were cited.
In addition five violations related
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to an extremity overexposure were cited.
Radiation protection
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continued to exist and impacted performance during the early part of this
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assessment period.
Tne licensee's inadequate supervision of radiation protection activities during the beginning of this assessment period may have contributed to several instances of personnel failing to follow i
procedures, and the extremity overexposure of an employee.
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overexposure occurred when a worker threw a piece of highly irradiated material back into the spent fuel pool when it was inadvertently removed
during cutting of instrument dry tubes.
Immediate program improvements were noted in this area after the overexposure incident.
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The radiological protection program is staffed with qualified personnel.
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previous problems associated with the lack of an health physics general l
supervisor were corrected near the beginning of this assessment period by the appointment of a well qualified and knowledgeable individual to this
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position.
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The licensee has shown increased responsiveness to NRC concerns during this (
assessment period.
Programmatic and equipment weaknesses identified in NRC (
inspection reports early in the assessment period were generally resolved by the end of the assessment period. A notable exception continues to be i
the radiological survey instrument controls and calibration facility, r
Although the facility is adequate to support normal plant operation, it is
'i severely taxed during outage conditions.
Daring this assessment period the individual frisking units located within j
the radiation controlled area were removed from service due to concerns l
expressed by hRC inspectors cencerning high background count rates in the
frisker areas. These were replaced with seven IFM-7 complete personnel j
contamination monitoring systets installed at the access control points.
j These coniters are state-of-the-art instruments and should facilitate
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detection of personnti contamination.
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The radiation protection training and qualification program for radiological and environmental services personnel was found to be very good. An initial training program has been established for all personnel and a continuing training program has been established for radiological and environnental technicians, These training programs have received INPO accreditation during this period.
The ALARA program is well organized with good management support and represents a program strength. ALARA reviews of planned work, completed work, and continuous exposure evaluation of work in progress are good.
Major projects that are in place or planned which will reduce exposure
include source term reduction through a complete primary system decontamination, installation of removable lagging, use of high radiation
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area video mapping, use of a drywell closed circuit television system, and use of a tele-dose monitoring system.
During the course of two inspections during this assessment period, the ALARA program was examined and found to i
be of consistently good quality.
The licensee's ALARA person-rem exposure goal for the site was 950 person-rem for 1937, a refueling year. Actual exposure accumulated was 940
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person-rem which continues to be high. Although the ALARA section was able
to plan and control many jobs well, inspectors observed instances of
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exarple, approximately 25 personnel were observed standing at the refuel f
guard rail in a 25 mr/hr area and watching the decontamination of the
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i cavity. Also, controls of work involving exposure were lax during the refueling outage (i.e. contamination of personnel during cavity
decontamination, unmarked containers with radioactivt material contributing l
to personnel unplanned exposure, and poor radiological controls of dry tube
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cutting cperation).
However, exposure goals for 1988 and beyond indicate a
much more aggressive approach to ALARA.
By 1990, the licensee's goal is
500 person-rem for a three year average.
This is ambitious considering the age and hfstory of the plant.
The program for external and internal exposure control, after the over-exposure incident, reflects an increased comitment to safety.
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strict adherence to radiation work procedures and radiation work permits.
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The respiratory protection prograt continues to be of high quality.
It is apparent that the licensee has placed a high priority on this program as
evidenced by effective respirator selection, training, issue, use, and maintenance practices.
I Licensee quality assurance audits of the radiation protection program were found to be technically sound and thorough.
The NRC identified one
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deficiency regarcing the lack of audits of the qualifications of radiation
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protection supervisors below the level of the Radiological and j
Environmental Services Superintendent, which was prcmptly corrected.
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Chemistry / Radiochemistry An extensive riant chemistry upgrade program was noted during the
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assessment period indicating a management commitment to improve performance
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in this area.
Corporate involvement in, and support for, the program were clearly evident.
Technically sound and thorough approaches to improve sampling and measurement capabilities, introduction of hydrogen water
chemistry and monitoring for control of intergranular stress corrosion
cracking demonstrated a clear understanding of the issues.
Chemistry staffing at the facility was adequate, fully cognicant of their duties and responsibilities, and knowledgeable of the licensee's sampling and analyses
procedures.
State-of-the-art analytical capabilities were provided, j
Analytical capability intercomparisons showed the licansee's analyses to be
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adequate with all results within agreement of NRC values.
Technicians t
demonstrated both theoretical and practical kncwledge of the operation of
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the equipment while attempting to resolve disagreements with NRC measurements. Adequate radiochemical capabilities were demonstrated by the
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licensee during a measurements intercomparison with NRC-supplied radioactivity standards.
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l Radioactive Waste Management
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Ihe licensee's radioactive waste managiment program was generally adequate.
The liquid and gaseous waste systems meet 10 CFR 50, Appendix I design I
objectives but the licensee takes a nore conservative approach treating all liquid waste before release and requiring th? offgas treatment system to be operational virtually at all times when the plant is operating. The l
licensee has adequate procedures for handling and discharging liquid and
gaseous effluents. Procedures address, as appropriate, valve line-ups, t
sampling and analysis, alarm and isolation setpoints and tracking of releases to ensure compliance with technical specification limits. In
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response to self-identified weaknes:es, the licensee has initiated a
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program to impro'ee the Offtite Dose Calculation Manual and related l
procedures to better address the Radiological Effluent Technical r
Specifications.
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Summary f
Several radiological program weaknesses noted early in this assessment I
pericd ray have contributed to an extre'nity overexposure of a worker.
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However, significant program improvements in the areas of program oversight (
and acherence to procecures were later achieved during this assessment l
period.
Increased responsiveness to NRC concerns, a good radiation
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protection training and qualification program, and further improvements in
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the ALARA program were noted.
Supervisory staffing levels were apprcpriate i
to ensure program oversight and effective implementation.
Subsequent to the extremity overexposure incident, there exists an increased ccmitment i
to safety and strict adherence to radiation work permits and procedures, j
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Programs for the control of plant chemistry and radioactive wastes are effective and indicate strong site and corporate management support for these two programs, 2.
Conclusion Rating: 2
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Board Recommendation
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C.
P_aintenance (571 hours0.00661 days <br />0.159 hours <br />9.441138e-4 weeks <br />2.172655e-4 months <br />,18.2*e)
1.
Analysis During the previous assessment period, the maintenance functional area was i
rated as Category 2.
Improvements were noted in this area with the absence of personnel errors and proficiency in properly completing work. Progress
,
'
i was generally good in implementing improvement programs. Procedural
[
compliance and root cause analysis ware areas where attention was warranted.
!
i The area of outage management was combined with engineering support during
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the previous assessment period.
This area was rated as Category 2 with
!
improvements noted in the planning and managing of two short outages (24
days total).
During this assessment period, outage management and maintenance are addressed under one functional area.
l
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During this period, three routine inspections were conducted covering l
activities associated with outage maintenance.
In addition,throughout the (
assessment period, the resident inspector frequently reviewed activities in
!
j this area, i
The licensee continued to make progress implementing the extensive
!
improvement progra:ns already begun. Although progress is slow, the scope (
'
and thoroughness of the programs and large volume of information needed
i makes this a difficult task. The Master Equipment List (MEL) was completed
,
during this period, and is the first key to the comprehensive preventive j
i maintenance program.
The licensee gathered all pertinent data i
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(manufacturer, drawings, nameplate) and assigned safety classification
'
(including basis) for 36,000 components. The next significant portion of l
l the program begun was the determination of preventive maintenance
.
requirerents. As part of this effort, the licensee began a program to
[
l validate all of the vendor technical manuals.
This effort is designed to I
]
ensure that the licensee's technical manuals are up to date with the
'
a vendor's latest revision and any other information, p'.us gather information
concerning recommended maintenance, spare parts, and drawings.
$
In 1983 (Generic Letter 83-28), the NRC requested that all licensee's
!
upgrade or confire their MEL and validate their vendor supplied
!
inferration, including the appropriate technical manuals.
The NYPA efforts l
l described above, although slow and indicative of limited resources, are
[
responsive to these issues, The licensee is comitted to completing the
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update of vendor manuals by Deceeber 1983.
l Ouring this period, eaintenance personnel continued to exhibit a good safety perspective concerning the potential 1.mpact of their activities on
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j pisnt operation. This is evicenced by the absence of plant transients or l
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equipment failures attributed to personnel error during eaintenance.
'
l Maintenance personnel generally exhibit pride and professionalism in the condu:t of their activities. Management involvetent in and control of the l
quality of maintenance was evicent by icequate planning and prioriti:ation j
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of maintenance activities including ample QA/QC coverage for these activities.
Individual responsibilities and authorities are well defined for control of maintenance activitics. Maintenance staffing is adequate to perform the existing work load, with a very low turnover rate. During the 1987 refueling outage, three maintenance supervisors, thirty-four craft personnel, and containment integrated leak rate testing consultants were added to support the maintenrnce activities.
Generally, maintenance personnel conduct work activities in a quality manner, as noted during replacement of an emergency diesel generhter turbocharger, calib-ation of instrumentation, and during the generator ground troubleshooting.
However, several examples of poor workmanship or practices were noted.
These involved inadequate troubleshooting which failed to recognize a low control oil pressure and corrective maintenance l
which damaged a valve operating cylinder of a High Pressure Coolant i
Injection system, insufficient testing of reactor mode switch in all modes,
!
failure to tighten fasteners for a L1mit7rque valve operator switch ccmponent, and continuing maintenance problems for reactor feed pumps.
Although these are considered isolated occurrences, they indicate a need for more effective supervision.
In addition, although the licensee's program implementation for control of measuring and test equipment is generally satisfactory, three instances of not recording test instrument usage were found. Although some improvement in p mcedural adherence was observed, continued euphasis should be placed in this area. Two examples of inattention to procedJres were noted during Standby Liquid Control pump maintenance involving system tagout recommendations and inattention to the
expiration date of the procedure.
During this period, a refueling outage of 105 days and a planned outage for plant maintenance of 14 days were conducted.
This was the first refueling outage under the recently established Planning and Contract Services Department and Work Control Center.
Irrprovements were evidtnt in the planning, scheduling, and control of activities under these newly established programs. Work progressed smoothly and problems were effectively communicated and resolved. The licensee took prompt corrective action following an overexposure incident on the refuel floor, and conducted extensive analysis and review of a missing Control Rod Blade roller guide ball, and the failure of bolts in the High Pressure Coolant Injection Turbine.
During the 1987 refueling outage, it was observed that the licensee made a I
concerted effort to produce quality welds by training welders in the use of
the automatic welding equipment. However, review of other welding activities indicated poor judgment or lack of technical support for not
!
properly evaluating the adequacy of the welding requirements involving
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dissimilar metal joints. This is indicative of a need for more supervisory oversight in this area.
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_ _. _ _ _ _ _. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.. _ _ _ _. _.... _. - _ _ _ -..
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______ ____________ _ _-_ ___ ____________ ____________-- _________ _ _______ ______________ _ _.
__ __
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Improvements continue to be made in training of personnel, Benefits from
'
implementation of the four year apprentice training program are, in i
general, evident in the conduct of work activities.
The licensee
effectively utilizes mock-ups of equipment in training personnel.
INPO accreditation was received in December 1987 for the maintenance training i
program, Management's commitment to improvements in performance is
!
evidenced by the emphasis placed in the training of personnel, In summary, the maintenance program is adequately staffed with well-trained i
and experienced personnel. Slow, steady progress is being made on a very
,
comprehensive maintenance program, although continued emphasis is required to ensure timely completion. Management attention should be focused on
'
improving supervisory oversight to ensure proper workmanship and procedural j
compliance,
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2.
Co_nclusion l
Rating: 2
3, Board Recommendations Licensee: Expedite upgrading the preventive maintenance program including validation of vendor manuals.
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D.
Surveillance (406 hours0.0047 days <br />0.113 hours <br />6.712963e-4 weeks <br />1.54483e-4 months <br />,12.9'4)
!
1.
Analysis During the previous assessment period, this functional area was rated as
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Category 2.
A strength noted was the lack of personnel errors during
l testing.
Improvements were noted in the procedures which fall under the l
inservice testing (IST) program, including providing for a thorough review
,
of data by the operator and the addition of the acceptable values.
However review o' data by plant performance personnel was, at times, excessively
,
slow.
Increased management attention was warranted in the area of program
'
a administration, as evidenced by three missed surveillance tests,
!
!
During the current assessment period, inspections were conducted in the
j areas of containment local leak rate testing (LLRT), containment integrated l
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leak rate testing (CILRT), and inservice testing of pumps and valves.
The
'
resident inspectors reviewed routine surveillance activities regularly.
,
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The licensee surveillance program is, in general, technically adeeuate and l
sufficiently controlled.
Each department is responsible for scheduling,
tracking, and performing their own surveillance testing. Approximately
[
j 5000 surveillance tests were completed during this assessment period. The j
scheduling and tracking of surveillance tests utili:es computerized i
systems. Procedures generally are clearly written and suf ficiently j
detailed for ef fective implementation.
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l Ore reactor scram and three Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuations I
J occurrad while conducting surveillance testing during this assessment j
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period.
The cause of the scram was mainly due to personnel error in that l
l an instrument isolation valve was not tightly shut.
Following shutting of
!
!
the valve by the technician trainee, a very small amount of valve novement
!
(apprcximately 1/16th of a turn) was found by a supervisor, durirg initial
[
'
review of the scram. During followup investigation of the trip, this
occurrence was verified.
Contributing to this event is the fact that these i
,
valves are original plant equipment and require a slightly larger amount of
"
torque to fully close, due to years of operatten.
Two of the three ESF
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i actuations were reactor core isolation cooling system isolations; bath
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j involved personnel error.
The third E5F actuatien involved a core spray
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l system and emergency diescl generator start during 19tegrated leak rate
[
i testing; this occurred due to a procedural inadequacy involving lifted
!
In addition, isolated cases were identified, by the NRC, where
)
. surveillance test procedures were in error or confusing.
These were t
promotly corrected by the licensee.
In general, cperators and technicians i
readily identify and correct surveillance test inadequacies during performance of testing activities, j
i Training of Instrucent and Control (I&C) Technicians, who are involved in a j
large portion of the surveillance testing, is considered to ta a strergth j
as indicated by the small number of plant transients or equipment failures j
j caused by surveillance testing.
Irprove nent? were made in this area i
j throughout the assessment period.
Iepl e entation of the four year l
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i
I apprentice training program has improved the technicians overall
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l performance.
Except as noted above, the I&C department on-the-job training
l for technicians involved in surveillance testing assures personnel are
,
l adequately trained prior to becoming responsible for conducting testing.
l Plant management's increased attention and emphasis on training indicate a
commitment to improved perfurmance.
!
l During the previous assessment period, three surveillance tests were missed
'
or late; two of which were missed due to surveillance test scheduling inadequacies.
Following these missed surveillances, the licensee took prompt action to strengthen their administrative controls through increased
-
audits and improved tracking programs.
In this period, two Tec'.nical
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Specification surveillance test requirements were identified by the
!
licensee as being missed.
These sur,elllance test problems were of little i
or no safety significance. One ins-ved the f ailure to calculate drywell i
lesk rate during cne four-hour per-This occurred while the plant was
,
shut down preparing for a reactor.urtup and instrumentation was operating
!
to detect any abnormal leak rate.
The second missed surveillance test was i
a TS required test of the standby gas treatment system during secondary
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leak rate tests (normally once per cycla). This requirement had been
overlooked and had never been Acheduled at the plant because these tests
'
have also been performed on a six month interval as required. Although
'
these two examples of missed surveillance tests occurred, overall
!
improvement in the scheduling and tracking of required surveillance tests j
was noted.
t Administrative controls for LLRT were good. Positive aspects of this control included individual acceptance criteria for valves, good record i
leeping of LLRT results, and a good tracking system for valve raintenance.
!
Management involvement and control of LLRT activities, and response to NRC
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concerns and initiatives were satisfactory, which was reflected through the
!
licensee's effective performance of the control rod drive removal hatch l
stal test ard LLRT. H: wever, it was observed that, although the QA
!
personnel had conducted LLRT surveillances, no evaluation of the LLRT program was performed.
The licensee recognized the concern and instituted
l an LLRT effectiveness audit.
!
In the area of CILRT, the licensee's technical staff demon trated good
'
kocA edge and cov etency in CILRT methodology and test performance.
The licensee hired a CILRT consultant who collected test data, analyzed the i
test to.its and provided technical assistance.
The progress of CILRT l
prepamtics and execution were discussed daily by the licensee managemert i
anc tec eical staft Huever, administrative control of the test and its
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related activities appeared weak in seme areas.
The test director did not
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have co*plete control over test preparation or containment access prior to
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the test. The operations and !&C departments worked independently of the
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test director and ne was not apprised of the status of such preparations as l
CILRT sensor installation and operability, and valve lineup.
In one
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instance, the I&C department accessed the containment to check a cewcell and upon exiting could not secure the equalization valves properly. This l
led to large leakage during p.*essurization. This lack of adainistrative
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control was also evident in another instance during the initial containment pressurization for the test when incorrect leads were lifted which a:tuated emergency diesel generators and the core spray system.
During the previous period, the review of data by plant performance personnel following the test was, at times, excessively slow.
Administrative controls have adequately addre a d this concern, however, continued ineffective contro! and implementation of the IST program indict i poor management oversight of the program.
Lack of proper
=11oc.
'n of resources, including staffing, and lack of attention tn 11. and review of the test activities were identified.
Test entation and corrective action were also inadequate.
Two specific sinterns were identified: (1) failure to follow IST procedures, and (2)
failure to verify and document the acceptability of the new High Pressure Coolant Injection pump reference data, per ASME Section XI.
These instances indicated inconsistency in data recording and general program implementation, which were attributable to the lack of formal methodology to generate and retain test data, and inattention to details by the cogni: ant test reviewer. Many of the IST program implementation related changes were made on-the-spot without appropriate safety committee review and attention to details.
This contributed to lack of reference to differential pressure in the test program, lack of incorporation of Alert and Required Action values in the test reports, and existence of various transposition errors in the test reports, including stroke times, valve designation, and white-out of test data.
These deficiencies indicate a lack of management attention to the IST program.
In summary, the licensee continues to implement an adequate surveillance program. Although improve'nents have beer: made in some areas, weaknesses continue in program administration. These are noted by inadequate staffing in the IST program area and deficiencies in the management involvement and administrative control of the IST and CILRT programs.
Personnel are well qualified and conscientious: however, continued emphasis needs to be placed in procedural control and adherence.
2.
Conclusion Rating:
3.
Board Recomendation Licensee:
Review IST program and evaluate reasons for continued inef fectiveness in program administrations, w
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E.
Engineering and Technical Support (323 hours0.00374 days <br />0.0897 hours <br />5.340608e-4 weeks <br />1.229015e-4 months <br />,10.3%)
1.
Analysis This area was not evaluated as a separate functional area in the previous assessment, but was discussed under the functional area of Outage Management and Engineering Support.
In the previous period, this area was rated as a Category 2.
Although the engineering support group generally performed well in assuring technical adequacy of modifications, several inadequacies noted required the need for increased manageme'
attention.
During this assessment period, this functional area addresses the adequacy of technical and angineering support for all plant activities, including Jasign of plant modifications and engineering support for operations, outages, maintenance, and surveillance.
The engineering support evaluation for this period is based on four inspections which covered the licensee's Equipment Qualification (EQ)
program implementation, evaluation of the pipe supports per NRC Bulletin
79-14, plant design changes and modification activities, and drawing control activit'es.
In addition, the resident inspector reviewed this area throughout the assessment period.
The plant technical services depart. ment is resporsible for reviewing and designing modifications, resolving plant engineering problems, administering the EQ program, and supplying engineering support as needed.
The major modifications installed in the plant for most of this period were originated and controlled from the utility's corporate office in White plains, New York.
in addition, an Operations and Maintenance Support group located in the corporate office assists in providing engineering support to the facility.
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During this assessment period, the performance in this area was inconsistent.
The technical services department continues to be staffed with dedicated, knowledge 0ble, and industrious personnel. This department is actively involved in significant improvement programs, which include the Master Equipment List, procu.ement programs, motor operated valve performance enhancement, and 69velopment and implementation of new design change control program procedures from a corporate level.
The engineering support organization demonstrates the ability to adequately control major modifications, complete minor plant nodifications, and provide support on
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an as-needed basis.
Examples of timely and effective completion of
,
modifications include: installt. tion of the new plant computer system and i
piping removal and replacement.
In cddition, numerous modifications in the radioactive waste systems and main controi room (recorders and instrumentation) were effectively implemented.
In support of plant r oblems, noteworthy performance was demonstrated in review of operation g th 3 of 4 steam lines, analysis of a reactor w3ter cleanup system cracked weld, and follow up and analysis of plant trips and transients.
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However, instances where the licensee's design and engineering were not properly reviewed and coordinated and analyses which lacked depth or proper documentation were also noted. Numerous deficiencies were noted in the modification to upgrade the automatic depressurization system pneumatic supply. Examples where the licensee's analysis or documentation lacked details included determining effects on the residual heat removal system components due to missing check valve internals, documenting the test pressure of a hydrostatic test of the core spray system, and analysis of pitting on the core spray system piping.
In addition, some long-standing engineering problems have been slow to be resolved.
In particular, a problem with the recirculation pump speed control circuit contributed to 2 scrams during this period.
This problem nas existed since 1979; several fixes were attempted since that time, however, they had been unsuccessful.
In September, 1986, an engineering review, which made use of information from other sites, identified a modification to correct the problem.
This modification was installed in January 1988 and has corrected the speed control problem.
In January 1988, a licensee reorganization took place to strengthen the engineering organization.
Portions of the previous Engineering and Design group were placed under the nuclear generation department.
This change was made so that all activities, including engineering, will fall under the cognizance of one department and are intended to improve communications,
,
management, and control of the activities at the nuclear facilities.
In addition, a new field engineering group was added at the FitzPatrick site
<
which reports to the corporate office.
Their role is to assist in the engineering of major plant modifications which originate from the corporate
'
i office.
This group is staffed with 4 engineers, who previously worked for the plant's technical services department and 4 contractor engineers; it
provides the interface and work area for engineers from the corporate office during their site visits.
Their main function is to review and assist in major modifications and provide an interface with the plant, assuring the modifications accurately reflect tne as-built plant and input any operating experience.
This group's efforts has allowed the technical services engineers to focus their efforts in supporting minor modifications and day-to-day support of plant activities.
The EQ i.,spection identified a lack of active site management involvement to address and resolve EQ issues.
In addition, limited staffing and expertise were available to properly review, evaluate and comply with the
EQ requirements in a timely fashion.
The technical service department, l
which has the responsibility for the E0 program, assigned three individuals, including the department supervisor, to establish and implement the EQ program and maintain station equipment qualification within the guidelines of 10 CFR 50.49.
Several concerns were identified, The licensee could not establish qualification of several EQ related components prior to the November 30, 1935 deadline, and did not provide an operability statement (justification for continued operation).
The j
licensee relied heavily on consultants to respond to the NRC concerns; EQ
,
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e
files consisted of the consultant's review of specific EQ components.
This resulted in a lack of self-sufficiency and an inability to resolve the plant specific EQ concerns on their own.
In the area of drawing control, improvements have been noted in reducing the backlog of drawings awaiting update to final as-built conditions.
However, examples of drawings not yet updated where the modifications had been completed over two years ago still exist. Additionally, minor discrepancies are continuing to be identified in the control of drawings.
Altnough improvements have been made and discrepancies found are of minor significence, continued attention is warranted in the control of drawings.
In summary, station engineering support has been adequate.
Deficiencies have been noted in the quality of modification packages; however, the corporate management has taken measures to improve the communication and control of engineering from the corporate level.
From the site engineering group, performance has been inconsistent; this appears to be due to heavy workload of on-site engineers.
Efforts should be continued to improve the effectiveness of the engineering support organization.
2.
Conclusion Rating:
3.
Board Recommendations Licensee: Evaluate the adequacy and use of site staff in the engineering support area to ensure a high level of performance.
NRC:
Perform followup inspection of EQ program open issues including the licensee oversight of the program,
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F.
Security an_d Safeguards (126 hours0.00146 days <br />0.035 hours <br />2.083333e-4 weeks <br />4.7943e-5 months <br />, 4.0*4)
1.
Analysis During the previous SALP, the licensee's performance in thir area was Category 1.
That rating was influenced by the licensee's responsiveness to NRC concerns, initiatives to review the ef fectiveness of the program, acquisitions of state-of-the-art systems and equipment, and continued support for the program from corporate and site management.
During this assess, tent period, two routine unannounced physical security inspections were conducted.
Routine inspections by the resident inspector continued throughout the period.
One violation was identified during the period.
Corporate security management continued to be actively involved in all site security orogram matters, including visits to the site by the corporate staff to provide assistance, program appraisals and direct support in the budgeting and planning processes affecting program modifications, upgrades and program plan changes.
Security management personnel are also actively involved in the Region I Nuclear Security Association and other industry groups engaged in nuclear plant security matters.
This demonstrates program support from upper level management.
As in past SAlp periods, the licensee continues to utilize a self-appraisal program which is independent of NRC's required annual security program review.
This licensee initiative allows management to identify potential problems early and take action to prevent their occurrence.
This program, ccmbined with the licensee's annual program review, is a contributing factor in the success of the program and reflects management's commitment to a high quality and effective program.
The annual review of the security program, performed by the licensee's quality assurance group, was made more comprehensive in scope and depth than previous reviews at the licensee's initiative; it placed more emphasis on the detailed requirements of the NRC approved Security, Contingency, and Training and Qualifications Plans.
Corrective actions on deficiencies identified during the annual reviews were prompt and effective with adequate follow-up to ensure their proper implementation.
There were no security events that required reporting under 10 CFR 73.71 during the assessment period.
Review of the licensee's event reporting procedures found them consistent with the NRC's revised regulation (10 CFR 73.71) and implemented by personnel knowledgeable of the reporting requirements.
As during the previous SALP periods, management and training of the proprietary security force continued to be effective, as evidenced by a low personnel error rate, low turnover rate, high morale and a professional attitude toward job performance by members of the security force.
Staffing of the security management organization and the security force is adequate as indicated by the limited use of overtime.
The security force training
,
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and requalification program is well developed and effectively administered.
This is apparent from the excellent job knowledge demonstrated by members of the security force during interviews by NRC personnel.
In addition to the initial and requalification training, a self-appraisal program measures the retention and proficiency of individuals with regards to general and specific security program requirements between qualification periods.
The licensee also conducted numerous Safeguards Contingency Plan drills during this assessment period to esercise members of the security force in emergency procedures, however there was very little indication of participation from the operations organization. When this was brought to the licensee's attention, plans were promptly made to conduct joint drills for contingency events.
During the period when a vital area door was found in an unlocked condition by the NRC, immediate compensatory measures were taken and the corrective actions were prompt and extensive.
Even thougn, in the case cited, the detection aid was still operable, the licensee took the initiative to change all vital area door locks to a type that will prevent recurrence of the problem.
This is further evidence of the licensee's desire to implement and maintain an effective high quality security program.
There were four revisions to the licensee's security program plans submitted to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.54(p) during this assessment period.
The plan changes were clear and concise, with detailed explanations of the reasons for change. This is indicative of knowledgeable personnel and adequate management oversight of submittals to the NRC.
In summary, the licensee continues to manage and implement a security program that is effective and goes beyond regulatory requirements and security plan commitments. Licensee initiatives, responsiveness to NRC concerns, and support for the program were readily apparent during the assessment period and combined to provide evidence of a high quality program.
,
2. Conclusion:
Rating:
3. Board Recommendation:
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None m
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L ment period, the licensee was rated Category in this area, based on information gathered during observation of a part i
participation exercise, review of the Emergency Preparedness (EP) tr ining program, and support of off-site emergency activities.
During this assessment period, there were two unannounced, rout e, safety inspections and observations of the annual exercise.
During
.e inspections, it was noted that Emerg u y Response Facilities ERFs) were adequately maintained and Emergency Preparedness procedure, equipment, training and training records were current.
About 85*; of the 550 full time, on site NYPA personnel are qualified for one or m e of the emergency response organization positions.
Three or four full tivation drills are conducted annually in addition to a number of partia activation drills.
During requalification training, licensed operator are given eight classroom hours of EP instruction, plus another e'ght hours on simulator.
The effectiveness of this training was demonstr ed by the results of walk-throughs with licensed, senior operators ualified as Emergency Directors (ED).
These operators were well t ined and o pable of
,
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discharging ED responsibilities correctly.
Communications and computer systems wer functional.
The Safety Parameter Display Systems (SPDS) was installed a d used during the last exercise. A new, dedicated Emergency Operations F cility (E0F) was built, having an area of about 2500 square feet, and is located beyond the ten mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
NRC review of the findings of dependent reviews / audits required by 10 CFR 50.54(t) disclosed that EP p sonnel gave the auditors their exercise i
observation assignments and racked their findings, which is contrary to the requirement for indep.dence of the auditor. Additionally, the auditors reviewed off-si e interfaces for adequacy but failed to notify the County of results unti this was called to their attention by the NRC.
During this assessm t period, the licensee reduced staffing support in the EP area by one tec.nical position.
The site emergency planning coordinator is supported by r e professional and one administrative assistant.
This reduction has e potential to negatively impact performance and coordination this area.
Observatio s of en unannounced, off-normal hours, full participation, exercise ndicated that, although the licensee could implement the energen plan and implementing procedures adequately, performance was not as strsng as in previous exercises. Observations indicated protective acti n recommendations (PARS) were sometirres in error, or reviewed af ter tr-smittal to the State and County.
This is attributed to a lack of 1.adership within the Health Physics group at the Er ergency Operations
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30(A)
G.
Emergency P_reparedness (212 hours0.00245 days <br />0.0589 hours <br />3.505291e-4 weeks <br />8.0666e-5 months <br />, 6.8%)
_
1.
Analysis During the previous assessment period, the licensee was rated Category 1 in this area, based on information gathered during observation of a partial participation exercise, review of the Emergency Preparedness (EP) training program, and support of of f-site enrgency activities.
During this assessment period, there were two unannounced, routine, safety inspections and observations of the annual exercise.
During the inspections, it was noted that Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) were adequately maintained and Emergency Preparedness procedures, equipment, training and training records were current. About 85% of the 550 full time, on site NYPA personnel are qualified for one or more of the emergency l
response organization positions.
Three or four full activation drills are i
conducted annually in addition to a number of partial activation drills.
'
Ouring requalification training, licensed operators are given eight classroom hours of EP instruction, plus another eight hours on simulator.
The effectiveness of this training was demonstrated by the results of walk-throughs with licensed, senior operators qualified as Emergency Directors (EO).
These operators were well trained and capable of discharging EO responsibilities correctly.
,
CoTmunications and computer systens were functional.
The Safety Paramet7r
'
Display Systems (SPDS) was installed and used during -he last exercise A
new, dedicated Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was Ld it, havino an area of about 2500 square feet, and is located beyond the ten mile Energency Planning Zone (EPZ).
NRC review of the findings of independent reviews / audits required by 10 CFR 50.54(t) disclosed that EP personnel gave the aucitors their exercise observation assignments and tracked their findings, which is contrary to the requirement for independence of the auditor. Additionally, the auditors reviewed off-site interfaces for adequacy but failed to notify the County of results until this was called to their attenticn by the NRC.
Observations of an unannounced, off-normal hours, full participation, exercise indicated that, although the licensee could implerent the erergency plan and implementing procedures adequately, performance was not as strong as in previous exercises.
Observations indicated protective action recommendations (PARS) were sometimes in error, or reviewed af ter transmittal to the State and County.
This is attributed to a lack of leadership within the Health Physics group at the Emergency Operations (
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Facility (E0F). Otherwise, there was good command and control as well as communication within and among Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs).
ERF activation was timely.
Emergency worker doses were well controlled.
In summary, while the licensee maintains commitments to Emergency Preparedness resulting in an adequate program, weaknesses identified above indicate a reduction in management attention to this area.
2.
Conclusion Rating: 1 Trend: Declining 3.
Board Recommendations:
Licensee: Improve administration of protective action recommendations including dose assessmen e
.
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I H.
LICENSING 1.
Analysis In the previous SALP assessment, a Category 2 rating with a declining trend
-
was given to this functional area.
Communications and spirit of cooperation with the NRC were noted as the principal areas where licensee improvement was needed.
During the current assessment period, a more active participation on the part of corporate management has been evident in the area of licensing.
Management has been cognizant of the status and priorities of current and anticipated licensing actions, both licensee-initiated and NRC-initiated, and utilizes an expanded, automated commitment tracking system to assist in
'
their oversight. Additionally, there has been increased communication during this period between the licensee and NRC at the corporate Vice-President level concerning licensing activities.
In December 1986, the licensee completely revised its procedure concerning the preparation, review, and control of submittals to the NRC. As a result, the licensing staff has been given increased authcrity to assign work to other organizations and to better control its adequacy and timeliness. Also,
<
under a recent management reorganization, the engineering and design function for Fit: Patrick has been assigned to the Nuclear Generation Department. As a result, resolution of problems occurring between the
'
licensing staff and the engineering / design staff, which previously needed to be handled interdepartmentally, is now simplified.
In the previous SALP evaluation, it was noted that corporate and station management had not directed sufficient attention toward correcting errors and upgrading some confusing sections of Technical Specifications (TS).
During the current SALP period, no significant progress has been made in this area. Although a large number of TS orrors were identified by the
,
I licensee early in the rating period, an amendment request to eliminate
these errors has not yet been submitted. A majority of the errors are i
,
typographical in nature; however, there are several cases where TS are ambiguous, inconsistent, or have wording which does not clearly reflect their intent.
Though none of the identified problems, per se, represents a direct or immediate safety concern, this situation may complicate the day-to-day implementation of the TS by operating personnel, Ouring this assessment period, examples of inadequate TS concerning minimum Emergency i
Core and Containment Cooling System availability while shut down,
'
conflicting TS in the case of spiral offload, and inattention to TS surveillance requirements involving standby gas treatment system were also identified.
In addition, several longstanding inadequacies including the TS table concerning containment isolation valves and containment integrated leak rate test acceptance criteria continue to go uncorrected.
Although in the final few months of this rating period, the level of activity devoted to rectifying this situation has increased, these problems (
demonstrate a lack of sensitivity to the accuracy and clarity of TS from a l
licensing standpoint.
However, the plant operating staff has been l
attentive in irrplementing TS requirements.
.
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-.
.
.
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m
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L A second area where additional management attention is needed is in assuring consistency in the technical quality of licensing submittals.
Evaluation of the licensee's approach to the resolution of the technical issues, as related to licensing activities, is based on an assessment of the technical quality of various licensing documents submitted, as well as on the licensee's priorities for scheduling these submittals.
During the current rating period, variability in the technical quality of licensing submittals has been evident.
For the most part, the licensee has presented clear and substantive descriptions and evaluations of the relevant issues, thus minimizing the need for requests for additional information and resubmittals.
Examples of high quality submittals include the reload TS amendment request and the Intergranular Granular Stress Corrosion Cracking I
(IGSCC) evaluations submitted in support of the 1937 refueling outage.
In certain instances, however, the licensee has not provided adequate technical justification to support its position.
System / component reliability data, based on plant operating history, which would have clarified the licensee's arguments, were not utilized.
Examples are the TS regarding operability of the control room emergency filtration system, and the responses concerning the recirculation pump trip aspect of the anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) rule. Additionally, there were
,
several cases where weak justification was provided for the licensee's no
,
significant hazards determinations. An example of this is the analysis i
submitted as part of the amendment request regarding license conditions for handling nuclear material. With respect to setting priorities for resolving safety-significant issues, the licensee's performance has been satisfactory overall.
Notwithstanding the need for increased attention to TS improvement and l
assuring the technical quality of submittals, licensee management has exhibited a greater involvement in managing and directing licensing
.
activities Jaring this rating period than in the past.
In the past three SALP evaluations, it was noted that improved performance was sought concerning the licensee's responsiveness to NRC initiatives.
,
During the current rating period, the licensing staff has exhibited notable improvement in its cooperation with the NRC.
As a result, there have been fewer impediments to conducting day-to-day business.
The licensee has
,
shown a greater willingness to provide schedules for licensing submittals,
'
has kept the staff better inforred on the progress of various activities, and has responded to requests for information in a more timely manner.
Additionally, submittals required to support refueling outages or other major activities have, in general, been timely and have been discussed with
-
the NRC in advance.
There have been isolated cases, however, where submittals were sig,11ficantly delayed. A case in point is the additional information required to support an amendment request regarding containment purge / vent valves.
,
i Staffing levels for the licensing group are adequate and have remained i
i constant (at nine persons) from the beginning of the rating period until
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January 1988, when one engineering position became vacant following a reorganization.
The licensee plans to fill this position in the near future. Presently, the entire licensing staff is situated at headquarters.
Communications between the licensing staff and the plant appear strong, with frequent project meetings held on site and a morning conference call held daily.
During this rating period, adequate resources have been allocated to training of the licensing group.
In addition to annual requalification training, ALARA training, computer sof tware training, and training in writing and communications, certain members of the licensing staff received more specialized technical training.
This included a 3-day Probabilistic Risk Assessment course, a one-week simulator course, and EQ training.
In addition, during the last refueling outage, two licensing engineer. vere sent to the site for a two-month period to assist in refueling operations.
In summary, during this rating period, licensee management has demonstrated
-
a more active involvement in licensing activities and generally satisfactory performance in resolving technical issues.
In addition, the licensing group is adequately staffed and trained and has exhibited an improved attitude of cooperation with the NRC. Additional management attention, however, should be directed toward TS improvement and assuring consistent high quality submittals.
,
2.
Conclusion Rating: 2 Trend:
Improving 3.
Board Recommendations None i
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I.
Assurance of Quality 1.
Analysis Assurance of Quality is a summary assessment of~ management oversight and effectiveness in implementation of the quality assurance program and administrative controls affecting quality.
This functional area is not an assessment of the quality assurance department alone, but is an overall evaluation of the licensee's initiatives, programs, and policies which affect or assure quality.
It also assesses the attitude and performance of plant staff personnel.
This functional area was rated as Category 2, improving, during the previous assessment period.
Strengths noted were the active role of the Quality Assurance Department in assuring quality at the facility and the aggressive attitude displayed by plant management in improving the quality at the facility. Weaknesses noted were the slowness in implementing programs and corrective actions, and lapses in the requalification training program, root cause analysis, and procedural adherence.
Various aspects of this area were routinely reviewed as part of the NRC routine inspections.
In addition, an NRC team inspection assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's quality verification activities.
The licensee has maintained a high emphasis on quality throughout all levels of the organization.
This is exemplified by the plant management's continuing efforts to improve communications throughout the site organization.
Efforts include: meetings with all station personnel to discuss plant and industry problems and promote a quality conscious attitude; training sessions for all station personnel which have improved overall radiological practices; implementing an employee feedback program; and conducting routine meetings between supervisors and department staff. Although additional attention needs to be focused in some areas (as noted in the particular functional areas) and isolated problems occur, an excellent worker attitude and approach to performance of duties is evident by the lack of personnel errors.
Corporate and plant management continue to strive for excellence and foster improvement in performance throughout the organization.
For example, more frequent and better quality critiques of events are being performed with more worter involvement in the critique.
Approximately 30 individual plant goals have been set with these goals extending over a 3 year period to
track long term improvement.
Individual tasks have been developed to help
'
achieve these goals. Many of these goals are tracked on a monthly basis with some posted for all personnel to review.
The above actions are aimed
-
at making long lasting improvements through increasing the awareness and pride of ownership through each individual.
Management has also demonstrated their commitment towards plant improvement in other areas.
The completion of a new training complex, including plant specific simulator, installation of a new plant computer, reduction of the i
number of lit control room annunciators, implementation of Hydrogen Water
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O
Chemistry program, significant efforts to detect and mitigate IGSCC, equipment upgrade for local leak rate improvements, motor operated valve performance enhancement programs, improvement in the procurement area, and planntd construction of a new warehouse and maintenance facilities are examples of this commitment. Reorganization of the corporate engineering staff is indicative of management's active role in identifying and taking action to correct weaknesses.
Progress, although slow, has been noted on some of the licensee's long term improvement programs.
In particular, the Master Equipment List has been completed and training conducted on use of the computerized system, and the vendor manual validation program has begun. Although these are longstanding concerns, the licensee is following an extensive and detailed planned maintenance program approach.
This approach includes developing detailed procedures for establishing component classification, closely monitoring of the vendor to assure the desired product is achieved, and conducting extensive material history reviews and equipment reliability studies to formulate a preventive maintenance schedules.
The licensee is expending a large amount of effort to ensure the job is done right the first time to assure a quality product with long term benefits.
Management involvement has also been demonstrated by increasing the effort to get supervisors into the plant, providing oversight by assigning management coverage of outage activities and plant startups, and implementing lessons learned, throughout the organization, from an overexposure incident.
The Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) continues to take an active role in reviewing plant events and safety evaluations. Noteworthy performance was identified during review of the personnel overexposure, generator field ground problems, and the reactor water cleanup system cracked weld.
Safety evaluations for plant modifications were found to adequately address the basis for determining whether an unreviewed safety question existed. However, two examples were noted where a formal safety evaluation was not written for changes made to the facility.
In these examples the PORC had considered the safety impact of the changes made.
l The site quality assurance (QA) organization has continued to play an active role in assuriag quality at the plant.
The QA department has established open lines of communications with plant management and all levels of the plant staff and interacts daily with these individuals.
During regional based inspections, management support to assure quality in the area of inspection and examination was found to be satisfactory.
This was evidenced by the addition of contracted QC personnel who more than tripled the site QC staffs.
In addition to the regular QC inspection, the
,
licensee has introduced another level of QC overview, monitoring of safety-related activities.
The QC overview was further enhanced by an on going update of the QA audit program.
A liberal use of technical i
specialists is a noteworthy feature of this audit program.
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The licensee's warehouse controls and conditions are satisfactory.
The enveloping of other than large items in a porous transparent wrap is an example of the licensee's action to improve quality of storage.
Concurrently, the procurement has also improved as evidenced by strengthened controls. The requirements, as established in the source documents such as FSAR, the plant Technical Specifications, and industry standards, are incorporated in tha procurement document.
In the area of LLRT and CILRT, QA/QC interfaces have been good. QA provided extensive coverage of the test program, including preparation, initiation and performance of the tests.
The test personnel and QA individuals were knowledgeable of test methodology and demonstrated conscientious efforts to complete the test professionally.
The QA department communicated effectively with the cognizant test groups to resolve QA findings, including general procedural compliance and tagging of the containment isolation valves.
The above are indicative of an improvement in the licensee's QA/QC interfaces in the areas of audits, inspection, and testing.
Overall, the site and corporate management is doing an effective job of identifying and correcting problems and programmatic weaknesses as described above. As discussed in each of the appropriate functional areas, attention is warranted in improving performance in the review of and corrective actions for events, improvements of Technical Specifications, and surveillance program administration.
In addition, efforts should continue to be placed in resolving long standing problems and concerns, such as NRC open items, and the implementation of minor plant modi fica tion s.
A professional and conscientious attitude is displayed by all members of the plant staff.
Free and open communications are encouraged with outside organizations, including the NRC.
The licensee takes a very self-critical and conservative approach towards their activities and performance.
This was demonstrated by testing of Safety Relief Valves, on their cwn initiative, following problems identified at another facility and the prompt and extensive corrective actions following the overexposure incident.
In summary, there exists a sensitivity to Assurance of Quality throughout management and plant staff personnel of the FitzPatrick facility.
The management has demonstrated a conservative approach to operation and instituted numerous irprovement programs.
Continued attention is warranted in the areas of engineering support and Technical Specifications.
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2.
Conclusion Rating: 2 Trend:
Improving 3.
Board Recommendations None r
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V.
SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES A. Investigations and Allegations Summary During this assessment period, a total of three allegations were received and reviewed by the NRC. One was directed towards the Department of Labor and unsubstantiated. Of the remaining two, one was unsubstantiated and the other partially substantiated.
B.'
Escalated Enforcement Actions An Enforcement Conference was held on March 25, 1987, to discuss numerous violations identified from the event on February 13, 1987, leading to the occupational extremity radiation exposure of a contract worker in excess of NRC quarterly limits. A Notice of Violation was issued on March 11, 1987, detailing five instances of violations, citing an aggregate Severity level III and cumulative 575,000 civil penalty.
C.
Management Conferences The management meeting for the previous SALP period was held'on April 15, 1987, in the NRC Region I Office, King of Prussia, PA.
On January 29, 1988, a meeting was held at the NRC Region I Office, King of Prussia, PA. at the licensee's request to discuss plant performance and prngrams, future plans, and a recent reorganization of the corporate engineering department.
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TABLE 1 INSPECTION HOURS SUMMARY
'
AREA HOURS
% OF TIME Operations 1001 31.8%
Radcon/ Chemistry 504 16.0%
Maintenance / Outages 571 18.2%
surveillance 406 12.9%
Engineering 323 10.3; See/ Safeguards 126 4.0%
Emergency Preparedness 212 6. 8*.'
Licensing
,
Assurance of Quality
,
l
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TOTALS:
3143 100%
Hours expended in the area of assurance of quality are included in
j other functional areas, thereforo, no direct inspection hours are given for these areas. Operator licensing activities are not included
,
'
with direct inspection effort statistics.
Hours expended in facility licensing activities are not included in
,
direct inspection effort statistics.
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!
. - -
.
-
-
-
. -
.
-
- -
. - - - -
- -
-.
- -
.
-
-
- - - - - - -. - -
- -. - - -.
.
.
l
l TABLE 2 l
ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY A. Violations Versus Functional Area By Severity level Functional No. of Violations in Each Severity Level Area LI*
V IV III II I
Total
Plant Operations
2
.
i Radiological Controls
1"
i Maintenance and Outages
1
$
Surveillance
1
Security and Safeguards
1 Assurance of Quality
3 J
l Licensing
i Engineering and
3
Technical Support i
j TOTALS
_
_
_
_
, _
_
'
'
5
1
0
1
)
i
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- LI - Licensco Identified Violations (10 CFR 2, Appendix C)
i
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- 5 violations in aggregate were considered to be a severity level i
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!!! violation.
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TABLE 3 LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS Cause Determined by SALP Board An assessment has been conducted to determine the root cause of each event from the perspective of the NRC.
The causes fell into the following categories and sub-categories.
Personnel Errors (PE)
1.
Lack of Knowledge (LK) - the individual was not properly trained or provided with instructions from supervision.
2.
Inattention to Detail (10) - the individual failed to pay proper attention to a task and was careless.
3.
Poor Judgement (PJ) - the individual failed to make the correct assessment with the proper amount of training and attention to facts.
Equiement Malfunction / Failure (EM/F)
1.
Random (R) - isolated component problem not of generic concern.
2.
Design Deficiency (00)
poor design was the cause of the malfunction / failure.
3.
Construction Deficiency (CO) - improper installation during construction / modification caused or could have caused the malfunction failure.
Maintenance Deficiency (MO) - improper preventive or corrective maintenance.
P_rocedural Error _(PROE)
The procedure failed to provide adequate instruction, was poorly worded or was not properly reviewed for use Ineffective Corrective Action (ICAl Action was not taken by management or the action taken on a previously identified item was not timely or did not correct the root cause and allowed this occurrence.
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TABLE 3 (Cont'd)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS Causes As Determined By The Licensee The licensee is required to include cause codes in the reports. These codes are only required when equipment malfunction or failure is determined to be the cause of the occurrence.
The following codes are used:
A - Personnel Error B - Design, Manufacturing, Construction or Installation C - External Cause D - Defective Procedures E - Component Failure X - Other i
)
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- TABLE 3 (Cont'd)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS Summary of Cause Determined by SALP Board by Functional Areas CAUSE OPS RAD MAINT SURV ENG/TS SEC QA TOTAL
.,
PE/LK
1 i
PE/ID
1
7 PE/PJ
EM/F/R
3
EM/F/00
2
EM/F/CD
1 EM/F/MD
4 PROE
1
4 t
2
TOTAL
1
7
2
Sum. mary of Causes of Equipment Malfunctions / Failure Determined by Licensee
-
Area A
B C
D E
X TOTAL i
Assurance of Quality
1
,
Surveillance
1 Maintenance
1
8
,
Operations
2
-
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TOTALS
2
1
8
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TABLE 3 (Cont'd)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS SALP LER Number /
Cause Deternined Functional Cause Code *
Event Date Description SALP Board Area 86-19 **
11/12/86 Automatic PE/ID - Technician Surveillance Actuation of failed to check test an Engineered equipment readiness Safety before commencement
'
Feature of activities.
(Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Isolation).
86-20 12/21/86 TS Violation:
0E/10 - Radwaste Operations
'
Unauthorized operator did not release of ensure discharge radioactive permit requirements liquid.
were met prior to commencing discharge.
86-21 12/23/86 High Pressure EF/00 - Battery Engineering Coolant Motor Control Support Injection Center was not
,
System water tight
'
inoperable allowing intrusion due to water of water, intrusion into Battery
,
Motor Control t
Center.
!
87-01 01/18/87 Excessive EF/MD - Cause of Maintenance
'
X leakage of failures was Primary attributed to wear, Containment licensee is Isolation developing program Valves during to review failures
,
J LLRT.
and maintenance histories of the failed components to develop preventive maintenance recommendations.
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-. - - --
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TABLE 3 (Cont'd)
LIC~NSEE EVENT REPORTS SALP LER Number /
Cause Determined Functional Cause Code *
Event Date Description SALP Board Area 87-92 02/13/87 TS Violation:
PE/ID - Deficiencies Rad. Control
'
Extremity included inadequate overexposure, radiological surveys, training, poor pre-job planning failure to follow procedure.
87-03 02/19/87 High Pressure EF/MD - Failure Maintenance B
Coolant mechanism of the Injection bolts caused by Turbine high bolt hardness throttle and contributed by valve bolts pitting due to use broken, of copper antiseizure compound.
87-04 02/04/87 Three of six EM/DD - No apparent Maintenance X
Main Stem reason for setpoint Safety Relief drift other than Valves sticking of one of setpoints the pilot valve disc.
found out of tolerance.
87-05 04/01/87 Main Steam EM/MD - Sten packing Maintenance X
Line leakage from main Isolation, steam differential pressure isolation valves allowed instrument depressurization creating a simulated high steam flow resulting in PCIS actuatio ~.
.
TABLE 3 (Cont'd)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS SALP LER Number /
Cause Determined Functional i
Cause Code *
Event Date Description SALP Board
. Area 87-06 04/07/87 Core Spray rROE - Procedure did Surveillance and Emergency not give adequate
'
Diesel instructions to Generator ensure proper Automatic electrical leads Actuation due were lifted.
to procedure
<
deficiency.
87-07 04/09/87 Reactor EM/CD - During Assurance of A
Vessel Head construction Quality vent piping supports were not inoperability installed as due to required by plant
missing pipe drawings.
<
supports.
,
87-08 06/10/87 Low reactor ICA - Reactor Scram Engineering vessel water caused by operating Support level scram with scoop tube due to positioners locked
-
Reactor Feed up, losing the Pump Trip, ability to receive f
while an auto recirculation operating system runback on a
'
i with scoop loss of feed pump,
'
i tube j
positioners locked up.
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87-09 06/11/87 Emergency EM/00 - During Engineering l
Diesel transfer of loads Support
'
Generator voltage drop start due to sufficient to a
temporary activate degraded protective system a
voltage before operator
"
condition action could corr *ct during bus voltage.
l transfer, i
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- -
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-
-
- -
-
-
-
-
- - - -
-
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TABLE 3 (Cont'd)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS
-
SALP LER Number /
Cause Determined Functional Cause Code *
Event Date Description SALP doard Area
'
87-10 07/23/87 High Pressure EF/R - Auxiliary Maintenance i
B Coolant oil pump bearing Injection failed resulting inoperable in lower discharge due to pressu-e.
Cause of j
Auxiliary failure was not Oil Pump determined,
low pressure.
'
87-11 07/28/87 Fire Barrier PROE - Previous Assurance Electrical procedures for of
-
Penetration inspection of fire Quality
,
Seals not barriers failed to installed.
contain unscheduled penetratioas.
87-12 08/28/87 Reactor Trips EF/R - Teflon Maintenance 09/07/87 due to Main insulation tubes had Turbine trip a cupric oxide layer
'
,
caused by buildup which under generator certain electrical
field ground, conditions becomes
fully conductive.
i 87-13 09/05/87 Reactor Core EF/R - The trip Operations
X Isolation unit and transmitter
!
Cooling were replaced.
Vendor
!
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System analysis could not
Isolations determine a cause
'
!
due to of the spurious trips.
I spurious
,
Analog
Transmitter i
Trip Unit trip.
87-14 09/12/87 Emergency ICA - Corrective Operations Diesel actions taken to Generator prevent recurrenee j
start due to of this event were j
temporary inadequate (see
-
daaraded t.ER 87-09).
l voltage during
]
bus transfer, i
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- -
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- - - -
. -.
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a
TABLE 3 (Cont'd)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS SALP LER Number /
Cause Determined Functional Cause Code *
Event Date Description SALP Board Area
,
87-15 09/16/87 High Pressure EM/MD - Malfunctional Maintenance X
Coolant because of foreign Injection material deposits inoperable on internal float i
due to mechanism.
t unstable
'
suppression l
chamber level
,
switch.
i 87-16 09/16/87 High Steam FE/IO - Operator Surveillance
'
i flow failed to follow Isolation prescribed sequence
,
i of Reactor of surveillance Cere test procedure, t
Isolation i
Cooling J
System due l
to operator error.
R7-17 09/24/87 Reactor low ICA - Reactor scram Engineering
level scram caused by operating Support follcwing with scoop tube feed pump positioners locked
trip on up, losing the
!
high ability to receive i
vibration.
an auto recirculation system runback on loss
,
i of feedpump.
!
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-
-
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O
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TABLE 3 (Cont'd)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS SALP LER Number /
Cause Determined Functional Cause Code *
Event Date Description SALP Board Area 87-18 11/8/87 High Flux EF/R - Recirculation Operations X
Reactor Trip System Speed Controller due to malfunctioned; reactor water suspected cause was an recirculation age effect, controller system pump was replaced with a sudden speed spare unit.
increase.
87-19 12/7/87 TS Violation:
PE/IO - Responsible Maintenance Failure to supervision did not perform ensure that the Standby Gas specified Treatment survaillar ce test Surveillance was performed as Test as required.
required.
87-20 12/9/87 Reactor Trip PE/LK - Technician Surveillance X
from low failed to fully water level close an isolation actuation valve prior to caused by valving in test i
personnel equipment.
error during
^
surveillsnce test.
'
87-21 12/13/87 Reactor Water PROE - Bol'.
Maintenance Cleanup torquing
'
Isolation pro:edure on High was inadequate, temperature causing improper due to flange m:Leup, inadequate resulting in a procedure.
steam leak which resulted in system isolation on righ room temperature, d
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TABLE 3 (Cont'd)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORTea
SALP LER Number /
Cause Determined Functional
_Cause f;de Event Date Description SALP,, Boa _rd Area a
87-22 12/20/87 TS Violation:
PE/ID - Operators Surveillance i
Failure to failed to perform perform surveillance test
.
J drywell at required leakage rate frequency,
,
i surveillance
'
at required i
frequency.
i 90-01 03/10/88 High Pressure PR" - Maintenance Maintenance O
Coolant procedure did not Injection include evaluation System of relubrication of
-
inoperable of the valve stem a
due to motor and stem nut during operated maintenance causing valve failure motor operated valve
),
as a resul t failure due to
procedcre excessive current.
deficiency.
88-01 03/10/88 Reactor Core PE/ID - I&C Surveillance
.
Isolation technician performing Cooling the assigned task did
Autonatic not follow the Isolation prescribed procedure; during there was no copy of Surveillance the procedure Testing as a utilized, which led result of to the wrong trip
'
personnel not unit placed in test, following procedures.
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TABLE 3 (Cont'd)
L1CENSEEEVENTREPORTS SALP LER Number /
Cause Determined Functional Cause Code *
Event Date Description SALP Board Area 88-03 04/18/88 Engineered EF/R - The relay coil ' Operations X
Safety is normally energized Feature and had been in Actuations service for thirteen due to loss
)nars. No similar of Reactor problems with this Protection type relay.
System power supply caused by relay failure.
Indicates licensee's cause code for equipment failures only.
- Event occurred during previous assessment period.
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UNITED STATES eo
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j -
- ,g NUCLEAR REZULATCRY COMMISSION o
ENCLOSURE 2 RE210N1
.g
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o a
478 ALLENDALE MOAD
[
KING oF PRuSSI A. PENNCyLVANIA 19408
....*
07 JUL 1888 Docket No. 50-333 Fower Authority of the State of New Yerk James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant ATTN: Mr. J. P. Bayne President
,
123 Main Street White Plains, New York 10601 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP):
Report No.
50-333/86-99.
An NRC SALP Board conducted a review on June 15, 1983 to evaluate the performance of activities associated with FittPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
The results of this assessment are documented in the enclosed SALP Board report. A meeting will be scheduled to discuss this assessment.
This meeting is intended to provide a forum for candid discussions relating to your performance during the period.
At the meeting, you should be prepared to discuss our assessment and your plans to improve performance.
In particular, you should be prepared to discuss your planned actions relative to evaluating the effective use of resources:
specift-cally, staffing in the areas of engineering and technical support, (including l
Inservice testing and environmental qualification) and emergency planning.
l Any comments you may have regarding our report may be discussed at the meeting.
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Additionally, you may provide written comments within 30 days after the meeting.
We appreciate your cooperation.
- Sincerely, William T. Russell Regional Adm:nistrator Enclosure: As Stated
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ENCLOSURE 3 i
l Attendees at FitzPatrick Management Meeting
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(July 21, 1988)
Nuclear Regulatory Commiss' -
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W. Kane, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (ORP)
W. Johnston, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety (ORS)
i S. Collins, Deputy Director, DRP E. Wenzinger, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2, ORP R. Capra Director, Project Directorate I-1, NRR J. Johnson, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2C, DRP
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W. Lazarus, Chief. Emergency Preparedness Section, DRSS
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C. Anderson, Chief, Plant System Section DRS
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j W. Pasciak, Chief. Effluents Radiation Protection Section, DRSS
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j A. Luptak, Senior Resident Inspector FitzPatrick, ORP j
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H. Abelson, Licensing Project Manager FitzPatrick, NRR l
i R. Plasse, Resident Inspector FitzPatrick, ORP i
M. Banerjee, Project Engineer 2C, DRP
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l M. Weber, Radiation Specialist, ORSS
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l New York Power Authority
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I J. Bayne, President
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J. Brons, Executive Vice President - Nuclear Generation
A. Klausmann, Senior Vice President Appraisal and Compliance Services
i R. Beedle, Vice President Nuclear Support i
l S. Zulla, Vice President Nuclear Engineering
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R. Burns, Vice President Operations
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R. Converse, Resident Manager FitzPatrick
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l W. Fernandez, Superintendent of Power
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L. Guaquil. Director Project Engineering FitzPatrick j
J. Kelly, Director Radiological Health and Chemistry i
F. Pesce, Director Quality Assurance
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J. Gray, Director Nuclear Licensing - BWR
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j R. Lauman, Director Operation and Maintenance - BWR i
C. Patrick, Director Nuclear Information
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D. Lindsey, Operations Superintendent
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R. Patch, Quality Assurance Superintendent j
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j A. Zaremba, Emergency Planning Coordinator
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