IR 05000333/1988004
| ML20153D786 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 04/22/1988 |
| From: | Eapen P, Hunter J, Prividy L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20153D763 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-88-04, 50-333-88-4, NUDOCS 8805090289 | |
| Download: ML20153D786 (14) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-333/88-04 Docket No.
50-333 License No.
DPR-59 Priority Category C
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Licensee: Power Authority of the State of New York
>TO Box 41 Scriba, New York Facility Name: James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At:
Scriba, New M Inspection Conducted:
February 22-26, 1988 Inspectors: Q o k_f gg.2/f(
. G. I unter III,Teactor Engineer, DRS dite h faAM h 6 h3pj.jj'
. J. Prividy, Reador Engineer, DRS dste Approved by:
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Dr. P. K. Eapen, Chief, Special Test date Programs Section, EB, DRS Inspection Summary:
Inspection on February. 22-26, 1988 (Inspection Report No. 50-333/88-04
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Ag as Inspe n d: A routine unannounced safety inspection of the licensee's implementation of the Inservice Test (IST) Program for Pump and Valves was i
conducted by two region based inspectors on February 22-26, 1988.
Results: The inspection findings indicate that the administration of the IST program is not being controlled as it was intended.
Inconsistent program implementation and an inattention to detail in documenting the program are j
indicative of the inadequate time and resources being expended.
The inspectors also identified a concern with the implementation of the corrective action i
program. Management attention through evaluation is necessary to ensure that adequate measures are taken to effectively implement the IST and Corrective Action programs.
Two violations were identified during the inspection, and are discussed in sections 2.2 and 4.2 respectively. The first violation for failure to follow procedures involved six examples of the IST program not being imple-mented in accordance with PS0 31, "lST Program for Pumps and Valves".
The second violation involved the failure to verify and document, in accordance 8805090289 880429 PDR ADOCK 05000333 O
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with ASME Section XI, IFP-3111, that new HPCI 23-P-1M pump reference values represented acceptable pump operation.
Four unresolved items were also identified during the inspection and are discussed in sections 3.0, 5.2 and 6.2 respectively. The first unresolved item involves various aspects of the IST program which are not consistent with current NRC staff positions. These items will be addressed during the formal NRC review of the licensee's second 10 year interval IST program.
The second unresolved item deals with the adequacy of testing performed on parallel pump discharge check valves.
The third unresolved item deals with confirmation of the adequacy of the safety review performed pertaining to identified problems with the Emergency Service Water (ESW) check valves.
The fourth unresolved item identifies an NRC concern with the informal program in use for escalation of corrective action requirements regarding QA findings.
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted Power Authority State of New York
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"R. Converse, Resident Mana e-
- W. Fernandez, Superintendent of Power
- H. Friedman, Inservice Inspection Engineer J. Kerfien Quality Control Supervisor
- 0. Lindsay, Operations Superintendent
- J. Lyons, Perforiance and Reliability Supervisor
'D. Patch, Quality Assurance Superintendent
- J. Prokop, Quality Assurance Engineer
- V. Walz, Technical Services Superintendent United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- A. Luptak, Senior Resident Inspector
- R. Plasse, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those in attendance at the exit meeting held on February 26, 1988.
Other licensee Operations, Technical Services, and QA/QC personnel were also contacted during the course of this inspection.
2.0 Administration of IST Program 2.1 General Program Review and Implementation
The licensee is currently implementing its second 10 year interval IST program for safety related pumps and valves.
The program is officially titled the "James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant l
Inservice Testing Program for Pumps and Valves, Second Inspection Interval, Revision 0, Dated November 15, 1985".
This program was submitted to the NRC in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a.
It commits to ASME Code,Section XI, 1980 Edition through Winter 1981 Addenda. An NRC safety evaluation report has not yet been issued for this program interval.
The key elements of the IST program are the pump and valve tables which contain symbols, notes and related information to describe the required testing for the pumps and valves.
The licensee has compiled these tables and associated information into five (5) controlled manuals and distributed them to the ISI Coordinator, Operations, Maintenance, Quality Assurance and Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection end Insurance Company. The user groups implement the IST program in
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accordance with Plant Standing Order (PS0) 31 and the instructions of the various surveillance test procedures (STPs).
The STPs are structured to include testing requirements and acceptance criteria
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of both the Technical Specifications and IST Program. The Operations Department schedules and conducts the STPs. Most of these tests are performed monthly which is more conservative than the normal quar-terly test frequency required per ASME Section XI.
P50 31 is an administrative procedure which defines the guidelines for IST data
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collection and review to meet the requirements of ASME Section XI.
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The procedure includes specific instructions which define the responsibilities of plant personnel and the required format for the pump and valve data sheets.
In practice, the Inservice Inspec-
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tion Coordinator (ISIC) extracts the test data from the STPs and transcribes the data onto the IST data sheets.
The inspectors performed detailed reviews of various completed
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STPs for procedure content and to determine the adequacy of the actual pump and valve test data taken during prior tests.
This STP information was reviewed from an overall IST programmatic standpoint i
and more specifically as it pertained to the pump and valve portions of the program. The inspectors determined that, from an IST program-i matic standpoint, the licensee was generally performing the required testing within the required frequencies.
The required IST data was being obtained and reviewed, however, the specific findings given below inoicate that further management involvement in controlling the IST program implementatson is warranted.
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2.2 Findings and Conclusions
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While reviewing the implementation of the IST Program, the inspector determined that the licensee was not adequately implementing procedure PSO 31.
Examples of the licensee's failure to implement
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PSO 31 are discussed below.
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While reviewing the ISIC's valve test records, the inspector i
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determined that the test records for safety, relief and explo-sively activated valves were incomplete.
The test records for
valves 07-TIP-SHEAR-1, 2, 3, 4; 10-SV-35A; 10-SV-350; 10-SV-40;
10-SV-44; 14-SV-20A; and 14-SV-20B were blank even though tests had been performed respectively as follows: A rch 1987; i
September 1981 and April 1987; September 1981, December 1982
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and April 1987; December 1982 and July 1983: December 1982 and April 1987; December 1982 and July 1983; and April 1987, The
test records for valves 11-SLC-39A, B and 11-EV-14A, B were incomplete since they did not include the test results for i
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February 1986/ April 1987 and September 1986/ January 1987
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respectively.
The failure to record the test information.
in accordance with the Section 7.1.3 of PSD 31, is the first example of the violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 for j
failure to follow procedures (50-333/88-04-01).
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The apparent cause of this problem can be attributed to the lack l
of a formal method for the ISIC to receive safety, relief and I
explosively activated valve data upon the completion of testing.
Prior to the 1987 outage the ISIC sent a memo to the Planning l
and Mai7tenance Groups asking for completed work request forms
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to ensure that he received the test results.
However, the ISIC l
did not have the work request in his record books.
Instead his records included Quality Control inspection reports stating that the work was completed.
The lack of a formal method for record-ing test information contributed to the test information not being recorded in the valve test records.
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The inspector discussed the missing test data with the ISIC and expressed concern that the ISIC did not have the required information readily available to ensure that all safety, relief
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l and explosively activated valves had been tested in accordance
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with the code.
The licensee then searched the computer for
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past test dates of the safety, relief and explosively activated valves since the data was not recorded in the valve test records by the ISIC.
The inspector reviewed the dates and it appeared that 10-SV-40 and 14-SV-20A were not tested since December 1982 which meant the valves were not tested within the last five years as required by ASME Section XI. Upon further investiga-tion the licensee determined that the valves we e last tested in July 1983 and were therefore in compliance with the code.
l The ISIC is currently developing a more formal method to ensure that all applicable test information is included in
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the valve test records.
b.
While reviewing the valve test records the inspector determined that the test records for valves 26-27-A0V-126 and 26-27-A0V-127 (Category B power operated valves) were being recorded on the
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test record sheet for category C, O and non power operated l
category B valves (Figure 8.1) instead of the test record sheet
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for category A and power operated category B valves (Figure 8.2).
The failure to record the valve information on Figure 8.2, in accordance with section 7.1.4 of PSO 31, is the second example
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of the violation (50-333/88-04-01).
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c.
The inspector determined that the valve test record category A Leak Rate Data (Figure 8.6) was not updated based on the test results of the 1987 outage.
The failure to update the data within three months of the end of the outage, in accordance with section 7.2.2.A.5 of PSO 31, is the third example of the i
violation (50-333/88-04-01).
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While reviewing the pump test report files the inspector i
determined that lube oil information (e.g., oil reservoir level
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or pressura) was not consistently recorded even though the
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information was recorded in the surveillance tests and required by the IST program.
The test records for the Residual Heat
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Removal pumps 10-P-3A s ad 10-P-3C on June 21, 1987 and July 24, 1987 had dashes filled in the lube oil columns.
The Standby Liquid Control System test records for pump 11-P-2A from October 18, 1984 to January 9,1988 and pump 11-P-28 from February 2, 1985 to April 10, 1987 were marked "NR" in the lube oil column.
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The failure to consistently transpose lube oil information from
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the surveillance tests to the test records, in accordance with section 7.2.2 of P50 31, is the fourth example of the violation (50-333/88-04-01).
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The inspector determined that the new pump acceptance criteria i
was not incorporated into a surveillence test procedure prior
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to the procedure being used again.
The ISIC established new
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acceptance criteria for 1:PCI pump 23-P-1M (af ter the completion of surveillance test F-ST-4B on January 27,1988) but did not revise the procedure prior to the next performance of the test on February 17, 1988. A temporary change was subsequently written on February 17, 1988 to incorporate the new acceptance erfteria.
The failure to incorporate new pump acceptance
criteria into surveillance test F-ST-4B in accordance with section 5.2.6 of PSO 31, prior to the test being periormed
again is the fif th example of the violation (50-333/88-04-01).
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The performance of F-ST-3A, on February 15, 1987, established
the normal stroke time of 14-MOV-5B after maintenance was t
performed. While reviewing the valve test records, the inspector determined that the ISIC did not establish a new
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valve limiting stroke time after F-ST-3A was performed for 14-MOV-5B.
The failure to establish a new valve limiting
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stroke time, in accordance with section 7.1.5.1 of PSO 31, a
after maintenance was performed is the sixth example of the violation (50-333/88-04-01).
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The ISIC is responsible for the implementation of the IST Program
and for answering Inservice Inspection related questions on site.
l He was also responsible for the Ten Year Hydro Testing which was
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performed during the past outage.
The ISIC has tried to improve
the IST program.
However, many of the changes he has made have been of the "on the spot" nature which have led to the inconife-
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tencies noted by the inspectors.
There were many items which reflected an inattention to detail, Examples of these items in-lude no differential pressure reference, alert or required action values i
recorded on the current test report for HPCI pump 23-P-1M; various transposition errors including stroke time values, test cates, valve designations and the direction of the valve stroke which is timed; i
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and the use of white out in the pump and valve test report record.
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4 Although the above examples of the violation and lack of attention to
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detail currently do not have a high level of safety significance, the inspector's findings indicate that the IST program is not being imple-mented as it was intended. The problem areas identified are indicative of the inadequate time and rescurces being_ expended to control the IST program implementation. ' Management involvement through evaluation is necessary to ensure that: adequate measures are taken-to effectively implement the_IST
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program in accordance with. plant procedures.
3.0 Review Comments on Second 10-Year Interval IST-Program
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During the inspection the inspector determined that several aspects of the IST program were inconsistent with current NRC staff positions.
These items need to be resolved in conjunction with the'NRC staff review of the second 10 year interval IST program. The specific items are detailed below and they will be carried as an unresolved item (50-333/88-04-02) pending the formal NRC staff review of the IST program.
3.1 Stop and Throttle Valves for High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)
Pump Turbine The inspector' noted that the HPCI turbine stop (HOV-1) and throttle (TCV-2) valves were not included in the IST program.
These valves do perform a safety related function and it appears that they should be included in the IST program.
The inspector discussed this matter with the Performance and Reli-
ability Supervisor and determined that these valves were included in the first 10-year interval IST program and that they were inad-vertently omitted from the current IST program. The licensee will evaluate whether these valves should be included in the program.
3.2 Keep Full System Check Valves The inspector noted that-the Keep Full System check valves in the Core Spray (CSP) and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Systems were not included in the IST program.
The affected val.es are:
CSP System RHR System CSP-62A&B RHR-261
CSP-63A&B RHR-262 CSP-76A&B RHR-276 CSP-77A&B RHR-277
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If either the CSP or RHR system were called upon to perform its safety function, these valves would perform a safety. function by closing due to reverse flow from the system..This matter was discussed with the license who stated that they will evaluate whether the valves should be included.in the program.
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3.3 Trending Stroke' Times for Fast Acting Valves The licensee's second 10 year IST program states that there will be no trending of stroke times for valves with closure times equal to or less than 2 seconds. Also, the licensee assigns a maximum limiting stroke time of 5 seconds to various rapid acting valves.
The inspector determined that certain valves (27-A0V-111,112 and 113), which were originally timed at less than one second, had subsequent stroke times greater than one second.
However, they were still less than the licensee assignea 5 second maximum limit-ing stroke time. The licensee is not trending the~ percent change in stroke time and performing corrective actions when necessary for these valves since their original stroke times were less than-2 seconds.
The NRC has identified rapid-acting power operated valves as those which stroke in 2 seconds or less.
Relief from the trending. require-ments of ASME,Section XI (Paragraph IWV-3417(a)) presents no safety concerns for these valves since variations in stroke time will be affected by slight variations in the response time of the personnel performing the tests. However, the current NRC staff position assigns a maximum limiting stroke time of 2 seconds to these valves in order to obtain the relief from the code requirements. The licen-see was informed of this position and this item remains unresolved pending the licensee's formal response to the stated position.
t 4.0 Pump Testing Program l
l 4.1 _ Review and Implementation The licensee utilizes STPs to gather data for the pumps included in the IST program.
The STPs are clear from an IST standpoint in the definition of the test's purpose, acceptance criteria and data collection requirement;.
The data is-initially analyzed by control room personnel since the acceptance criteria is. included in the procedures.
The ISIC transposes the pertinent information from the STPs to the pump test record sheets and reviews this data.
The ISIC
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is responsible for ensuring that the pump test program is implemented
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in accordance with ASME Section XI requirement.
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4.2 Findings and Conclusions The inspector reviewed the completed procedures in Section 9.0 and determined that:
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Acceptance criteria were met except as noted below concerning the HPCI pump;
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Proper review and approvals were obtained;
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Data evaluations were performed; and
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Dispositions of failures were adequate except as noted below concerning the HPCI pump.
The HPCI main pump 23-P-1M was rebuilt during the 1987 outage. On April 25, 1987, HPCI flow rate test F-ST-4B was performed.
The test results indicated that the pump differential pressure of 446 psid was in the alert range on the high side.
This was noted in the surveillance tests remarks section when the data was recorded.
Upon review of the results, the ISIC noted in the remarks section that new reference values were required for the' pump and that a procedure change was required.
However, the test was performed on May 26, 1987, with the old acceptance criteria (discussed in sec-tion 2.2) in the procedure, and the pump differential pressure was determined to be 1151 psid.
The licensee determined that the speed indication was not operating properly and decided to perform a retest.
The retest results of F-ST-4B performed on May 26, 1987 indicated that the pump differential pressure was 552 psid.
The licensee decided that this was new baseline data since the pump was overhauled during the outage.
The ISIC subsequently revised the reference, alert range, and required action range values based on the retest data.
The ISIC revised the applicable calculation sheet to incorporate the new base-line data and filled out a Design Input Considerations Checklist which were both reviewed by a review engineer.
The verification process was then approved by the Technical Services Superintendent.
The licensee considers the May 26, 1987 data as baseline data after the pump was rebuilt. However, the test performed on April 25, 1987 was the actual baseline data after the pump was rebuilt.
The licen-see accepted the data obtained on May 26, 1987 without adequately evaluating the reasons for the 106 PSI increase in pump differential pressure.
The licensee's acceptance of the change in differential pressure based on the fact that the pump was rebuilt is not justified since a baseline test had previously been performed.
Also, the licensee did not verify and document that the new baseline reference value for differential pressure of 552 PSID represented acceptable pump operation.
The failure to verify and document that the new
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reference values of pump. parameters (i.e., differential pressure),
represenced acceptable pump operation is a violation of ASME Section XI, Subsection IWP-3111 (50-333/88-04-03).
5.0 Valve Testing Program 5.1 Program Review and Implementation Similar to the pump testing program, implementation of the valve testing requirements of the IST program is achieved through the performance of STPs which are well written and clear to follow from an IST standpoint.
The data is initially analyzed by control room personnel since the acceptance criteria is included.in the
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procedures. The data is then reviewed by the ISIC who also trans-scribes the pertinent information to the valve test record sheets.
The ISIC is responsible for ensuring that the valve program is
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implemented in accordance with the ASME Section XI requirements.
5.2 Findings and Conclusions
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The inspector reviewed the completed procedures listed in Section 9.0 and determined that:
acceptance criteria were met;
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proper review and approvals were obtained;
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data evaluations were performed; and
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dispositions of failures were adequate.
i Specific areas of concern identified during the review of the valve program are discussed below, a.
Surveillance Test Acceptance While reviewing the completed STPs applicable to the valve pro-gram, the inspector identified a concern regarding the control room and ISIC signatures signifying that the surveillance test acceptance criteria were met.
The inspector determined that both the shift supervisor and the ISIC signed that the accept-ance criteria were met when it was noted in the remarks section
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that they were not.
This condition existed for surveillance tests F-ST-3A performed on December 26, 1986, February 15, 1987 and April 3, 1987 and for F-ST-4B performed on April 25, 1987.
Upon discussion with the licensee, the inspector determined that the tests in question were actually the first test per-formed after maintenance was performed on those valves which were determined to be outside the acceptance criteria.
The tests in question, therefore, were actually establishing the new baseline acceptance criteria.
The inspector discussed
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the situation with the licensee and stated that the lack of identification that the tests were being performed as a post maintenance test led to the perception that the Shift Supervisor and the ISIC were accepting data that was_noted to be out of the
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acceptable range.
The. licensee stated that more attention would be directed in this area to insure.that tests being performed to establish new criteria are so noted.
The inspector had no
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further questions.
b.
Testing of Pump Discharge Check Valves During review of surveillance test procedure F-ST-2R the inspector noted that there were specific steps included to verify proper opening of the RHR service water pump discharge -
check valves 10-RHR-14 A, B, C and D.
However, no steps were included to verify proper closure of these valves upon stopping the associated pump.
Proper check valve closure at this time
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is important to ensure backflow does not occur from~the other pump which operates in parallel with the pump just secured. The inspector also discussed the possibility of similar problems in other safety related systems with parallel pump circuits with the licensee representatives.
The licensee representatives agreed to review other systems for similar concern.
This item will be carried as Unresolved Item 50-333/88-04-04.
c.
Documentation of Safety Review of Inoperable ESW System Check Valves
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In accordance with the requirements of the IST program, certain check valves are required to be disassembled for inspection during refueling outages.
Included in this category are 2-inch, piston-type check valves which provide emergency service water to four electrical bay unit coolers.
Upon disassembly these valves, which are designated 46 ESW-1?A&B, 20A&B, 21A&B, 22A&B, were found to be inoperable due to a heavy layer of scale and mud on the valve internals.
The licensee initiated Occurrence Report (OR)87-024 to obtain corrective action and determine the root cause and the safety significance.
In reviewing licensee actions as a result of OR 87-024, the inspector noted that the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) concluded in PORC meeting No.87-047 that these ESW valves are not safety significant and that an LER need not be submitted to the NRC.
These conclusions were based on information received from the architect engineer and a review of appropriate FSAR sections.
Since these valves are included in the IST Program which primarily addresses safety related equipment, the inspector requested from the Technical Services Superintendent a copy
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of this information.
Since this information was not available at the exit meeting, Unresolved Item 50-333/88-04-05 will be identified to verify this safety review documentation.
6.0 QA/AC Involvement in IST Program 6.1 QA Audit and Surveillance Activity The licensee has not performed any audits of its second 10 year interval IST Program. The last audit was performed in October, 1985 and this audit only reviewed the administrative controls of the IST Program per PS0 31.
In discussing this with the QA Superintendent, the licensee recognized their weakness in the lack of performing a current technical audit of the IST program.
The inspector was advised.that such an audit was being planned and.would be conducted after this inspection. The inspector asked QA personnel how they plan to. verify operability in light of current plant practices concerning valve' packing repairs and valve backseating.
Concerns like this are published in NRC Information Notices such as Information Notice No. 87-40 "Backseating Valves Routinely to Prevent Packing Leakage". The inspector was advised that applicable NRC Information Notices would be included in the scope of the forthcoming technical audit of the IST program.
QA personnel perform surveillances on selected STPs with the objective to complete 10% of all STPs.
The inspector reviewed several completed surveillance reports as noted in Paragraph 9.0 (Reference Documents).
No unacceptable conditions were noted.
6.2 Corrective Action Control As noted in Paragraph 5.2.c of this report certain ESW check valves were determined to be inoperable due to a heavy layer of scale and mud on the valve intervals. QC personnel initiated Deficiency and Corrective Action Reports (DCARs)87-106 and 87-145 to obtain cor-rective action.
In addition to initiating OR 87-024, Operations personnel noted that a flushing procedure will be developed by May 31, 1987, to periodically flush the ESW check valves.
The cause for the problem was attributed to a non-flow condition at the valves which produced a sludge trap.
The inspector determined that the flushing procedure was not yet finalized and that QA/QC personnel had not been formally advised by memo from the Operations Department head of a revised completion data in accordance with QA Procedure 16.1 "Corrective Action Control".
Rather than follow this formal procedure, the QC supervisor had verbally checked with operations personnel and periodically updated the completion date
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for the flushing procedure based on this conversation.
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The inspector determined that other DCARs (e.g.87-141 and 87-229)
had been dispositioned in a similar fashion.
The inspector advised the QA superintendent that this informal program for escalation of corrective action requireme,nts regarding QA findings was not con-sistent with QA procedure 16.1. -The QA superintendent noted the inspector's concern and advised him that corrective actions were already in. process at the corporate level in response to a similar concern at another of its licensed facilities (see Inspection Report 50-286/87-27). Also, a recent internal audit by the licen-see identified the need to correct the program for escalation of corrective action requirements.
Since this problem had been previously identified by the licensee and corrective actions were
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in progress, a violation is not being issu-1.
However, licensee corrective actions in response to this con, I will be reviewed in future NRC inspect.'ons and this item will be carried as Unresolved Item 50-333/88-04-06.
7.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (50-333/87-11-01):
Failure to initiate and document a nonconformance on a nonconformance or deficiency and corrective action report (DCAR) form. A violation was issued since neither a nonconformance nor a DCAR had been issued to identify a known deficiency concerning significant pitting of the internal surfaces of core spray system piping.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action which' consisted of ultrasonic thickness checks of the pipe wall in similar areas in other systems. As a result of this evaluation a section (3" W20-302-25B) of residual heat removal system piping was determined to have slight wall thinning.
The licensee subsequently analyzed this condition and deter-mined the piping to be acceptable. This area of pipe wall thinning will also be incorporated into the plant Erosion / Corrosion program to inspect the erosion rate on a scheduled basis.
Other areas evaluated were
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satisfactory.
This item is closed.
8.0 Unresolved Item
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Unresolved items are matters about which more inform.ation is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable, deviations or violations.
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unresolved items were identified during this inspection and they are discussed in sections 3.0, 5.2. and 6.2.
9.0 Reference Documents F-ST-4B HPCI Flow Rate /HPCI Pump Operability /HPCI Valve Operability Tests performed on 8/26/85, 4/25/87, 5/26/87, 1/25/88, 1/27/88 and 2/17/88.
F-ST-3A Core Spray / Flow Rate / Valve Operability Test performed on 7/17/85, 7/18/85, 12/26/86, 2/15/87, 3/12/87 and 4/3/87.
F-ST-20M Scram Discharge Volume Vent and Crain Valves Full Stroke Timing i
Test performed on 2/6/88.
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F-ST-28 RHR Pump Operability and Keep Full Level Switch Functional Test performed on 1/5/88.
F-ST-2C RHR M0V Valve Operability Test performed on 2/25/86 i
AP-8.2 - Administrative Procedure for Reporting Variations from Normal Plant Operations, Rev. 12.
PS0 31 - Plant Standing Order for IST Program for Pumps and Valves, Rev. 4 F-ST-2R - RHR Service Water Pump and MOV Operability Test (IST),
'
Rev. 16
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New York Power Authority Audit Report No. 563 of Plant Standing Order 31, dated October 28, 1985 i
F-ST-98 - Emergency Service Water Pump and MOV Operability Test, Rev. 23 Audit No. 1124, Rev. 1 - Surveillance Report Dated 9/25/87 concerning F-ST-1B, MSIV Fast Closure Audit No. 1148 - Surveillance Report Dated 12/9/86 Concerning F-SY-98, EDG Full Load Test and Diesel Operability Test 10. Management Meetings Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the inspection at the entrance meeting conducted on February 22, 1988. The findings of the inspection were discussed with licensee representatives during the course of the inspection. An exit meeting was conducted on i
February 26, 1988 at the conclusion of the inspection (see section 1.0 for attendees) at which time the licensee management was informed of the inspection results.
At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee.
The licensee did not indicate that proprietary information was involved within the scope of this inspection.
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