IR 05000333/1990005
| ML20059L232 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1990 |
| From: | Meyer G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059L222 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-90-05, 50-333-90-5, NUDOCS 9009260219 | |
| Download: ML20059L232 (13) | |
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U.S.' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Region I
Report No.:
90-05 Docket No. '
50-333-1>
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License No.:
DPR-59 Licensee New York Power Authority
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P.O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093
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Facility:
James A. FluPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
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l-Location:
Scriba, New' York
Dates:
. July.1, 1990 through August 11, 1990
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Inspectors W. Schmidt, Senior Resident Inspector
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R. Plasse, Jr., Resident Inspector P. O'Connell, Radiation Specialist, DRSS l
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- Approved bya.
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[61ennW.Meyer,SectfonChief, Date.
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Projects Section 1Bf DRP l
INSPECTION SUMMARY This inspection report. discusses routine and reactive inspections of plant
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. activities _'. during. day and. backshift hours including: plant ' operations,.
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radiological protection, surveillance and maintenance, emergency preparedness,'
ll security, engineering and technical support,; and quality verification and safety -
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-assessment. This period included deep backshift and weekend inspection hours.
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INSPECTION RESULTS L
An Executive Summary and an Outline of Inspection follow.
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9009260219 900904 gDR ADOCK0500g3
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ii PESIDENT INSPECTOR OFFICE JAMES A.'FITEPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT INSPECTION REPORT 90-05 RXECUTIVE SUMMARY Ooerations Operators performed well during plant evolutions.
Imposition of the 93% power limit, based on TIP system difficulties and declaration of the B and D EDGs inoperable, based on output fluctuation were conservative actions.
NYPA j
adequately determined a method to evaluate APRM indication at low power and flow.
conditions.
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Radlolocical Protection NYPA identified an instance where nine security guards entered a posted high
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radiation area without following the appropriate procedures.
Specialist'and'
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resident inspector review determined that the actions taken by NYPA made this a potentially non-cited, licensee identified violation. However, because-of.the-l continued lack of sensitivity to potentially adverse consequences during
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radiological work, a violation was issued. The specialist inspector also noted l
that improvement was necessary to ensure updating of all RWP working copies when
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making field changes.
Surveillance and Maintenance
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NYPA performed the HPCI injection test to the reactor vessel very well, and the data analysis was proper and well documented. The troubleshooting conducted by I&C on the effects of DC bus grounds on the EDGs was proper and in accordance
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with plant procedures. The periodic testing of the ESW system appeared adequate
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to identify system or check valve degradation.
~Emeroency Preoaredneso j
NYPA conducted a practice emergency drill, which met its objective.
Enaineerina and Technical Sucoort
i The inspector identified an unresolved item regarding the assumptions used in the calculations of design condition heat removal ' rate for safety related unit =
coolers. NYPA adequately resolved an SSFI concern over emergency power bus load acceleration times during testing, with simulated LOOP and LOCA signals.
' Safety Assessment /Ouality Verification-NYPA management began a new policy of conducting morning meetings with the department first level supervisors. This initiative was positive in increasing communication between the departments allowing for ef fective work preplanning and
.prioritization. Planning improved for short duration outages of limited scope, i
NYPA took. adequate actions to resolve previous concerns over the control of overtim _.
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' RESIDENT INSPECTOF. OFFICE
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JAMES A. FITEPATRICK NUCLEAR' POWER PLANT INSPECTION REPOR't 90-05'
OUTLIME OF INSPECTION 1.
Operations (MC 71707, 93702)
1.a Operator performance ~during plant evolutions.
1.b NYPA actions in response to C TIP machine problems.
1.c NYPA corrective actions to evaluate APRM indication of low power and low flow conditions. Resolved Item F-2, Inspection Report 89-11.
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Radiological Prctection (HC 71707, 83750)
P 2.a Failure to meet the requirements for entry into a posted high
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radiation area. Violation 90-05-01 L<
2.b Improvement neoded in NYPA's program for updating RWPs changed in p
the field.
F-1 v
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Surveillance and Maintenance (HC 61726, 62703, 92702)
-l 3.a (Closed) Unresolved Item 89-03-04 and Violation 90-02-04: HPCI
vessel injection test and resolution of HPCI testing issues.
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Resolved item F-2 from Inspection Report 90-01.
3.b I&C troubleshooting of DC-bus ground ef fect on the DC control power to the EDGs. F-2 3,c HPCI system maintenance.
3.d (Open) Unresolved Item 90-02-06: Periodic ESW system surveillance L
testing.
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NYPA practice drill.
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Security (HC 71707)
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Engineering and Technical Support (HC 90712, 92700, 92702)
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- 6.a Method - of calculating unit cooler heat exchanger effectiveness.
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L Unresolved Item 90-05-02
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6.b (Closed) Unresolved Item 89-80-14: Adequacy of bus voltage during-ECCS pump start.
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i-6.c Correction to Inspection Report 90-04.
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Safety Assessment / Quality Verification (MC 30703, 71707)
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7.a Change in daily meeting structure and sahedule.
7.b-Forced outage planning.
7.c LER review.
7.d Review of QA surveillance activity for ultrasonic flow instrument manufacturer.
7.e (closed) Unresolved Item 89-12-06: NYPA management control of site
.i overtime.
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Management Meetings and Other Inspections
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Attachment A Acronyms
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l DETAILS 1.
ooerations.
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NYPA returned the unit to service on July 3 following startup from an-
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eight day outage to repair the C traversing incore probe (TIP) machine.
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l on July 7 operators shutdown the unit from 100% power to correct elevated
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L temperatures in the drywell equipment sump and.a hi/lo bearing oil alarm on the B recirculation pump.
NYPA restarted the unit on July 8 and
proceeded 1 to 93 % power.
The reactor analyst imposed this power-limit since. three channels of the C TIP machine were again not performing properly and could not be used to perform an LPRM calibration.
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increased power to 100% for six days following confirmation from GE that l
the core flux shapes stored from the previous TIP traces were adequate to J
allow thermal limit determination. In order to ensure that thermal limits" would be met after the six days, GE provided NYPA with an evaluation g
allowing LPRM calibration and thermal limit determination without the use of-three TIP channels (12 LPRMs).
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The inspector found that the operators were attentive to duty and j
performed well during startups, shutdowns, surveillance testing,: and-q power change evolutions.
b.
The inspector found the reactor analyst's limiting of power to 93 %
a conservative action. -Further, the inspector reviewed temporary operating procedure (TCP)-78 which allows substitution of flux-values from other symmetrical LPRMs for the LPRMs that could not be calibrated using TIPS.
This assumed that NYPA would operate the
core - ir a symmetrical configuration.
Further, this procedure-l Amposed a 4% penalty on all core thermal limits because of the minor
.I uncertainties involved with thic substitution. The inspector found u
this acceptable.
c.
Due to APRM variations experienced at low power and flow conditions, NYPA had previously agreed. to find a. method - to evaluate APRM
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ll indication at less than 15% power.
The inspector found that a
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revision to RAP 7.3-1 provided the operators adequate instruction to
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determine if APRMs were responding properly at low power and~ flow conditions, during startup, shutdown and, hot standby operations.
This resolved issue F-2 from Inspection Report 89-11.
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Radioloolcal Protection i
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NYPA identified an instance in which nine security guards failed to follow radiation protection procedures by entering a posted high
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radiation area without using an RWP.
Also, eight of the guards did l-not notify radiation protection personnel prior to the ~ entry.
L Specifically, these guards entered the east crescent area, a posted l.
high radiation area, to perform hourly. fire watches.
The first guard to enter the area discussed radiological conditions with a radiation protection (RP) technician in the RP office.
The guard used a mastor radiation area key and entered the east. crescent.
without using an RWP. Subsequently, eight other security guards did not check with RP technicians and also entered the east crescent l-
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.without an RWP.
Entering a high radiation area without using an RWP was a violation NYPA's Radiation Protection Manual, Chapter 6, External. Exposure
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control and Chapter 8 Radiation Work Permit.
The safety significance of this event was minor, since the highest radiation level in the area at the time was 35 mr/hr. However, the radiation
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levels in this area are dependent on plant conditions, and levels
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could have been greater than 100 mr/hr if an RHR pump was operating
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in shutdown cooling or if the high pressure coolant injection system was operating. NYPA estimated that the exposures to these persons-l were minor.
As a result of this event NYPA trained the security
force on the proper methods and procedures for entering a
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radiologically controlled area, rurther, NYPA had. been in' the
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process. of taking the master ' radiation area keys back from all personnel at the time of'this instance.
NYPA planned to control
entry into high radiation areas by requiring the checking out of the keys along with' preparation for entry into the area.-
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'This violation was considered for non-citing in accordance with the-
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l NRC enforcement policy for licensee identified violations. However, j
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l-radiological work and-inadequate sensitivity to radiological procedures and posting, a violation was issued. VIO 90-05-01.
Further, the nine guards entered the posted high radiation' area
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without a continuous radiation monitoring instrument. Although this would have been specified in the 1RWP had one been used, the ll inspector concluded that the guards 'and the RP technician who spoke to.the first guard should have ' known that use of a continuous
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radiation monitoring instrument was needed in the E posted high radiation area.
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Prior to touring the east crescent to review the above event,, a regional. specialist inspector noted that the RWP at the job location
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dif fered from the RWP at the instrument issue-room. Whil) both RWPs
specified alarming dosimeters; the RWP at the entrance to the area specified a setpoint of 30 mrem, while the RWP at the instrument
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issue room did not specify an alarm setpoint.. The inspector and the RES superintendent had been issued alarming - dosimeters with; the incorrect alarm setpoint of 100 mrem.
NYPA corrected the alarm b
setpoint and stated that they would. update the copy of the RWPlin l
the instrument issue room to reflect the proper ~ alarm setpoint.
NYPA committed to. review their program for making field changes to RWPs and to ensure the updating of all RWP working copies. as l
' appropriate. This item wLil be reviewed during a future inspection.
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-Surveillance and Main *IBADER a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 89-03-04 and Violation 90-02-04: The HPCI
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injections to the reactor vessel (Preoperational Test, POT-23E) was a
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.t well performed and. the analysis of data was proper and well
.y documented.
NYPA performed POT-23E on : July 3 to determine a baseline for HPCI system response time and characteristics during an -
injection.
NYPA temporarily installed -the GE ~ Test Analysis
Recording System (GETARS) to monitor HPCI performance parameters
during the test.
The inspector. observed the preparations and the
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testing. The professionalism of the preshift briefing by the system t
engineer and of the control room staff during performance were
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strengths. The briefing of all personnel included discussion of the
expected plant behavior and potential problems with reactor vessel)
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water level and plant power level.
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Operators provided very effective feedback on the ef fect ' of the.
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injection on plant parameters to the shift supervisor during the.
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initial injection and subsequent HPCI perturbations.- Team work was i
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very evident;when turbine speed decreased more than expected during
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the step change evolution. The resulting reactot vessel water level
transient, if not properly handled, could have caused a low level
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NYPA's intentions to use the baseline information from the ' injection test to validate system performance during surveillance testing was
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proper and documented by the system engineer by memo JSEM-90-0035, j
eted July 11, 1990. Using the data obtained from GETARS during the -
step changes, NYPA was able to develop a total HPCI system gain.
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(i.e., percent change of flow control due to step change over the I
percent change in a total pump discharge flow following the step-change).
NYPA determined the system gain from-testing to be.211 l
with no system instability.
During testing to the CST the system-gain was. 197 with no instability.
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i on August 8, NYPA issued ST-4N revision 11, HPCI flow rate and IST.
NYPA specified in this procedure that step changes to verify, system gains of 2.0 to 1.667 were to be completed once per year, ' while i testing the system with flow to the CST.
This procedure revision
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also addressed inspector concerns in Inspection Report 90-01 dealing -
L with the monitoring of the HPCI lube oil system. NYPA specified an
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Q acceptance criteria for the lube oil filter differential pressure of
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less than 8 paid. This should enable trending of.the loading of the 1:
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filter-and determination of the effect :that any-increased differential pressure has on system performance.
Based on these actions taken by NYPA, the inspector considered this m
unresolved item and violation closed. Further, the actions taken on mon.toring of the lube oil system. resolved item F-2 from Inspection
Report'90-01.
b.
Control room operators performed conservatively by declaring the B and D EDGs inoperable following the monthly operability test on July 17.
While the diesels held 100% load for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> as specified, the l
KW output was spiking.
Initial observations by the operators
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was causing fluctuations of DC control power to the EDG and effecting the output.
At that time the HPCI system engineer
- verbally evaluated the ground as not being a HPCI operability issue.
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. However, NYPA was concerned with the ef fect that such a ground could have on the operability of the EDCs.
The -inspector, observed troubleshooting where IGC connected a temporary, DC power supply to the D-EDG and ran the machine-to j
troubleshoot the control circuitry. The evolution, including lif ted
leads, was properly conducted and documented in approved procedures and work requests. It should be noted that the HPCI ground cleared without any action by NYPA.
I&C noted no deficiencies in the EDG'
j control circuit and the spiking condition could not be repeated.
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Operators returned the B and D EDGs to operability on July 20.
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NYPA was still investigating the effects that grounds on the DC
busses would have on. the stability of the EDO KW output.-
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NYPA performed a well controlled outage of HPCI on July 23.
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work package was well defined and included changeout of the lube oil-
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L and' lube oil filters, a bench check of^the HPCI turbine controller
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I and an investigation of the controller ground discussed above...The-l-
inspector observed portions of the HPCI turbine lube oil and lube oil filter changeout work ~and found that it was conducted well.
Further, the inspector reviewed the post maintenance testing. The work requests specified performance of applicable sections of ST-4N.
The inspector found that this' description of the activities was L
vague and could lead to missed testing.
However,-review of the'
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completed ~ ST indicated proper completion of ' all the necessary procedure sections, including step changes in both automatic flow.
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control and manual speed control.-
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(Open) Unresolved Item 90-02-06*' NYPA completed the first periodic j
surveillance test of the ESW system and check valve performance.
NYPA planned to perform these two surveillance procedures, ST-8R
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(check valves) and ST-8Q (system), monthly until results indicate no significant degradation. At that time NYPA planned to evaluate-the.
need for continued monthly testing. This approach appeared adequate to the inspector.
The inspector observed,the performance of portions of both tests.-
The operators and personnel conducting the tests were knowledgeable about their duties.
-The results of the testing showed that all check valves performed their safety functions.
The system test showed that the ESW system could provide adequate cooling water flow to all safety related components.
This item will remain open pending review of - NYPA's long term corrective actions to prevent silt and corrosion buildup and
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resubmittal of their response to NRC Bulletin 90-13.
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Emeroency Preoaredness a.
NYPA performed well during their July 11 practice emergency drill.
The inspector observed the manning of the Technical Support Center
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(TSC) after declaration of an alert condition.
The inspector had the following observations:
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i The manning evolution was smoothly carried out. However, the
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people were not given a general briefing of the plant conditions and the reasons for manning, until approximately 30-min. after the manning began.
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Once accountability began all personnel in the TSC had: to.
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leave their posts and card into the computer system and'aign i
in on a sheet.
This could lead to disruption of activities during an actual emergency.
The NYPA phone talkers (i.e., who would be in contact with the
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NRC, NY State and Oswego County) were not receiving questions
from the persons on the other and of the lines as would be the
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case during an actual emergency.
Because of this the phone
talkers were not fully able to practice their methods.of
obtaining the needed informatior..
'l NYPA took these observations under advisement.
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Security The inspector found acceptable results regarding security functions while -
performing the routine inspection program.
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Encineerino and Technical Sucoort i
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The inspector reviewed the performance testing of unit coolers.
This testing consisted of taking performance data (i.e.,
air-and water inlet and outlet temperature and either measured or assumed design air flow) and calculating the water flows and overall heat transfer coefficients for a ' given - test' condition.
The test conditions of water flow, and inlet air and water temperatures l-differs from - the conditions that would be - encountered during' a M
design basis accident. To determine the heat load that each cooler could be expected to remove under the accident conditions NYPA-applied the principle of heat exchanger effectiveness.
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inspector found that the analytical methodology (heat exchanger j
ef fectiveness) used in this instance was proper.. However, NYPA used -
i formulas for counterflow heat exchangers, but the inspector concluded that these formulas may not accurately address the air
crossflow design of the unit coolers.
Further, the inspector
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questioned why the overall heat transfer coefficient at test i
conditions was not analytically reduced (flow under accident i
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conditions is lower than test condition flow) to give a mord
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accurate representation of the actual heat that the coolers ~could-remove'under accident conditions.
NYPA committed-to= review this calculation mett ndology. :
The inspector considers this~ item; unresolved. UNR 90-05-02 be (Closed) Unresolvei le; 33-80-14: NYPA conducted testing to ensure bus voltage and Ecc5 L 4 # -et and acceleration-times were within the timer specifiso 'y th, W a.
In conjunction with the normal
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outage performanco of ST
- >C-V ergency bus load. sequence test, NYPA
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installed a chart recordtr to record-the' bus voltage and acceleration time ny caci ECCS pump supplied'from the A and C EDOs.-
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The results of the testing and. a. recommendation to continue monitoring of this system response during subsequent tests ' were
l documented in a June 16, 1990 memo from the TS superintendent to the superintendent of power. NYPA stated that ST-9C would be revised to:
i incorporate the collection of the required data with-a strip chart recorder when completing ST-9C.
This closed this item.
c.
In section 6.h of Inspection Report 90-04, the inspector stated that ~
j NYPA committed to completing modifications to the 1 EDG fuel oil system during the 1991 refueling outage to address SSFI concerns.
In subsequent discussions with the inspector, NYPA stated that they_
did'not make a specific commitment to do these modifications during.
that outage, but plan to do so.
7.
Safety Assessment /ouality verification
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a.
NYPA began a policy of conducting morning meetings with tho'first q
level supervisors of each department to review the planned work for:
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the upcoming day and to begin planning for the next-day's work. The normal daily department head meeting -was pushed back to the L
af ternoon and used solely as a update 1 tool. The inspector attended several of these meetings and concluded.that they were a positive.
j step to getting first level supervisors involved with the. other departments on site. Further they allowed ~each department to plan for the nxt day and to get work requests and radiation work permite preparou in advance.
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b.
The planning conducted for the two outages conducted during this '
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period (TIP and drywell sump) was exceptionally well done.
'The inspector concluded that this was possible because of the limited-scope of these outages. The plans included line schedules showing what needed to be completed, in what sequence and by what time, to allow completion of the activities and plant restart.
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The inspector reviewed the following LERs and found that the information and corrective actions provided were adequate.
The information in parenthesis indicates the event date and the SALP functional area to which the report applies.
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89-026-01, SRV Setpoint Drift, (November 5,
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Maintenance)'.
90-006-01, Extremity Exposure Resulting from Contamination
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Event (March 8, 1990, Radiological Prttection).
90-015-01, Procedure Deficiency causes Missed Surveillance
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Test, (April 20, 1990, Operations).
00-016-01, Shutdown Cooling System Isolations (April 24, 1990,
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Engineering and Technical Support).
90-017-00, Instrument Setpoint Drift Exceeds Technical--
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Specification Li'. alt for HPCI Turbine Trip on High = Reactor
' Water Level (May 26, 1990, surveillance).
90-018-00, SRV Setpoint Drift (March 31, 1990,. Maintenance).
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90-020-00, Shutdown Cooling Isolation caused by-Air in
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Pressure Switch Sensing Line Due to Deficient Installation Design (June 26, 1990, Surveillance).
d.
The inspector concluded that NYPA had performed an adequate +
vendor surveillance at the manuf acturer of the ultrasonic flow measuring devices (Contro1otron).
It appeared that ' NYPA.
adequately reviewed Controlotron's methods for calibrating the -
instruments. NYPA documented the surveillance in SR-90-045-J dated July 16, 1990.
e.
(closed) Unresolved Item (89-12-06): The inspector found that NYPA had taken action to control overtime, during the 1990-refueling outage.
PSO #26, Overtime Policy, was revised: to clarify.NYPA's overtime guidelines.
The. inspector verified
- adequate. implementation of PSO #26 during ; the -refualing outage.
The inspector found the. control: of overtime acceptable and closed this item.
8.
Manacement Meetinos and Other Insoections-a.
On July 23 Mr. T. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region I, toured the plant with the resident inspectors and discussed plant performance with plant managers.
b.
On July 26 Mr. J. Wiggins, Deputy Director, DRP, Region I, toured'
the: plant with the inspectors and discussed plant performance with plant managers.
Inspection Report 90-173, Regulatory Effectiveness Review, August 6 c.
through August 10, 1990.
9.
Exit Interview
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At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior f acility management to discuss inspection scope and findings. In addition, at the end of the period, the inspectors met with licensee representatives and summarised the scope and findings of the inspection as they are described in this report.
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APPENDIX A FittPatrick i
Aeronyms
i Automatic Depressuritation System
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Average Power Range Moniter (
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Boiling Water Reactor BWR
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Condensate Storage Tank
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i Direct Current DC
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Emergency Core Cooling System ECCS
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Emergency Diesel Generator EDG
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Final Safety Analysis Report FSAR
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Emergency Service Water l
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High Pressure Coolant Injection System HPCI
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Instrumentation and control l
IGC
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Licensee Event Reprit l
LER
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Loss of Coolant Accident
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Local Power Range Monitor i
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC
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Primary Containment Isolation System l
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Plant Operations Review Committee
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Plant Standing Order PSO
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Reactor Analyst Procedure RAP
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Radiological and Environmental Services l
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Radiation Protection RP
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Revolutions Per Minute RPM
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Roactor Protection System RPS
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Radiation Work Permit RWP
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Safety System Functional Inspection SsFI
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Surveillance Test ST
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Traversing In-Core Probe TIP
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Three Mile Island TMI
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Technical Services
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