IR 05000333/1986005

Insp Rept 50-333/86-05 on 860510-0620.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Ler Review,Operational Safety Verification,Surveillance Observations,Maint Observations & TMI Task Action Plan Item Followup

ML20203E657
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	07/17/1986
From:	Linville J, Stair J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203E649	List: IR 05000333/1986005 ML20203E644
References
TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM 50-333-86-05, 50-333-86-5, NUDOCS 8607240203
Download: ML20203E657 (9)

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l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

DCS No Report N .

Docket N "

License No. DPR-59 Priority --

Category C Licensee: Power Authority of the State of New York

, P.O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility Name: J.A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At: Scriba, New York Inspection Conducted: May 10 - June 20, 1986 i

i Inspectors: A.J. Luptak, Senior Resident Inspector l R.K. Struckmoyer, Radiation Specialist, DRSS Reviewed by: Cd b _]-/746 J. y Stair Reactor Engineer Date j

Approved by: mNb 7l7/Jf? ~

Linville, Chi f, Reactor Date Jects Secti fi C, DRP

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Inspection Summary:

Inspection on May 10 - June 20, 1986 (Report No. 50-333/86-05 Areas Inspected: Routine and reactive inspection during day and backshift hours i by one resident inspector (128 hours0.00148 days <br />0.0356 hours <br />2.116402e-4 weeks <br />4.8704e-5 months <br />) pf licensee event report review, opera-tional safety verification, surveillance observations, maintenance observations, licensee responses to High Pressure Core Cooling System reliability issues and Biofouling of Cooling Water Heat Exchangers, engineered safety feature system walkdown, TMI Task Action Plan item followup, and review of periodic and special report Results: During the inspection no violations were noted. Identified within this report is the licensee's failure to supply formal justification and documentation for a modification committed to during a TMI Task Action Plan review, which was not completed (paragraph 8).

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PDR ADOCK 05000333 O PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• R. Baker, Maintenance Superintendent

'R. Converse, Resident Manager

• W. Fernandez, Superintendent of Power

• J. Flaherty, Acting Instrument and Control Superintendent

• D. Lindsey, Operations Superintendent

• J. Lyons, Plant Performance and Reliability Supervisor

• E. Mulcahey, Radiological & Environmental Services Superintendent

• R. Patch, Quality Assurance Superintendent V. Walz, Technical Services Superintendent The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during this inspection, including shift supervisors, administrative, operations, health physics, security, instrument and control, maintenance and contractor personne * Denotes those present at the exit intervie . Summary of Plant Activities The plant inspection period began with the plant operating at full powe On May 15, 1986, the plant was shut down as required by Technical Speci-fications when a Recirculation Pump Discharge Bypass Valve was found inoperable. The plant returned to power operation on May 18, 1986 and continued at full power throughout the remainder of the inspection perio . Licensee Event Report (LER) Review The inspector reviewed LERs to verify that the details of the events were clearly reported. The inspector determined that reporting requirements had been met. the report was adequate to assess the event, the cause appeared accurate and was supported by details, corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause, the form was complete, and generic applicability to other plants was not in questio LER 86-11 was reviewed and selected for onsite followu LER 86-11 reported the failure of the "B" Recirculation Pump Discharge Bypass Valve (02MOV548) to operat On May 15, 1986, plant operators noted that drywell unidentified floor drain leakage had increased from 1.3 to 3 GPM over a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period. The Technical Specification (TS) limit is 5 GPM. The licensee attempted to locate and isolate the leak by electrically backseating motor-operated valves which are inside the drywell. When an attempt was made to backseat the normally open 02MOV548, the valve failed to move in either directio After declaring the valve inoperable a plant shutdown was commenced in

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accordance with T.S. 3.5.A.6, which requires the plant be in a cold condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. An Unusal Event was declared at 10:30 as a result of initiating a plant shutdown required by The Unusual Event was terminated at 6:32 a.m. on May 16, 1986, when the plant reached a cold shutdown condition. Plant personnel found that the

, manual declutch lever for 02MOV54B was almost in contact with a tubing support structure. When the valve was again attempted to be electrically operated, personnel present at the valve noted that the manual declutch lever moved from the manual position to the normal electrically operating position as the motor was energized and the valve stroked. The valve operator is designed to function this way to prevent the position of the manual declutch lever from disabling the valve from operating electricall However, based on the above observations, marks indicating contact between the support and the valve's declutch lever, and the calculated and actual measurements of thermal growth between the valve operator and the support, it was concluded that, due to thermal movement in the Recirculation Loop piping from cold to hot conditions, the manual declutch lever was forced into the manual position by the support piece. With the declutch lever being held in the manual operating position, the motor was unable to operate the valve. The support piece was relocated and the limitorque operator inspected to ensure no other cause could be identifie *

During a recent short outage in March 1986, the operators for both Recir-culation Pump Discharge Bypass Valves were replaced for environmental qualification reasons. The replacement operators were slightly larger dimensionally and therefore 02MOV54B was installed oriented differently than the original operator, to allow for clearance of the moto The valve operated satisfactorily when tested in the cold condition. The failure of 02MOV548 was attributed to the lack of procedural control and design drawing details addressing the orientation of the operato., and the failure to consider clearance requirements to acccmmodate thermal expansio The ifcensee has committed to make procedural changes to l

ensure that installation and modification of those components which experience thermal growth have sufficient operating clearanc The increase in unidentified drywell leakage was caused by a packing leak on 02MOV548, which was unrelated to the operator failure. The valve was repacked prior to the plant startu . Emergency Notification System Reports The inspector reviewed the following events which were reported to the NRC via the Emergency Notification System as required by 10 CFR 50.72. The review included a determination that the reporting requirements were met, that appropriate corrective actions have been taken, and the event evalu-ated for possible generic implications.

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The following reports were reviewed:

Event Date Subject May 15, 1986 An Unusual Event was declared when a shutdown from full power was commenced as required by Technical Specifications due to an inoperable valve. The Unusual Event was termin-ated on May 19, 1986 when the plant was placed in cold shutdown. This event was also reported in LER 86-11 and discussed in paragraph May 25, 1986 The High Pressure Coolant Injection Syste'm was declared inoperable when the breaker for Turbine Steam Supply Valve tripped. The breaker tripped when water leaked into its motor control center. The water was drained from a fire suppression system as part of a routine surveillance tes The temporary tubing which was connected to the drain line near the fire suppression system did not run directly~to the floor drain as expected, but ended below the floor grating directly above the motor control center. The wetted equipment was dried, tested, and a HPCI operability test was performed prior to declaring HPCI operabl . Operational Safety Verification l Control Room Observations Daily, the inspector verified selected plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with limiting conditions for oper-ation of the plant Technical Specifications. Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken. The inspector noted the licensee has continued to emphasize reducing the number of continuously lit control room annunciator The inspector observed shift turnovers bi-weekly to ensure proper control room and shift manning. The inspector directly observed the ope ations listed below to ensure adherence to approved procedures:

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Plant shutdown on May 15, 198 Routine power operation Issuance of RWP's and Work Requests / Event / Deficiency form No violations were identifie Shift Logs and Operating Records Selected shift logs and operating records were reviewed to obtain information on plant problems and operations, detect changes and trends in performance, detect possible conflicts with Technical

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Specifications or regulatory requirements, determine that records are being maintained and reviewed as required, and assess the effective-ness of the communications provided by the log No violations were identifie Plant Tours During the inspection period, the inspector made observations and conducted tours of the plant. During the plant tours, the inspector conducted a visual inspection of selected piping between containment and the isolation valves for leakage or leakage paths. This included verification that manual valves were shut, capped and locked when required and that motor operated valves were not mechanically blocke The inspector also checked fire protection, housekeeping / cleanliness, radiation protection, and physical security conditions to ensure compliance with plant procedures and regulatory requirement No violations were identifie Tagout Verification The inspector verified that the following safety-related protective tagout records (PTR's) were proper by observing the positions of breakers, switches and/or valves:

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PTR 860844 on "A" Standby Gas Treatment Syste PTR 860883 on "A" Control Room Emergency Ventilation syste PTR 860869 on the "A" Core Spray Syste No violations were identifie Emergency System Operability The inspector verified operability of the following systems by l ensuring that each accessible valve in the primary flow path was in j the correct position, by confirming that power supplies and breakers l were properly aligned for components that must activate upon an

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initiation signal, and by visual inspection of the major components for leakage and other conditions which might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirements:

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Standby Gas Treatment Syste "B" Core Spray Syste Standby Liquid Control System.

! No violations were identified.

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6 Surveillance Observations The inspector observed portions of the surveillance procedures listed below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, the work was performed by qualified personnel, limiting conditions for operation were met, and the system was correctly rostored following the testin F-ISP-1000, Reactor Protection System and Primary Containment Isolation System Functional Test / Calibration, Revision 3, dated March 26, 1986, performed May 20, 198 F-ST-70, Standby Gas Treatment Valve Exercising, Revision 1, dated February 26, 1986, performed June 5, 198 F-ISP-27-2, Service Water Process Radiation Monitor Instrument Channel Calibration, Revision 1, dated January 15, 1986, performed June 12, 198 F-ISP-150A, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Auto Isolation Instrument Functional Test / Calibration, Revision 3, dated February 26, 1986, performed June 17, 198 The inspector also witnessed all aspects of the following survel'. lance test to verify that the surveillance procedure conformed to technical specification ~ requirements and had been properly approved, limiting conditions for operation for removing equipment from service were met, testing was performed by qualified personnel, test results met technical specification requirements, the surveillance test documentation was reviewed, and equipment was properly restored to service following the tes F-ST-48, High Pressure Coolant Injection Flow Rate / Pump Operability /

Valve Operability Tests, Revsion 23, dated April 9, 1986, performed June 11, 198 No violations were identifie . Maintenance Observations a, The inspector observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to determine that redundant components were operable, that these activities did not violate the limiting conditions for opera-tion, that required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the work, that approved procedures were used or the activity was within the " skills of the trade," that appropriate radiological controls were properly implemented, that ignition / fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and that equipment was i properly tested prior to returning it to service.

I During this inspection period, the following activities were observed:

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WR 02/42797, inspect the limitorque operator for the "B" Recirculation Pump Discharge Bypass Valv WR 00/33088, inspect the limitorque wiring for "A" Core Spray Valve WR 70/33154, troubleshoot the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Syste . TMI Task Action III.D.3.4 Control Room Habitability In letter number JPN-81-60, dated August 13, 1981, the licensee, based on the results of its study, committed to install a redundant damper in the Control Room Emergency Ventilation outside air intake, perform periodic system capacity verification tests, and submit Technical Specification to require these tests. The licensee's study concluded that a damper, in addition to the installed damper (MOD-113), was necessary to ensure single failure criteria was met for the system. In a Safety Evaluation dated February 24, 1982, NRR concluded that upon completion of these modifica-tions, the licensee would meet the requirements of Item III.D.3.4. On March 14, 1983, the NRC issued an Order confirming the licensee's commit-ment to make the modifications identified. The inspector reviewed test reports which document the completion of the periodic system capacity verifications. A Technical Specification Amendment, which requires the verification, was submitted April 15, 1986, after a licensee review identified the outstanding commitment. The inspector found, however, that no changes had been made on the emergency outside air intake. The inspector noted an internal licensee memorandum stating the redundant damper was not necessary since testing has shown MOD-113 would meet single failure criteria. However, this item was never formally reviewed by the NR The licensee has informed the inspector they will submit this item to NRR for review. This item is unresolved pending the review of the licensee's submittal by NRR. (333/86-05-01)

9. Licensee Response to High Pressure Core Cooling System Reliability Issues.

The inspector reviewed Operating Experience Reviews No. P021 and No. P023,

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various procedures, and held discussions with licensee personnel to deter-mine the licensee's actions in response to Institute of Nuclear Power

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Operations' Significant Operating Experience Reports No. 82-11 and 82-14, concerning the reliability of High Pressure Core Cooling Systems. The

inspector noted that procedures have been changed, programs established, l and management controls implemented to improve system reliability.

L The inspector reviewed the appropriate surveillance test procedures and verified that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core l Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Systems are tested for operational readiness by l cold, quick starting. In addition, the inspector held discussions with l

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the engineer assigned to monitor HPCI and RCIC performance and maintenance, vendor recommendations, and problems at other plants, and found that he adequately fulfills the above dutie The inspector also reviewed various Instrumentation and Operation Surveil-lance procedures to verify that trip and isolation signals are tested and calibrated as often as initiation signal It was noted that, while most system initiation, isolation and turbine trip signals are tested monthly, two trip signals (pump low suction pressure and turbine high exhaust pressure) are tested quarterly. The licensee feels, based upon past performance of these instruments, that this test frequency is justifie Also, there is no periodic test of the RCIC turbine overspeed trip devic The HPCI turbine overspeed trip test is conducted once per cycle. There are no Technical Specification requirements concerning the turbine trip function . Licensee Response to Biofouling of Cooling Water Heat Exchangers The inspector reviewed Operating Experience Review No. 213, various procedures, and held discussions with the licensee to determine the licensee's actions in response to Institute of Nuclear Power Operations'

Significant Operating Experience Report No. 84-01, concerning cooling water systems degradation due to aquatic life. The inspector noted that the licensee does not have instrumentation available on all safety-related equipment cooled by open-cycle service water systems to monitor flow and determine degradation of heat exchanger performance. Also, the licensee does not specifically address degradation of heat exchanger performance due to fouling in procedures or training; nor do they conduct periodic inspection for such fouling. However, based on the fact that no fouling has,been noted in the plant's 10 year operating history, the absence of aquatic life in the cooling water (especially Asiatic Clams, which are sampled for routinely), and no indications of fouling have been found during inspections of heat exchangers performed in order to support main-tenance and eddy current testing, the licensee feels justified in not taking action. The licensee does monitor flow through the Residual Heat Removal Service Water System and temperatures on the Emergency Diesel Generators, but these indications are not trende . Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special reports. The review included the following: inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report information. The following periodic report was reviewed:

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May 1986 Operating Status Report, dated June 5, 198 ~

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A region-based inspector also reviewed the licensee's Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program annual report for 1985. This report summarizes the results of the sampling and analyses of environmental media to determine the radiological impact of station operations. These envi-ronmental media include air, water, vegetation, and aquatic plants and animals. In addition, direct radiation is monitored by placement of thermoluminescent dosimeters at various locations around the statio As a result of this review, the inspector determined that the licensee has generally complied with its Technical Specification requirements for sampling frequencies, types of measurements, analytical sensitivities, and reporting schedules. Exceptions to the sampling and analysis program were adequately explained, e.g., low air sample volume due to power failur The report included summaries of the laboratory quality assurance program and of the land use surve The analyses of environmental samples indicated that doses to humans from radionuclides of station origin were negligibl . Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown The inspector verified the operablity of the following ESF system by performing a complete walkdown of accessible portions of the system to confirm that system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuration, to identify equipment conditions that might degrade performance, to determine that instrumentation is calibrated and function-ing, and to verify that valves are properly positioned and locked as appropriat Emergency Control Room Ventilatio No violations were identifie . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations. The unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph . Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings. On June 24, 1986, the inspector met with licensee representa-tives (denoted in paragraph 1) and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are described in this repor Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussions held with licensee representatives during the exit meeting, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions.