ML20247M997

Insp Rept 50-333/89-19 on 890905-07.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Annual Emergency Exercise Conducted on 890906

ML20247M997
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	09/14/1989
From:	Lazarus W, Vito D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247M976	List: ML20247M973 ML20247M997
References
50-333-89-19, NUDOCS 8909260110
Download: ML20247M997 (6)

See also: IR 05000333/1989019

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION' ,

REGION I

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Report No. 50-333/89-19

Docket No. 50-333

License No. DPR-59 Category _ C

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Licensee: Egy York Power Authority

, -P.O. Box 41

Lycomina. New York 13093

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Facility Name: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

Inspection At: _ Lycomina. New York

Inspection. Conducted: September 5-7 1281 .

Inspectors: f

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D.Vito/EPS,FRSSB,DRSS / date >

E. Fox, Sr. EPS, RI .

W. Schmidt, SRI, FitzPatrick

R. Plasse, RI, FitzPatrick

Approved by: w I P9

W. C laz s, Chief, Emergency Preparedness date

Sect , FRSSB, DRSS

Inspection Summary: Insoection on September 5-7. 1989 (Inspection Report

No. 50-333/89-19)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and

observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise on September 6,1989.

The inspection was performed by a team of four NRC Region I personnel. The

State of New York and Oswego County participated to a-limited degree. The

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not observe the exercise.

Results: No' violations were identified. Emergency resp .se actions were

adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the

public.

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8909260110 890914

PDR ADOCK 05000333

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DETAILS

1.0 -Persons Contacted

The following key licensee representatives attended the exit meeting on

September 7, 1989.

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E. Berzins, Public Information Officer i

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W. Fernandez, Resident Manager

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H. Keith, Superintendent, Instrumentation and Controls

E. Mulcahey, Supervisor, Radiological and Environmental Services

W. Robinson, Quality Assurance Engineer

G. Vargo, General Supervisor, Radiological Engineering

A. Zaremba, Jr., Emergency Planning Coordinator

The inspectors also observed the actions of, and interviewed other

licensee personnel.

2.0 Emeraency Exercise

The James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant partial participation

exercise was conducted on September 6, 1989 from 8:00 A.M. to 1:30 P.M.

The State of New York and Oswego County participated to a limited

degree.

2.1 -Pre-Exercise Activities

Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I had telephone

conversations with the licensee to discuss the objectives, scope and

content of the exercise scenario. As a result, certain portions of the

scenario were revised to ensure that all exercise objectives would be

met.

NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on September 5, 1989 and

participated in discussions of emergency response actions anticipated

during the exercise. The licensee stated certain emergency response

activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in

exercise activities to prevent deviations from the scenario and to

ensure that normal plant operations were not disrupted.

The exercise scenario included the following events:

1. ADS failure resulting in a shutdown required by the Technical

Specifications;

2. Inadvertent HPCI initiation and accompanying transient causing

fuel cladding failures;

3. A stuck open safety relief valve;

4. Main Steam equalizing header rupture with MSIV failure resulting

in a steam leak to the turbine building; and

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5. Leakage past the turbine vent dampers resulting in a release to

the environment.

2.2 Activities Observed

During the conduct of the exercise, four NRC team members made

observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency

organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions

of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency

response facilities. The following activities were observed:

1. Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events;

2. Direction and coordination of the emergency response;

3. Augmentation of the emergency organization and response facility

activation;

4. Not ification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of

pertinent plant status information;

5. Communications, information flow, and record keeping;

6. Assessment and projection of offsite radiological dose,

consideration of protective actions, and recommendation of

protective actions to state officials;

7. Provisions for in-plant radiation protection;

8. Performance of offsite and in-plant radiological surveys;

9. Maintenance of site security and access control;

10. Performance of technical support, repairs and corrective actions;

11. Assembly, accountability and evacuation of personnel;

12. Preparation of information for dissemination at the Media Center;

and

13. Critique of the exercise.

3.0 Exercise Observation _s

The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of

the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response

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facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with the

Vermont Yankee emergency response plan and implementing procedures.

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3.1 Exercise Strenaths

The NRC team noted the following actions that provided strong positive

indication of the. licensee's ability ta cope with abnormal plant

conditions:

1.. The licensee effectively interacted with the State of New York and

Oswego County representatives in the EOF during the exercise,

contributing to scenario realism;

2. Dose assessment. activities were proactive and aggressively

attempted.to evaluate potential radiological conditions based on

projected trends in plant conditions;

3. Emergency Action Levels (EALs) were effectively utilized, event

classifications were correct, and subsequent notifications were

timely;

4. Emergency Response Facility (ERF) communications, interactions,

and overall command and control were effectively demonstrated; and

5. Staff augmentation was prompt and each ERF was activated in a

timely manner.

3.2 Areas for Improvement

The NRC team identified the following areas which did not have a

significant impact on overall performance during the exercise but in

which improvements could be made. These areas for improvement should be

evaluated by the licensee to determine whether improvements could

strengthen the emergency response effort. The areas for improvement are

indicated as-follows:

1. Control room supervisory personnel dispatched an individual from

the control room to close a set of truck bay doors which had been

discovered to be open as part of the exercise scenario. The

Operations Support Center (OSC) was manned at the time. The

dispatching and tracking of this individual should have been under

the control of the OSC so as to relieve the control room staff

from this responsibility.

2. There was no prohibition of eating, drinking and smoking in the

OSC prior to the establishment of habitability.

3. Although appropriate Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) were

developed by the licensee during the exercise, the licensee

decisionmakers in the EOF appeared, at times, to spend excessive

time searching for a predetermined PAR (via existing charts and

procedural guidance) to validate their decisions. The licensee's

emergency response decisionmakers should not only be able to

recognize those conditions for which a predetermined PAR exists,

but should also recognize those conditions when one does not or

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L when an existing predetermined PAR is somewhat related to a given

situation but may not directly apply. The inspectors noted that

in these situations, the decisionmakers should consider the use of

existing PAR guidance along with other pertinent available

information (field radiological data, dose assessment,. evacuation

time estimates, plant conditions, state and. local agency. input) to

develop the-most appropriate PAR. This area will be reviewed as-

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part of a subsequent routine EP inspection.

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4.0 Licensee Action on Previous 1v Identified Items

Based on discussions with licensee representatives, observations.of the

exercise, and review of records, the following items which were

identified during the previous exercise (Inspection Report 50-333/88-08)

were not repeated and are closed.

- (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-333/88-08-01.- TSC disorganized.

TSC command and control lacking.

Command and control was evident during the exercise. Personnel exhibited

- proper use of the emergency plan and implementing procedures and

knowledge of their respective emergency response organization

responsibilities. -The transfer of control of the emergency response

effort from the-TSC to the EOF was performed well. Based on these

findings, this item is closed.

- (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-333/88-08-04 - Form EAP-4, which

provides input for Procedure EAP-18 was not used in TSC.

Appropriate portions of Procedure EAP-4, Dose Assessment Calculations,

were used during the exercise. Based on this finding, this item is

closed.

5.0 Licensee Critioue

The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on September

7, 1989. The lead licensee controller for each emergency response

facility discussed the licensee's observations of the exercise. The

Emergency Planning Coordinator indicated that the observations would be

evaluated and appropriate corrective actions taken. The critique was

thorough and comprehensive and demonstrated the licensee's ability to

perform a proper self-evaluation.

6.0 Exit Meetino and NRC Critioue

The NRC team leader met with the licensee representatives listed in

Section 1 of this report at the end of the inspection. The team leader

summarized the observations made during the exercise.

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_The licensee was informed that previously identified items were

adequately addressed and no violations were observed. Although there.

were areas identified for improvement, the NRC team determined that

within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's

performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan

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and Emergency Plan implementing Procedures in a manner which could

adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety. of the

public.

Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that they

would evaluate the NRC comments and observations and take corrective

actions as appropriate.

At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide written

information to the licensee.

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