IR 05000333/2004002
| ML041250540 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 05/04/2004 |
| From: | Meyer G Reactor Projects Branch 3 |
| To: | Ted Sullivan Entergy Nuclear Northeast |
| References | |
| IR-04-002 | |
| Download: ML041250540 (19) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2004002
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
On March 31, 2004, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 28, 2004, with Mr. Kevin Mulligan and other members of your staff.
The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
On the basis of the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC has issued five Orders and several threat advisories to licensees of commercial power reactors to strengthen licensee capabilities, improve security force readiness, and enhance controls over access authorization. In addition to applicable baseline inspections, the NRC issued Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/148,
"Inspection of Nuclear Reactor Safeguards Interim Compensatory Measures," and its subsequent revision to audit and inspect licensee implementation of the interim compensatory measures required by Order. Phase 1 of TI 2515/148 was completed at all commercial power nuclear power plants during calendar year 2002, and the remaining inspection activities for FitzPatrick were completed subsequently. The NRC will continue to monitor overall safeguards and security controls at FitzPatrick.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS).
Mr. Theodore Sullivan 2 ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web Site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA by A. Randolph Blough Acting For/
Glenn W. Meyer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000333/2004002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
Mr. Theodore Sullivan 3
REGION I==
Docket No.: 50-333 License No.: DPR-59 Report No.: 05000333/2004002 Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Northeast (Entergy)
Facility: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Location: 268 Lake Road Scriba, New York 13093 Dates: January 1, 2004 - March 31, 2004 Inspectors: L. M. Cline, Senior Resident Inspector D. A. Dempsey, Resident Inspector D. M. Silk, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector Approved by: Glenn W. Meyer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000333/2004002; 01/01/2004 - 03/31/2004; James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
Routine Integrated Report.
The report covered a thirteen-week period of inspection by resident inspectors and a regional specialist inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
The reactor began the inspection period operating at full power. On February 15, 2004, power was reduced to 33 percent due to frazil ice blockage at the circulating water intake. During the downpower, the A reactor feed pump (RFP) seal failed. Because the A RFP could not be isolated, power was reduced to 15 percent and the unit turbine was taken off line. The turbine was placed back into service on February 18 and full power operation was achieved on February 19. On March 4 power was reduced to 55 percent to perform power suppression testing. Two fuel assemblies with fuel pin leaks were identified, and some control rods were inserted to suppress local power. Full power was restored on March
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 1 Sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample. On January 29 and 30, Oswego county experienced significant lake effect snowfall. Snow fall totals in some areas of the county exceeded three feet and snow fall rates at times reached several inches per hour. The inspectors reviewed Entergys preparations for these weather conditions including appropriate actions specified by supplemental action procedure (SAP) - 19, Severe Weather, and administrative procedure (AP) - 12.04, Seasonal Weather Preparations. In particular, the inspectors verified that Entergy management took action to ensure adequate operator and onsite staffing was provided during the storm.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial System Walkdown. (71111.04Q - 4 Samples) The inspectors performed four partial system walkdowns to evaluate the operability of one train while the opposite train was inoperable or out of service for maintenance and testing. The inspectors compared system lineups to system operating procedures (OPs), system drawings, and the applicable chapters in the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR). The inspectors also verified the operability of critical system components by observing component material condition during the system walkdown and reviewing the maintenance history for each component. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the systems listed below. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- A Residual heat removal (RHR) and core spray (CS) while B RHR was out of service on January 28 for planned maintenance
- B emergency diesel generators (EDG) and 115 kilovolt (kV) off-site power lines while the C EDG was out of service for planned maintenance during the week of February 10
- B standby gas treatment (SGT) while A SGT was out of service for planned maintenance on March 9 Complete System Walkdown. (71111.04S - 1 Sample) The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system to identify any discrepancies between the existing equipment lineup and the specified lineup. During the walkdown system drawings and OPs were used to verify proper equipment alignment and operational status. The inspectors reviewed the open maintenance work requests (WRs) on the system for any deficiencies that could affect the ability of the system to perform its function. Documentation associated with unresolved design issues such as temporary modifications, operator workarounds, and items tracked by plant engineering were also reviewed to assess their collective impact on system operation. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the condition report (CR) database to verify that equipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05 - 11 Samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors toured eleven areas important to reactor safety to evaluate conditions related to Entergys control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment and features; and the fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation. The inspectors used procedure ENN-DC-161, Transient Combustible Program, the fire hazards analysis report, and the fire protection system design basis document to perform the inspection. The areas inspected included:
- West crescent area, elevations 227 feet and 242 feet, fire area 18/zone RB-W
- East electric bay, turbine building, fire area 02/zone SW-2
- West electric bay, turbine building, fire area 1C/zone SW-1
- A battery and battery charger room, fire area 03/zone BR-1 and BR-2
- B battery and battery charger room, fire area 04/zone BR-3 and Br-4
- Motor generator set room, fire area 1A/zone MG-1
- Standby gas filter room, fire area 20/zone SG-1
- South cable run room, fire area 11/zone CT-3
- North cable run room, fire area 1D/zone CT-4
- Relay room, elevation 286 feet, fire area 07/zone RR-1
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11 - 1 Sample)
a. Inspection Scope
On February 26 the inspector observed licensed operator simulator training to assess operator performance during a scenario involving a steam leak from the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system complicated by the failure of several control rods to insert and several safety relief valves to open during the subsequent reactor shutdown and depressurization. The inspector evaluated the performance of risk significant operator actions, including the use of emergency operating procedure (EOP)-3, Failure to Scram, EOP-5, Secondary Containment, and the emergency depressurization procedure. The inspector assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications, the implementation of appropriate actions in response to alarms, the performance of timely control board operation and manipulation, and the oversight and direction provided by the shift manager. The inspector also reviewed simulator fidelity to evaluate the degree of similarity to the actual control room.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Implementation (71111.12 - 4 Samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed performance-based problems involving selected in-scope structures, systems, or components (SSCs) to assess the effectiveness of the maintenance program. Reviews focused on: proper maintenance rule scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65; characterization of reliability issues; changing system and component unavailability; 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications; identifying and addressing common cause failures, trending key parameters, and the appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified (a)(2) and the adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified (a)(1). The inspectors reviewed system health reports, maintenance backlogs, and maintenance rule basis documents. The four maintenance rule samples are listed below. Documents that were reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- Reactor manual control system
- 120 Vac uninterruptible power supply (UPS)
- Primary containment isolation valves
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13 - 6 Samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the risk assessments for the work weeks listed below. The inspectors verified that risk assessments were performed in accordance with AP-10.10, On-line Risk Assessment; risk of scheduled work was managed through the use of compensatory actions and schedule adherence; and applicable contingency plans were properly identified in the integrated work schedule.
- Week of February 8 that included a C EDG maintenance outage, RCIC testing, and relay room ventilation system maintenance
- Week of February 29 that included repairs to the A RHR pump discharge check valve following an emergent failure, emergency service water (ESW) lock-out matrix testing, C service water pump preventive maintenance, and emergent flux suppression testing specified to identify fuel leakage
- Week of March 6 that included both replacement of the A SGT filter train heater and VOTES testing for the A CS pump discharge isolation valve, 14MOV-11A
- Week of January 4 that included rebuilding and testing control rod drive unit scram pilot solenoid valves
- Week of February 15 that included replacement of the A RFP seals
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions (71111.14 - 3 Samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the control room operators performance during three non-routine evolutions. The adequacy of personnel performance, procedure compliance, and use of the corrective action process were evaluated using NRC inspection procedure 71111, attachment 14, Personnel Performance Related to Non-routine Plant Evolutions and Events.
- Power suppression testing to identify and suppress two defective fuel pins performed on March 4-9
- Unplanned power reduction due to frazil ice formation in the circulating water intakes on February 15
- Reactor water recirculation pump motor-generator electric speed stop adjustments performed on March 25
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15 - 6 Samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed six operability determinations to assess the acceptability of the evaluations, the use and control of compensatory measures if needed, and compliance with technical specifications. The inspectors review included a verification that the operability determinations were made as specified by ENN-OP-104, "Operability Determinations." The technical adequacy of the determinations was reviewed and compared to the TS, UFSAR, and associated DBDs.
- CR-2003-05828 concerning degradation of D230 control rod blades and CR-2003-05881 concerning degradation of Marathon control rod blades
- CR-2003-00172 concerning valve stem binding that prevented main steam isolation valve (MSIV) 80D from fully closing when it was stroked in slow speed during the August 2003 forced outage
- CR-2004-00609 concerning discolored insulation on several ring terminals attached to the field flash resistors for the C EDG
- CR-2004-00822 concerning the results of an ultrasonic thickness evaluation of the B residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) strainer basket housing that identified wall thickness readings less than the calculated minimum wall thickness requirement
- CR-2004-00886 concerning the D EDG jacket water immersion heater that was found de-energized
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 6 Samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed post maintenance test procedures and associated testing activities for selected risk significant mitigating systems to assess whether the effect of maintenance on plant systems was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design basis documentation; that test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and accuracy for the application; and that tests were performed, as written, with applicable prerequisites satisfied. Upon completion, the inspectors verified that equipment was returned to the status specified to perform its safety function. The following six post maintenance test activities were reviewed:
- WR JF-980644520 that involved the installation of a new disc hanger arm for the D RHR discharge check valve 10RHR-42D. The retest was performed through partial performance of surveillance procedure (ST)-2AM, RHR Loop B Quarterly Operability Test (IST).
- WR JF-020203314 that involved mechanical cleaning of crescent area cooler 66UC-22G. The retest was performed using temporary surveillance procedure (TST)-104, Testing of ESW Loop A.
- WR JF-020311806 that involved replacement of the heater contactor HR-1 for the A SGT filter train. The retest was performed using ST-7A, SGT Manual Bypass Operation, Heater Capacity, Filter DP, and Downstream Piping Leak Tests.
- WR JF-030428700 that involved VOTES testing of the A CS pump discharge outboard isolation valve, 14MOV-11A. The retest was performed using ST-3PA, CS Loop A Quarterly Operability Test (IST).
- Planned TS LCO maintenance on the C EDG. The retest was performed using ST-9BA, EDG A and C Full Load Test and ESW Pump Operability Test.
- Reactor water recirculation pump motor-generator speed stop adjustments. The retest was performed using IMP-02-184.6, Recirculation MG Set Scoop Tube Actuator Online High Speed Stop and Limit Adjustment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 5 Samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors witnessed performance of STs and reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether the SSCs satisfied TS, UFSAR, technical requirements manual, and Entergy procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design basis documentation; that test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and accuracy for the application; and that tests were performed, as written, with applicable prerequisites satisfied. Upon completion the inspectors verified that equipment was returned to the status specified to perform its safety function. The following five tests were witnessed:
- Instrument surveillance procedure (ISP)-23, Emergency Service Water Lockout Matrix Instrument Channel Calibration
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04 - 1 Sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector performed an in-office review of recent changes to emergency plan implementing procedures on February 3. A thorough review was performed of documents related to the risk significant planning standards (RSPS) and a general review was completed for non-RSPS documents. The inspector verified that the changes satisfied the standards of 10 CFR 50.54(q), 10 CFR 50.47(b), the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, and the intent of NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, and that the changes did not decrease the effectiveness of the plan. These changes are subject to future inspections to ensure that the emergency plan continues to meet NRC regulations.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 Sample)
a. Inspection Scope
On January 22 the inspector observed a partial scale practice drill. The drill simulated an independent spent fuel storage cask drop in the refuel pool. The inspectors verified that emergency classification declarations and notification activities specified by NRC regulations were properly completed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151 - 2 Samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed performance indicator (PI) data for the below listed cornerstones and used NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidance, to verify individual PI accuracy and completeness.
Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
- Safety system unavailability, RCIC The inspectors reviewed data and plant records from January to December 2003. The records reviewed included PI data summary reports, LERs, operator narrative logs, and maintenance rule records. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the number of critical hours reported, and interviewed the system engineers and operators responsible for data collection and evaluation.
Barrier Integrity Cornerstone
- Reactor coolant system leakage The inspectors reviewed operator logs, plant computer data, and surveillance procedure ST-40D, Daily Surveillance and Channel Check, to verify the accuracy of Entergys reported maximum reactor coolant system identified leakage for January to December 2003.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 )
1. Annual Sample Review (71152 - 1 Sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a detailed review of Entergys evaluation and corrective actions for CR-2003-03954. The CR involved a failure of RCIC to start automatically on reactor vessel low water level following a reactor scram on August 14, 2003. The CR was reviewed to ensure that the correct level of evaluation was performed and that appropriate corrective actions were specified. The inspectors evaluated the reports against the requirements of procedure ENN-LI-102, Corrective Action Process, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
Entergy determined that the RCIC system did not start automatically, because the initiating low reactor water level signals cleared before the initiating relays timed out.
Subsequent operability testing demonstrated that while the relays actuated slightly slower than the nominal, the overall response time of the system was well within specified limits.
b. Findings and Observations
No significant findings were identified.
2. Routine PI&R Program Review
a. Inspection Scope
As specified by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into Entergys corrective action program. The review was accomplished by accessing Entergys computerized database for CRs and attending CR screening meetings.
In accordance with the baseline inspection modules, the inspectors selected 58 corrective action program items across the initiating events, mitigating systems, and barrier integrity cornerstones for additional follow-up and review. The inspectors assessed Entergys threshold for problem identification, the adequacy of the cause analyses, extent of condition review, and operability determinations, and the timeliness of the specified corrective actions. The CRs reviewed are noted in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
a. Inspection Scope
(2515/TI-154)
Temporary Instruction 2515/TI-154, Spent Fuel Material Control and Accounting at Nuclear Power Plants. Phase I and Phase II of the inspection were completed during this inspection period. Appropriate documentation was provided to NRC management as specified.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Entergy management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 28, 2004. Entergy acknowledged that no proprietary information was involved.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Entergy Personnel
- N. Avrakatos, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- V. Bhardwaj, Manager, Programs and Components Engineering
- S. Bono, Manager, System Engineering
- C. Boucher, Chemistry Superintendent
- A. Halliday, Manager, Regulatory Compliance
- A. Khanifar, Manager, Design Engineering
- D. Johnson, Manager, Operations
- J. LaPlante, Manager, Security
- O. Limpias, Director, Engineering
- B. Maguire, Director, Nuclear Safety
- K. Mulligan, General Manager, Plant Operations
- T. Sullivan, Vice President, Operations