ML20137N911

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Accident Mitigation Systems Review
ML20137N911
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 04/03/1997
From:
External (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137N877 List:
References
PP-02, PP-2, NUDOCS 9704090088
Download: ML20137N911 (16)
v • d • e


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L " PARSONS PP-02 MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP PROJECT PROCEDURES

Title:

Accident Mitigation Systems Review i

REVISION O Prepared by: Date: [

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Approved by: N Date: / #7 )

{ ag Company Quality Program 2 Approved by: <2+x  % Date: Y kb Project Director h I

l REVISION HISTORY REVISION DATE REVISION DESCRIPTION 0 04/03/97 Procedure initiation O

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g MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP PROJECT PROCEDURES PP-02 PARSONS

( TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 0 DATE: 04/03/97 PAGE 2 OF 16 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 PURPOSE....................................................................................................................3 2.0 DEFINITIONS.........................................................................................................3 J

3.0 P R E R E Q U I S I T ES . ........ ... ........ ........ . .. .... .. . . ... .... ... ..... .. .... ....... . ...... .. ........... . . ............. . 3 4.0 PROCEDURE.............................................................................................................4 4.1 DEFINE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS . . .5 1

4.2 CRITICAL PARAMETER... .. . ..9 4.3 CRITICAL COMPONENT / SYSTEM.. . 11 4.4 CRITICAL DESIGN CHARACTERISTIC. . . . . . .. . . .. 13 4.6 CRITICAL DESIGN CHARACTERISTIC ASSESSMENT . . .14 l

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1 MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP PP-02 g PROJECT PROCEDURES g

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5TLE: ACCIDENT MlTIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW i REVISION: 0 DATE: 04/03/97 PAGE 3 OF 16 1.0 PURPOSE I The Accident Mitigation Systems Review (AMSR) will identify and verify the critical )

design characteristics for the accident mitigation systems and their components as identified to meet the Design Bases Events (DBEv) identified in Chapter 14 of the Millstone Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analyses Report (UFSAR).

2.0 DEFINITIONS 2.1 Design Bases Event (DBEv) - Design Bases Events are defined as those initiating events as presented in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR that form the bases for the operating license of the Millstone Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant.

p l C 2.2 Critical Safety Functions (CSF) " Critical Safety Functions" are defined as the required specific set of activities that must occur in order to ensure that a success path associated with the design bases event mitigation is met and maintained. l 2.3 Critical Action " Critical Action"is defined as an active change that must happen in order for the critical function to be met.

2.4 Critical Parameters " Critical Parameters" are a set of attnbutes that are required to be met by a system or component in order to achieve success in meeting critical actions.

2.5 Critical Design Characteristic (CDC)- A critical design characteristic is defined as that aspect of a component or system that must be provided by the designer to ensure that the component or system will meet the performance criteria identified in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR.

3.0 PREREOUISITES  !

  • Copies of Emergency Operating Procedures

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gg MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP PP-02 I PROJECT PROCEDURES PARSONS TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 0 DATE: 04/03/97 PAGE 4 OF 16

. Chapter 14 of the UFSAR e System P&lDs e Accident Analyses

. System Design Descriptions (SDD) e Safety System Logic Documents

. Shut Down Logic e Safety Evaluation Report (SER)

, e Design Bases Documents (DBD)

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4.0 PROCEDURE 1

Overview: Determine the critical design characteristics for systems and components that must be confirmed in order to ensure that the plant will comply with the safety analyses identified in Chapter.14 of the UFSAR. The simplified process flowchart is presented in Exhibit 2-1. The DBEv groups covered by this procedures are identified in Table 1.

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g'g MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP PROJECT PROCEDURES PP-02 PARSONS TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 0 DATE: 04/03/97 PAGE 5 OF 16 Exhibit 2-1 AMSR PROCESS FSARl. _

lDesignBases Eventsf vChapter 14L ((DBEv):

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Define Critical.'

-Safety Functions.--

V Identify Critical ' ,

O Safety Actions 1I j . Identify 8 Critical Parameters:

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! Tier 1 l System Component '

Review -

. Assessment -

II - Key Parameters:

Identify Critical:

Design Characteristics

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! ..By System & DBEv.

Y Critical Design -

Tier-3 CMPJ q  ;

Prepare AMSR.

Characterisuc

! Program - Report '

Assessment-l LO l

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g PROJECT PROCEDURES PARSONS TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 0 DATE: 04/03/97 PAGE 6 OF 16 4.1 DEFINE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS Resources e System Engineer e Accident Analyst Electrical EnE ineer e Mechanical Engineer e Controls Engineer

. Safety Evaluation Report (SER)

  • FSAR e Emergency Operations Procedures I l

e Technical Specifications l t

  • PC database

. Action 1.1 Review UFSAR Chapter 14 and identify design bases events by logical groups (refer to Table 1).

1.2 Evaluate DBEv groups to identify Critical Safety Functions essential to achieve and maintain safe shutdown following an event. (e.g. RCS Heat Removal, Reactivity Control, RCS Inventoiy Control, etc.)

1.3 Identify Critical Safety Function objectives and system level plant processes / actions to achieve objectives.

1.4 Identify design and licensing criteria that apply to UFSAR Chapter 14 DBEv mitigation.

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gg MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP PP-02 PROJECT PROCEDURES PARSONS

, O TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATIOfJ SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 0 DATE: 04/03/97 PAGE 7 OF 16 Table 1 DBEv GROUPS 4

DBEv Variation Increase in Heat Removal Decrease in Feedwater Temperature by the Secondary System Increase in Feedwater Flow Increase in Steam Flow Inadvertent Opening of a Steam Generator Relief or Safety Valve Steam Pipe Failure Inside and Outside containment Decrease in IIcat Removal Loss of External Load by the Secondary System Turbine Trip Closure of Main Steam Isolation Valve Loss of Normal Feedwater Flow Decrease in Reactor Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant Flow Coolant System flow Reactor Coolant Pump Rotor Seizure Reactivity and Power Uncontrolled Control Rod Bank Withdrawal From a Distribution Anomatics Subcritical or Low Power Startup Condition Uncontrolled Control Rod / Bank Withdrawal at Power Control Rod Misoperation Startup of an Inactive taop CVCS Malfunction That Results in a Decrease in the Boron Concentration in the Reactor Coolant Control Rod Ejection Accident Decrease in Reactor Inadvertent Opening of a Pressurizer PRV Coolant inventory Steam Generator Tube Failure - Rad Consequences LOCA From Breaks in the RCP Boundary Radioactive Releases from Waste Gas System Failure a Subsystem or component Fuel Handling Accident Spent FucI Cask Drop Accident Non-Standard Review Plan Containment Analyses Events Hydrogen Accumulation in Containment Radiological Consequences of the Design Bases Accident 1.1 Create generic Critical Safety Function Diagrams for each Critical Safety Function identifying system level active components that support the process or

, action. (Example shown as Exhibit 2-2

g MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP PP-02 s PROJECT PROCEDURES

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TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 0 DATE: 04/03/97 PAGE 8 OF 16 1.2 Identify support system requirements for each system level component or action Critical Safety Function Diagram 1.3 Develop a specific critical safety function data base or diagram for each DBEv Exhibit 2-2 SAFETY FUNCTION DIAGRAM Loss of Feedwater Flow 1

O RCS Preswe a Inventory Conuel Reactmty Control 11 eat Removal l

Mamman ""g*"," Maman im w emer en ,((

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.,. .c so., oru ,. ",',",7 Component Critical Design Criteria Action Output

  • Critical Safety Function and affected systems for each DBEv e Critical Safety Function Diagram.

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PARSONS TITLE: ACCIDENT MlTIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 0 DATE: 04/03/97 PAGE 9 OF 16 i

e Documents identifying references used to determine the Critical Safety Functions.

4.2 IDENTIFY CRITICAL PARAMETERS Resources e System Engineer

. Accident Analyst

  • PC database e Design Calculations e Regulatory Commitments l e Accident Analyses e Engineering Calculations
  • System Design Descriptions e Fmergency Operating Procedures (EOP) j e Technical Speciscations e Critical Safety Function Diagrams e Electrical Systems Diagrams e System Logic and Control Diagrams Action 1.1 Review each DBEv group accident analyses including , DBD's, system calculations and analyses, as necessary, to identify key system level process.

1.2 Using the Critical Safety Function Diagrams for each DBEv, evaluate each Critical Safety Function and identify the system and component critical parameters essential to achieving the safety function.

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TO E: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW i l

REVISION: 0 DATE: 04/03/97 PAGE 10 OF 16 l

1.3 Identify where analyses parameters are bounding and document key assumptions made.

1.4 Create DBEv critical parameter list by system and component.

1.5 Confirm critical parameter requirements by defming the critical parameter and the definitive references that identifies the critical parameter.

1.6 If an inconsistency exists, the System Engineer will prepare a discrepancy n::tice identifying the critical parameter, and the documentation that supports the potential finding. Resolution will be in accordance with the potential fmding evaluation process (PP-07). J l

1.7 f f it is determined that the critical parameter is not specified, the System Engineer will prepare a potential finding notice identifying the missing critical parameter, and why it is critical to the safe operation of the plant. Resolution will be m accordance with the potential finding evaluation process (PP-07).

1.8 Ifit is determined that the parameter is not critical and is not essential to the safe operation of the plant, then the System Engineer will document this information. l 1

He document will include, the parameter or fimetion, the material reviewed and l the conclusion reached.

Action Output l

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  • Database file and reports of the critical parameter for each system and DBEv safety function. (See Exhibit 2-2 as reference for type of information)
  • Discrepancies report i

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l gg MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP PROJECT PROCEDURES PP-02 l

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l TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 0 DATE: 04/03/97 PAGE 11 OF 16 Exhibit 2-2 EXAMPLE OF CRITICAL PARAMETER REPORT Design Bases Event:

Systetn:

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Component Function Design Parameter Design Source

/ Action Characte Referenc ristic es Pump Valve 1 l Valve 2 l Instrument 1 l Instrument 2 4.3 CRITICAL COMPONENT / SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Resources

  • System Engineer l l

e Mechanical Engineer 1

. Electrical Engineer i 1

e Controls and Instrument Engineer l

e Accident Analyst

  • PC database e Engineering Calculations e System Design Descriptions e Design Bases Documents
  • ppd e SER e Electrical System Diagrams
  • Control Loop Diagrams I

gg MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP PP-02 PROJECT PROCEDURES PARSONS D

(U TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 0 DATE: 04/03/97 PAGE 12 OF 16 l

i Action l.1 Develop system composite database or diagrams including all essential support systems for critical safety function systems using "As-Built" design bases information l

1.2 Develop list of component design performance requirements 1.3 Document active component as-is performance capabilities from IST data and logs.

1.4 Create critical component list 1.5 Document references and source information used to identify the important to safety components and systems.

1.6 If a compcnent or system is found to contain a discrepancy, a potential finding notice shall be prepared. Resolution will be in accordance with the potential fmding evaluation process (PP-07).

Findings shall contain the following information:

  • Critical Function
  • Critical component l
  • Discrepancy 1

. Effect of Discrepancy e Documents supporting potential finding l e References

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PARSONS TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 0 DATE: 04/03/97 PAGE 13 OF 16 Action Outout

. Critical Component / System Listing including performance requirements and i

capabilities (See Exhibit 2-2) 4.4 IDENTIFY CRITICAL DESIGN CHARACTERISTIC Resources e System Engineer

  • Mechanical Engineer

. Electrical Engineer e Controls Engineer

  • PC database from System Assessment and Critical Parameter Identification e Accident Analyses
  • Engineering Calculations )

i e System Design Descriptions l

. Electrical System Diagrams e EOP

e Technical Specification -

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  • Critical Safety Function Diagrams Action 1.1 Review critical parameter list and establish critical characteristics at the system component level through the review of appropriate design documents and calculations.

It may be necessary to review additional system level documents in order to establish any non-safety related system level interfaces.

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MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP PP-02 g PROJECT PROCEDURES g >

PARSONS TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 0 DATE: 04/03/97 PAGE 14 OF 16 1.2 Correlate CDC's with the critical component list to check component performance requirements. There may be multiple requirements that are derived for different DBEv, check to ensure that all the bounding information is identified on the matrix before confirming with performance information.

1.3 Review technical specifications versus critical design characteristic.

1.4 Prepare a matrix that documents the folloving information:

  • Critical Safety Function e Applicable Design Bases Event e Critical Component e Critical Parameter ,

e Critical Characteristic e Reference source for confirmation Action Output

. Critical Design Characteristic Matrix.

4.5 CRITICAL DESIGN CilARACTERISTIC ASSESSMENT Resources e System Engineer e Walkdown personnel e PRA

  • PC database O

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PARSONS TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 0 DATE: 04/03/97 PAGE 15 OF 16 Action 1.1 The Critical Design Characteristic team lead will review the list Of Critical Design Characteristics and with the AMSR team determine the CDCs to be proposed for verification. The PRA will be used to identify risk significant systems and compone:4s.

1.2 The Team te.aler will identify a selection of Critical Design Characteristics that will be validated by the Critical Design Characteristic walkdown team and submit the list to the NRC for approval.

1.3 Verify through visual inspection that the Critical Design Characteristics are inplace and properly documented.

V 1.4 Verify through the review of maintenance and testing procedures that the characteristics are properly maintained and tested to meet safety function requirements 1.5 Verify through a review ofin-sersice tests and visual inspection that critical parameters are sensed and controlled to meet their safety function requirements.

1.6 Review of operations, maintenance and inservice testing records to ensure that the Critical Design Characteristic is maintained in its required condition.

1.7 in those cases where the SVSR Team is evaluating a system having a group of Critical Design Characteristics, the Critical Design Characteristic walkdown team will not verify them in the field, the SVSR Team will provide the validation.

1.8 For all other selected Critical Design Characteristics, the Critical Design Characteristic w.dkdown team will be responsible for validating the existence of the Ciitical Design Chameteristic for the component through either visual verification in O

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) o -PARSONS PROJECT PROCEDURES TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 0 DATE: 04/03/37 PAGE 16 OF 16 the plant, collection of valid documents, or other solid evidence that the c Critical Design Characteristic is in place and maintained.

1.9 Identify as a potential findings components not having the Critical Design Characteristic met. It will be compared to the results of the NNECo program finding to determine ifit is on the list. Ifit is on the list, the parameter will be documented as being covered under the NNECo program.

1.10 Components with Critical Design Characteristics that must exist and have not been found by NNECo will be documented as potential findings. Resolution will be in accordance with the potential fmding evaluation process (PP4)7).

Action Output e Validation report containing the following information:

e Critical component

  • Critical parameter e Critical Design Characteristic (s) e Validation method e References e Final Report N

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