ML20154G531

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Rev 4 to Project Procedure PP-02, Accident Mitigation Sys Review
ML20154G531
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 10/07/1998
From: Glariam R
External (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20154G456 List:
References
PP-02, PP-2, NUDOCS 9810130216
Download: ML20154G531 (12)
v • d • e


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O PARSONS PP-02 MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP PROJECT PROCEDURES

Title:

Accident Mitigation Systems Review REVISION 4 s

Prepared by: - /

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4/A M Date:

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\s Approved by: . t Date: I de7 TY ager, Co pany Quality Program Approved by: Lddh Date: /0 Project ctor REVISION HISTORY REVISION DATE REVISION DESCRIPTION 0 04/03/97 Procedure initiation 1 06/09/97 incorporation of NRC Comments 2 06/27/97 Revision for AMSR Process Details 3 09/19/97 incorporation of NRC Comments 4 10/05/98 Incorporation of NRC Comments lO

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TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 4 DATE: 10/05/98 PAGE 2 OF 12 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Pace No. Revision No.

l All 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 PURPOS E - . . . .__..___._ ..,,,,,,,,,,,,3 2.0 DEFINITIONS - . . ... .. . . 3 3.0 AMSR BASIS. . . . . _

. .. 3 4.0 RESOURCES. .4 5.0 PROCEDURE. . .. . ..._ .. .... ,4 5.1 CDC DEVELOPMENT -DEFINE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS.. . . . . .. .. .. . 7 5.2 CDC DEVELOPMENT -IDENTIFY CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PARAMETERS . ...9 5.3 CDC VALIDATION - COLLECT SYSTEM DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE DATA.. . .. . . . 10 5.4 CDC VALID ATION - VALIDATE FSAR CHARACTERISTICS . . . .. .. .. . 11 i

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REVISION: 4 DATE: 10/04/98 PAGE 3 OF 12 l

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l 1.0 PURPOSE The Accident Mitigation Systems Review (AMSR) will identify and verify the critical design characteristics for accident mitigation systems and their components required to meet the Design Bases Events (DBEv) identified in Chapter 14 of die Millstone Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analyses Report (UFSAR).

2.0 DEFINITIONS 2.1 Design Bases Event (DBEv) - Design Bases Events are defined as those initiating events as presented in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR and form the bases for the operating license of the Millstone Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant.

O U 2.2 Critical Safety Functions (CSF) " Critical Safety Functions" are defined as the required specific set of activities that must occur in order to ensure that a success path associated with the design bases event mitigation is met and maintained.

2.3 Critical Design Characteristic (CDC) - A critical design characteristic is defined as that aspect of the functional / system design that must be provided to ensure that the system or component will meet the performance criteria identified in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR.

2.4 Critical Parameters - A numerical value associated with a CDC.

3.0 AMSR BASIS l

'Ihe following documents are the basis for the ICAVP AMSR l

. UFSAR Chapter 14

= Accident Analyses & Supporting Calculations p

  • Technical Specifications V

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  • System P& ids & Diagrams i e System Design Descriptions (SDD)

. Design Calculations

  • Emergency Operating Procedures

. Safety System Logic Documents

  • Safety Evaluation Report (SER) e Regulatory Commitments 4.0 RESOURCES The following resources are utilized to perform the AMSR
  • System Engmeer

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V e Accident Analyst

  • Electrical Engineer
  • Mechanical Engineer
  • Controls Engineer e Operations Engineer
  • Tier-2 Database 5.0 PROCEDURE Oveniew: Determine the critical design characteristics for systems and components that must be confmned in order to ensure that the plant complies with the safety analyses identified in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR. Validate the presence of the critical design characteristics in the installed plant systems. The simplified process flowchart is presented in Exhibit 2-1. The DBEv groups covered by this procedures are identified in Exhibit 2-2.

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g MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP PP-02 PROJECT PROCEDURES PARSONS TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW

REVISION
4 DATE: 10/05/98 PAGE 5 OF 12 Exhibit 2-1 AMSR Process FS AR Chanter 14&

"" Develop Tech Snee E Define Each Devebp System Emem Oo pre I

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"*" ** b Boundary Diagrams Fundens Dngmm NNEco Data I Analysis Priority DBEvCDC to NRC for Review

--h To Tier 1 1r Review Crticel Parameters &

g y Develop T2 hsign Determine Characteristes by System '

u Database + Basis N Critical 7 Structure Events Characteristics I

4 Colect ' Validate FSAR System Characteristics NNEco Data ->-

Design & h n

g Performance Data Tier.1 o Validation Prepare Tier 2 Report u g Report k

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Exhibit 2-2 l DBEv GROUPS '

l DBEv Variation Increase in Heat Removal Decrease in Feedwater Temperature by the Secondary System Increase in Feedwater Flow Increase in Steam Flow Inadvertent Opening of a Steam Generator Relief or Safety Valve Steam Pipe Failure Inside and Outside containment Decrease in Heat Removal Loss of Erternal Load by the Secondary System Turbine Trip Closure of Main Steam Isolation Valve Loss of Normal Feedwater Flow Decrease in Reactor Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant Flow V Coolant System flow Reactor Coolant Pump Rotor Seizure Reactivity and Power Uncontrolled Control Rod Bank Withdrawal From a Distribution Anomalies Subcritical or Low Power Startup Condition Uncontrolled Control Rod / Bank Withdrawal at Power Control Rod Misoperation Startup of an Inactive Loop CVCS Malfunction That Results in a Decrease in the Boron Concentration in the Reactor Coolant Control Rod Ejection Accident Decrease in Reactor Inadvertent Opening of a Pressurizer PRV Coolant inventory Steam Generator Tube Failure - Rad Consequences LOCA From Breaks in the RCP Boundary Radioactive Releases from Waste Gas System Failure a Subsystem or component Fuel Handling Accident Spent Fuel Cask Drop Accident Non-Standard Review Plan Containment Analyses Events Hydrogen Accumulation in Containment Radiological Consequences of the Design Bases Accident O

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REVISION: 4 DATE: 10/05/98 PAGE 7 OF 12 I

5.1 ' CDC DEVELOPMENT - DEFINE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS Purpose l 1.1 he purpose of this activity is to develop e CSF Definitions

. CSF Diagrams

  • System Boundary Diagrams e Tier-2 Database Structure Action 1.1 Review UFSAR Chapter 14 and identify design bases events by groups (refer to

() Exhibit 2-2).

1.2 Evaluate DBEv groups to identify Critical Safety Functions essential to achieve and maintain a controlled condition following an event. (e.g. RCS Heat Removal, Reactivity Control, RCS Inventory Control, etc.)

1.3 Define Critical Safety Function objectives and system level processes / actions to achieve objectives.

1.4 Create generic Critical Safety Function Diagrams for each Critical Safety Function.

1.5 Identify system level active components that support the process or action.

(Example shown as Exhibit 2-3) i

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! - f7 l (,) i TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW i REVISION: 4 DATE: 10/06/98 PAGE 8 OF 12 1.6 Develop a Boundary Diagram for each System involved with the DBEv.

1.7 Develop a data base structure to record the system and component critical characteristics and parameters for each DBEv.

Exhibit 2-3 SAFETY FUNCTION DIAGRAM Loss ofFeedwater Flow i

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RCS Presswe & Reacuvity Inventory Control Heat Removal Control Mamtam Pm um M Cored M waw ControlMam Mamm Reacw Tempersnare Ranctor Pressure Baron Level Rods To SG Stream Flow Component Critical

Design Criteria i

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(,) TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW j REVISION: 4 DATE: 10/05/98 PAGE 9 OF 12 1

5.2 CDC DEVELOPMENT - IDENTIFY CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PARAMETERS Purpose 1.1 The purpose of this activity is to develop e Functional / system level critical characteristics I e

Database file and reports of the critical parameter for each system and DBEv safety function.

. Discrepancy report Action O

h 1.1 Review each FSAR chapter 14 DBEv, including supporting analyses and calculations, to identify design requirements. Using the Critical Safety Function Diagrams, identify functional / system level critical characteristics for each DBEv.

1.2 Using the System Boundary Diagrams identify the components and their critical parameters essential to achieving the functional / system critical characteristics for each DBEv.

1.3 Enter DBEv critical characteristics and parameters into the Tier 2 database (T2DB) .

1.4 Document source of analyses parameters and key assumptions.

1.5 If an inconsistency exists, a discrepancy report shall be prepared in accordance with the discrepancy report process (PP-07).

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TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 4 DATE: 10/05/98 PAGE 10 OF 12 l

1.6 Submit the DBEv functional / system level critical characteristics to the NRC for review.

1.7 Provide system and component critical design data to Tier I for Systems selected '

for review.

5.3 CDC VALIDATION - COLLECT SYSTEM DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE DATA Purnose 1.1 The purpose of this activity is to develop p

'sj Critical System / Component listing including performance requirements and t

capabilities e Discrepancy Reports Action 1.1 Develop system composite database for critical safety function systems using documented information (plant design drawings, calculations, DBDs, test procedures, etc.).

1.2 List component design performance requirements into the T2DB.

1.3 Document references and source infbrmation used to identify the important to safety components and systems.

1.4 If a component or system is found to contain a discrepancy, a discrepancy report shall be prepared in accordance with the discrepancy report process (PP-07).

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MILLSTONE UNIT 2 ICAVP PP-02 PROJECT PROCEDURES PARSONS cO l Q TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 4 DATE: 10/05/98 PAGE 11 OF 12 1

5.4 CDC VALIDATION - VALIDATE FSAR CHARACTERISTICS Purnose 1.1 The purpose of this actisity is to 1

1 Validate that the Functional / System level Critical Design Characteristics are present in the installed plant systems.

. Develop Discrepancy Reports Action 1.1 Validate 100% of the functional / system level critical characteristics derived from FSAR chapter 14 and supporting analyses. This validation will be based on D

[Q review of plant test data, Technical Specifications, calculations, A/E design requirements or alternate methods, as appropriate.

1.2 Review Emergency Operating Procedures versus critical design characteristic to determine consistency.

1.3 Document the following information:

. Critical system / component design requirement from the FSAR DBEv resiew Confirmation that the installed design meets the design requirement

. Validation references 1.4 Validation of the Critical Design Characteristics for the NRC selected systems will be coordinated with the Tier 1 SVSR team.

1.5 Tier 2 personnel will validate that the Critical Design Characteristics are in place O

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and properly documented for the remeuung systems.

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PARSONS PROJECT PROCEDURES TITLE: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM REVIEW REVISION: 4 DATE: 10/05/98 PAGE 12 OF 12 1.6 Systems and components not meeting the Critical Design Characteristics will be identified as a discrepancy in accordance with PP-07.

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