ML20210Q521
| ML20210Q521 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/1999 |
| From: | NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210Q516 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9908160053 | |
| Download: ML20210Q521 (24) | |
Text
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MfilAikMEhT SYSTEMS 12/24/97 314.6.2 OEPRESStlRIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS cdNTAINMENT 00ENCH SPRAY SYSTEN LIMIT!HG CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.1 :
OPERABLE. Two independent Containment Quench Spray subsystems be shall APPLICA3ItIT1: H0 DES 1, 2, ', and 4.
ACTIOS:
Vith one Containment Quench Spray subsystem e, reste:
inoperabl
'he inoperable the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLDu SHUIDOWN e,:ing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
within the f llsys withi..
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.1 Each CPERABLE: Containment Quench Spray subsystem shall be demonstrated a.
At least once per 31 days:
g.
- 1) Verifying that each valve
'c not power automatic) in the flow path (unual, operated, or locked, sealed, 'or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position; and 2) water storage tank is betw'een 40*f and 50*F. Verifying b.
By verifying that each pump's developed head at the test flow point is pursuant to Specification 4.0.5; greater than or equal to the requir c.
At le'ast once each REFUELING INTERVAL, by:
1)
Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a CDA test signal, and 2)
Verifying signal. that each spray pump starts automatically est on a CDA t
- d. At least once per 10 years by. performing an air or smoke flow test ,
through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.
h,lST0HE-UNIT:
3/4 6-12 Amendment No. E, pp Jpp J77. 155 ~
l 9908160053 990805 DR ADOCK 05 423--
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1 12/24/97 CC6TAINMEhT SYSTEMS RECIRCUL.ATION SPRAY SYSTEM LIMITING CCNDITION FOR OPERATION
- 3.6.2.2 Two ' independent Recirculation Spray 'Systems shall be OPERABLE. .
ADPt1CN41LITY: M)3ES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
' ACTION:
With one Racirculation Spray System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the inoperable Recirculation Spray System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. '
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4,6.2.2 Each Recirculation Spray System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: o
- a. ptk9t At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-cperated, or automatic) in the ' flow pathfis not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position; b.
By verifying that each pump's developed head at the test flow point is greater than or equal to the required developed head when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5; c.
At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL by verifying that on a CDA test signal, each recirculatior. spray pump starts automatically after a 660
- 20 second delay; d.
At least once- each REFUELING INTERVAL, by verifying that each automatic. valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a CDA test signal; and e.
At least once per 10 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each' spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.
l Mill. STONE uss UNii 3 3/4 6-13 Amendment No. E9.199. JEE. LSS
s.
May 12,1995 ELECTRICAL P0%fER SYSTEMS SURiEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
- 8) Verifying that the auto-connected loads to each diesel generator do not exceed the 2000-hour rating of 5335 kW;
- 9) Verifying the diesel generator's capability to:
a) Synchronize with the offsite power source while the generator is loaded with its emergency loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power, b) Transfer its loads to the offsite power source, and c) Be restored to its standby status.
- 10) Verifying that with the diesel generator operating in a test mode, connected to its bus, a simulated Safety Injection signal overrides the test mode by: (1) returning the diesel generator to standby operation, and (2) automatically energizing the ,
emergency loads with offsite power;
- 11) Verifying that the fuel transfer pump transfers fuel from each fuel storage tank to the day tank of each diesel via the ,
installed cross-connection lines; !
- 12) Verifying that the autbatic load sequence timer is OPERABLE with designtheinterval; intervaland betwedn each load block within i 10% of its l~;i) Verifying that the following diesel generator lockout features prevent diesel generator starting:
a) Engine overspeed, b) Lube oil pressure low (2 of 3 logic),
c) Generator differential, and d) Emergency stop.
- h. At least once per 10 years or after any modifications which could affect diesel generator interdependence by starting both diesel generators simultaneously, during shutdown, and verifying that both '
diesel generators achieve generator voltage and frequency at 4160 1 420 volts and 6010.8 Hz in less than or equal te li seconds; and
- i. At least once per 10 years b : #-
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' kpraining each fuel oil storage tank, remov'ing the accumulated sediment and 1 rii'ng the tank u' sing a sodium hypochlorite solutio , an ,
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 8-7 0346 Amendment No. H . 77. 799.112
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ONSITE POWER DISTRIBlfTION SHUTDOWN .
LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.3.2 As a minimum, one train (A or B) of the following electrical busses shall be OPERABLE:
- a. Train "A" consisting of:
- 1) One 4160' volt AC Emergency Bus #34C, and
- 2) Four 480 volt AC Emergency Busses #32R, #32S, #32T, #32Y, and
- 3) Two 120 volt AC Vital Busses consisting of:-
a) Bus fVIAC-1 energized from Inverter flNV-1 connected to DC Bus #301A-1, and b) Bus fVIAC-3 energized from Inverter #INV-3 connected to DC Bus #301A-2, and
- 4) Two 125 volt DC Busses consisting of:
a) Bus f301A-1 energized from Battery Bank f301A-1, and b) Bus #301A-2 energized from ' Battery Bank f301A-2.
- b. _ Train "B" consisting of
- 1) One 4160 volt AC Emergency Bus #34D and 2 Four 480 volt AC Emergency Busses #32U, #32V, #32W, #32X, and 3 Two 120 volt AC Vital Busses consisting of:
a) Bus fVIAC-2 energized from Inverter flNV-2 connected to DC Bus #3018-1, and b) Bus fVIAC-4 energized from Inverter flNV-4 connected to DC Bus #3018-2, and
- 4) Two 125 volt DC Busses consisting of:
q) p Bus #3018-1 energized from Battery Bank #3018-1, and b) Bus #301B-2 energized from Battery Bank #3018-2.
APPLICABILITY: NODES 5 and 6.
ACTION.
With any of the above required electrical busses not energized in the required I manner, imediately suspend all operations involvir,g CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel, crane operation with loads over the fuel storage pool, or operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, initiate corrective action to energize the required electrical busses in the specified manner as soon as possible.
gLSTONE-UNIT 3 3/4 8-18 Amendment No. 17, 77, 177,146
, 5-9,; '*
Decsber 28,1995 REFUELING OPERATIONS' 3/4.9.12 FUEL BUILDING EXHAUST FILTER SYSTEN LIMITING C0klITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.12 lwo 'ndependent Fuel Building Exhaust Filter Systems shall be OPERABLE. At least one Fuel Building Exhaust Filter System shall be in pool or crane operations with loads over the storage pool is
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APPLICABILITY:
the storage pool.Whenever irradiated fuel with less than 60 days decay is in ACTION:
a.
With one Fuel Building Exhaust Filter System inoperable, fuel movement within the storage pool or crane operation with loads over the storage pool may proceed provided the OPERABLE Fuel Building Exhaust Filter System is capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source and is in operation and discharging through at least one train of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.
b.
With no nial Building Exhaust Filter System OPERABLE, suspend all opernions involving movement of fuel within the storage pool or crane operation with loads over the storage pool until at least one Fuel Butiding Exhaust Filter System is restored to OPERABLE status.
c.
The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4,9s /,LI 4.0.12- The above required Fus i Building Exhaust Filter Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
Within 31 days prior to moving fuel within or loads over the storage pool when irradiated fuel with less than 60 days decay is present by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers, and verifying a system flow rate of 20,700 cfm 1:D% and that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating; b.
At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or l (2) following painting, fire, or chemir al release in any ventilation zone comunicating with the system by:
MILLSTONE 0373
- UNIT 3 3/4 9-13 Amendment No. 7. F7.19F.123
1,
'h 4
5/26/98
_ INSTRUMENTATION _
BASES
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3/4.3.1 FEATURES andACTUATION 3/4.3.2 = REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM SYMt.M IHsiRUMENTATION INSTRUnEni (Continued)
~~
The methodology, as defined in WCAP-10991 to derive the Nominal-Trip Setpoints, is based upon combining all of the uncertaintie of these channel uncertainties.
these channels uncertainty magnitudes.should be capable of operating within the allowances of the determined characteristics.
to be acceptable based on the other device performanceOccas Device drift in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, investigation. may be indicative of more serious problems 'and would warrant further Table (Item 3C and Item 7E).The above Bases do not apply to the two radia are essentially nominal values.For these
. Due radiation to the monitorsinvolved uncertainties the allowable in values radiological parameters, the methodologies of WCAP-10991 were .not applied.
Actual trip setpoints will be reestablished below the allowable value based on calibration accuracies and good' practices.
The measurement for response time at the specifiad frequeries provides assurance that the Reactor trip and the Engineered Safety Features actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the s3fety analy.ses.
-l8 .4ddPC " Technical Requirements.HSupplementavjtAbhnkdThe RTS a Pts W ta Monse."
Any changes to the RTS and ESF response times shall be in.P A zd accordance Review Committee.with Section 50.59 of 10CFR50 and appioved by the Plant Operations j Msponse times indicated as not . applicable.No credit was taken in the analyses Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel test measurements Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated (1) in place, by eith onsite, certifiedorresponse offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with time.
on line noise analysis-response time degradation method described in theDe Westinghouse Topical Report, "The Use of Process Noise Measurements To Determine Response Characteristics of Protection Sensors it'IU.S. Plants," Augest 1983.
)
MILLSTONE osss - UNIT 3 B 3/4 3-2 Amendment No. J. H . 159
f .,
I'g 6 2/12/98 i REACTOR C00LAKf SYSTEM B
,ASES 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity and oper readiness of the throughout theselifecomponents of the plant.will be maintained at an acceptable level These programs are in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g).
Components of the Reactor Coolant System were designed to provide access to permit inservice . inspections in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Veswl code, 80 Edition and Addenda through Winter. !
3/4.4.11 REACTKC0r.: AiT SVFTG Vein 3 Reactor Coolant System vents are provided to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam hn the Reactor Coolant System that could inhibit !
natural circulation e cooling. i The OPERABILITY of least one Reactor Coolarnt ste System vent path from the reactor vessel head and the pressurizer l The.am space ensures that the capability exists to perform this function.
' reactor redundant vessel head vent path consists of two parallel flow paths with Z%7'i in isolation each valves flow (3RCS*SV8095A, 3RCS*SV8096A and 3RCS*SV80958, path. The pressurizer steam space vent path i
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consists PORY block obwo valve parallel paths with a power operated relief valve (PORV) a in series (3RCS*PCV455A, 3RCS*MV800A and 3RCS*PCV456, 3RCS*MV8000B).
The valve redundancy of the Reactor Cooiant System vent paths serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path.
The function, " capabilities, and testing requirements of the Reactor Coolant System vents are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TH1 Action Plant Requirements," November 1980.
3 RC555VBo%)B MILLSTONE , . 11 3 0528 B 3/4 4-27 Amendment No. FF. FF. J7f, 157
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't. 7/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ^"
- l BASES l
3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE (continued) are representative the intent of the LCO. of those which would occur at accident pressure while meet provided in ANSI /ANS 56.8-1981This test methodology is consistent with the guidance Appendix J. ,
for meeting the requirements set forth in i
the requirements of Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50.The surveillanc A partial exemption has been granted from the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix J, Section lil.D.1(a) exemption removes the requirement that the third Type A test The for each 10-year ,
period be conducted when the plant is shut down for the 10-year plant inservice inspection (Reference License Amendment No.131 j
The enclosure building bypass lea oc N W/:"f34 " Technical Requirement paths are listed inTW%
$iog . " m k :-
The addition or deletion of the enclosure building bypass leakage Ml !
paths shallOperation
[by the Plant be made in accordance Review Committee. with Section 50.59 of 10CFR50 and apprI 3 j
3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCXS The limitations are required leak iate. to meet the on closure restrictions onand leak rate for CONTAINMENT the containment INTEGRITY air i and containment c
the o' recall Surveillan~ e testing of the air lock seals provides assurance that ;
air lockbetween leakageairwilllock notleakage becometests.
excessive due to seal damage ;
during the intervals i While the leakage rate-limitation is specified at accident pressure, P., the actual surveillance tes ,
is performed c by apply.ing a pressure greater than or' equal ,.
to P This high'er i pressure a' counts for test instrument uncertainties and test volume stabilization changes which occurs under actual test conditions.
surveillance testing is consistent with the guidance provided in ANSIThis 56.8-1981 method of perfo and ensures Appendix J. that the leakage rate measured meets the intent of the 100 and 3/4.6.1.4 and 3/4.6.1.5 AIR PRESSURE and AIR TFMPERATURE
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ensureThe that:limitations (1 on containment' pressure and average air temperature the containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative p)ressure of 8 psia, and (2) the containment pe not exceed ments shall the design pressure of 60 psia during LOCA conditions. Measure-instruments be made at all listed locations the pressure, prior to determining the average , air temperature.whether The limits on by fixed or portabl of the safety analysis.and average air temperature are consistent with the assumptions is. determined by summing The minimum total containment pressure of 10.6 psia the minimum permissible air partial pressure of 8.9 psia and the maximum expected vapor pressure of 1.7 psia (occurring ;a maximum permissible containment initial temperature of 120*F).
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MILLSTONE - UNIT 3
- B 3/4 6-la Amenoment No. EP. W . J M .
Devised by Npr letter dated _AUG 3 I iW
?-
n/14fg7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.
BASES ,
3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EOUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are pro-tected by either deenergizing circuits not required during reactor operation or by demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protec- !
tion circuit breakers during periodic surveillance.
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The Surveillance Requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers provide assurance of breaker reliability by testing at least one representative sample of eagh manufacturer's brand of circuit breaker. Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers !
are tested. If a wide variety exists. within any manufacturer's brand of l circuit breakers, .it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's b.reakers into !
groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker for surveillance l purposes. 4
.Long-time trip elements are tested by injecting a test current (300% of the pickup) in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications and verifying that the circuit breaker operates within the time delay band width for that current as specified by the manufacturer. Short-time trip elements are tested by i' injecting a test current (150% of the pickup) in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications and verifying that the circuit breaker operates within the time delay band width for that . current as specified by the manufacturer.
The molded case circuit breakers and unitized starters will be tested in !
acc.ordance with Manufacturer's Instructions. !
The OPERABILITY of the motor-operated valves thermal overload protection and int'egral bypass devices ensures that the thermal overload protection will not prevent safety-related valves from perfoming their function. The Surveil-lance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the thermal overload protection are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106, "Themal Overload
- Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves," Revision 1, March 1977.
""5 fbl 4%%"'1c9fM fW " Technical Requirementsf6 MbhWsWVirpetrtNDtwws," Me4- containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices and thermal overload protection bypassed only under accident conditions and thermal overload protection not bypassed under accident conditions. The adottion or deletion of any device shall be made'in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10CFR50 and approved by the Plant Operation Review Committee.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 8-3 Amendment No. g , Q , 153 0517
ea 8 Docket No. 50-423 B17799 I
l Attachment 2 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specification Correction of Tvooarachical Errors ffSCR 3-06-99)
I Retyped Pages i
i August 1999 i .
.:. :r Nucbar Regulatory Commission B17799/ Attachment 2/Page 1 RETYPE OF PROPOSED REVISION I l
Refer to the attached retype of the proposed revision to the Technical Specifications (TS). The attached retype reflects the incorporation of the proposed changes to the TS.
Pending Technical Specification revisions are not reflected in the enclosed retype. The enclosed retype should be checked for continuity with recently issued TS prior to issuance.
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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3 /4. 6. 2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS CONTAIMMENT 00ENCH SPRAY SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.1 Two independent Containment Quench Spray subsystems shall OPERABLE. be APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
With one Containment Quench Spray subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.1 Each Containment Quench Spray subsystem shall be demonstrated
'0PERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days:
- 1) Verifying that each valve (manual, power operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, seal ed, or I otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position; and 1
- 2) Verifying the temperature of the borated water in the refueling I l
water storage tank is between 40*F and 50'F.
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- b. By verifying that each pump's developed head at the test flow point is greater than or equal to the required developed head when tested l pursuant to Specification 4.0.5;
! c. At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL, by:
! 1) Verifying that each automatic vahe in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a CDA test signal, and
- 2) Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically on a CDA test signal.
- d. At least once per 10 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-12 Amendment No. J, JP, J99, 177, JY$,
t
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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RECIRCULATION SPRAY S.JSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.2 Two independent Recirculation Spray Systems shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION: i With one Recirculation Spray System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the inoperable Recirculation Spray System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.2 Each Recirculation Spray System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, I or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;
- b. By verifying that each pump's developed head at the test flow point is greater than or equal to the required developed head when tested pursuant to Fpecification 4.0.5;
- c. At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL by verifying that on a CDA test signal, each recirculation spray pump starts automatically after a 660 20 second delay;
- d. At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL, by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on i a CDA test signal; and l e. At least once per 10 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is l unobstructed.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-13 Amendment No. 59, 199, 177. /EF.
0640 i
i o
- i. a ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENf5 (Continued)'
- 8) Verifying that the auto-connected loads to each diesel generator do not exceed the 2000-hour rating of 5335 kW;
- 9) Verifying the diesel generator's capability to:
a) Synchronize with the offsite power source while the generator is loaded with its emergency loads upon a :
simulated restoration of offsite power, b) Transfer its loads to the offsite power source, and c) Be restored to its standby status.
- 10) Verifying that with the diesel generator operating in a test mode, connected to its bus, a simulated Safety Injection signal overrides the test mode by: (1) returning the diesel generator to standby operation, and (2) automatically energizing the emergency loads with effsite power;
- 11) Verifying that the feel transfer pump transfers fuel from each fuel storage tank to the day tank of each diesel via.the installed cross-connection lines;
- 12) Verifying that the automatic load sequence timer is OPERABLE with the interval between each load block within + 10% of its design interval; and
- 13) Verifying that the following diesel generator lockout features prevent diesel generator starting:
a) Engine overspeed, b) Lube oil pressure low (2 of 3 logic),
c) Generator differential, and d) Emergency stop.
- h. At least once per 10 years or after any modifications which could affect diesel generator interdependence by starting both diesel generators simultaneously, during shutdown, and verifying that both diesel generators achieve generator voltage and frequency at 4160 1 420 volts and 60 i 0.8 Hz in less than or equal to 11 seconds; and
- i. At least once per 10 years by draining each fuel oil storage tank, removing the accumulated sediment and cleaning the tank using a sodium hypochlorite solution.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 8-7 Amendment No. H. 77, 199 JJ7.
0641
.. ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION I SHUTDOWN
, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i
1 3.8.3.2 As a minimum, one train (A or 8) of the following electrical busses shall be OPERABLE:
- a. Train "A" consisting of:
- 1) One 4160 volt AC Emergency Bus #34C, and l
- 2) Four 480 volt AC Emergency Busses #32R, #32S, #32T, #32Y, and
- 3) Two 120 volt AC Vital Busses consisting of:
a) Bus CVIAC-1 energized from Inverter #INV-1 connected to DC Bus #331A-1, and b) Bus #VIAC-3 energized from Inverter #INV-3 connected to DC Bus #301A-2, and
- 4) Two 125 volt DC Busses consisting of:
a) Bus #301A-1 energized from Battery Bank #301A-1, and b) Bus #301A-2 energized from Battery Bank #301A-2.
- b. Train "B" consisting of
- 1) One 4160 volt AC Emergency Bus #340, and^[
- 2) Four 480 volt AC Emergency Busses #320, #32V, #32W, #32X, and
- 3) Two 120 volt AC Vital Busses consisting of:
a) Bus #VIAC-2 energized from Inverter #INV-2 connected to DC Bus #3018-1, and b) Bus #VIAC-4 energized from Inverter #INV-4 connected to DC Bus #301B-2, and
- 4) Two 125 volt DC Busses consisting of:
a) Bus #3018-1 energized from Battery Bank #3018-1, and I b) Bus #3018-2 energized from Battery Bank #3018-2.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and S.
ACTION:
With any of the above required electrical busses not energized in the required manner, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel, crane operation with loads over the fuel storage pool, or operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, initiate corrective action to energize the required electrical nusses in the specified manner as soon as possible.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 8-18 Amendment No. JE, 79. J97. 19%,
O'33
e REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.12 FUEL BUILDING EXHAUST FILTER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.12 Two independent Fuel Building Exhaust Filter Systers shall be OPERABLE. At least one Fuel Building Exhaust Filter System shall be in operation whenever any evolution involving movement of fuel within the storage pool or crane operations with loads over the storage pool is in progress. ,
APPLICABILITY: Whenever irradiated fuel with less than 60 days decay is in the storage pool.
ACTION:
- a. With one Fuel Building Exhaust Filter System inoperable, fuel 1
movement within the storage pool or crane operation with loads over the storage pool may proceed provided the OPERABLE Fuel Building i Exhaust Filter System is capable of being powered from an OPERABLE 1 emergency power source and is in operation and discharging through !
at least one train of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. j
- b. With no Fuel Building Exhaust Filter System OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving movement of fuel within the storage pool or crane operation with loads over the storage pool until at least one Fuel Building Exhaust Filter System is restored to OPERABLE status. 3
- c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.12.1 The above required Fuel Building Exhaust Filter Systems shall be I demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. Within 31 days prior to moving fuel within or loads over the storage pool when irradiated fuel with less than 60 days decay is present by initiating, from the control room, flow through tte HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers, and verifying a system flow rate of 20,700 cfm 110% and that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating;
- b. At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL or (1) after ay structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 9-13 Amendment No. 7, 57, J9E, J77, 0642
INSTRUMENTATION
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. BASES )
3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION and ENGINEERED SA FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)
The methodology, as defined in WCAP-10991 to derive the Nominal Trip Setpoints, is based upon combining all of the uncertainties in the channels.
Inherent in the determination of the Nominal Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes l of these channel uncertainties. Sensors and other instrumentation utilized in l these channels should be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes. Occasional drift in excess of the allowance may be determined to be acceptable based on the other device performance characteristics. Device drift in excess of the allowance that !s more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and would warrant further investigation.
The above Bases do not apply to the two radiation monitors in the ESF Table (Item 3C and Item 7E). For these radiation monitors the allowable values are essentially nominal values. Due to the uncertainties involved in radiological parameters, the methodologies of WCAP-10991 were not applied.
Actual trip setpoints will be reestablished below the allowable value based on calibration accuracies and good practices.
The measurement for response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the Reactor trip and the Engineered Safety Features actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. The RTS and ESF response times are included in the " Technical Requirements Manual." Any changes to the RTS and ESF response times shall be in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10CFR50 and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee. No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable. Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined.
Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either: (1) in place, onsite, or offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response time. Detector response times may be measured by the in situ
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on line noise analysis-response time degradation method described in the Westinghouse Topical Report, "The Use of Process Noise Measurements To Determine Response Characteristics of Protection Sensors in U.S. Plants," August 1983.
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MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 3-2 Amendment No. 7. FJ JFF, 0646 i
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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY The inservice inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2,
.and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity and operational readiness of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. These programs are in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g).
Components of the Reactor Coolant System were designed to provide
> access to permit inservice inspections in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 80 Edition and Addenda through Winter.
3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS Reactor Coolant System vents are provideri to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the Reactor Coslant System that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling. The OPERABILITY of least one Reactor Coolant System vent' path from the reactor vessel head and the pressurizer i
steam space ensures that the capability exists to perform this function.
The reactor vessel bead vent path consists of two parallel flow paths with redundant isolation valves (3RCS*SV8095A, 3RCS*SV8096A and 3RCS*SV80958, l
1 3RCS*SV8096B) in each flow path. The pressurizer steam space vent path 1 consists of two parallel paths with a power operated relief valve (PORV) and PORV block valve in series (3RCS*PCVd55A, 3RCS*MV800A and 3RCS*PCV456, 1 3RCS*MV8000B).
The valve redundancy of the Reactor Coolant System vent paths serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path.
The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the Reactor Coolant System vents are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plant Requirements," November 1980. '
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 4-27 Amendment No. #, 77. UE, #7.
0643
Q ' 3/4.6 CONTAINNENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE (continued) are representative of those which would occur at accident pressure while meeting the intent of the LCO. This test methodology is consistent with the guidance provided in ANSI /ANS 56.8-1981 for meeting the requirements set forth in Appendix J.
The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates are consistent with the requirements of Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50. A partial exemption has been granted from the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix J, Section III.D.1(a). The exemption removes the requirement that the third Type A test for each 10-ycar period be conducted when the plant is shut down for the 10-year plant inservice inspection (Reference License Alrendment No.111).
The enclosure building bypass leakage paths are listed in the " Technical Requirements Manual." The addition or deletion of the enclosure building bypass leakage paths shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10CFR50 and approved [by the Plant Operation Review Committee.
3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to rt.eet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment leak rate. Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provides assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests. While the leakage rate limitation is specified at accident pressure, P , the actual surveillance testing is performed by applying a pressure greater than or equal to P,. This higher pressure accounts for test instrument uncertainties and test volume stabilization changes which occurs under actual test conditions. This method of performing surveillance testing is consistent with the guidance provided in ANSI 56.8-19G1 and ensures that the leakage rate measured meets the intent of the LC0 and Appendix J.
3/4.6.1.4 and 3/4.6.1.5 AIR PRESSURE and AIR TEMPERATURE The limitations on containment pressure and average air temperature ensure that: (1) the containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure of 8 psia, and (2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 60 psia during LOCA conditions. Measure-ments shall be made at all listed locations, whether by fixed or portable instruments, prior to determining the average air temperature. The limits on the pressure and average air temperature are consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis. The minimum total containment pressure of 10.6 psia is determined by summing the minimum permissible air partial pressure of 8.9 psia and the maximum expected vapor pressure of 1.7 psia (occurring at the maximum permissible containment initial temperature of 120*F).
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 6-la Amendment No. 57, 77, JEF, oso Revised by NRC letter dated Aug. 31, 1998
V ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are pro- ;
l tected by either deenergizing circuits not required during reactor operation
) or by demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protec- l L tion circuit breakera during periodic surveillance.
The Surveillance Requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers provide assurance of breaker reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturer's brand of circuit breaker. Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers are tested. If a' wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of circuit breakers, it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers into ,
groups and treat each group as e separate type of breaker for surveillance purposes.
Lon pirkup) g-time trip elements in accordance aremanufacturer's with the tested by injecting a test current specifications (300% of and verifying the that the circuit breaker operates within the time delay band width for that current as specified by the manufacturer. Short-time trip elements are tested by ;
injecting a test current (150% of the pickup) in accordance with the j manufacturer's specifications and verifying that the circuit breaker operates '
within the time delay band width for that current as specified by the manufacturer.
The molded case circuit breakers and unitized starters will be tested in accordance with Manufacturer's Instructions.
The OPERABILITY of the motor-operated valves thermal overload protection '
and integral bypass devices ensures that the thermal overload protection will not prevent safety-related valves from performing their function. The Surveil-lance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the thermal overload protection are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106, " Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves," Revision 1, March
.1977.
" Technical Requirements Manual," lists containment penetration conductor I overcurrent protective devices and thermal overload protection bypassed only under accident conditions and thermal overload protection not bypassed under accident conditions. The addition or deletion of any device shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10CFR50 and approved by the Plant Operation Review Committee.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 8-3 Amendment No. 77, 77. J77, 0645 i
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'h a r Docket No. 50-423 B17799 Attachment 3 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specification Correction of Tvooarachical Errors (TSCR 3-06-99)
Background and Safety Summary i
August 1999 I l
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Nucl3ar Regulatory Commission <
B17799/ Attachment 3/Page 1
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Backaround This TSCR is comprised of editorial corrections deemed necessary to ensure the cleri+y of the TS. These editorial corrections were identified as a result of various independent efforts and are presented as a single TSCR in order to maximize review efficiencies.
Safety Summary The proposed TS changes are editorial in nature and do not alter or impact the design, operation, maintenance or surveillance associated with MP-3 Structures, Systems, and Components (SSC) during normal or accident operations.
This proposed change is considered safe because it will not result in the plant being operated in an unsafe condition, decrease available safety margins, nor adversely impact the consequences of an accident. It will cause no increase in risk to the public ;
health or safety. It does not increase the probability of event occurrence, the probability j of human errors mitigating the event, the probability of the failure of mitigating !
equipment, nor does it introduce any new accidents or equipment malfunctions. I The proposed TS changes are considered safe and do not represent an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ). ,
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' Dockat No. 50-423 l B17799 l
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l Attachment 4 l l l l l Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 I Proposed Revision to Technical Specification j Correction of Tvooarachical Errors (TSCR 3-06-99) i Significant Hazards Consideration and Environmental Considerations I
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l August 1999 t
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Nucinar Regulatory Comm'ission B17799/ Attachment 4/Page 1 i
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Sianificant Hazards Consideration NNECO has reviewed the proposed revision in accordance with 10 CFR50.92 and has concluded that the revision does not involve any Significant Hazards Considerations (SHC). The basis for this conclusion is that the three criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) are not satisfied. The proposed Technical Specification revision does not involve an SHC because the revision would not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed TS changes are editorial in nature and do not alter or effect the design, operation, maintenance or surveillance associated with MP-3 Structures, Systems, and Components (SSC) during normal or accident operations. Since the SSC's are not altered the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
The proposed TS changes are editorial in nature and do not alter or effect the design, operation, maintenance or surveillance associated with MP-3 Structures, Systems, and Components (SSC) during normal or accident operations. Since the Units SSC's have not been modified physically, or operationally due to procedure changes prompted by this TSCR, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
These proposed TS changes are editorial and do not impact any MP-3 design or operational requi ements. MP-3 system performance and operating limits are not affected; therefon: 'ho proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of 'safety. l In conclusion, based on the information provided, it is determined that the proposed l revision does not involve a SHC.
Environmental Considerations NNECO has reviewed the proposed license amendment against the criteria of 10CFR51.22 for environmental considerations. The proposed revision does not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration, does not significantly increase the type and amounts of effluents that may be released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposures. Based on the foregoing, NNECO concludes that the proposed revision meets the criteria delineated in 10CFR51.22(c)(9) for categorical exclusion from the requirements for environmental review.
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