ML20204F903
| ML20204F903 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 03/17/1999 |
| From: | NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204F896 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9903260035 | |
| Download: ML20204F903 (25) | |
Text
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l Docket No. 50-336 I B17658 i
Attachment 3 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Emergency Core Cooling System Valves, Atmospheric Steam Demp Valves, and Control Room Ventilation System Marked Up Pages 1
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l March 1999 9903260035 990317 PDR T
P ADOCK 05000336i PDR ,
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INDEX -F^hru ry 3, 1999 i .
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS ( 1 1
SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS \
3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-1 l Safe ty V al ves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7- 1 1
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-4 Condensate Storage Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-6 I Activity
........................ 3/4 7-7 Main Steam Line Isolation Valves ............ 3/4 7-9 1
i Main Feedwater Isolation Components (MFICs) . . . . . . 3/4 7-9a l
)
Atmospheric-Geeam Dump Valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-9c (
Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valves . . . . . . .. 3/4 7-9d i I 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION . . . 3/4 7-10 3/4.7.3 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM . . . . . 3/4 7-11 3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM .................
3/4 7-12 3/4.7.5 FLOOD LEVEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-13 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROON EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . (3/4 7-16 3/4.7.7 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-19 3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS
...................... .. 3/4 7-21 3/4.7.9 DELETED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-33 3/4.7.10 DELETED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-33 3/4.7.11 ULTIMATE ilEAT SINK
................... 3/4 7-34 l
3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES .................... ..
3/4 8-1 Operati ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-1 j Shutdown ......................
.. 3/4 8-5 l 3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-6 l
A.C. Distribution - Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-6 A.C. Distribution - Shutdown ............ ..
3/4 8-7 D.C. Distribution - Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3/4 8-8 D.C. Distribution - Shutdown ............ .. 3/4 8-10 D.C. Distribution (Turbine Battery) - Operating . . . ..
3/4 8-11 Mill. STONE - UNIT 2 VIII AmendmentNo.77,#,M,/Gp 1%, IH,10 U1, 70, k
gp ; a +. > min g <+r i ' '**
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.iday 12,1979 g :. . y. .
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS A)O CH40G$'
ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,yg 1 3004 ou q ,
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION -
3.5.2 Two separate and independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of: .
- a. One OPERABLE high-pressure safety injection pump, t
- b. One OPERABLE low-pressure safety injection pump,
- c. A separate and independent OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection actuation signal and automatically trans-ferring suction to the containment sump on a sump recircu-lation actuation signal, and
- d. One OPERABLE charging pump with a separate and independent ;
OPERABLE flow path from an OPERABLE Boric Acid Storage Tank '
via either an OPERABLE Boric Acid Pump or a gravity
- feed connection.
APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1, 2 and 3*.
.ACTIO.N_: I
- a. With one ECCS subsystem ir} operable, restore the inoperable subsy.; tem to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />,
- b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date'.
With pressurizer pressure > 1750 psia.
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MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 S-3
,,m v . , ,+ , , y ., , ..
s .
Ajo CH4MCf June 1*. ""
, EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS Ag J+EorMrIm
. SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS MI
) .
- 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE
(
- a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:' -
- 1. Verifying that each high-pressure safety injection puap:
a) Starts automatically on a test signal.
Develops a differential b) pressure. of 1 1231 psi on recirculation flow.
c) Operates for at least 15 minutes.
l l 2. Verifying that each low-pressure safety injection pump:
l a)' Starts automatically on.a test signal.
1 b) Develops a differential pressure of 1 157 psi on !
recirculation flow.
j c) Operates for at least 15 minutes.
- 3. Verifying that each charging pump:
)
a) Starts automatically on a test signal.
b) Operates for at least 15 minutes.
- 4. Verifying that each boric acid pump (when required OPERABLE per Specification 3.5.? q:
a) Starts automatically on a test signal.
b) Develops a discharge pressure of 1 98 psig on recirculation flow.
c) Operates for at least 15 minutes.
- 5. Verifying that upon a sump recirculation actuation signal, the containment sump isolation valves open.
- 6. Cycling each testable, automatically operated valve through at least one complete cycle.
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- 7. Verifying the correct position for each manual valve not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position.
- 8. Verifying the correct position for each remote or j automatically operated valve.
cis
- 9. Verifying that each ECCS subsystem is aligned to receive '
electrical power from separate OPERABLE emergency busses.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-4 002 Amendment No. 52,159
' + .
.m.~ynnympn i -99 +aan EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) '
) .
10.
Verifying that the following valves are in the indicated l position with power to the valve operator removed:
Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position t 2-SI-306 Shutdown Cooling Open F Flow Control 2-SI-659 SRAS Recirc.
2-SI-660 Open*
SRAS Retirc. Open*
2 - C". 04 -
Thcr el Eyp::
Cle ed*^ -
b.
By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, i trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed: !
- 1. !
For all accessible CONTAINMENT areas INTEGRITY, andof the containment prior to establishing 2.
s Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of
! containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.
N
- c. At least once per 18 months by:
1.
Verifying automatic interlock action of the shutdown cooling system from the reactor coolant system by ensuring that with a simulated reactor coolant system pressure signal greater than or equal to 300 psia the interlock prevents the shutdown cooling system suction valves from being opened.
2.
A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no ,
evidence of structural distress or corrosion. !
- 3. DELETED l
- 4. DELETED l
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- To be clos 1 prior to recirculation following LOCA.
J "'4-Lh-434, a manual va'i16, -
dibll 'eu le d ad clust.u.
) 4 4 0,neJ ~.1/s,hel -f p,< a / yA n n/r q pen p .,afi.. .
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-5 un Amendment No. 7,. Q, R, JN, H1, $$
} r ; . 'G 'e * ' * ,v w
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1 May 26, 1998 ENERGENCY CORE COOLING _ SYSTEMS-A/() C //gagg [ '
[D9 Twfo9M A TZcw SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Cgntinued) _
o06P
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- 5. i Verifying a total leak rate less than or equal to 12 gallons per hour for the high pressure safety injection system in conjunction with the containment spray system ;
(reference Specification 4.6.2.1.1.c) at: J
}
a)
A high pressure safety injection pump discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 1125 psig on recirculation flow, for the parts of the system between the pump discharge and the header injection valves, including the pump seals.
b)
Greater than or equal to 22 psig at the pump suction forthe to thepump pipingsuction.
from the containment' sump check valve !
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i MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-Sa Amendment No. FJ, 215
, ~ r
< < "p?'fN + h TN ' M* "
- my+ g s P
. EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS
) ,
SURV,EILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) d.
At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by.cyc. ling each powe operated valve in the subsystem flow path not testable during plant operation through one complete cycle of full travel, ,
e.
By verifying the correct position of each electrical and/or mechanical position verification stop forbeeach shall of the thatth valves in Table 4.5-1. This performed:
1.
4 Within operation, 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following the completion of each valve stroking
- 2. Immediately maintenan.e, prior to returning the valve to service after repair, or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator or its control circuit, or
- 3. At least once per 18 months.
f.
By ccaducting a flow balance verification immediately prior to of a modification that could alter system flow The charac
.} injection leg flow rate shall be as follows:
l 1- 1.
HPSI Headers - the sum of the three lowest injection flows must be 1 471 gpm.
1 675 gpm. The sum of the four injection flows must be 2.
LPSI be 1 2850 Header gpm. - the sum of the three lowest injection flows must The sum of the, four injection flows must be l _< 4 5 0 0 + [ N 1ml R) - 10 (%) x 200]
90%
l a.
At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that on a Safety Injection Actuation test signal:
1.
The valves in the boron injection flow path from the boric acid storage tank via the boric acid pump and charging pump actuate to their required positions, and 2.
The charging pump and boric acid pump start automatically.
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MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-6 Amendment No. fE, E/, JEE, h l
- ng, .v ,
n s .
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e Decc..Ler 0, 1978-r
(
TABLE 4.5-1 },yyfc 73 i
ECCS THROTRE VALVES I i
- 1. 2-SI-617 "A" HPS1 Header - Loop 1A Injection l
"B" HPSI Header - Loop 1 A Injection
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nlLL SIOTE - Uni t 2 3/4 5-fia
%n, n 99 +> .s. . 2, is
- O m s i...h e . 31, 1000 PLANT SYSTENS_
ATHOSPHERIO -STCA;i DUMP VALVES (
LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION e
3.7.1.7 _
Each atmospheric. steam dump valve shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTION:
/,q a.
With one atmospheric-steam dump valve inoperable, restore the inoperable to OPERABLE status within +-days or be in MODE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the following f,y gg b.
With restoremore than one atmospheric -steam dump valve inoperable, one inoperable-to OPERABLE status within h or be in24MODE following hours, 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within j j SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
(
4.7.1.7 Verify one-complete least once per 18 months. cycle of each at;;;cspheric steein dump valve at l c WfsAO.[L17y .
ea A aim >yhvoe clusep h wlae /me 6y /oca /imaa /
opudan af <aJ e/ve t~
\ ff,c d 4 w f W y ouys, one amphh Cyc/r c =C 09ua /sev l l
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a MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 0372 3/4 7-9c Amendment No.
.o
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PLANT SYSTENS '
- "Jd. 10, 1000 I
3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROON ENERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEN l.IMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.6.1 Two independent Control Room Emergency Ventilation Trains shall be -
OPERABLE. l APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES ACTION:
Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4:
hWithoneControlRoomEmergencyVentilationTraintnoperable,restorethe inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
g MODES 5 and 6*
- a. With one Control Room Emergency Ventilation Train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate and maintain operation of the remaining OPERABLE Control Room Emergency Ventilation Train in the recirculation mode. l
- b. With both Control Room Emergency Ventilation Trains inoperable, or with tM OPERABLE Control Room Emergency Ventilation Train required to b> the recirculation mode by ACTION (a.
powev' >y an OPERABLE normal and emergency po)wer source, suspendno all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity chr.nges .
In Modes 5 and 6, when a Control Room Emergency Ventilation Train is l determined to be inoperable solely because its emergency power source is l inoperable, or solely because its normal power source is inoperable, it may be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of 3.7.6.1 Limiting Condition for Operation, provided: (1) its corresponding normal oc emergency power source is OPERABLE; and (2) all of its redundant system (s), subsystem (s), train (s), component (s) and device (s) are OPERABLE, or likewise satisfy the requirements of the specification. Unless both conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, then Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.6.1.a or 3.7.6.1.b shall be invoked as applicable.
I MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 7-16 AmendmentNo.77,J79,Jpp,h
_ - . _ __ _ . _ . _ _ . .. . _ _ _ - - ._ _ . . - - . ~ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ ___ -___
d .
INSERT A - Paae 3/4 7-16
- b. With both Control Room Emergency Ventilation Trains inoperable, restore at least one inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
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. h = y 8, 1000 PLANT SYSTEMS
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BASES a feedwater isolation signal since the steam line break accident analysis credits them in prevention of feed line volume flashing in some cases.
Feedwater pumps are assumed to trip immediately with an MSI signal. I 3/4.7.1.7 ATMOSPHERIC-STfAM DUMP VALVES + 7Et T f The a ospheric st m dump valves ASDVs) provipe'a method for' maintaining Jtheun in HOT ST BY, and to co the unit to hutdown Cool Yg (SDC) Syste
'entr conditions f heat remov by the cond ser steam d p valves is t a ilable. Th SDVs are no ly operated om the main ntrol room.
anual opera on of the ASD is provided. The ASDVs ar OPERABLE as ngcal as the valves an be opened f om the contro room, or locj ly at the val es. j 3/_4.7.1.8 STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN ISOLATION VALVES The steam generator blowdown isolation valves will isol' ate steam generator blowdown on low steam generator water level. An auxiliary feedwater actuation signal will also be generated at this steam generator water level. Isolation of steam generator blowdown will conserve steam generator water inventory
) .following a loss of main feedwater. The steam generator blowdown isolation valves will also close automatically upon receipt of a containment isolation '
signal or a high radiation signal (steam generator blowdown or condenser air ejector discharge).
3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70*F and 200-psig are based on a steam generator RTuor of 50*F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture. '
3/4.7.3 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABIllTY of the reactor building closed cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of vital components and Engineered Safety Feature equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
)
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-3a AmendmentNo.7J7,777,hp
- a. .
INSERT B - Pace B 3/4 7-3a The atmospheric dump valve (ADV) lines provide a method to maintain the unit in HOT STANDBY, and to replace or supplement the condenser steam dump valves to cool the unit to Shutdown Cooling (SDC) entry conditions. Each ADV line contains an air operated ADV, and an upstream manual isolation valve. The manual isolation valves are normally open, and the ADVs closed. The ADVs, which are normally operated from the main control room, can be operated locally using a manual handwheel.
An ADV line is OPERABLE if local manual operation of the associated valves can be used to perform a controlled release of steam to the atmosphere. This is consistent with the LOCA analysis which credits local manual operation of the ADV lines for accident mitigation.
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- d Docket No. 50-336
. B17658 Attachment 4 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Emergency Core Cooling System Valves, Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves, and Control Room Ventilation System Retyped Pages March 1999
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INDEX l LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l l
SECTION igg 1 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-1 l S a fe ty Val ve s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3/4 7 - 1 j Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-4 Condensate Storage Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-6 Activity ........................ 3/4 7-7 Main Steam Line Isolation Valves ............ 3/4 7-9 Main Feedwater Isolation Components (MFICs) . . . . . . 3/4 7-9a l Atmospheric Dump Valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-9c l l
l Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valves . . . . . . . 3/4 7-9d 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION . . . . 3/4 7-10 1
1 3/4.7.3 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SY5 TEM . . . . . . 3/4 7-11 l 3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM .................. 3/4 7-12 l 3/4.7.5 F LOOD L EV E L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7 - 13 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM . . . . . . . 3/4 7-16 3/4.7.7 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7 -19 l 3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS ........................ 3/4 7-21 3/4.7.9 D E L ETED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7 -33 3/4.7.10 DE L ET ED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7 -3 3 3/4.7.11 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK ................... 3/4 7-34 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES ...................... 3/4 8-1 Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-1 Shutdown ........................ 3/4 8-5 3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-6 A.C. Distribution - Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-6 A.C. Distribution - Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-7 D.C. Distribution - Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-8 D.C. Distribution - Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/ 4 0 - 10 D.C. Distribution (Turbine Battery) - Operating . . . . . 3/4 8-11 MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 VIII Amendment No. //, 75, 77. 19J.
ous 195 197, 199, 191, 177, life
ENERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTENS SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS (Continued)
- 10. Verifying that the following valves are in the indicated position with power to the valve operator removed: '
Valve Numbqt Valve Function Valve Position 2-SI-306 Shutdown Cooling Open** i Flow Control 2-SI-659 SRAS Recirc. Open*
2-SI-660 SRAS Recire. Open*
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- b. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment semp and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:
- 1. For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and
- 2. Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.
- c. At least once per 18 months by:
- 1. Verifying automatic interlock action of the shutdcWn cooling system from the reactor coolant system by ensuring that with a simulated reactor coolant system pressure signal greater than or equal to 300 psia the interlock prevents the shutdown cooling system suction valves from being opened.
- 2. A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
- 3. DELETED
- 4. DELETED l
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- To be closed prior to recirculation following LOCA.
- Pinned and locked at preset throttle open position. I NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 7 Q , J/, # 1, o<so 151,ill,
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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS (Continued) i i
- d. Atleastonceper18 months,duringshutdown,bycyclingeac$hpower operated valve in the subsystem flow path not testable during plant operation through one complete cycle of full travel.
- e. By verifying the correct position of each electrical and/or mechanical position stop for each of the injection valves in Table 4.5-1. This l l verification shall be performed: !
- 1. Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following the completion of each valve stroking operation,
- 2. Immediately prior to returning the valve to service after ;
maintenance, repair, or replacement work is performed on the <
valve or its associated actuator or its control circuit, or ;
- 3. At least once per 18 months.
- f. By conducting a flow balance verification immediately prior to returning to service any portion of a subsystem after the completion of a modification that could alter system flow characteristics. The injection leg flow rate shall be as follows:
- 1. HPSI Headers - the sum of the three lowest injection flows must be 1 471 gpm. The sum of the four injection flows must be l 1 675 gpm. I
be 1 2850 gpm. The sum of the four injection flows must be '
i s 4500 + [ RWST level (%) - 10 (%) x 200]
90%
- g. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that on a l Safety Injection Actuation test signal:
- 1. The valves in the baron injection flow path from the boric acid storage tank via the boric acid pump and charging pump actuate to their equired positions, and
- 2. The charging pump and boric acid pump start automatically, i
MIgLSTONE-UNIT 2 3/4 5-6 Amendment No. JJ, 57, JJ7, 7/J,
J.
- I Table 4.5-1 4
ECCS INJECTION VALVES l
d MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-6a Amendment No. (),
0461
y 3 =
PLANT SYSTEMS
' ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVES l
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.7 Each atmospheric dump valve line shall be OPERABLE. I APPLICABILITY MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTION:
- a. With one atmospheric dump valve line inoperable, restore the inoperable line to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- b. With more than one atmospheric dump valve line inoperable, restore one inoperable line to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.7 Verify the OPERABILITY of each atmospheric dump valve line by local manual operation of each valve in the flowpath through one complete cycle of operation at least once per 18 months.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 7-9c Amendment No. 777, 0462
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- PLANT SYSTEMS I 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROON ENERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i
3.7.6.1 Two independent Control Room Emergency Ventilation Trains shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES ACTION:
Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4:
- a. With one Control Room Emergency Ventilation Train inoperable, restore the I inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
- b. With both Control Room Emergency Ventilation Trains inoperable, restore at least one inoperable train to OPERABLE status within I hour, or be in I at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within i the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
MODES 5 and 6*
- a. With one Control Room Emergency Ventilation Train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate and maintain operation of the remaining OPERABLE Control Room Emergency Ventilation Train in the recirculation mode,
- b. With both Control Room Emergency Ventilation Trains inoperable, or with the OPERABLE Control Room Emergency Ventilation Train required to be in the recirculation mode by ACTION (a.) not capable of being powered by an OPERABLE normal and emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
In Modes 5 and 6, when a Control Room Emergency Ventilation Train is determined to be inoperable solely because its emergency power source is inoperable, or solely because its normal power source is inoperable, it may be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of 3.7.6.1 Limiting Condition for Operation, provided: (1) its corresponding normal or emergency power source is OPERABLE; and (2) all of its redundant system (s), subsystem (s), train (s), component (s) and device (s) are OPERABLE, or likewise satisfy the requirements of the specification. Unless both conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied within 2 hnurs, then Limiting Condition for Operation (LC0) 3.7.6.1.a or 3.7.6.1.b shall be invoked as applicable.
NIgLSTONE-UNIT 2 3/4 7-16 Amendment No. 77, U p, J# , #7,
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- PLANY SYSTEMS
- BASES a feedwater isolation signal since the steam line break accident analysis credits them in prevention of feed line volume flashing in some cases.
Feedwater pumps are assumed to trip immedirtely with an MSI signal.
3/4.7.1.7 ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVES The atmospheric dump valve (ADV) lines provide a method to maintain the unit in HOT STANDBY, and to replace or supplement the condenser steam dump valves to cool the unit to Shutdown Cooling (SDC) entry conditions. Each ADV line contains an air operated ADV, and an upstream manual isolation valve.
The manual isolation valves are normally open, and the ADVs closed. The ADVs, which are normally operated from the main control room, can be operated locally using a manual handwheel.
An ADV line is OPERABLE if local manual operation of the associated valves can be used to perform a controlled release of steam to the atmosphere.
This is consistent with the LOCA analysis which credits local manual operation of the ADV lines for accident mitigation.
3/4.7.1.8 STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN ISOLATION VALVES The steam generator blowdown isolation valves will isolate steam generator blowdown on low steam generator water level. An auxiliary feedwater actuation signal will also be generated at this steam generator water level. Isolation of steam generator blowdown will conserve steam generator water inventory following a loss of main feedwater. The steam generator blowdown isolation valves will also close automatically upon receipt of a containment isolation signal or a high radiation signal (steam generator blowdown or condenser air ejector discharge).
3/4.' _ STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70*F and 200-psig are based on a steam generator RTuor of 50*F arj are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
3/4.7.3 REACTOR BU?tDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the reactor building closed cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of vital components and Engineered Safety Feature equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
MILLSTONE.- UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-3a Amendment No. 7J7, 777, 77%,
0464
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l Docket No. 50-336 I
B17658 Attachment 5 i
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 l Revision to Technical Specification Bases Containment isolation Valves Discussion of Changes and Retyped Pages
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l March 1999 f
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. U.S. Nucirr Regulrtory Commission
, - B17658/ Attachment 5/Page 1 Revision to Technical Specification Bases Containment isolation Valves DiscusrAn of Changes and Retyped Pages Bases Page B 3/4 6-3b The Technical Specification Bases was changed to indicate that when the plant is in MODES 1,2, or 3, the closing and opening coils for motor operated valve 2-SI-651 will be removed and stored to satisfy Appendix R Requirements.
Bases Page B 3/4 6-3c The Technical Specification Bases was changed to exclude remotely operated
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containment isolation valves from the dedicated operator requirement when the valves are operated locally in accordance with Abnormal Operating Procedures and i
Emergency Operating Procedures.
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- CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
- TSCR 2-17-98 i- .
BASES e uary 22,19%
3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (continued)
The appropriate administrative controls, based on t's above I considerations, to allow locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves to be opened are contained in the procedures that will be used to opera.te the valves. Entries should be placed in the Shift Manager Log when these valves are opened and closed. However, it is not necessary to log into any Technical Specification Action Statement for these valves, provided the appropriate administrative controls have been established.
1 I If a locked or sealed closed containment isolation valve is opened while operating in accordance with Abnormal or Emergency Operating Procedures (A0Ps and E0Ps), it is not necessary to establish a dedicated operator. The A0Ps and E0Ps provide sufficient procedural control over the operation of the containment isolation valves.
Opening a locked or sealed closed containment isolation valve bypasses a plant design feature that prevents the release of radioactivity outside the containment. Therefore, this should not be done frequently, and the time the valve is opened should be minimized. As a general guideline, a locked or sealed closed containment isolation valve should not be opened longer than the time allowed to restore the valve to OPERABLE status, as stated in the action statement for LC0 3.6.3.1 " Containment Isolation Valves."
l A discussion of the approsriate administrative controls for the containment isolation valves, t1at are expected to be opened during operation in MODES 1 through 4, is presented below.
Manual containment isolation valve 2-SI-463, safety injection tank (SIT) recirculation header stop valve, is opened to fill or drain the SITS and for Shutdown Cooling System (SOC) boron equalization. While 2-SI-463 is open, a dedicated required. operator, in continuous communication with the control' room, is When SDC is iniitiated, SDC suction isolation remotely ' operated valves 2-SI-652 and 2-SI-651 (inside containment isolation valve) and manual valve 2-SI-709 (outside containment isolation valve) are opened. 2-SI-651 is normall." iperated from the control room. While in Modes 1, 2 or 3, 2-SI-651 is closed
'tn the closing and opening coils removed and stored to satisfy Appendu R requirements. It does not receive an automatic containment isolation closure signal, but is interlocked to prevent opening if Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure is greater than approximately 275 psia. When 2-SI-651 is opened from the control room,. either one of the two required licensed (Reactor Operator) control room operators can be credited as the dedicated operator required for administrative control. It is not necessary to use a separate dedicated operator.
l When valve 2-SI-709 is opened locally, a separate dedicated operator is i
not required to remain at the valve. 2-SI-709 is opened before 2-SI-651.
- j. Therefore, opening .2-SI-709 will not establish a connection between the RCS i
and the SDC System. Opening 2-SI-651 will connect the RCS and SDC System. If a problem then develops, 2-SI-651 can be closed from the control room.
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l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 6-3b 1
Amendment No. 7Jp, 7JJ, l- ,
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5 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS _
TSCR 2-19-98 9 BASES February 10, 1999
- 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES icontinued) during The SDCadministrative controls for valves 2-SI-651 and 2-SI-709 only apply operation. They are acceptable because RCS pressure and temperature are significantly below normal-operating pressure and temperature (the RCS is administratively required to be < 300 *F and < 265 psia before shutdown cooling flow is initiated), the penetration flowpath can be isolated from the cont *. a r1om by closing either 2-SI-652 or 2-SI-651, and the manipulation procedures. o. these valves, during this evolution, is controlled by plant lhe pressurizer auxiliary spray valve, 2-CH-517 can be used as an alternate method to decrease pressurizer pressure, or,for boron precipitation control following a loss of coolant accident. When this valve is opened from the control room, either one of the two required licensed (Reactor Operator) control room operators can be credited as the dedicated operator required for administrative control. It is not necessary to use a separate dedicated operator.
The exception for 2-CH-517 is acceptable because the fluid that passes through this valve will be collected in the Pressurizer (reverse flow from the Pressurizer to the charging system is prevented by check valve 2-CH-431), and the penetration. associated with 2-CH-517 is open during accident conditions to allow flow from the charging pumps. Also,-this valve is normally operated from the control: room, under the supervision of the licensed control room operators, in accordance with plant procedures.
A dedicated operator is not required when opening remotely operated valves associated with Type N fluid penetrations (Criterion 57 of 100 350, Appendix A)~. Operating these valves from the control room is suffi ant. The main steam isolation valves (2-MS-64A and 64B), atmospheric steam dump valves (2-MS-190A and 1908), and the containment air recirculation cooler RBCCW discharge valves (2-RB-28.2A-D) are examples of remotely operated containment isolation valves associated with Type N fluid penetrations.
Local operation of the atmospheric steam dump valves (2-MS-190A and 1908), or other remotely operated valves associated with Type N fluid penetrations, will require a dedicated operator in constant communication with the control room, except when operating in accordance with A0Ps or E0Ps. I Even though.these valves can not be classified as locked or sealed closed, the use of a dedicated operator will satisfy administrative control requirements.
Local operation of these valves with a dedicated operator is equivalent to the operation of other manual (locked or sealed closed) containment isolation valves with a dedicated operator.
The main steam supplies to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (2-MS-201 fluid and 2-MS-202). are remotely operated valves associated with Type N penetrations. These valves are maintained open during power operation.
2-MS-201.is maintained energized, so it can be closed from the control room, if necessary, for containment isolation. However, 2-MS-202 is deenergized MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-3c Amendment No. EU , E U ,
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