ML20203F675
| ML20203F675 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 02/16/1998 |
| From: | Bass K, Neri A SARGENT & LUNDY, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203F653 | List: |
| References | |
| PI-MP3-07, PI-MP3-7, NUDOCS 9803020022 | |
| Download: ML20203F675 (11) | |
Text
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PROJECT INSTRUCTION PI-MP3-07 INSTRUCTION <
REV.2 l Cli0nt: Northeast Uti[Bles Station: Millstone Unit 3 .
Title:
REVIEW OF ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEMS h Safety Related _
Non-Safety-Related Reviewed By: Approved By:
System Lead Programmatic O&M Lead Accident QA Engineer intemal Review Verification Team Lead Mitigation Committee Manager
' Lead Chairman
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Date: J'M' fI YY Y hW [bbt 4 lflwIw/ 'O % A 5 gj
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Description (/
Rev.2 . Revised PI to:
- Allow Verifiers to limit the scope of documentation reviewed to those drawings which are applicable and appropriate, e Proside generic verification methodologies for certain types of critical characteristics.
Page 1 of 6 l 9803020022 980225 PDR ADOCK 05000423 P PDR
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PROJECT !NSTRUCTION PI-MP3-07 INSTRUCTION .- REV. 2 l 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure establishes the requirements for the IC ' VP Verification Team to identify an:1 review the entical design characteri6 tics for the aw - ent mitigating systems to provide reasonable assurance that these system parameters meet their design and licensing requirements as discussed in References 2.1 and 2.2.
2.0 REFERENCE 2.1 NRC Confirmatory Order establishing independent Corrective Action Verification Program - Millstone Power Station Units 1,2 and 3.
2.2 Millstone Independent Corrective Action Veilfication Program - Oversight inspection Pisn dated 12/19/96.
l 2.3 S&L Prcject Instruction PI MP3-01, ICAVP Communications Protocol 2.4 S&L Project Instruction PI MP3-02, Review of System Design for Compliance with Design and' Licensing Basis 2.5' S&L Project Instruction PI-MP3-03, Review of Plant Modifications Prepared p After Receipt of Operating License for Technical Adequacy and for Configuration Control-2.6 S&L Project Instruction PI-MP3-06, Operations and Maintenance and Testing .
Procedures end Training Documentation Reviews 2.7 S&L Project Instruction PI-MP3-09, Preparation and Approval of Checklists 2.8 S&L Project Instruction PI-MP3-11, Discrepancy Report Submittal and Closure 2.9 S&L Project instruction PI-MP3-12, Project File Index 2.10' CK-MP3-07 Series Checklists as follows:
CK-MP3-07-01 FSAR Ch 15 decidents, Systems & Components (Not included in this PI)
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PROJECT: - INSTRUCTION PI-MP3-07 LINSTRUCTION - REV. 2 l-3.0 - DEFINITIONS 3.1 Accident Mitigation Systems Review Group (ARG)- The subgroup of the ICAVP Verification Team responsible for the identification and review of the critical design characteristics for the accident mitigating systems to ensure that :
they can perform their required safety functions,.
3.2 System Review Group (SRG)- The subgroup of the ICAVP Verification Team responsible for performing an in-depth review of the design of the systsm in the scope of the ICAVP.
3.3 - Operations & Maintenance and Testing Review Group (ORft) - The subgroup
- of the ICAVP Verification team responsible for the review of the operating, maintenance and testing procedures,- and training manuals for the systems within the scope of the ICAVP.
3.4 ' - Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP) - The program required by NRC Confirmatory order, Reference 2.1 to verify the adequacy of the corrective actions taken by NU for their configuration management of design -
and licensing basis of the unit.
l 3.5 '- Discrepncy Report (DR) The mechanism for documenting the discrepant conditions identified by the ICAVP and reporting an apparent error, inconsistency, or procedural violation with regard to licensing commitments, specifications, procedures, codes or regulations.
3.6 - Verifler -The individual assigned to review engineering attributes within his area of responsibility.
3.7 - System Critical Characteristics - The system design features and component performance parameters that must be met to perform the safety related function - ,
of accident mitigation.'
J 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 The Verification Team Manager shall be responsible for providing overall' guidance and management to the teams.
4.2 The ARG Lead shall be responsible for assigning the discipline verifiers for identifying the accident mitigating systems and a review of their critical design characteristics necessary to perform their safety function (s).
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PROJECT INSTRUCTION PI-MP3-07 INSTRUCTION < REV.2 l 4.3 The Discipline Verifiers shall be responsible for identifying the critical system characteritics for the FSAR accidents and verifying that for the accident mitigating systems that the component parameters meet the plant current design basis in accordance with this instruction.
5.0 PROCEDURE The process discussed below shall be used by the ARG to develop the system critical characteristics for the accident mitigating systems. Sections 5.1,5.2 and 5.3 discussed below shall be the responsibility of the ARG for all the accident mitigation systems. ARG shall be responsible for the remainder of the Sections 5.4 through 5.8 l for only those accident mitigation systems which are not included in the detailed Verticel Slice Review (VSR) which sha!! be done by ORG and SRG These reviews are addressed in the Project Instructions References 2.4 through 2.6.
5.1 The ARG Lead and Discipline Verifiers shall review the accidents enalyzed in the FSAR, for Millstone Unit 3 and identify the accident mitigating systems, components within the system and specific component parameters which are required to mitigate the event. - As a result of this review the ARG Lead or his designee shall create a database consisting of the following items: a) Analyzed Accidents, b) Mitigating Systems, c) Components, d) Component Parameters and e) References to the accidents and associated documents. The component parameters shall be identified in Parts 1 & 2 of Checklist CK-MP3-07-01 (Ref 2-10). These component parameters are the inputs and or assumptions in the accident analysis.
5.2 The ARG Lead or his designee shat! sort the database in Section 5.1 to facilitate the verification of the system critical characteristics in the following order, a)
Mitigating Systems, b) Components, c) Component Parameters, d) References and e) Analyzed Accidents. The list of systems and associated critical characteristics shall be submitted to the NRC for approval.
5.3 The portion of the database consir'ing of the accident mitigation systems in the VSR shall be given to the ORG and SRG for their review of the Critical Characteristics.
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PROJECT. INSTRUCTION PI-MP3-07 INSTRUCTION - 77"' REV.2 l 5A Where applicable the ARG Verifiers shall verify the System Critical l Characteristics listed in Section 5.2 using a documented System / Component test, and or Surveillance test from the Millstone Unit 3 Technical Specification or '
Post Maintenance Tests. The venfication shall be documented on the ORG .
Checklist CK-MP3-06-15 from Reference 2.7 which shall be signed and dated.
To facilitate this review, these component parameters which are identified for review using a test approach shall be listed on ORG Checklist CK MP3-06-01 from Reference 2 7. The results of the verification and documents used shall be identified on the database contained in CK-Mi 07-01 (Reference 2-10).
5.5 in addition to the verification of the Critical Characteristics by test reviews discusssd in Section 5.4, where appropriate the design calculations, - l specifications, vendor documents and drawings shall be obtained and reviewed for conformance with the design requirements of the accide nt analysis.
Request for documentation shall be processed in accordance with Reference 2.3.
5.6 Verification of the Crit l cal Characteristics using design calculations, shall be documented on the SRG Checklist CK-MP3-02-03 (Ref. 2.4) which shall be
- signed and dated. For a Mechanical, I&C or Electrical Calculation, the section of this checklist covering each discipline shall be completed to vstify the numerical accuracy, modeling accuracy, assumptions, engineering judgment, design inputs, methodology and results associated with each calculation. The results of the verification and documents used shall be identified on the database contained in CK-MP3-07-01 (Reference 2-10).
5.7 If the Critical Characteristics cannot be verified the review conc,u. ions shall be documented on the appropnate Checklist (s) and a Discrepancy Report sheli be -
processed in accordance with Reference 2.8. The ARG Lead or his designee shall verify that the checklists have been property completed and indicate concurrence with his signature and date. He shall file the documents per ,
Reference 2.9.'
5.8 Generic verification methodologies are identified in Attachments 6.2
- through 6.5 for the following specific characteristic types:
a) Instrumentation Actuation b) Pump Flow c) Operator Action d) Emergency Diesel Generator 5.9 The AR3 Lead shall draft a final report summarizing the results of the review. l The report format shall be determined by the Verification Team Manager.
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PROJECT INSTRUCTION PI MP3-07 INSTRUCTION REV.2 l 6.0 ATTACHMENTS 6.1 ICAVP Review of Critical Characteristics for Accident Mitigation Systems (1 page) 6.2 Instrumentation Actuation Verification Methodology 6.3 Pump Flow Verification Methodology 6A Operator Action Venfication Methodology 6.5 Emergency Diesel Generator Verification Methodology l
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Flaurs 1 lCAVP Review of Critical Characteristics for Accident Mitigating Systems Review Plant Accident initiating Events ,
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Create a Database 'l Submit Critical Accidents, Systems, Characteristics to Components, - NRC for Approval '
Parameters, -*
References ARG ARG/NRC l
' Verify critical -
Characteristics Using Tech. Spec., Provide Critical Design Cales, Characteristics for Specifications, vendor VSR Systems to documents / drawings [> ORG/SRG for Review per PI-MP3-02 & 06 ARG AMU Were No Discrepancies identified? [
.,,Yes Process DRs PI-MP3-11 ARG v
1r Prepare Report ARG
Attachment 6.2 instrumentation Actuation Verification Methodology
- 1) . Verify the input assumption as stated for the critical characteristics in the accident analysis is conservative with regard to the Technical Specifications.
= 2) Verify the instrument channel is properly calibrated in the calibration procedure / surveillance including appropriate output _ signals for this accident. Verify '
that the calibration procedures includes and/or references setpo;nt margins for drift, ,
inaccuracy, etc., and that these margins are considered in the calibration procedures.-
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- 3) Verify the response time of instrument channel, as required, for this accident.
- 4) Verify that RPS/ESFAS generates a signal to the appropriate end device (breaker, valve, etc.).
- 5) Verify the end device response (verify response time if required).
. Notes:
A). The above review process will consider the lasi test date available. ,
B). For each critical parameter or characteristic of the accident mitigating system, the review will address only one instrument channel for all the reviewed accidents.
However, if the same instrument is used for different system critical characteristics, then additional channels will be verified for each system critical characteristic.
(Example: Hi Pressurizer Leve! and Lo Pressurizer Level).
C)._ --Verification of items 4 and 5 will be accomplished by a review of appropriate logic diagrams and by a review of surveillance procedure test results.
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Attachment 6.3 -
Pump Flow Verification Methodology
- 1) Verify fluid source parameters (i.e. capacity, chemistry, temperature, etc.) using surveillance data.
- 2) Verify flow path from fluid source to delivery point. (P&lD review, integrated ESFAS test and valve line-up surveillance tests).
- 3) Verify performance through IST, surveillance, startup tests and manufacturer and other plant test data.
Notes:
A). The above review process will consider the last test data available.
B) The signal to actuate pump flow has been verified under the instrument actuation verification methodology. (Attachment 6.2).
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Attachment 6.4 Operator Action Verification Methodology
- 1) If the operator action relies on instrumentation, the instrumentation actuation will be
] verified in accordance with the
- instrumentation Actuation Verification Methodology",
items 1 and 2 (See Attachment 6.2).
- 2) For those operator actions associated with a main control board annunciator input, the annunciator response guide for that annunciator will be reviewed to ensure appropriate operator direction is provided either in the guide itself or by referencing other appropriate procedures.
a) the cpera0r is made aware of the event, b) the operator has adequate guidance for instr' s
- won response and that appropriate action is defined in the procedures,6. .
c) the operator has adequate guidance for manual cperations to mitigate or terminate the event.
- 4) Verify the Reactor Operator training records for emergency operation. This will be accomplished by a review of a sample of the confidential, personal operator training records maintained at the Millstone Site Training Center, Page 1 of 1 l
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Attachment 6.5 Emergency Diesel Generator Vedfication Methodology Subsequent to establishing the methodology for emergency diesel generator verification, the Diesel Generator System was picked as one of the Tier 1 systems. ,
Therefore, as part of the Tier 1 review the Operations Review Group (ORG) will perform
- 1) a review of the diesel generator surveillance procedures and last test results
_ (including trending) to assure diesel generator operability and availability and
- 2) a review of the surveillance procedures and last test results pertaining to ESF load sequencing onto the 'Jiesel generator.
Notes:
A review of the design documentation and system requirements associated with the emergency diesel generator system will be reviewed by the Systems Review Group (SRG) as part of the Tier i review.
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