ML20155B033
| ML20155B033 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 10/22/1998 |
| From: | NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20155B014 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9810300047 | |
| Download: ML20155B033 (22) | |
Text
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-LL 22, 1 22 TABLE 3.3-3 x
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
['O MINIMUM g
TOTAL NO.
CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE n'
OPERABLE MODES ACTION FUNCTIONAL 'MIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP i
E g
1.
SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS) a.
Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 (cd s) 1 2
1,2,3,4 1
l 61 y
b.
Containment Pressure -
High 4
2 3
1,2,3 2
l 61 t
1,2(e),3(a) 2 l 61 c.
Pressurizer Pressure -
1 Low 4
2 3
2.
CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS) a.
Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1
2 1,2,3,4 1
l 61 wg L
High - High 4
2(b) 3 1, 2, 3 2
l 61.
b.
Containment Pressure --
w m
' 3.
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS)
Buttons) 2 1
2 1,2,3,4 1
1 61 a.
Manual CIAS (Trip b
g (N
b.
Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons) 2 1
2 1,2,3,4 1
1 61 p
y c.
Containment Pressure -
High 4
2 3
1,2,3 2
l 61 p
(k
~
d.
Press 6rizer Pressure -
Low 4
2 3
1,2(e),3(a) 2
- 1. 6:
I g
l 9810300047 991022 PDR ADOCK 05000336 PM P
Januusy 17,1996 TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATION (a) Trip function may be bypassed when pressurizer pressure is < 1750 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer pressure is 21750 psia.
(b) An SIAS signal is first necessary to enable CSAS logic.
- (c) Trip function may be bypassed below 600 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 600 psia.
(d)
- v... s w a uM, nto ca fly w.1,, moog y yA, pp5x W, ca, os
,,y wnj s.,sa l
au (e) Trip may be bypassed during testing pursuant to Special Test Exception 3.10.3.
1 ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Humber of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPEpABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTOOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
i ACTION 2 -
With the number of OPEPASLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels and with the pressurizer pressure:
(
< 1750 psia; icuediately place the inoperable channel in a.
the bypassed condition; restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing the pressurizer pressure above 1750 psia.
b.
11750 psia, operation may continue with the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition, provided the following conditions are satisfied:
1.
All functional units receiving an input from the bypassed channel are also placed in the bypassed condition.
2.
The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be removed from service for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided one of the inoperable channels is placed in the tripped condition.
I MILLSTONE - 11 HIT 2 3/4 3-16 AmendmentNo.Jf7,777.h 0210
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM July 1, 1998 OVE_PPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
./00 C MVGE Q laAd/n/Pr2cm {
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION MI 3.4.9.3 A Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System, as specified below, shall be OPERABLE.
MODE 4, and MODE 5 with all RCS cold leg temperature > 190*F:
a.
1.
Maximum of two charging pumps and one HPSI pump may be capable of injecting into the RCS; and 2.
Two OPERABLE PORVs with a lift setpoint of f 415 psia.
l b.
MODE 5 with any RCS cold leg temperature 1 190 *F, and MODE 6 e.ither:
1.
Maximum of one charging pump may be capable of injecting into the RCS; and 2.
Two OPERABLE PORVs with a lift setpoint of 5 415 psia.
OR l
l 3.
Maximum of two charging pumps and one HPSI pump may be capable of injecting into the RCS; and 4.
The RCS is depressurized and an RCS vent of > 2.2 sq. inches.
-APPLICABILITY:
MODE 4 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than I.
or equal to E75'F, MODE 5. and MODE 6 when the head is on the reactor vessel.
ACTION:
With one required PORY inoperable in MODE 4, restore the inoperable a.
PORY to OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through a 1 2.2 square inch vent within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, b,
With one required PORY inoperable in MODES 5 or 6, either restore inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or depressurize and vent the RCS through a > 2.2 square inch vent within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
With both required PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS c.
through a > 2.2 square inch vent within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
d.
With more than the maximum allowed pumps capable of injecting into the RCS, take immediate action to comply with 3.4.9.3.
In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent (s) are used to e.
mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or RCS vent (s) on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.
f.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
(
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-21a Amendment No. Ep JEJ /RJ._218
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM W.7 1. 193o -
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:
a.
Performance of a
CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required i
OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required OPERABLE.
b.
Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months.
Verifying the PORY block valve is open at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> c.
when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.
d.
Testing in accordance with the inservice test requirements of Specification 4.0.5.
4.4.9.3.2 Verify no more than the maximum allowed number of charging pumps are capable of injecting into the RCS at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
This is accomplishe4.by verifying th actor circcit treder
'ntended to oe capauie vf injecting ints the "IS are infer the cherging pumps nct the open petitien-.
'4.4.9.3.3iVerify more than e maximum alJetfed number of gh pressure s etyl injec on pum are cap e of inject g into the R at least o e per 12 urs.
. s is accom shed for the gh pressure sa ty injection umps not i
ended a be capabl of injecting to the RCS by erifying tha either the motor rcuit break s have been di onnected from eir power su y circuit,
'or shutting anjVtagging the di harge valve wi the key loc on the to 01 ;
nel (2-SI-654Ar 2-SI-656).
J 4.4.9.3.4 Verify the required RCS vent is open at least once
\\
vent pathway is provided by vent valve (s) that is(are) per 31 days when the locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, otherwise, verify the vent pathway at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Aw cach cbary nypany preve.dr./
INSE/?r /)
frem w,ec hn9 inf tk gcs 6y Mrifyany t/t, im A, c wcuo /
Yv open foso hee,
/
'N HILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-21b AmendmentNo.59,/97,JEE.[h
INSERT A - Pace 3/4 4-21b Verify no more than the maximum allowed number of HPSI pumps are capable of injecting into the RCS at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This is accomplished for each HPSI pump prevented from injecting into the RCS by; a.
Racking down the motor circuit breaker from the power supply circuit; or b.
Shutting and tagging the discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel (2-SI-654 or 2-SI-656); or c.
Placing the pump control switch in the pull-to-lock position and removing the breaker control power fuses; or d.
Placing the pump control switch in the pull-to-lock position and shutting the discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel (2-SI-654 cr 2-SI-656).
J j
d
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS
,hrb-47-14%-
l ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T, < 300*F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 One ECCS subsystem / comprised of the follewing shall be OPERABLE:
l One OPERABLE high-pressure safety injection pump **, and l
a.
b.
An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refuel-ing water storage tank on a safety injection actuation signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a sump recirculation actuation signal.***
APPLICABILITY: MODES 3* and 4.
ACTION:
With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one ECCS a.
subsystem to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in COLD l-SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.
i b.
In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and 3
submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.
l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.
e With pressurizer pressure < 1750 psia.
The provisions of Spccifications 3.0.4 and 4 0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 4 for the high pressure safety injection pump that is inoperable pursuant to Specification 3.4.9.3 provided the high pressure safety injection pump is restored to OPERABLE status within I hour after entering MODE 4.
In MODE 4, the requirement for OPERABLE safety injection and sump recirculation acteation signals is satisfied by use of the safety injection and sump recirculation trip pushbuttons.
1 4
6AT 8 i
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2
/4 5-7 AmendmentNo.77,Jpp,7Jp,p i
INSERT B - Paae 3/4 5-7 In MODE 4, the OPERABLE HPSI pump is not required to start automatically on a SIAS. Therefore, the pump control switch for this OPERABLE pump may be placed in the pull-to-lock position without affecting the OPERABILITY of this pump.
3 r,-
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM July 1, 1998 i
A> o C N4WE BASES
- N" Od'O The low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System provides a physical barrier against exceeding the 10CFR50 Appendix G pressure / temperatu limits during low temperature RCS operation either with a steam bubble in the pressurizer or during water solid conditions.
each PORV is equivalent to a vent of This system consists of either two PORVs with a(pressure setpoint 1415 psia, or an RCS vent of sufficie approximately 1.4 square inches)
{
Analysis has confirmed that the design basis mass addition transient discussed
' of sufficient size.below will be mitigated by operation of the PORVs or by establisi The LTOP System is required to be OPERABLE when RCS cold leg temperature at or below 275'F MODE 6 and the reac(Technical Specification 3.4.9.3).
However, if the RCS is in has been established such that RCS pressurization is not possible. to LTOP System is not required (Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 is not applicable Therefore, an The LTOP System is armed at a temperature which exceeds the limiting 1/4t RTnor plus 90*F as required by NUREG-0800 (i.e., SRP), Branch Technical Position RSB 5-2.
For the operating period up to 20 EFPY, the limiting 1/4t RT which results in a minimum LTOP System enable temperature of at least 263*F whe uor is 145'F corrected for instrument uncertainty. The current value of 275'F will be retained.
The mass input analysis performed to ensure the LTOP System is capable of protecting the reactor vessel assumes that all pumps capable of injecting into the RCS start, and then one PORV fails to actuate (single active failure).
/~
the PORVs have limited relief capability, certain administrative restrictions Since
(..
have been implemented to ensure that the mass input transient will not exceed the relief capacity of a PORV.
PORV fails) are sufficient if the mass addition transient is limited to the inadvertent start of one high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump and two charging pumps when RCS temperature is at or below 275'F and above 190*F, and inadvertent start of one charging pump when RCS temperature is at or below 190*F.
The assumed active failure of one PORV results in an equivalent RCS vent size of approximately 1.4 square inches when the one remaining PORV opens.
Therefore, a passive vent of at least 1.4 square inches can be substituted the PORVs.
for when venting the RCS.However, a vent size of at least 2.2 square inches will be required 2.2 square inch vent, the peak RCS pressure, resulting from the maxim input transient allowed by Technical Specification 3.4.9.3, will not exceed 300 psig (SOC System suction side design pressure).
When the RCS is at or below 190*F, additional pumping capacity can be made capable of injecting into the RCS by establishing an RCS vent of at least 2.2 square i.ches.
in a passive vent of at least 2.2 square inches. Removing a pressurizer POR Additional methods to establish the required RCS vent are acceptable, provided the proposed vent has been evaluated to ensure the flow characteristics are equivalent to one of these.
Establishing a pressurizer steam bubble of sufficient size will be sufficient to protect the reactor vessel from the energy addition transient
(
associated with the start of an RCP, provided the restrictions contained in Technical Specification 3.4.1.3 are met.
These restrictions limit the heat MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 4-7a Amendment No. 218
l
'uly 1, 1000 --
, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES l
l input from the secondary system.
in the pressurizer to accommodate the insurge.They also ensure sufficient steam v assumed in the LTOP analysis of the energy addition transient.No credit for PORV actuatio 1
The restrictions apply only to the start of the first RCP.
Once at least one RCP is running, equilibrium is achieved between the primary and secondary temperatures, eliminating any significant energy addition associated with the
' start of the second RCP.
The LTOP restrictions are based on RCS cold leg temperature.
This temperature will be determined by using RCS cold leg temperature indication when RCPs are running, or natural circulation if it is occurring. Otherwise, SDC return temperature indication will be used.
Restrictions on RCS makeup pumping capacity are included in Technical Specification 3.4.9.3.
These restrictions are based on balancing the bd>
requirements for LTOP and shutdown risk.
For shutdown risk reduction, it is desirable to have maximum makeup capacity and to maintain the RCS full (not vented). flowever, for LTOP it is desirable to minimize makeup capacity and vent l
the RCS.
To satisfy these competing requirements, nakeup pumps can be made i
capable of injecting, but available at short notice.
ot A pump can be considere to l
be not capable of injecting into the RCS if the pump breaker is racked eet-under administrative control. en alterete method is to maintair the p=p discharge va h; cle:cd under admi"istrati w centrek 1
pump injections while allowing manual actionThese methods prevent inadvertent to rapidly restore the makeup l
capability if conditions require the use of additional charging or llPSI pumps for l
makeup in the event of a loss of RCS inventory or reduction in shutdown margin.
CIMfifCh if a loss of RCS inventory or reduction in shutdown margin event occurs, the appropriate response will be to correct the situation by starting RCS makeup If the loss of inventory or shutdown margin is significant, this may pumps.
necessitate the use of additional RCS makeup pumps that are being maintained not capable of injecting into the RCS in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.9.3.
The use of these additional pumps to restore RCS inventory or shutdown margin will require entry into the associated action statement.
The action statement requires immediate action to comply with the specification'.
The restoration of RCS inventory or shutdown margin can be considered to be part of l
the immediate action to restore the additional RCS makeup pumps to a not capable of injecting status.
While recovering RCS inventory or shutdown margin, RCS pressure will be maintained below the Appendix G limits.
After RCS Ynventory or shutdown margin has been restored, the additional pumps should be immediately made not capable of injecting and the action statement exited.
I 4
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-7b AmendmentNo.h
)
l INSERT C - Paae B 3/4 4-7b i
IF
)
Alternate methods include placing the pump control switch in pull-to-lock with the I
associated discharge valve closed, placing the pump control awitch in pull-to-lock with the breaker control power fuses removed, or maintaining the associated discharge valve closed under administrative control.
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-___.___._._.__._.__.._____..m.
' BASES Ado C /MNGE FOG 3'Nfo$ntif r%cu OnLY An exception to Technical Specification 3.0.4 is soecified for Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 to allow a plant cooldown to MODE 5 if one or both POR are inoperable.
MODE 5 conditions may be necessary to repair the PORV(s).
3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity and readiness of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant.
These programs are in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Add as required by 10 CFR Part 50.55a been granted by the Commission pur(g) except where specific written relief has suant to 10 CFR Part 50.55a(g)(6)(1).
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MILLSTONE - Ut1IT 2
=
i B 3/4 4-7c Amendment flo. 218
A)co c Hou 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)_
A R 2 W N rro+
BASES 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS (continuedi within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and pressurizer pressure reduced to < 1750 psia within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant condition from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
If more than one SIT is inoperable, the unit is accident analyses.
in a condition outside the Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.
3/4.5.? and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABIllTY of two separate and independen a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.
Either subsystem operating in injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit thecon peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limi i
downward.
The ECCS leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the leakage rat assumed for the system outside containment during the recirculation phase will i
not be exceeded.
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABIllTY of each l
ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the accident analyses are i
met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.
LPSI pumps differential pressure test on recirculation ensures that theThe purpo pump (s) have not degraded to a point wnere the accident analysis would be adversely impacted.
LPSI pumps differential pressure (discharge-suction) when run 1
recirculation are 1209 and 150 psi, respectively.
the Technical Specification; were adjusted upward to account for instrument The acceptance criteria in uncertainties and drift.
l f
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i d
FILLSTONE - UNIT 2 04on B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No gJ, 77, 777. 7/7 220 l
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES The purpose of the ECCS throttle valve surveillance requirements is to provid assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.
Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:
(1) prevent total pump flow from
' exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance l
configuration, (2) accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-1.0CA analys (3) equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.
Verification of the correct position for the mechanical and/or electrical i
valve stops can be performed by either of the following methods:
1.
Visuall verify the valve opens to the designated throttled position; or 2.
Manually position the valve to the designated throttled position and verify that the valve does not move when the applicable valve control switch is placed to "0 PEN."
In MODE 4 the automatic safety injection signal generated by low pressurizer pressure and high containment pressure and the automatic sump recirculation required to be OPERABLE. actuation signal generation by low refueling wate Automatic actuation in MODE 4 is not required l
because adequate time is available for plant operators to evaluate plant conditions and respond by manually operating engineered safety features components.
Since the manual actuation (trip pushbuttons) portion of the safety injection and sump recirculation actuation signal generation is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4, the plant opentors can use the manua pushbuttons to rapidly position all components to the required accident position.
Therefore, the safety injection and sump recirculation actuation trip pushbuttons satisfy the requirement for generation of safety injection and sump recircu ionactuationsignalsinMODE4.
.wwg r D)
Only one HPSI pump may De OPERABLE in MODE 4 with RCS temperatures les Overpressure Protection System.or equal to 275'F due to the restricted rel pumping capacity readily available,To reduce shutdown risk by having additional a HPSI pump may be made inoperable but available at short notice by shutting its discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel.
The provision in Specification 3.5.3 that Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 4 is provided to allow for connecting the HPSI pump breaker to the respective power supply or to remove the tag and the discharge valve, and perform the subsequent testing necessary to declare the inoperable HPSI pump OPERABLE.
Specification 3.4.9.3 requires all HPSI pumps to be not capable of injecting into the RCS when RCS temperature is at or below 190*F.
Oncc RCS temperature is above 190*F one HPSI pump can be capable of injecting into the RCS.
However, sufficient time may not be -
available to ensure one HPSI pump is OPERABLE prior to entering MODE 4 as required by Specification 3.5.3.
Since Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 MILLSTONE - UNIT 2
)
B 3/4 5-2a Amendment No. M @. J JEE, 7/%,
04cs 7M.
INSERT D - Paae B 3/4 5-2 I
In MODE 4, the OPERABLE HPSI pump is not required to start automatically on a SIAS. Therefore, the pump control switch for this OPERABLE pump may be placed in the pull-to-lock position without affecting the OPERABILITY of the pump. This will prevent the pump from starting automatically, which could result in overpressurization of the Shutdown Cooling System.
A/O LMM6E EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS FoR ZwfWeMMrzo~'
0<vlf TSCR 2-5-98 BASES June 25, 1998 prohibit a MODE change in this situation, this exemption will allow Millstone
' Unit No. 2 to enter MODE 4, take the steps necessary to make the HPSI pu capable of injecting into the RCS, and then declare the pump OPERABLE.
statement of Specification 3.5.3is necessary to use this exemption duri If it reached.
should be entered as soon as MODE 4 is 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST)
The OPERABIllTY of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA.
sufficient water is available ' ithin containment to permit r 1) w cool ing flow to the core, and 2) af ter a LOCA the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes.
Small break LOCAs assume that all control rods are inserted, except for the control element assembly (CEA) of highest worth, which remains
][,jlI, withdrawn from the core.
9 withdrawn from the core. Large break LOCAs assume that all CEAs remain MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2b Amendment No. 9E, JE)r, JEE, 7JE, Mu 719,ll9,220
Docket No. 50-336 B16951 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Shutdown Cooling System Overpressurization Retyped Pages October 1998
-, 7
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_25 TABLE 3.3-3
^
EF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION g
m MINIMUM g
TOTAL NO.
CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE q
FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION 1.
SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)(d) l a.
Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1
2 1,2,3,4 1
i b.
Containment Pressure -
High 4
2 3
1, 2, 3 2
c.
Pressurizer Pressure -
i Low 4
2 3
1,2(e),3(a) 2 2.
CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS) a.
Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1
2 1,2,3,4 1
E b.
Containment Pressure--
High - High 4
2(b) 3 1, 2, 3 2
3.
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS) a.
Manual CIAS (Trip Buttons) 2 1
2 1, 2, 3, 4 1
b.
Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons) 2 1
2 1,2,3,4 1
(
c.
Containment Pressure -
g High 4
2 3
1,2,3 2
5=
d.
Pressurizer Pressure -
[
Low 4
2 3
1, 2(e), 3(a) 2 o
M t
i
a TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATION (a) Trip function may be bypassed when pressurizer pressure is < 1750 psia-bypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer pressure is 11750 psia.
(b) An SIAS signal is first necessary to enable CSAS logic.
(c) Trip function may be bypassed below 600 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 600 psia.
(d)
In MODE 4 the HPSI pumps are not required to start automatically on a SIAS.
(e) Trip may be bypassed during testing pursuant to Special Test Exception i
3.10.3.
ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTOOWN within the next l
36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
l ACTION 2 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels and with the pressurizer pressure:
a.
< 1750 psia; immediately place the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition; restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing the pressurizer l
pressure above 1750 psia.
b.
21750 psia, operation may continue with the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition, provided the following conditions are satisfied:
1.
All functional units receiving an input from the bypassed channel are also placed in the bypassed condition.
2.
The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be removed from service for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided one of the inoperable channels is placed in the tripped condition.
I t
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-16 Amendment No. JJJ, J/J, ),'J.
0421 a
,r
.y r-r
o.
)
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEN SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENT 4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:
a.
Performance of a
CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV l
1s required OPERABLE.
b.
Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months.
Verifying the PORV block valve is open at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> c.
when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection, d.
Testing in accordance with the inservice test requirements of Specification 4.0.5.
l 4.4.9.3.2 Verify no more than the maximum allowed number of charging pumps are capable of injecting into the RCS at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
This is accomplished for each charging pump prevented from injecting into the RCS by verifying the motor circuit breaker is in the open position.
4.4.9.3.3 Verify no more than the maximum allowed number of HPSI pumps are capable of injecting into the RCS at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
This is accomplished for each HPSI pump prevented from injecting into the RCS by:
a.
Racking down the motor circuit breaker from the power supply circuit; or b.
Shutting and tagging the discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel (2-SI-654 or 2-SI-650); or l
c.
Placing the pump control switch in the pull-to-lock position and l
removing the breaker control power fuses; or d.
Placing the pump control switch in the pull-to-lock position and shutting the discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel (2-SI-654 or 2-SI-656).
4.4.9.3.4 Verify the required RCS vent is open at least once per 31 days when the vent pathway is provided by vent valve (s) that is l
otherwise secured in the open position, otherwise, ver(are) locked, sealed, or ify the vent pathway at l
least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
I I
I NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-21b Amendment No. pp, JJ/, J75, 7/7, j
0422 a
1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS l
ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T
< 300*F x
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i
I 3.5.3 One ECCS subsystem compr.ised of the following shall be OPERABLE:
One OPERABLE **** high-pressure safety injection pump **, and l
a.
b.
An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refuel-ing water storage tank on a safety injection actuation signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a sump recirculation actuation signal.***
APPLICABILITY: MODES 3* and 4.
ACTION:
With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one ECCS a.
subsystem to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in COLO SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.
b.
In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.
SURVElLLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.
With pressurizer pressure < 1750 psia.
The provisions of Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 4 for the high pressure safety injection pump that is inoperable pursuant to Specification 3.4.9.3 provided the high pressure safety injection pump is restored to OPERABLE status within I hour after entering MODE 4.
In MODE 4, the requirement for OPERABLE safety injection and sump recirculation actuation signals is satisfied by use of the safety injection and sump recirculation trip pushbuttons.
In MODE 4, the OPERABLE HPSI pump is not required to start automatically on a SIAS. Therefore, the pump control switch for this OPERABLE pump may be placed in the pull-to-lock position without affecting the OPERABILITY of this pump.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-7 Amendment No. 77, J77, 7J7, 7J7.
l 0423 t
1
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES i
input from the secondary system.
exists in the pressurizer to accommodate the insurge.They also ensure sufficient i
actuation was assumed in the LTOP analysis of the energy addition transient No credit for PORV The restrictions apply only to the start of the first RCP.
temperatures, eliminating any significant energy additi Once at least start of the second RCP.
e The LTOP restrictions are based on RCS cold leg temperature.
This when RCPs are running, or natural circulation if it is occ 1
n SDC return temperature indication will be used.
Otherwise, Specification 3.4.9.3. Restrictions on RCS makeup pumping capacity are included requirements for LTOP and shutdown risk.These restrictions are based on balancing t For shutdown risk reduction, it is j
desirable to have maximum makeup capacity and to maintain the RCS fu vented).
To satisfy these competing requirements, makeup the RCS.
capable of injecting, but available at short notice.
administrative control.be not capable of injecting into the RCS if the pump b Alternate methods include placing the pump control n er switen in pull-to lock with the discharge valve closed, placing the pump cont switch in pull-to-lock with the breaker control power fuses removed, or maintaining the associated discharge valve closed under administrative contro These methods prevent inadvertent pump injections while allowing manual to rapidly restore the makeup capability if conditions require the use of s
additional charging or HPSI pumps for makeup in the event of a loss of RCS inventory or reduction in shutdown margin.
If a loss of RCS inventory or reduction in shutdown margin event occurs appropriate response will be to correct the situation by starting RCS makeup
, the If the loss of inventory or shutdown margin is significant, this may pumps.
necessitate the use of additional RCS makeup pumps that are being maintained capable of injecting into the RCS in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.9.3.
The use of these additional pumps to restore RCS inventory or shutdown margin will require entry into the associated action statement.
statement requires immediate action to comply with the specification.
The action the immediate action to rescore the additional RCS makeu The of injecting status.
pressure will be maintained below the Appendix G limits.While recovering RC apable made not capable of injecting and the action statement exite After RCS inventory or MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-7b 0424 Amendment No. /JE,
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 5.
g i
BASES The purpose of the ECCS throttle valve surveillance requirements is to provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.
Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:
(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configu~ation, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.
Verification of the correct position for the mechanical and/or electrical valve stops can be performed by either of the following methods:
1.
Visually verify the valve opens to the designated throttled position; or l 2.
Manually position the valve to the designated tr.rottled position and verify that the valve does not move when the applicable valve control switch is placed to "0 PEN."
In MODE 4 the automatic safety injection signal generated by low pressurizer pressure and high containment pressure and the automatic sump recirculation actuation signal generation by low refueling water storage tank level are not required to be OPERABLE.
Automatic actuation in MODE 4 is not required because adequate time is available for plant operators to evaluate plant conditions and respond by manually operating engineered safety features components.
Since the manual actuation (trip pushbuttons) portion of the safety injection and sump recirculation actuation signal generation is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4, the plant operators can use the manual trip pushbuttons to rapidly position all components to the required accident position.
Therefore, the safety injection and sump recirculation actuation trip pushbuttons satisfy the requirement for generation of safety injection and sump recirculation actuation signals in MODE 4.
In MODE 4, the OPERABLE HPSI pump is not required to start automatically on a SIAS. Therefore, the pump control switch for this OPERABLE pump may be placed in the pull-to-lock position without affecting the OPERABILITY of the pump.
This will prevent the pump from starting automatically, which could result in overpressurization of the Shutdown Cooling System.
Only one HPSI pump may be OPERABLE in MODE 4 with RCS temperatures less than or equal to 275'F due to the restricted relief capacity with Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection System. To reduce shutdown risk by having additional pumping capacity readily available, a HPSI pump may be made inoperable but available at short notice by i
I shutting it.c discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel.
The provirion in Specification 3.5.3 that Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 4 is provided to allow for connecting the HPSI pump breaker to the respective power supply or to remove the tag and open the discharge valve, and perform the subsequent testing necessary to declare the inoperable HPSI pump OPERABLE.
Specification 3.4.9.3 requires all HPSI pumps to be not capable of injecting into the RCS when RCS temperature is at or below 190*F.
Once RCS temperature is above 190*F one HPSI pump can be capable of injecting into the RCS.
However, sufficient time may not be available to ensure one HPSI pump is OPERABLE prior to entering MODE 4 as required by Specification 3.5.3.
Since Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 MILLSTOKE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2a Amendment No. f), JJ7, JJJ, 7JJ, o*2s il9,719,179 J