ML20082A109

Requests Approval for Application of Alternative Pipe Break Criteria (Excluding RCS Primary Loop).Response by 840106 Requested.Summary of Breaks & Restraints & Postulated Arbitrary Intermediate Pipe Breaks Encl

ML20082A109
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	11/11/1983
From:	Foster D GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GN-281, NUDOCS 8311180049
Download: ML20082A109 (13)

Text

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LGehrgia Power dompany .

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'M r 333 Piedmyit Avenue' i ~ "

Atlanta, Georgia 30308 ' f e Tefcohone 404.526-(726.

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• - i Mailing Addreg -

L Post Office dox 4545 .

- Atlanta, Georg'a 30302.

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Georgia Power - )

a  ! C;c A G3ter the southem ekttic sntem l

- %ce President and General Manager '

. Vogtte Project

, November 11, 1983 Mr.-Harold ~R. Eenton,' Director ..

File: X6BB06 Office of Nuclear-Reactor-Regulation _

Log: GN-281 U..S.: Nuclear Regulatory Commission

' Washington, D.C. 20555

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j F

NRC DOCKET NUMBERS.50-424 AND 50-425 CONSTRUCTION PERMIT NUMBERS CPPR-103 AND CPPR-109 ~

V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNITS 1 AND 2 I

' ARBITRARY INTERMEDIATE PIPE BREAKS 4

Dear Mr. Denton:

+  ;

Georgia Power' Company (GPC) has followed closely the recent activities of- i U the Nuclear Regulatory Commissicn (NRC) staff .and the nuclear industry

-related to the treatment of design basis pipe breaks in high energy piping a

systems. 1In particular, it is noted that the NRC staff has expressed an interest .in the industry's propesal to modify the current pipe break criteria to: eliminate from design consideration those intermediate breaks'

• generally referred to as arbitrary intermediate breaks, i.e. those break )

locations.which, based on stress analysis, are below the stress limits and/or I

[ .the cumulative usage factors specified in the current NRC criteria, but i

I' -are selected 'to provide a minimum of two breaks between terminal ends. NRC 1 staff and-industry' discussions with the' Advisory Committee on Reactor Safe-

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!. 1 guards (ACRS) on March.29 and June 2,~1983 have indicated general agreement i with' these; objectives and recognition that elimination of the arbitrary

. intermediate breaks offers' considerable benefits due to the deletion of the l associated pipe whip restraints and other provisions currently incorporated p

.in plant designs to mitigate the effects of such breaks. i 1

The' break selection criteria currently employed by GPC for Plant Vogtle is l- .taken from NRC Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1 and described in section 3.6 of the Plant Vogtle Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). These ,

documents require that pipe' breaks be considered at terminal ends and at I intermediate locations where' stresses or cumulative usage factors exceed

[; specified limits. If two intermediate locations cannot be determined based i

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on the above, i.e. stresses and cumulative usage factors are below specified l r limits,.then the two highest' stress locations are selected.

t GPC concurs with the nuclear industry in the belief that current knowledge F -and experience supports the conclusion that designing for the arbitrary l ' intermediate breaks is not justified and that this requirement should be deleted. :This conclusion is supported by extensive operating experience goof nin over.80 operating U.S. plants and a number of similar plants overseas in which no piping failures have been known-to occur that would suggest

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8311180049 831111 PDR ADOCK 05000424

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t Mr.: Harold R. Denton, Director File: X6BB06

< November 11,L1983. .,

Log: GN-281 Page'2--

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, r Lthe4 need to-design protective features to mitigate'the' dynamic effects of' Jarbitrary intermediate breaks.-LArbitrary intermediate breaks are often.

postulated at. locations ~where stresses are well below the ASME Code allow- '

ables and within a few percent _of the. stress leiels at other points in the same system. This results in complicated protective features being

.provided"for-specific break. locations in.thelpiping system that provide M y;

little to enhance overall: plant safety.- .

L '

'In practice,' consideration'of these two arbitrary intermediate breaks is.

particularlyl difficult because the location of the high stress points may

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move several.tbnes as the seismic design and analysis of structures and l' piping develops. The; industry ~ recognizes ~that the revised NEB 3-1, which was included-in the July 1981 revision to the Standard Review Plan (NUREG- '~

'0800), provides criteria for'not having to relocate intermediate break

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' points when highest stress locations shift.as a result of piping reanalysis.

[ As a practical matter, however,-these criteria provide'little relief, since 4

the burden is:on the designer to prove,that not postulating breaks at.

r -relocated highest stress points doesinot degrade safety. This may require extensive additional analysis of break / target interactions for the relocated breakLpoints and could result in design, fabrication and installation of

. additional pipe whip restraints at the relocated break points and elimination

.of previously installed restraints at abandoned break points. Early determi-nation of exact break locations is quite important because of all of the

secondary effects of the pipe break to be considered.

J The benefits to be realized from the elimination of the arbitrary intermediate Lbreak locations center primarily around the elimination of the associated l pipe whip restraints and other structural provisions to mitigate the con-- ,

' sequences of these breaks. While a substantial reduction in capital costs t .for these' restraints and~ structures can be realized immediately, there are

' also significant operational benefits to be realized over the 40 year life

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I of the plant.

Access during plant operation for such activities as maintenance and inservice inspection is improved due to the elimination of' congestion

created Lby these restraints arul the supporting structural steel, and in some cases'due to the need to remove some. restraints to gain access to welds. ~In addition to the decrease in maintenance effort, a significant reduction in man-rem exposure can be realized through fewer ~ manhours spent

'in radiation areas. Also, theineed to verify adequate cold and hot clear-l ances between pipes and restraint during initial heatup, which requires '

additional hold points during this already critical'startup phase, can he dispensed with..

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. MrdHarold-R.L Dentyn, Direttcr. File: ' X6BB06 cNovember.11, 1983 ,

/ Log: GN-281

. Page53 Recovery from unusual plcnt conditions would also be improved by elimination of this congestion. In'thelevent -of a radioactive release or spill inside the plant, decontamination-operations weald be much more effective if the complexLshapes, represented by_the stre2tural frameworks supporting the restraints, were eliminated. This-results_in decreasing' man-rem exposures-associated with decontamination and restoration activities. Similarly,

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access'for control of fires within these areas of the_ plant would beJimproved, especially under. low visibilityfconditions. Substantia 1'overall benefits

. . in these' areas would be realized by reducing the number of whip restraints required.

By design, whip restraints fit closely around the high energy piping with gaps' typically being on the order of half an inch. These restraints and their supporting steel increase the' heat loss to the surrounding environment significantly. Also, because thermal' movement of the piping system during

-startup and shutdown could deform the piping insulation against the fixed '

whip' restraint,1the insulation must be cut back in these areas,~ creating convection gaps adjacent'to the restraint, which also increases heat loss to.the environment._ This is a major contributor to the tendency of many containments to operate at temperatures-near technical-specification limits.

- The elimination of wnip restraints associated with arbitrary intermediate' '

breaks would assist in controlling-the normal environmental temperatures

- and improve system operational efficiency.

'For the above reason, GPC requests NRC approval for the application of the following alternative pipe break criteria (excluding the RCS primary-loop) on. Plant Vogtle: '

ASME Section III Piping'Inside Containment e Piping systems shall be designed to accommodate pipe breaks at terminal ends'and locations where the stress or usage factor criterion of MEB 3-1 are exceeded. No arbitrary intermediate breaks will be postulated when the stress and/or usageifactor criterion arecnot exceeded.

e For_ breaks that must be taken, the design will accommodate pipe whip, i mjet' impingement and compartment pressurization resulting from mechanistic treatment of the break. Current acceptable methods for limiting break opening, moderate and low energy exclusions, limited duration operation, etc.-may still be-applied.

~ ASME Section.III and Seismically Designed Non-ASME Section III Piping Outside Containment e Piping systems shall be designed to accommodate pipe breaks at terminal ends and locations where the stress criterion of MEB 3-1 are exceeded.

No arbitrary intermediate breaks will be postulated when the stress criterion are not exceeded.

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lKr. Harold'k.'Denton, Director ' File: fX6BB05:

>J . November 11,'1983 Log: GN-281.

-Page 41

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For breaks that must Lbc taken, the design will accommodate pipe whip

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and. jet impingement' effects resulting from mechanistic treatment of Lthe break. Current acceptable methods -for limiting break opening,.

moderate and low er.ergy exclusions, limited duration operation, etc.

. may'still,be' applied, e-J For' environmental qualification of-equipm nt and structural design-

.of compartments or enclosures traversed by high energy piping systems,..

breaks'wi11' continue to be postulated in accordance with the present project criteria, i.e. in each compartment or enclosure traversed by the high energy piping system, non-mechanistic breaks are postulated at the location.that results in the most severe environmental consequences.

Therefore, elimination of'the arbitrary intermediate breaks will not

' impact the environmental qualification program or planc structural design.

Application of the alternative' pipe. break criteria described above will not alter Plant Vogtle's commitment to qualify in the design of structures,

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systems.and. components important to safety. The Plant Vogtle quality

, - assurance program'will continue to ensure that' structures, systems and components important to safety are (esigned, fabricated, erected and tested

-'to the quality standards commensurate with the safety function to be per-l formed. "

The number of pipe breaks (terminal end and intermed#. ate) currently postulated in the Plant Vogtle pipe break analysis and associated pipe whip restraints is summarized in Attachment A. This attachment also identifies the number of pipe: breaks and pipe whip restrants to be elimianted from the design

.through application of the proposed alternate crteria.

Attachment B provides specific identification of the arbitrary intermediate breaks and pipe whip restraints to'be-eliminated from=the design, the system in which the breaks and associated restraints are located and the FSAR figure which shows their physical location within a given system.

l i GPC has evaluated the potential cost savings and operational benefits that result from the elimination of arbitrary intermediate breaks. These-benefits

. include $3-4 million savings in analysis, design, fabrication and installation of ' associated pipe whip restraints and jet impingement barriers and 400-500

. man-rem in dose reductions for both Vogtle units over the 40 year plant life.

. This dose reduction results in an additional operational cost savings of $2-3 l million. A detailed breakdown of the benefits realized by the climination

[ of the crbitrary intermediate breaks is provided in Attachment C. The actual benefits that GPC will realize are expected to be higher than these due to the hidden factors and intangibles that are difficult to identify at this

' time. It .is clear, however, that elimination of the arbitrary intermediate breaks is both safety effective and cost effective.

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ti Mr.1 Harold.R..Denton, Director . File: X63B06 November 11,11983 Log: GN-281 Page 5 s

The percentage of the total potential benefits that can be realized by GPC for Plant Vogtle becomes_a matter of_ timing due to the advanced stage

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of-design and construction. To make it possible for GPC to realize the maximum benefits afforded by this proposed change in the pipe break criteria, immediate attention by the NRC is requested.

GPC believen' that elimination of the arbitrary intermediate breaks is entirely independer.t of the NRC's current consideration of changes in the criteria for breaks in the primary coolant loops _and, selected application of leak before break me:hodology at high stress points, and that these efforts can proceed independently.

We would appreciate a favorable response to the proposed change in the pipe break criteria by January 6, 1984.

You s truly

/ / _

/ 4-D. O. Fos er.

DOF/sw xc: R. A. Thomas D. E. Dutton O. Batum J. A. Bailey' M. Malcom G. Bockhold, Jr.

L.'T. Gucwa M. A.~ Miller j G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire l

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. i Attachment A d

SUMMARY

OF BREAKS AND RESTRAINTS (PER UNIT) i PMW VMEE Total Summary To be Deleted No. of No. of No. of No. of Breaks Restraints Breaks Restraints Inside containment e ASME Class 1 Branch Lines

, Terminal Ends 79 35

) Intermediate - High Stress

• 81 19 i - Arbitrary 22 6 22 6 4 e ASME Class 2 i Terminal Ends 88 44

Intermediate - High Stress

• 8 5

- - Arbitrary 70 83 70 83

. e Total 348 192 92 89 I Outside Containment i

e ASME Class 2 & 3 and -Seismically Designed

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ANSI B31.1 Piping Terminal Ends 134 18 l Intermediate - High Stress

• 4 2 i - Arbitrary 90 21 90 21 i

e Total 228 41 90 21 Total - Inside & Outside Containment 576 233 182 110

• Stress and/or usage factor criterion of MEB 3-1 are exceeded.

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F' .

• Attechment B Pags 1 of 6 POSTULATED ARBITRARY INTERMEDIATE PIPE BREAKS - PLANT V0GTLE

[This-table ~provides specific identification of.the arbitrary intermediate breaks (event' number) and pipe whip' restraints (PWRs) to be eliminated from the Plant Vogtle design, the system in which the breaks and associated PWRs are located.and the FSAR figure which shows their physical location within a

.given system. An asterisk in the last column denotes that the pipe break event number and PWR (where applicable) were identified after= submittal of the' FSAR and.as a result'are not shown in FSAR Figure 3.6.1-1. The event number and PWR number will be included in a future FSAR amendment.

FSAR Pipe Break Figure 3.6.1-1 System Event Number PWR Number Sheet Number INSIDE CONTAINMENT - ASME SECTION III, CLASS 1 Safety Injection (Cold Leg) - P-0301-C 27 Loop 1 -

Safety Injection (Cold Leg) - P-0304-C 32.

Loop 2 -

Safety Injection (Cold Leg) - P-0309-C PBR-91 38 Loop 3 Safety Injection (Cold Leg) - P-2067-C 35 Loop.41

. Chemical & Volume Control P-0121-C 78 (Charging) P-0122-C. PBR-153 78

?

Safety Injection (Hot Leg) - P-0422-B PBR-87 20 Loop 2 P-0423-B PBR-86 20 Reactor Coolant - Pressurizer P-0105-C 8 Surge l Seal Whter Injection - Loop 1 P-2501-C 195 Seal Water Injection - Loop 2 P-2505-C 196 P-2506-C 196

Seal Water Injection - Loop 3 P-2511-C 197 Seal Water Injection - Loop 4 P-2513-C 198 P-2515-C 198 Reactor Coolant Drain - P-0342-C 65 Loop ~1 P-0343-C PBR-128 65 l

Reactor Coolant Drain - P-0346-C 66 Loop 2 P-0347-C PBR-131 66

}

Attachment B Pag 2 2 of 6 FSAR Pipe Break Figure 3.6.1-1 System Event Ncmber PWR Number Sheet Number

. Reactor Coolant Drain - P-0350-C 67 Loop'3_ P-0351-C -

67 Reactor Joolant Drain - P-0357-C 68 Loop-4-(Excess Letdown)

INSIDE CONTAINMENT - ASME SECTION III, CLASS 2 Chemical & Volume Control P-2122-C 80

-(Charging) P-2123-C 80 Chemical & Volsme Control P-2117-C PBR-162 87 (Letdown) P-2119-C 85

+

Chemical & Volume Control P-0124-C 78 (Charging) P-0125-C PBR-156 78 ,

Auxiliary Feedwater - Loop 1 P-2265-C ?BR-277,279 156 P-2266-C PBR-278,280,281,282 156 P-2267-C 156 Auxiliary Feedwater - Loop 2 P-2271-C PBR-290,291 157 P-2272-C PBR-292,293,315 157 P-2273-C PBR-294,295,296 157 P-2274-C 157 Auxiliary Feedwdter.- Loop 4 P-2261-C PBR-269,272 159 P-2262-C PBR-271,273,274,275 159 Steam Generator Blowdown - 'P-1649-C 132 Loop-1 - P-1645-C 133 P-1641-C 130 P-1642-C PBR-188 130 Steam Generator Blowdown - P-1672-C 135 Loop 2 P-1673-C 135 P-1666-C 139 P-1667-C PBR-287 139 l Steam Generator Blowdown - P-1652-C 141 Loop 3 P-1653-C 141

< P-1659-C PBR-228,229 146 P-1660-C PBR-230 146 Steam Generator Blowdown - P-1675-C 147 Loop 4 P-1634-C 147 P-1637-C PBR-182 149 3

P-1636-C 149

- , - _ _ . . , - - - . . _ _. - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . . . ,- . _ _ - . - . _ - ~ . _ - , _ _ , . . . . - . - _ -

( . . .. - .

• ~

3; Attechment B Pega 3 cf 6

{

FSAR Pipe Break Figure 3.6.1-1 System Event Number PWR Number Sheet Number Steam Generator Wet Layup - P-1029-C 152.

Loop 1 P-1030-C -

152

. Steam Generator Wet Layup - P-1037-C 153 Loop 2 P-1038-C- 152 Steam Generator Wet Layup - P-1033-C 154 Loop 3 P-1034-C 154 Steam Generator Wet Layup - P-1025-C 155 Loop 4 P-1026-C 155 Main Steam - Loop 1 P-1004-C PBR-17,18,19 2 P-1005-C PBR-20,22 2 Main Steam - Loop 2 P-1010-C PBR-63,64,65 3 P-1011-C PBR-66,68 3 Main Steam - Loop 3 P-1007-C PBR-70,71,72 3 P-1008-C PBR-73,75 3 Main Steam - Loop 4 P-1001-C PBR-10,11,12 2 P-1002-C. PBR-13,15 2 Main Feedwater - Loop 1 P-1108-C PBR-38,40,41,42,120 5 P-1109-C PBR-43,45 5 Main Feedwater - Loop 2 P-1111-C PBR-55,57,58,59,121 6 P-1112-C PBR-60,54 6 Main Feedwater - Loop 3 P-1101-C PBR-46,49,48,50,122 6 P-1102-C PBR-51,53 6 Main Feedwater - Loop 4 P-1105-C PBR-8,5,6,4,123 5 P-1106-C PBR-3,1 5 Chemical & Volume Control P-2518-C PBR-316 195 (Seal Water Injection - Loop 1)

Chemical & Volume Control P-2520-C PBR-321 196

( (Seal Water Injection - Loop 2) P-2521-C PBR-320 196 i

l Chemical & Volume. Control P-2523-C 197 (Seal Water Injection - Loop 3) P-2524-C PBR-322,317 197 l

j- Chemical & Volume Control P-2526-C PER-323 198 (Seal Water Injection - Loop 4) P-2527-C PBR-318 198 l

l Safety Injection (Accumulator P-2027-C 61 Drain) - Loop'1 P-2028-C 61 l

I

e Attachment B Page 4 of 6 FSAR Pipe Break Figure 3.6.1-1 System Event Number PWR Number Sheet Number Safety Injection (Accumulator P-2031-C 62 Drain) Loop 2 P-2032-C _

62

. Safety. Injection (Accumulator P-2035-C 63 Drain) - Loop 3 P-2038-C 63 Safety Injection (Accumulator P-2041-C 64 Drain) - Loop 4 P-2044-C 64 OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT Auxiliary Feedwater P-22Po-C. 174*

P-2290-C 174*

P-2293-C 174*

Chemical & Volume Control P-2136-C 88 (Charging) P-2137-C 88 P-2142-C 89 P-2143-C 89 Chemical & Volume Control P-2177-C 91 (Charging) P-2176-C 91 P-2159-C 93 P-2158-C 93 P-2164-C 98 P-2163-C 98 P-2162-C 98 P-2151-C 100 P-2152-C 100 P-2153-C 97 P-2192-C 103 P-2193-C

^

104 P-2126-C 117 P-2125-C 117

! P-2131-C 118*

l P-2132-C 118*

Chemical & Volume Control P-2186-C 106 (Letdown) P-2187-C 106 P-2198-C 108 P-2197-C 108 P-2113-C 109 P-2112-C' 109 Main Steam - Loops 1 & 4 P-1055-C PBR-201, PBR-218 2 P-1054-C PBR-217 2 9

Main Feedwater - Loops 1 & 4 P-1149-C PBR-241, PBR-242 5 Auxiliary Feedwater - Train A P-2204-C 190 P-2201-C 190 u -- - . - _ . _ . _ . . , _ ~ . _ . . . _ _ . _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _

Attachment B Pega 5 of 6 FSAR j Pipe Break Figure 3.6.1-1 l System Event Number PWR Number Sheet Number q Auxiliary Feedwater - Train B P-2207-C 189 P-2209-C _ 189 Auxiliary Feedwater - Train C 'P-2216-C 180 P-2215-C -180 P-2240-C 180*

P-2239-C 180 Steam Generator Blowdown - P-1601-C PBR-301 119 Loop 1 P-1602-C 119 Steam Generator Blowdown - P-1605-C PBR-302 120 Loop 2 P-1606-C- 120

- Steam Generator Blowdown - P-1609-C PBR-303 121 Loop 3 P-1610-C 121 Steam Generator Blowdown - P-1620-C

~

PBR-304 122 Loop 4 P-1621-C 122 Steam Generator Blowdown - P-1627-C 125 Common P-1628-C 125 Main Steam (Atmos. Dump) - P-1087-C 70 Loop 1 P-1088-C 70 Main Steam (Atmos. Dump) - P-1090-C >

73 Loop 4 - P-1091-C 73 Main Steam - Loop 1 P-1084-C

• P-1085-C

• Main Feedwater - Loops 2 & 3 P-1119-C PBR-249 6 ,

P-1118-C PBR-247 6 P-1117-C 6 Main Feedwater - Loops 1 & 4 P-1140-C PBR-234, PBR-263 7 P-1139-C 7 P-1137-C 7 Main Steam - Loops 2 & 3 P-1064-C PBR-206 3 P-1068-C PBR-208, PBR-209, 3 PBR-222 P-1074-C 4 P-1075-C 4 Main Steam - Loops 1 & 4 P-1061-C PBR-213 4 P-1062-C 4 Auxiliary Feedwater - Train A P-2276-C 186 P-2277-C 186

Atte.chment B Pign 6 cf 6 FSAR Pipe Break Figure 3.6.1-1 System Event Number PWR Number Sheet Number

- Auxiliary Feedwater - Train C P-2241-C 179*

P-2278-C -

179 Auxiliary Feedwater P-2236-C 170

^

.P-2231-C 169 Main-Steam - Loop 2 P-1017-C P-1018-C

• Main Steam - Loop 3 P-1021-C

• P-1022-C *

--Main Steam (Atmos. Dump) - P-1093-C 71 Loop 2 P-1094-C PBR-260 71 Main Steam (Atmos. Dump) - P-1096-C PBR-257 72 Loop 3 P-1097-C ,

72 Main Steam - Loop 2 P-1125-C PBR-262

• P-1126-C *

' Auxiliary Steam P-1129-C

• P-1130-C

• P-1157-C

• P-1156-C ,

P-1153-C

• P-1152-C

• I e- .- . . . . - , - - -

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ATTACHMilff C

+-

e SUt91ARY OF BENEFITS FOR TIJE ELIMINATION OF ARBITRARY INTERMELIATE PIPE BREAKS -

PLANT VOCTII UNITS 1 & 2 Changes Resulting from Break Elimination Cost Savings (1983 Rates) Operational Benefits Elimination of 110 Pipe Whip Restraints e Design, Fabrication and Installation Costs

• e Potential improvement in quality of inservice (PWRs) Per Unit inspection (ISI) e Dome Reduction Costs e Cose reduction free improved personnel access during maintenance, ISI and recovery from unusual plant conditions, e.g., radioactive spills, fires, etc.

e Improved capability to recover from unusual plant conditions, e.g., decontamination following radioactive spills, access for fire fightir.g. etc.

e Redu, 1 system heat loss resulting from improved insulation design e Dose reduction and improved construction schedule by eliminating the need to set and maintain PWR clearance gaps Elimination of Jet Barriers and/or o Barrier Design, Fabrication and Installation e Dose reduction from improved personnel cccess Equipment Relocation Costs

• during maintenance and recovery free unusual plant con 4itions, e.g., radioactive spills, e Dose Reduction Costs fires, etc.

• Relocation Costs e Improved capability to recover from unusual plant conditions, e.g., decontamination following radioactive spills, access for fire fighting, etc.

Elimination of Analyses Associated e Jet Impingement Load and Pipe Whip Analyses e Improved system layout and design for future with the Dynamic Effects and Loadina Costs

• plant modifications Conditions TOTAL SAVINGS (UNITS 1 AND 2) $5-7 Million 400-500 man-rea in dose redudtion over the 40 year plant life.

• 0ne Time Cost Applicable to Both Units.

E

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