ML20078S075
| ML20078S075 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1983 |
| From: | Sorensen G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GO3-83-834, NUDOCS 8311150384 | |
| Download: ML20078S075 (78) | |
Text
r 1 x ,
s f
Washington Public Power Supply System Box 1223 Elma, Washington 98541-1223 (2061482 4428 l l
Do:ket No. 50-508 November 3, 1983 G03-83-834 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN: Mr. G. W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 ,
Division of Licensing l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
Subject:
NUCLEAR PROJECT 3 l RESPONSES TO NRC SAFETY EVALUATION QUESTIONS
References:
a) Letter #G03-83-561, G. C. Sorensen to j G. W. Knighton, dited July 15, 1983 b) Letter #G03-83-711, G. C. Sorensen to G. W. Knighton, dated September 2,1983 c) Letter #G03 83-720, G. C. Sorensen to G. W. Knighton, dated September 8,1983 Via references a) & b) the Supply Systen transmitted for NRC Review our responses to questions generated as part of the Safety Evaluation of the WNP-3 Operating License Application.
Due to an error in our document reproduction facilities while generating the requisite number of copies for the above submittals, portions of those re-sponses were inadvertently not included. Reference c) contained information resulting from a preliminary evaluation of the scope of this problem. This transmittal is intended to complete the Supply System responses by provid-ing all missing infomation not already presented in reference c). In all cases, where some infomation may have been missing from tim earlier sub-mittal, the entire question response is repeated herein.
83y1 % f0 DR h00 E :
I O
/
Mr. G. W. Knighton ,
Page 2 November 3, 1983 C03-83-834 .
RESPONSES TO NRC SAFETY EVALUATION QUESTIONS If you require additional inform = tion or clarificacion, the Supply System point of contact for this matter is Mr. D. W. Coleman, Licensing Project Manager (206/482-4428 ex. 5436).
Sincerely, b( /
.L wcw G. C. Sorensen, Manager (Acting)
Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Programs l
AJM/tn __
Attachments:
cc: D. J. Chin - Ebasco NY0 N. S. Reyrolds - 0 & L J. A. Adams - NESCO D. Smithpeter - BPA 1 A. Vietti - NRC A. A. Tuzes - CE Ebasco - Elma WNP-3 Files - Richland i i
l i
l l
l l
l I
- , - - , - , . -----e-- -,- + , -- - , ----r- - - -+ %.-w
Question No. .;
24T.23 In your response to Question 241.10, you stated that' Equation (1)
(2.5.4) of that response was obtained from " Dynamics of Bases and Founda-tions"~by D. D. Barker, McGraw Hill,. 1962. We cannot locate this equation in the mentioned reference by Barker. Please provide copy of relevant pages from your reference where this equation and the basis fer its development are given. Also, descrfbe the pro-cedure you used to obtain the shear modulus (G) equal to 330 ksi from Figure 2.5-121; give the corresponding strain level. Discuss your basis for selecting this particular strain value. Justify the statement in your response that the reduction factor, Rd .
used to convert the laboratory data to field data, can vary from 5 to 20. What value of Rd did you use, and what is the basis for your selection?
Response
Attached for your review are copies of the relevant pages from
" Dynamics of Bases and Foundations" by D. D. Barkan, McGraw Hi.11, 1962.
Equation (T) of the response to Question 241.10 was obtained in-the following manner:
. (1) Ks= Cu (pages.18-21) -
where: Ks- modulus of subgrade reaction Cu= coefficient of elastic uniform ccmoression of soil C, C (2) Ks= (p. 24, EQ. I-2-12)
VA where: C, = coefficient equal to 1.08 for an absolutely .
rigid rectangular foundation (p. Za, Table I-3)
A <10 m2
- = Area NOTE: ofFor foundation base, A > 10 m2, use(TO m2 )
(pp.25-2E,p.40);
E (3) , C =
2 (p. 24, EQ. I-2-13) 1-u where: = Poisson's Ratio = .40 (from-FSAR Table 2.5-16)
(4) E =
23 (1 + u) (c. 5, E0. I-1-9) where: E = Young's Modulus G =
Shear Modulus = 330 ksi (at a strain rate of 10-2 in./in., frem FSAR Figure 2.5-121)
I 2541W-16 241.23 ._e. .
Resoonse(cont'd) .
Now, substituting (4) into (3) results in the following:
= 2G (5) C
() _
)
Additionally, substituting (5) into (2), and using the value of 1.08 for Cs,. yields the subject equation:
0.08M2G) ,
2.16G (6) K s = (1 .jt ) p (1 . g) v-g The shear modulus value of 330 ksi was taken fecm FSAR Figure 2.5-121 for a shear strain value of 10-2 in./in. This high strain value is appropriate for the static analyses. Lower strain values would be appropriate for dynamic analyses or machine vibra-tion problems. ,
A reduction factor (Rd) of 20 was applied in selecting a value for the subgrade modulus (from equatien (6)). This factor adds con-servatism in that it softens the subgrade in the analysis of the
~
Category I Tank Enclosure Structure..
e
-eme. e=-
'~.*6
- x e
' ' ' " ' * ' **I" "' *
- "'i"#. '
[
'"U #_D 1 __._i_l
'_'_=I_'_Y.[ _____)_ $ [_ ' *_ _ ' _ _ . _ _ _ _ I .
, a .-
.aAsne reornnes or sos.. -
.;- 's From these equations we find directly- .
A+s
, " " a(3A + 2,)
- N'I4) -
k
- '
- 4 * .
2m(3A + 24) ' U-I4) e The quantity ~
I
- a(3A + 2a) x+, 6-14) which defines the relationship between a tensile (or compressive) stress i
and the elongation (or compression) esused by this stress, is called the normal modulus of elasticity or Young's modulus. '
Since the expressions for e and e. have diferent signa, it fonows that t axial elongation of a bar will be accompanied by laters! contraction.
Fmm G-14) and (I-14) we obtain
- " k " f, " 2(A + ,) U~I-7) -
Hence itt foUows that the ratio between the relative lateral contraction and the relative axial elongation does not depend on the shape of the eroes section and is a constant for a given material.
The quantity a la caHed Poisson's ratio and lies within the Emits 0 < , <M . Young's modulus and Poisson's ratio are the two principal quantities defining the elasde properties of materials. They are usually appliedin engineering calculations.
Solving Eqs. G-14) and (I-1-7) for A and g, we obtain their expressions in terms of Young's modulus E and Poisson's ratio r.
I
- * (1 + n)( - 2,) O'I4}
E a = 2(1 + ,) " 6 II-I)
&. Applica6dity of Hooke's Law to SaiZ. Since Eqs. (I-12) are valid only for a homogeneous isotropic body in which no initial stresses are present, it is evident that Young's modulus and Poisson's ratio may be applied as elastic constants only to bodies satisfying these conditions.
Therefore it is necessary to clarily whether it is possible to consider that soil satisfies the conditions of homogeneity and isotropy.
Some soils, such as sands, elsys with sand, and clays, consist of particles of different matarsals surrounded by air or by a film of capillary water containing solutions of various salts and gases. The rigidity of separate particles is much higher than that of the soil as a whole. Therefore in theinvestigation of elastie (and total) deformations of soils, the particles composing the soil may be considered to be absolutely rigid.
I a 10- DTMAMfG OF BAssE AND POUNDA1104 1.5 kg/cm* (Fig. I-10). The second section, which corresponds to higher pressures, is characterized by a, nonlinear settlement-pressure relationship ._.
expressed by a convez curve. In this section, settlement increases.at a ~ '
greater rate than pressure.
ts. ,
.- s*
Y p r a 21.3 f -
/
l't.0
. .J o
o + 4 12 tssenamer, 20 24==:s 32 34 40 Fre. I-II. noenits or so.d t : at a s.o.me pine. a I Forloessial soil (Fig. I-11) a linear relationship between pressure and plate settlementla observed up to a pressure of 1.25 kg/cm8; then the nonlinear section follows.
A simalarrelationship between settlement of the bearing plate and pres-sure on the soil is observed in clayey soils. This is con A=4 byFig. I-12, showing such s. relationship in a clay with silt and sand (a bearing plate of 8 m' area was used). The graph she ws that the linear plate-eettlement -
tm
,4F** "
. "d 0,75 #
, s....-
go.so '**
C25 o , _.
a 2 + 6 e to 12 to is -
, Seltlament, mar -
F:e.1-11 Resulte of load test of an 8.0.m' plate on clar.
Ioad relationship exists up to 0.75 kg/cm8; then settlement increasesat a greater rate than pressure. -
This characteristic settlement-pressure relationship may be generalized. ,
for various soils. A proportionality limit may be established, below
, which the pressure-settlement relationship is linear; i.e., below a certain point, p, - e,3, (I-2-1) - .
m,_..
masne recenmss os sce.~ t, wherep, = normal pressure on soit c,.= coeScient of proportionality, also called modulus of subgrade-reaction ,
l 3, = total settlement of bearsag plate resulting from external i pressu n - - - - - -
The proportionality limit is s,cdterion in the seleetion of the permissible __
bearing value of soil under static load, often taken as being equal to or somewhat lower than the proporticaality limit. .
A question arises as to whether the proportionalitylimit is a. constant _ , , , _,
physical property cf a soil or whetherit depends on such test conditions as the bearing-plate area or shape. The experimental data available are not suScient to allow a fairly positive answer to this question. The proportionality limit apparently does not depend on b area of the bearing plate used in the investigations and apparently depends only on soilproperties. This has been condrmed, for example, by D. E. Polahin's tests performed on loessial soils. He studied' settlements of six square plates having areas of 0.25, 0.50,1.0, 2.0, 4.0, and 8.0 rm . The experi-ments did not reveal any definite relationship between the bearing-plate area, and the proportionality limit. This leads to an aarumption that -
the proportionality limit is a characteristic. constant property for a given soil.
If b validity of the law of linear relationship between bearing-plate.
settlement and pressure thereon is confirmed by experiment, then, in the range of pressures smaller than the proportionality limit, there exists also - - - - -
- a. linear relationship between deformation at any point in the soil and stressinduced. at that point by extarr.al. forces acting on a IImited area.
of thesoilsurface. Therefore, for stresses not exceediag a certain limit, --
the soil is considered to be a. linearly deformable body. The theory of linearly deformable bodies is applied in studies of deformations and -
g stress conditions in soil l 5. Coe.1teient of ETastic Uniform Compression c Figure I-13 presenta t
the graph of the results of tests performed by the auther and associates, who investigated the settlement of a 1.4-m2 bearing plate on a Ioessial soit under conditions of repeated loading and unloading. The maximum , ,
stress transferred to the soil was increased in each loop. In the Erst --
loop, maximum stress reached only 0.34 kg/cm8;i.e.,it was much smallstI '
than the proportionality limit, which in loess is approximately equal to-1.25 to 1.5 kg/cm*. In spite of the relatively small value of maximum I
stress in this loop, residual settlement was about 90 per cent of total settlement. If one considers that the elastic limit corresponds to the -
.. magnitude of stress at which residual settlement forms only s. negligible part (around 2 to 3 per cent) of total settlement, then, in the esse con-earned, the elastic ?.imit of the soil evidently is much mmIIer than the-i, f
.- . - --. ~ _ - . . . . - .
j sr syMAases or Pasa AM: poWNBATIONS * ..
proportionality limit. This conclusion apparently rssy also be. applied - '
to other soils. The experimental results are not. mEcient to permit eenclusions concerning numerical values of the elastic limit for various soils. Probably for most soils (not for preloaded soils and not for meks) .
this limit equals only several tenths of a kilogram per square centimeter; j 'i.e., it is much lower than the usually permissile working pressures on soil. Thus, for small pressures only, the assumption is possible that ,
soils of the clay and sand types satisfy the ccadition of reversibility of deformations.
A. graph of the footing settlement-pressure relationrhip under condi tions of repeated loading and unloading permits easy separation of the I te,s L s, l/7.
,,, . /R/ I -
3 ,_, D l Al 11
// 1 lR l Eu a . s TV ~ J1 0 \h 1 g, /T $ N $ $ '
JT V V V V F ~
/
' 'o QA 1.0 1.5 2.0 2J 10 13 40 45 10 u s.O u -to 1.3 an u so servense, m=
Fre. I-12. Results of lead test of a,1.M8 piste on Ioems.
elastie part of the deformation from the total settlement. FigureJ-14 ,
indicates the result of an analysis performed on Fig. I-13. The circles l t=h*^ themagnitudes of elastic settlement for the maximum pressure in each loop. The graph shows that within a range of pressures up to j LO kg/cm*, elastic settlements change proportionally to pressurea i Figure I-15 presents graphs of elastic settlementa obtained by the !
author for 1,600- and 3,600-em* bearing plates on medium sand of natural '
moisture content. Similar graphs showing interrelationships between.
settlement and pressure on the plate were obtained for other soils. On the basis of these investigations, the statement can be made that within a. ., 1 certain range there is a proportional relationship between elastic settle-mants of footings and external uniform pressure on the soil;i.e., , ,
- p. = c.S, (I-2-2) l where e is the coeScient of proportionality; called the coefficient of !
! elastic uniform compression of soil, and S is the elastic settlement of the i bearing plate due to the external pressure. .
i The coe5cient of elastie uniform compression c. of a soil difers from -
the coeEcient of proportionality c, (in Eq. (I-2-1)], but the diference is l
l 1
_ . - - - ..___ _ .._ . _ , . . . _ . ~ . _ . . . . . . . _ _ - . ,_____,.-m,_ . _ . . _ . , _ _ _ . , _ _ . . _ _ . . _ . . . . ~ _ . _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ .
- aasne recramus or sea. - -
~
2r not ofterr taken lato consideration. While e,,.relatee the total w& ment .
to the external pressure, e. relates only the 44stic part of the total w&mene to the pressure. Ence the-total a*+f et of a foundation is always ~
!arger thanits elastic settlement, c. is larger than e,in all soils, without-exception.
1.3 l 1.2 l '
t 1.12 lI / l
.au l., .$Ylff+r 1
- u '
" e m
,as S
- f /*
ss
- col }
~
E o.7
/ /
, l
\ seul I las [ ' d[ .
1 a / /
-l
- as ca4ll4 ass l a<
u
/
)>,
J ,
l 42
,f l . .. . -.
at4 as og o /#
o 2 s of seedssemensm: . .
== o aio azo aso neo asoene,o 'r coensmem. amcs-am cao cso t.oo Pss. I.14. Evaluaties of Fro. T.15. Evaluation of hysterene loops obtaaned dur-h kreterums loops of insloed tesse os footings of two sisen.
F5s. 31L - -
- c. TheEfect of the Area ar.d Shape of a Fe2.~% Bau on the Confeient of Elastic Uniform Comprrmien.
The coeScient of elastic uniform _
compression and. the coeScient of proportionality would be constant nlues (characteristic of certain soils cad independent of test conditions and area and. shape of the foundation base) if the stresses in the soil under a uniformly loaded foundation remained constant at any point. -
Ot% both coeScients would depend on the ares of the footing base and its shape.
^ '
-If d2 is the soil reaction on the element dA. of the foundation base contact area, then, assuming that at any point directly under dA the nettlement 3 of' the soil is proportional to the stress, we obtain d2 = c(A)S dA e m.m
= a m.
se armecsw nams me rouwomme. .
where c(4) le a, variable, coef5cient orproportionality whose magnitude depends on the elastic constants of the soil and the coordinates of the element of area da. The to+a1 reaction of the soil equals the load P, imposedonit. Therefore, P., = [, d2 - 5[ c(A) da (I-24)
^ - - ---
This integral extends over the entire area of the foundation base.
Se**haat is assumed to be constant, and the foundation to be abeclutely~ ~ ~~
rigid. But P, = p.A where p. is the magnitude of the normal pressure on the soil, and Eq. .
(I-24) can be rewritten as follows:
3 p, = A s c(A) dA (I-2-4)
If the normal stress in the soil under the foundation remains constant, then c(A) win also remain constant and will equal e,. Hence its value -
is determined only by the elastic properties of the soil, and.
[,c(4)dA=e,4 (I-24) -
In this cam- the-coeScient of uniform compression of the soil does not~ ~ ~ ' ~
depend.on the size of the foundation base contact area.
In reality, when suniform pressure acts on the foundation, the-normal-stresses in the soit under it are distributed irregularly.
I~~T Since machinery foundations consist of either a rigid block placed directly on the soil ora framed elastie system supported by s. rigid plate i
placed on the soil, the problem of distribution of stresses under the base '
contact area of a rigid plate which has undergone uniform settlement of a certain magnitude is of great interest.
Sadovstry" gave a solution to this problem for a.cW- base contact area of a rigid plate. For soil directly under the base contact area, the er pression for c(A) may be written in the form
~
B 1 e(d) = L ~ us , q as. ps -(I-24) where E = Young's modulus of soil
, = Poisson's ratio 2 = radius of plate r a = radius vector of point under consideration in soil under bear-4: ing plate (, < R) 1 4
. _ . - . - - _ - . . _ . . _ . _ _ . _ , - - _ _ _ . - _ . _ . _ _ _ - ~ . _ , . _ . _ _ . . _ - -
e
- masnc Psoremas ce sea. m 1 Equation (I^4) shows that, the stress under the base contact ares of a rigid. bearing plate is smaUest at the center of the plate. The -
stresses at other pointa grow proportionaHy with distance from the center; the maximant value is reached near the edges of the foundation, where p- R. Theoretically this maximum equals infnity. However, no actual material can stand inanitely large stresses, and the soil at the -- I foundation edges will undergo plastio deformations; the stresses in these !
' sones will be of faite magnisudes, although they will be much larger l l
than thestresses at points near the bearing-plate centary i'
} Multiplying both parts of Eq. G-2-6) by the area element d.1 and '
integrating over the entire foundation base contact area, we obtain, according to Eq. E-2-4), .
l 2 1 adede
>=3 -
1 ~ v' Av s VR' -- f -
- .g I 1 " 0
(
1 - ,* a e de , va*n _* f G-2-7) l i Byintegration we End:
2 8 PS = 1.13 y_ G-2-8)
Comparing the right-hand parts of Eqs. (I-2-2). and U-2 8), we End the following expression fora.:
L c., - 1.13g _E
,,g G-2-9) :- : - .
1 Thus the equation for the coeScient of elastie uniform compression '
of a soil, obtained from the solution of the theory-ot*lasticity problem concerning the distribution of normal stresses in the soil under the base contact area of arigid plate, leads to the conclusion thatif the settlement of the foundation is uniform, the stresses under its base are not dis- 1..
tributed uniformly. The coemdent of elastic compression c. (or, if the solution is given for a proportionally deformed soil, the coefeient of proportionality e,) depends not only on the elastic constants E and r, which define the elastic or linear properties of a soil, but also on the si:e .
~
of the base contact areaof thefoundation. The coemdent e. changes in layerse proportion to the square root of the base area of the foundation. '
If the foundation consists of an absolutely Sexible plate uniformly '
loaded by a. vertical pressure, then stresses in the soil under the founda- -
tion will be distributed uniformly, but settlement under the foundation will vary. For an absolutely dexible foundation, the coeScient of '
1 1
__ _ _ _ . _ . _ . . _ _ . - . . _ - . - _ , . _ . _ - _ _ . _ _ . _ , ~ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - -
l s
amancs or naass ue pouweanons so. -
elastic uniform compression is the ratio of the uniform pressure t1the average value of settlement,
- e. = h (I-2-10)
Schleicher" gave a solution for an absolutely Sexible footing with rectangular base. Acco.ang to his solution, the average settlement value is determined,by the equation
,Tg1M .( V1 V1 + +a=8-+=a 1 - p*
8 V1 + a 8 + 1 2 (1 + a8 )M - (1 + a s)-' p.
+ a ln g (I-2-11)
Vi + as _ i e ,
' where n = 24/26 2s,26 = length, width of foundation - ' --- -
From Eq. (I-2-2) we have:
3 = p,c.
A--ig3 - S , we obtain fore.-
~
(I-2-12) where-8
. . C = 1 - v* . (I-2-13)
, c.is a coeScient which depends only on the ratio a between the length and.the width of the foundation base. Itis equal to -
c= r4 l +
- InYI+****+ab V1 + s* - = WlV1* +**a*--I I- M14 d)M 8 *
(I-2-14) l' Table I-3 gives values of c, for various values of a, computed from Eq. .
(I-2-14). -
Taan.s I-3. Acxn2Aar VAX.UES FOR TBE COMPUTATION Or IEETT1.EMEFFS or Rrarn Ana Fr.sxist.: Baas:so P:. Arms i
a s A .
1 i 1.06 1.08 1.5 1.07 2' I.09 I.10 3 1.13 1.15
' 5 1.22 1.24
- 10 1.41 1.41
__y,--,___..,__.__v - - . _ . , - - . - , . ,
-- 4asne recremes or son. -
- as
{ '
Tae same table gives also values of el computed:by M. T. Gorbunov- ,
Posadove
- foran absolutely rigid rectangula-foundation. The diference ,
between c;.and e,is not larger than 3 per cent. Hence, there will be little Eference between.the values of the coescient of elastie uniform
.- compression as computed for absolutely rigid and, absolutely Sexible l rectangularplates. TableI-3 indicates thatif the basearesof afounda-tion remains constant, the coescient of elastie uniform compression '
incrosses with an incrossela a Foundations for machincry are seldom .
constructed with n large ratio between the side lengths; in zcost cases was of K. a .
o.50 0.7f too 1.41 2.0o A
. $e.'Q25kg/ eda 2-
~ ' "
E .
-e .- f. og g e . ' es
'30 to .
ft -
14 -
Fan I14. Dependense of settlements on the loaded aren,under diferent pressarse.
it does not exceed 3. Hence, it can be held that, in practice, the coeE. .
eient of elastic uniform compression fora machine foundation does not ~~.
depend on a . -
_' The foregoing. conclusions concerning the efect of the ares of the. . .
fa==>"8a- base on the settlement and on the coeEcient of elastic uniform 1-compression will not change if we assume that the soil under the plate behaves, not as an elastic body, but as a proportionally deformable body.
- d. Esperimental Ineestigations of the Coefeient of Elastic Uniform. s Compression. The conclusions of the theory discussed above are fully condrmed by experimental investigations performed within the range of . . .
pressures smaller than the proportionality limit; then, residual settle-ments appear in addition to elastic settlements, and the soil does not behavelike an elastic body. Figure I-16 presents graphs obtained.by D. E Polshin which show the settlement of rigid bearing plates on loess plotted
- gainst the areas of the plates. The square roots of the beanns-plate areas are plotted as abai- , the settlements as ordinates. The test footings were square. Within the range of test errors, the relation-ship between settlement and the square root of base area may be con-1 I
. _ . . e 36 imwucs ce nasa um pouwoAnour _
sidered to be directJy proportional, which fully agrees with theoretical son.i ion A number of tests on various soils give us a chiace to verify the
. validity of the theoretical conclusion that the coeflici mt of elastic com-prendon increases in.IcVerse proportion to the equare root of bearing.
. TAmsa I-4. Coasrevus Amo Maassass VAuras or tus Cosmerswr or Es.aerar Uwaromas Consensemow e. or A Msorens Samn som Drrruussy Assas or Laassue e., hg/eE8 J,SEI ..
r_; -
Computed '
' 200 30.0 30.0 800 18.0 18.8
. 1,000 11.~4 13.4 3,000 9.9 7.7 7,300 6.6 4.9 pistearea. All tests were performed on rigid bearing plates with varying aftak .
Gerner86 performed laboratory tests on medium sands and obtained values of e.for several plate areas (see Table I-4).
IligureI-1Tg[ves curves, plotted on the basis of the data of Table I-4,
. which show changes in e., plotted against, changes in plate area. The 30
,2 .
k20 J tS s'-
k j
m , % ~ ,,,,
S
- EQ%~L o I I o a S a
+t Ares 4 se z to a Fio. T-17. Dependence of the coeScient of elaeue uniform compression of soil c. on the leaded ans, A.
values of c. wert obtained from experiments and from theoretical con-siderations. The latter values were computed as follows: according to Eq. (I-2-12), the coefficients of elastic compression c. and e for two
1
, , t t _ ._
. r 4
RAsnC PsCPWms5 OP SCE 2r foundationswith.dIAerent areas Asand de are related by the formula. -.
a = e.: f (I-2-15)
~'
As a result of 5 eld, testa performed by the author and the !ste Ya. N. ~
Smolikov on gray soft saturated clays with sand and silt, the following values d.a. were obtained for foundations with areas of 1.5,1.0, and e '. ~"
0.5 m*: 2.1, 2.52, and 3.50 kg/cm*. Inserting the values A = 0.5 m*
and e. = 3.5 kg/cm*, we obtain from Eq. (I-2-15) the following values of e. for the other two foundations investigated: 2.45 kg/cm8 for A = 1.0 m', and 2.02 kg/cm'for A - 1.5 m*.
Table I4 gives values of c. for foundations with three diferent base areas obtained from testa performed by the author and A. I. Mikhalchuk on sturated brown clays with silt and sand When the values presented in this table were computed, e value of e., equal to 4.4 kg/cm8 and corresponding to A = 2.0 m* was inserted in Eq. (I-2-15). The com.
puted values of c. for areas of 4 and 8 m* were Isrger than those found esperimentally. This diference was apparently caused by the diversity ~
of soil properties at the site of Seld investigations.
TAas.m I4. Courtrrso Ana Maascass YA$ess or rus-Costrresswr or .
Es.astse Untroam Courassmow s. or A SArvaaras Cr.Ar roa Lu, rr Aamas or Isaatwo
. *= W8"* ~
a, == -
Esperimental Computed '
- 2.os 2.2 - '
4 2.3 3.12-2 4.4r 4.4 _
\
The anthor, P. A. Saichev, and Ya. N. Smolikov performed tests on loess at its natural moisture content, using foundations with square bases -
of different sizes. The resulte of these investigations are presented in Table 14. - - .
All the investigations confirm that the coeScient of elastic uniform ~~
- compression of a soil decreases with an incrosse in the area of the founda-tion base. The same experiments indicate, however, that values of -
i
- e. computed from Eq. (I-2-15) decrease at a higher rate than those .
established experimentally. Experimental studies of forced and free j
vibrations of actual foundations with bases attaining 100 m* ares indicate '
that experimentally established values of c. are much larger than those obtained from computations in which values of c , found by testing a
m onwees ce massa me rovuondoes foundation of small area, were adjus+ad to s. larger area. Th4 author studied free vibrat'ons af the foundation for a horizontal compressor.
The fo An% was ered on toensial soirand had s. base area of 90 m*.
Yrom the results of the studies b coeScient of elastie uniform compres-sion of the soil was found to be 4.7 kg/cm'. Another foundation had a.
base area of syy.9%-+ 871.5 m and e an experimentally determined
- c. of 10.8 kg/cm*. Using Eq. (I-2-15) and this data, we- can find b value of c.for Aa = 90 m'.
1
- c. = 10.8 g.5 = 1.4 kg/cm*
This computed value of c. is almost 3.5 times smaller than that estab-lished experimentally. -
Similar results were obtained in ohr studies of actual machinery foundations. They indiente that, for foundations with large base a eas, Tass.s I-4. Coasytrras Ass Maassass VAI.UES or TER CoErrtCIENr or E!.AST!c Useromu Cournassaos s. or Inses rom Dtarsasav Anne.s or Loastmo
- a. kg/ca' J, m' Ezysrimastal Compated 0.81 14.2 14.2 1.4 10.8 10.6 - -
. 2.0
- 10.2 9.0 4.0 8.0 6.4 - ---
the coeSeient e. changes at s, much lower rate than is indicated by Eq. (I-2-15).
This disagreement between $eory and experimental data can be explained by the apparent dependence of the elastic constants of a soil, i
i particularly the modulus of rigidity, on the normal vertical pressure, as l
discussedin Art.I-1. The properties of muniform soil change with depth. .
WIth an increase in base contact area, a greater depth of soil is affected by the weight of b foundation, and the influence of deeper soillayers on foundation settlement increases.
- s. Valuse of t.% Coefeient of Elastic Uniform Compression for Soils Used is Design Cmputations. The true values of b coeScienta.cf i elastie uniform compression, just as do Young's modulus and Poisson's ratio, depend on s, number of factors whose influence in each separate.
case is very hard to evaluate. Therefore, in construction practice involving the erection of a susciently large number of foundatione for :
machinery subjected to dynamie loads, specialinvestigations of the elastic -
wm---v-,- - - --w.~ r . - - - , e -, ,,,,---n ,,- ,<-e.r-_, -,,-v,~,-o,. --~,,---,,e-- - . v-, ,r- m--e- --,,e-, ,-ee-r----, - - ,- , , -e ae., w
= omme ce sases ne potaeanows.
foundation base area. Figum I-24 shows values of this coe5cient established experimentally for test foundations on loess. - -
The dotted line is plotted on the basis of the assumption that e, changes in inverse proportion to the square root of the foundation base contact aren..
The conclusion can be reached, as it was in relation to the coeScient of elastle uniform compression, that the relationship expressed by Eq. .
(I-4 5) la valid only for foundations with comparatively small. contact areas. It esa be held that for foundations with base areas larger than 10 to 12 m*, e, does not depend on the area.
According to the data of Table I-II, for foundations with square bases
" and for esses in which Poissan's ratio l lies in the range 0.3 to 0.5, the ratio
? c./4 changes within the range 1.22
.{s to 1.30. The followingvalues of the Xs ratio c./c, were established as a re-4: '
sult of umLuents with the same 2 %"#4% test foundation and under a normal 0 I pressure of 0.4 to 0.5 kg/cm*: for -
L*w M[e 8 loess, e./c, = 1.9; for gray fine sand, c./e, = 2.20 to 2.40. Since theoreti-Fro. I.24. Dependesee o( the Meiant cally derived values of the ratio c./4 d naknah 4d M do not, take into account the in-
. ~~
a a.on theloaded us -
fluence of normal pressure on the-magnitude of e., it la advisable in design computations to use values of this ratio close to those established experirnentally. It can be tentatively assumed that c./c =. 2-l-1 Coemelent of Bostie Nonuniform bor of Soil c#
If a foundation is seted upon by a moment with respect to the vertical axis, it wi!1 rotate around this axis. Testa show that the angle of rotation p of afoundation la proportional to the external moment. Therefore we may wnte:
X, = c/.A (I-5-1) whereM. - external moment producing rotation of base of foundation around a vertical axis to angle
- J. = polar moment of inertia of contact base area of foundation ce = coeScient of elastic nonuniform shear In the rotation of a foundation around s. vertical axis, the base of the foundation undergoes nonuniform sliding; hence the term "coe5cient of elastic nonuniform shear" may be applied to the coeScient e,. Experi-ments show that its magnitude is somewhat larger than that of the
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Question No.
321.3 There are several discrepancies in the descriptions of (SRP 11.1, radioactive gaseous effluent release points between the text, 11.3) tables and figures in the Environmental Report and the Safety Analysis Report. For example. Table 3.5-8 (ER). identifies six release points, referencing'ER Figure 3.5-8 as a pictorial guide. In the FSAR, the six release points are designated "HVAC Vent Stacks #1 through #6 " while Table 3.5-8 (ER) gives such
- titles as " Fuel Handling Building Vent." Figure 3.5-8 and -
Figure 1.2-15a (FSAR) show discrepancies in stack height; for example, Vent Stack #4 on Figure 1.2-15a is shown to be 485 feet above mean sea level (ms1) while Figure 3.5-8 (ER) shows the same vent at 502.8 feet above ms1. No release point is shown for the effluent from the main condenser air ejector during nonnal operation -- only the alternate is shown for use during periods of known radioactive release. For all radioactive effluent release points, please provide corrected and consistent
- tables, diagrams and text showing location, designation or title, release point elevaticn, shape and inside dimensions of release point cross section, average effluent temperature and
. either exit velocity or volumetric flow rate. The requested 4 data is needed to adequately assess the meteorological dispersion conditions attending gaseous effluent releases.
Response Figure 3.5-8 of the Environmental Report identifies the location '
of the radiological and toxic release points for WNP-3. The radiological release points have been extracted and shown in Figure 1 (attached). Table 1 (also attached) indicates the designation, elevation, inside diameter, flow rate and temperature of each release point, as well as the various i systems / components exhausted.
HVAC Vent Stacks #1 and #4 handle the exhaust from the RAB Main l Ventilation System, Diesel Generator Area Ventilation System and the Shield Building Annulus Vacuum Maintenance System. Stack #1 additionally handles the Reactor Building Ventilation System, Containment Purge System and the exhaust from the Mechanical Vacuum Pumps (see response to Question 321.2).
Stack #4 also handles the exhaust from the Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System. Stacks #2 and #3 serve the Control Room Ventilation System and the Electrical / Battery Room l Ventilation System.
FSAR Sections 11.3 and 6.4 will be revised to reflect this information as attached. FSAR Figures 9.4.3-1, la, Ib & Ic will be updated by November 1983 to reflect the revised flow rates of 76,200 cfm and 199,500 cfm in the RAB Main Ventilation System.
The ER will also be updated accordingly.
i 4
-- - -. - - - ... _ --- _,...-..----.-- .- - _ ~. . . - , , _ _ . - - - , - - - , .
QUESTION 321.3 .
TABLE 1 POIENTIALLY RADI0 ACTIVE GASEOUS .
EFFLUENT RELEASE POINTS Release Elevation Inside Normal Flow
. Point (ft MSL) Diameter (ft) Rate (cfm) . Temperature (*F) Systems / Components Exhausted 1 501.00 8.50 76,200 (min) 60 (min) RA8 Main Ventilation, DG Area
, (Stack #1) 199,550(max) 115 (max) Ventilation, RB Ventilation, Shield Building i
Annulus Vacuum Maintenance Cnntainment Purge, Mechanical Vacuum Pumps.
- 2 483.33 5.50 4,800 (min) 60 (min) Control Room Ventilation, Electrical (Stack #2) 50,200 (max) 104 (max) Battery Room Ventilation.
4 3 483.33 5.50 4,800(min) 60(min) Control Room Ventilation, Electrical (Stack #3) 50,200 (max) 104 (max) Battery Room Ventilation.
4 502.83 9.17 76,310 (min) 60 (min) RA8 Main Ventilation, DG Area (Stack #4) 228,355 (max) 104 (max) Ventilation, Shield Building, Annulus Vacuum 4 Maintenance, FHB Ventilation.
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FSAR 6.4.4 DESIGN EVALUATION #
. q.
6.4.4.1 Radiological Protection Th3 evaluation of the radiological exposure to the Control Room Cperators is pr:sented in the Control Room accident dose analyses given in Chapter 15, Appendix 15I shows the doses f allowing the design basis accident (LOCA) and demonstrates compliance with GDC 19.
Tcble 6.4-2 is a summary sheet of the Control Roon HVAC System parameters used in the Main Control Room dose analysis.
Figure 6.4-2 is a plot plan showing the plant layout, including the location .
of onsite potential radiological and toxic gas release points with respect to the main control room air intakes.t Elevation and plan drawings showing building dimensions are given in Section 1.2. Potential sources of toxic gas rolesse are identified in Saction 2.2.
A description of systes controls and instruments is provided in Subsection 6.4.6. Redundant Class IE radiation monitors located at the outside air intakes are discussed in Subsection 12.3.4.
6.4.4.2 Toxic Gas' Protection radicachD e re. lease. @nh i s <. eta.med a) Protection f rom Chlorine in subse.e. hon 18 3.'3 Q.
Seismic Category I chlcrine detectors located in each outside air 1 4 intake of the Control Room Area Ventilation System are capable of -
detecting a sinimum level of one ppa chlorine and will provide signals for isolation valves to start closing within five seconds from detection of chlorine. The delay time for automatic isolation of the Control Room isieight seconds. TL'is delay time includes detector response time and valve closure time. The Control Room operator will assure that at least one of the two air cleaning Units is operating in the recirculation mode throughout the accident period.
b) Carbon Dioxide Generation and Oxygen Depletion The f ollowing assiumptions were used f or determining carbon dioxide generation and oxygen depletion of the Control Room during a postulated accident.
- 1) The number of personnel in the Control Room envelope during a toxic gas accident is conservatively selected to be twelve.
- 2) The Control Room HVAC system is in the isolated mode with both outside air intakes closed to prevent infiltration of toxic gas into the Control Room envelope (i.e., valves 3PV-B061SA or 3PV-B161SB and 3PV-B063SA or 3PV-B163SB are closed upon actuation signals addressed in Subsection 6.4.3).
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Figure 6.4-2 shows the location of all gaseous release points along with the clavation, of each release point and release rate.4 For additional discussion on ventilation systems see PSAR Section 9.4 and Subsectica 12.3.3. l2 N ,Rn L p- < - e a_. enas g n .4 - e a - - _.-
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TABLE 11.3.3-7_ I POTENTIALLY RADI0 ACTIVE CASEOUS N4
- EFFLUENT RELEASE POINTS *i Release Elevation Inside Flow Point (ft HSL) Diameter (ft) Rate (cfa) Temperature ("F) Systems / Components Exhausted
(
'l 501.00 8.50 76,200,(min) 60 (min) RAB Hain Ventilation, DC Area 199,550 (max) 115 (max) Ventilation, RB Ventilation, Shield (Stack #1) -
Building Annulus Vacuum Maintenance, containment Purge Hechanical
- Vacuum Pumps.
l 5.50 4,800 (min) 60 (min) Control Room Ventilntfon, Electrical 2 483.33 i (Stack #2) 50,200 (max) 104 (max) nattery Room Ventilation.
3 483.33 5.50 4,800 (min) 60 (min) Control Room Ventilation, Electricalj 50,200 (max) 104 (max) Battery Room Ventilation. (
(Stack #3) 4 502.83 9.17 76,310 (min) 60 (min). RAB Hain Ventilation DG Area (Stack #4) 228,355 (max) 104 (max)
Ventilation, Shield Building Annulus Vacuum Haintenance FHS Ventilation.
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1 25'45W-11 Question No.
410.31 Figures 9.1.2-1, 9.1.2-2'a and 9.1.2-2b are missing frein the FSAR.
(9.1.2) Provide these figures.
Response
.FSAR Figures 9.1.2-T, 9.1.2-2a and 9.1.2-2b are provided in the FSAR after p>.ge 9.T-13a. A copy of these figures is atta'ched to this response for your review. -
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9 Questien No.
450.5 The systems descriptions of the safety-related and non-safety-related portions of the Fuel Handling Ventilation System, Reactor (SRP 's 9.4.2, Auxiliary Building Main Ventilation System and the ECCS Area / Fuel 9.4.3) Handling Building Filtered Exhaust Systems are not providad in sufficient detail for us to complete our review. It is not clear how these three systems interact during an acc.ident. Provide one drawing which shows the interconnection of all these systems and a description of the alignment of the isolation dampers in these systems for both normal operation and for the loss-of-coolant and fuel handling accidents.
Response
Figures 6.5-14, 6.5-15 and 6.5-16 will be added to the WNP-3 FSAR to illustrate how the safety-related ECCS Area / Fuel Handling Building Filtered Exhaust System interacts with the non-safety Reactor Auxiliary Building Main Ventilation System and the Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System for normal operation, loss-of-coolant accident and fuel handling accidents, respectively. The figures, which are schematic diagrams, can be correlated with Table 6.5.1-4 for normal, LOCA and Fuel Handling Buildic.g accident operating modes respectively to assist in the
! description of the alignment of isolation valves and dampers and the air flow paths.
During normal operation, the safety-related ECCS Area / Fuel Handling Building Filtered Exhaust System is shut down and the ECCS Areas receive ventilation and cooling from the non-safety RAB Main Ventilation System. The Fuel Handling Bui,lding receives ventilation and cooling from the non-safety Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System with the safety-related isolation supply and exhaust dampers D-10A-SA, D-108-SB and D-11A-SA, D-llB-SB respectively in the open position. The safety-related exhaust isolation valves 80075A and B10758 remain in the closed position.
It is assumed that an accident occurs without a loss-of-offsite power. During a LOCA the RAB Main Ventilation System safety supply and exhaust isolation valves at the ECCS Areas are closed.
Both trains of ECCS Area / Fuel Handling Building Exhaust System are started and the system safety isolation valves to the ECCS Area are open. The isolation valves B0075A and B107SB to the Fuel Handling Building remain in the closed position to assist the safety system to draw down the ECCS Area anvelope to 0.25 inches water gage below atmospheric pressure.
- -- . .. . . , . .-____.n..,., ,
Respons9 450.5 (Cont'd)
During a fuel handling accident in the Fuel Handling Building, a high radiation signal will close the supply and exhaust safety isolation dampers D-10A-SA, 0-108-SB and D-11A-SA, D-118-SB respectively and automatically start both trains of the ECCS Area / Fuel Handling Building Filtered Exhaust System. The system exhaust isolation valves to the ECCS Areas remain closed and the Fuel Handling Building exhaust isolation valves B007SA and B107SB are opened. The Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System is shut down and the filtered exhaust system draws down the Fuel Handling Building envelope to 0.25 inches water gage below atmospheric pressure.
For a LOCA, the SIAS signal overrides the Fuel Handling Accident Control System and diverts both ECCS Area / Fuel Handling Building Filtered Exhaust System trains to serve the ECCS Area. For further discussion of the ECCS Area / Fuel Handling Building Filtered Exhaust System, refer to FSAR Subsection 6.5.1.2.1.2.
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. . FSAR H:- and 9.4.2-1. Tha ECCS Arar/FHB Filtcred Exhnust System ir.cludes in the 1
~~.. direction of flow, a demister, electric heating coil, prefilter, HEPA prefilter, charcoal adsorber, and HEPA af ter filter f ollowed by a fan.
Le system is designed to provida filtration and adsorption of exhaust air cither from the safety equipment rooms of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)
ECCS Area envelope or from the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) envelope. The ECCS Area envelope contains the following equipment:
a) Iow pressure safety injection pumps b) High pressure safety injectica pumps c) Containeent spray pumps i d) Shutdown cooling heat exhangers o) Auxiliary Feeduster pumps -
f) Valve operating and piping enclosures g) Mechanical penetrations and sampling system Under normal operation, the RAB Main Ventilation System provides the necessary ventilation of the ECCS Area and the Fuel Bandling Building Ventilatioti System provides the necessary ventilation for the FEB envelope. Upon receipt of a
^
Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) both trains of the ECCS Area /FHB Filtered Exhaust System air cleaning units will automatically start and all ECCS Area isolation valves are positioned to allow the fans to draw exhaust air from the ECCS . Area through HEPA and charcoal filters before discharge to
~
6).A the atmosphere. 4 The discharge of the ECCS irea/FHB filtered exhaust fans is provided with two butterfly valves 2PV-3029SA and 2FV-F165SA (or 2PV-B12953 and 2PV-F166SB) erranged in parallel, f ollowed by a check valve. The valves 2PV-F165SA and 2PV-F166SB are electro-hydraulic operated modulating type which control air flow through the air cleaning units.
The ECCS Area / Fuel Handling Building Filtered Exhaust System is automatically anargized from the first load block of the diesel generator to start and reach full operating speed approximately 16 seconds af ter the diesel generate has started .
If the'ECCS Area / Fuel Handling Building Filtered Exhaust System is operating to mitigate the *n consequences of a fuel handling accident, the SIAS will %fedully arrrf 9 ^ ~
t 52 'lig :: iE -2 centr:1 gn- -S divert both trains to serve the ECCS area in less than 20 seconds. Ihe Fuel Bandling Building amergency exhaust isolation valves will remain in the closed position. Table 6.5.1-4 shows the operating and failure positions of all the isolation valves.
The systet:r flow rate and operating characteristics are based on the requirement to evacuate the ECCS Area or FHB to negative 0.25 inches water gage in less than 60 seconds following an SIAS or high radiation signal and 1 maintain this negative pressure relative to the surrounding areas. The exhaust f an of each air cleaning unit is capable of drawing 2,000 cfm through a loaded filter train. -
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Q450.5 .
INSERT A Figures 6.5-14, 6.5-15 and 6.5.16 illustrate the interaction of the ECCS Area /FHB Filtered Exhaust System with the RAB Main Ventilation System and the Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System during the Normal, LOCA and Fuel Handling Accident operating modes respectively.
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WNP-3 12310-3 M8F-3/5 FSAR T ABLE 6.5.1-4 ECCS AREA /Filt FILTERED ext.AUST SYSTEM OPERATIIIC VALVE SCHEDULE Valve or Uni t 9r Area Type of Damper M.
FAIL Served F0nction Operator llerm loca fita ACC. POSITIUM 2PV-502 75A (2PV-Bl2 7S5) CU-5A (CU-58 ) thit laolation ll L. 0 L. 0 L. 0 -
2 PV-80 28SA (2 PV-Bl2 8S B) CU-5A (CU-55) Unit laolation II L. 0 L.0 L.0 -
2PV-80295A (2PV-B129SS) CU-5A (CU-58 ) Flow Ibdulation tras trok -Eli M ptc abel .f/c, lemt .'/t, 2 PV-80175A (2 PV-SI)1S B) ECCS RAS El.135 c /M E Emergency Esh. H C 0 C FAI 2PV-Bd,8S A (2PV-pl)8SB ) ECC . RAB 11.335 neersency Enh. M. C 0 C FAI 2 PV-80 39sA (2 PV-Ble ts s) Mech. Ian RAB.El.362 Emergency Enh. N C 0 C FAI 2PV-B04tSA (2PV-Bl4tS8) EC G . R AS . El .13 5 Ilarm. Esh. Isol. F 0 C 0 C 2 PV-8042SA (2 PV-Bl4 2S 8) Mech. Pea RA5.El.162 IIorm. Rale. loot. F 0 C 0 C 2?v-504)SA (2PW-814 3SB) Mech. ha ras.El.362 storm. Esh. Iso l. P O C 0 C 2 PV-t'344SA (2 PV-Bl4 4S B) ECCS, RAB. El.335 Ilare. Supply tool. F 0 C 0 C 2PV-5045SA (2PV-Bl45SS) EC G , RAS. El.335 IGorm. Supply laol. F 0 C 0 C 2 PV-8046SA (2 PV-814 6S B) Me cts. 47en RAB.El.162 llore. Supply teol. F 0 C 0 C 2PV-804 7S A (2PV-Bl4 7SB ) liach. ha RAB.dl.162 bra. Supply laol. F 0 C 0 C 2PV-8048SA (2 PV-Bl4 8S B) ECCS RAS. El.335 Blore. Exh. leol. F 0 C 0 C 2PV-B154SB (2PV-8054SA) CU-5A (CU-58 ) Decay iket CIg. N C C* C*
e 2PV-Bl5 5'iB (2 PV-8055SA) FAI CU-5A (CU-58 ) Decay Heat Clg. H C C* C* FAI h 2PV-8007SA (2PV-Sl07SB) F HS Amergency Enh. M C C 0 FAI 9 D-104 -S A ( D-105-S B ) FIS 0.A.I. laol. F 0 0 C C D-IIA-SA (D-188-S8) Fils ab ras. Enh. Iso l . F 0 0 C C APV o*IL UAf.a>v*s'nLSC1 s c. ss - u d ( C ' 3 0 ) p)w g,j y j g y gy pg g ,* p- Q Motes: H= Electric Operator - two position F= Pneumatic Operator - two position Eli a El ec t r o-ity dr aulic HUD = Hodulating Il = Iland Operated
. L.O . = tocked Open gg 0= Full Open
\ C= I'ull closed .
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- Valves will be open during IMcay liest Remova l Proces s only .
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t 2538W-12 I
qy Question No. -
450.10 Standard Review Plan Section 15.7.4 requires an evaluation of the (SP.P offsite consequences following a fuel handling accident inside 15.7.4) containment. Provide this analysis, including all the assumptions used, and describe the method of detection and the response times of the ventilation systems. Provide a drawing which identifies the location of the monitors used and the exhaust locations for the ventilation system with respect to the refueling pool.
Resoonse FSAR Subsection 15.7.4 indicates that isolation of the containment will be effected prior to any radioactive releases that can take place following a fuel handling accident inside containment. Tne analysis which is presented provides the justification for tnis conclusion.
'Following a fuel handling accident inside containment, the gaseous '
radioactivity and direct radiation will be detected by the Refueling Pool Ambient Radiation Monitors (RE-HV6701AS/BS, RE-HV67602AS/BS). A description of these monitors is given in Subsection 11.5.2.4. The location of these monitors is shown on Figure 12.3-13a. Upon detect! ion of the radioactivity, the monitors will initiate the closure of the containment isolation g4 valves and shutdown of the containment purge. The isolation time of the valves is 5 seconds. The detection and response time of the radiation monitors does not add any significant time to the overall system response. Consequently, as long as the total travel time of gaseous radioactivity from the refueling pool surface to the first isolation valve is more than the ventilation system isolation time of 5 seconds, any raoicactivity released as a result of the accident will be contained.
The total time for gaseous radioactivity travel consists of transit time between the refueling pool surface and the entrance
-of the exhaust duct plus travel time from the duct entrance to the first containment isolation valve. Tnese times were evaluated as follows:
A. Travel tiine from refueling pool surface to exhaust duct entrance. The equations of fiow for round hoocs is obtained from
" Industrial Ventilation," 8th edition, by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists. Tne velocity profile is given by:
V= 0 (1) 10 x2 +A pd
1 2538W-13
Response
450.10 (Cont'd) where:
l V = centerline velocity at distance x from hood, ft/ min. ;
X = distance outward along axis, ft l (equation is accurate only for limited distance of x, where x is within 1.50, where D is duct diameter)
Q = air flow rate, cfm A = area of hood opening, ft2 D = diameter of round hoods or side of essentially square hood, ft Using Equation (1) above, the average velocity between the hood and any distance x can be obtained as follows:
x V avg. = 1f 0 (2) ax xf10 x2 +A
- 1 *
- V avg. = 0, tan -l x (10A)E )
x (10A)& A /Jxl=0 The intake header is at EL. 445 ft. The water level in the refueling pool is a EL. 423 ft.
The distance between pool surface and intake header is then:
445 ft -423 ft = 22 ft.
X = 1.5D = 1.5 x 36 = 4.5 ft.
Tf l (x is evaluated using the smaller side of the intake header) l Q = 14,000 cfm A = 481n x 36in = 12 ft2 144 Y avg. in the first 45 ft of tne distance from the intake header equals:
V avg = 14,000 , tan -1 4.5 (10 x 10)N 4.5 x (10x12Ve 12 V avg e 378.3 ft/ min Travel time for the first 4.5 ft becomes:
l i
l 2538W-14
Response
450.10 (Cont'd) t 4.5 ft = 4.5 x 60 378.3
= .71 sec Air velocity at 4.5 ft is given by Equation (1) v4.5 ft = 14,000_,
iv x 4.a- + 12
= 65.3 ft/ min Conservatively assuming that velocity beyond 4.5 ft does not decrease, then travel time required for balance of the distance can be calculated as follows:
t22-4.5 ft = 22 - 4.5 x 60 65.3
= 16 sec.
- -~~-
B. Travel time from the intake header to the first isolation
- valve is then calculated.
l Exhaust flow rate = 30,000 cfm Length of pipe between duct entrance and isolation valve = 17 ft.
Duct size = 48 in diameter Average air velocity in duct = 0 pipe A
= 30,000 g x g x gm g Average air velocity in duct = 39.78 ft/sec.
l Therefore, travel time to first isolation valve is:
t duct = 17 l
L = 0.40 sec l Total travel time is then:
t total = 0.71 + 16.0 + 0.40 l
= 17 sec
2538W-15
Response
450.10 (Cont'd)
~
This time of travel of the radioactive gases from the refueling pool surface to the first isolation valve is much greater than the time of 5 seconds required to isolate the containment. Conse-quently, any activity released as a result of a fuel handling ac-cident inside co0tainment will be contained. As a result, no off-site dose consequences need to be evaluated.
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.* -e 2537W-13 Question No.
471.20 Based on information contained in NUREG-0731, " Criteria for Util-ity Management and Technical Competence," it is our position that the radiation protection group should be a separate organization from the chemistry group. Subsection 12.5.1.2 of your FSAR indi-cates your radiation protection and chemistry technicians are com-bined. These technicians report via two technical staffs to the RPM. Chemistry and radiation protection are two separate special-ties. Therefore, a qualified technician must meet the work exper-ience requirement (4.5.2 of ANSI N18.1-1971) for each individual.
Also, it is our position (based on NUREG-0731) that the chemistry staff report to a Technical Manager other than the RPM. Your FSAR should be revised to outline how your planned radiation protection program reflects these positions. ,
Response
The WNP-3 Health Physics / Chemistry organization complies with the characteristics specified in NUREG-0731, para. II.A.1 as follows:
o The organization includes one or more individuals knowledge '
able in each of the fields, o The reporting chain of the radiation protection function is independent of the operations, technical and maintenance.
functions, o The Health Physics / Chemistry Manager has a clear line of authority to the Plant Manager, i
o The organizations activities are clearly defined, o Each functional area is separately supervised, and i
o Qualified backup personnel are available.
. Additionally, the organization presented in NUREG-0731 "is a rep-
- resentative type organization." We do not find the NUREG to pro-f hibit the current WNP-3 organizational structure.
1 It is the Supply System's intent that Health Physics / Chemistry Technicians meet or exceed the ANSI N18.1 qualification criteria.
l It is noted however, that time requirements for the specialties I are not considered to be additive in that many of the knowledge and skill areas are common. Current industry documents, INP0 82-006 Radiological Protection Technician Qualifications and INP0 82-007 Chemistry Technician Qualifications illustrate the
- overlap of the two specialties. Of the 33 training areas for l Radiation Protection, 20 are common to the Chemistry Technician qualification criteria.
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2537W-14 l
d Response (Cont'd) 471.20 1 The combined health physics and chemistry department has been evaluated by the NRC staff in conjunction with the WNP-2 licensing j review. Their findings as stated in NUREG-0892 are as follows: ?
E "WNP-2 has a combined chemistry and health physics department. '8 Although NUREG-0737 suggests that the health physics and chemistry =
departments be separate, the applicant maintains that a combined i health physics and chemistry department will function effectively #
at the WNP-2 plant. The applicant provides an extensive training and qualification program for Health Physics / Chemistry Techni-cians, which include both academic and practical on-th health physics and chemistry department will function effectively at the WNP-2 plant. The applicant provides an extensive training and qualification program for Health Physics / Chemistry Technicians, which include both academic and practical on-the-job training.
This training program encompasses 4 years. This is in compliance with the guidelines of NUREG-0731 and Section 4.5.2 of ANSI N18.1, which specify that technicians have two years experience in their specialty (Health Physics / Chemistry Technicians at WNP-2 will be trained in two specialties). The formal classroom training con-sists of approximately 250 hours0.00289 days <br />0.0694 hours <br />4.133598e-4 weeks <br />9.5125e-5 months <br /> of health physics-related course work and 250 hours0.00289 days <br />0.0694 hours <br />4.133598e-4 weeks <br />9.5125e-5 months <br /> of chemistry / radiochemistry course work. Tech-nicians in training are given written exams in each subject area and these exams are maintained in that person's training file. In addition to academic training, all technicians in training receive training in specific skills in both health physics and chemistry functions. Each technician must demonstrate his/her competence to }
4 p
perform specified skills before being allowed to perform that task 1 independently. E All technicians in training must go through the full 4-year train- I ing program unless they had previous health physics or chemistry technician experience. Experienced technicians are evaluated at ;
time of hire and enter the program at a level commensurate with /
their skills. Upon completion of the training and qualification l program, the technicians are designated as journeyman. At least L one journeyman-level Health Physics / Chemistry Technician will be l on shift at all times. Journeymen Health Physics / Chemistry Tech- i nicians at WNP-2 will perform both chemistry and health physics functions and will spend one week out of every 6 in training /re-training. Based on WNP-2 's comprehensive training and qualifica-tion program, the staff concludes that the Health Physics /Chemis-try Technicians at WNP-2 can satisfactorily perform both the health physics and chemistry functions at the plant."
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2570W-3
-Question No.
480.22 The combustible gas control system should be designed to (6.2.5) facilitate periodic inservi'ce inspections, operability testing and leak rate testing of the system components.
Discuss the design provisions which will permit the above actions.
Response
The Combustible Gas Control System consists of the:
(a) Containment Hydrogen Analyzer (b) Containment Hydrogen Recombiner (c) Containment Hydrogen Purge System
- 1. Design provisions which will permit periodic inservice inspection are as follows:
, (a) All components of the Containment Hydrogen Analyzer System are accessible for periodic inspection and i maintenance as shown on Figure 1.2-10.
(b) All components of the Containment Hydrogen Recombiner System are accessible for periodic
. inspection and maintenance as shown on Figures 1.2-5 and 1.2-11.
i (c) All components of the Containment Hydrogen Purge System are accessible for periodic inspection and maintenance as shown on Figure 1.2-12.
- 2. Design provisions which will permit operability testing
! are as follows:
(a) Preoperational testing of the Combustible Gas Control System is conducted, as discussed in Section 14.2, during the final stages of plant construction prior to initial startup. These tests assure correct functioning of all components such as l
controls, instrumentation, alarm setpoints, fans, pumps, recombiners, piping and valves. System reference characteristics, such as pressure differentials and flow rates, are documented during the preoperational tests and are used as base points l for measurements in subsequent operational tests.
For further details see Subsections 14.2.12.2.28 and 14.1.12.2.32.
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2570W-4 Response .
480.22 (Cont'd) .
(b) The Combustible Gas Control System will be tested periodically to assure operability as specified in
. the Technical Specifications, Chapter 16.
(c) Switches, solenoids, and relays of the Hydrogen Analyzer System are shop energized to check operation. Electrical interlocks are shop checked under simulated operating End/or emergency conditions. Prior to 1,nstallation, the vendor performs a system operation test, using air to demonstrate the operability of the analyzer. The analyzer is operationally tested using calibrated gas samples introduced at the sample selector panel.
For further details see FSAR Subsections 6.2.5.4 and 6.2.5.4.1.
(d) The Hydrogen Recombiner manufacturer's qualification test program includes proof-of-principle tests and full-scale prototype recombiner unit test. In the proof-of-principle test, gas mixtures with varying concentrations of hydrogen (0.15 to 4.4 percent by volume) and oxygen are passed through an electric resistance heater. Chemical analyses of gas samples are taken before and after the heater to verify that essentially 100 percent recombination occurs in all cases. Prototype tests have been performed to verify natural convection flow characteristics of the recombiner, recombiner power requirements as affected by the concentration of steam and hydrogen in the containment atmosphere, recombination effectiveness as affected by heater temperature, and effects of containment sprays with various chemical additives in a simulated post-LOCA environment with varying hydrogen combinations.
The results of qualification tests performed on system components to demonsfected by heater temperature, and effects of containment sprays with various chemical additives in a simulated post-LOCA environment with varying hydrogen combinations.
The results of qualification tests performed on system components to demonstrate functional capability and operability in the containment '
accident environment have been presented in WCAP 7709-L Supplement 5, dated December 1975. The recombiner components satisfy the following type tests prior to acceptance.
2570W-5
. Response 480.22 (Cont'd)
For further information see FSAR Subsections 6.2.5.2.2, 6.2.5.4 and 6.2.5.4.2.
(e) Hydrogen Purge System fans have been shop tested to demonstrate performance, and are rated and listed in accordance with AMCA publication 211. The f an will also be operational tested in place. For further details see FSAR Subsections 6.2.5.4 and 6.2.5.4.3.
- 3. Design provisions which will permit leak rate testing are as follows:
(a) Leak test connections have been provided for Containment Isolation valves for the Containment Hydrogen Analyzer system. For further details see FSAR Figures 6.2-36d and 6.2-36r.
(b) The Hydrogen Recombiner supplied for WNP-Unit 3 is an inside Containment electric recombiner. Leak rate testing does not apply to this equipment.
(c) Leak test connections have been provided for Containment Isolation valves for the Containment Hydrogen Purge System. for further details see FSAR Figure 6.2-36j.
7 .. s, Question No.
640.14 Our review of your test program description disclosed that the operability of several of the systems and components listed in Regulatory Guide 1.68 (Revision 2) Appendix A may not be adequately demonstrated by your initial test program. Expand FSAR 14.2.12 to address the following items:
NOTE: Inclusion of a test description in FSAR Chapter 14 does not necessarily imply that the test becomes subject to FSAR Chapter 17 Quality Assurance Program controls.
Certain tests to be performed prior to fuel loading to verify system operability may be referred to as
" acceptance tests" to distinguish them from "preopertional tests" subject to FSAR Chapter 17 test control.
Preoperational Testing 1
1.e(7) Main condenser hotwell level control system.
1.e(8) Condensate system.
1.e.(10) Feedwater heater and drain systems.
1.e.(12) Condenser air evacuation system.
1.f(1) Station service water system.
. 1.f(2) Cooling towers and associated auxiliaries.
1.h.(10) Ultimate heat sink.
1.j(5) Reactor coolant system leak detection systems.
1.j(6) Loose parts monitoring systems.
1.j(7) Leak. detection systems used to detect failures in ECCS and containment recirculating spray systems located outside containment.
1.j(16) Hotwell level control systems.
1.j(22) Expand the preoperational test phase such that the following instrumentation used to track the course of postulated accidents is tested:
a) containment wide range pressure indicators.
b) containment sump level monitors, c) humidity monitors.
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Qurstion No.
640.14 (Cont'd) 1.j(25) Process computers.
1.k(2) Personnel monitors and radiation survey instrument tests.
1.k(3) Laboratory equipment used to analyze or measure radiation levels and radioactivity concentrations.
1.k(4) HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber efficiency and in-place leak tests. Modify the appropriate test abstracts to ensure that testing in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Post Accident Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants), Positions C.S.a - C.S.d, and Regulatory Guide 1.140 (Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Normal Ventilation Exhaust System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants), Positions C.S.a - C.S.d, is accomplished.
1.1(4) Isolation features for steam generator blowdown.
1.l(7) Modify FSAR Subsection 14.2.12.2.22 (Radioactive Water Systems) to include demonstration of the isolation features for liquid radwaste effluent systems.
1.m(1) Spent fuel pit cooling system tests, including the teting of antisiphon devices, high radiation alarms, and low water level alarms.
f 1.m(3) Operability and leak tests of sectionalizing devices and drains and leak tests of gaskets or bellows in the refueling canal and fuel storage pool.
i 1.m(6) Irradiated fuel pool or building ventilation system tests.
L 1.n(2) Closed loop cooling water system.
1.n(7) Fire protection systems. Modify FSAR Subsection 14.2.12.2.9 (Fire Protection) to include demonstration of fire protection systems in addition to water; e.g., Halon, Carbon Dioxide, AFFF.
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Qurstion N1 640.14 (Cont'd) 1.n(9) Vent and drain systems for contaminated or potentially contaminated systems serving essential areas, e.g., spaces housing diesel generators, essential electrical equipment, and essential pumps.
i 1.n(13) Communications Systems - Expand FSAR Subsection 14.2.12.2.15 (Communications) to include' all connunicaions systems, see requirements given in 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.IV.E, IE Bulletin No. 80-15, Generic Letter 82-33, and Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1 Position C.S.g.(4).
l 1.n(14)(e) Heating, cooling, and ventilation systems serving reactor auxiliary buildings, reactor bulding, and turbine building.
f 1.n(16) Cooling and heating systems for the refueling water l
storage tank.
1.n(18) Heat tracing and freeze protection systems.
Low Power Testing 4.f. Neutron and gamma radiation surveys.
4.j .- Demonstration of the capability of primary containment ventilation system to maintain the containment environment and important components in the containment within design limits with the reactor coolant system at rated temperature and with the minimum availability of ventilation system components for which the system is designed to operate. .
4.n. Demonstration of the operability of control room computer system.
Power Ascension Tests 5.n. Obtain baseline data for reactor coolant system loose parts monitoring system, if not previously done.
l 5.r. Verify by review and evaluation of printouts and/or cathode ray tube (CRT) displays that the control room process computer is receiving correct inputs from process variable, and validate that performance calculations performed by the computer are correct at 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% power.
l
e i Qu stion No.
640.14 (Cont'd) 5.w. Provide a preoperational test description to test containment penetration coolers. On those penetrations where coolers are not used, provide a startup test description that will demonstrate that concrete temperatures surrounding hot penetrations do not exceed design limits.
5.x. Demonstrate adequate beginning-of-life performance margins for auxiliary systems required to support the operation of engineered safety features or to maintain the environment in spaces that house engineered safety features to provide assurance that the engineered safety features will be capable of performing their design functions over the range of design capability of operable components in these auxiliary systems at 50% and 100% power.
5.b.b Conduct neutron and gamma radiation surveys to establish the adequacy of shielding and to identify high radiation zones as defined in 10CRF 20,
" Standards for Protection Against Radiation" at 50%
and 100% power.
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9 Response Tha following addresses items referred to in tha text of NRC Question 640.14.
640.14 Preoperational Testing (14.2.12) 1.e(7) See new test abstract Subsection 14.2.12.9.1 for and " Low Pressure Condensate" which includes main 1.j(16) condenser hotwell level control system.
1.e(8) See new test abstract Subsection 14.2.12.9.2 for "High Pressure Condensate." '
In combination with Subsection 14.2.12.9.1, the condensate system is complete.
1.e(10) See new test abstract Subsections 14.2.12.9.3 and 14.2.12.9.4 titled " Heater Drain Pumps - Initial Operation" and " Heater Drains and Vents".
1.e(12) See new test abstract Subsection 14.2.12.9.5 titled
" Air Evacuation".
1.f(l) See new test abstract Subsection 14.2.12.9.6 titled and " Circulating Water".
1.f(2) 1.h(10) See revised Subsection 14.2.12.2.17 titled
" Component Cooling Water".
1.j(5) There is no one system used for Reactor Coolant Leak Detection. Leakage is monitored and measured by a combination of systems. The leakage monitoring features will be tested within the conduct of their individual system testing.
lj(7) There is no specific leak detection system to monitor ECCS and containment recirculating spray systems located outside containment, this monitoring will be done by the monitoring of various portions of different systems, and those portions will be tested with their respective system.
1.j(6) See new test abstract Subsection 14.2.12.2.39 titled " Loose Parts Monitor".
1.j(16) See item 1.e(7) 1.j(22) Items a, b and c will be tested within the conduct of their individual system lineup testing.
1.j(25) See new test abstract Subsection 14.2.12.2.40 titled Process Computers".
0640.14 Response (Cont'd) 1.k(2) See new Subsection 14.2.12.2.41 " Personnel Monitor and Survey Instruments".
1.k(3) See new Subsection 14.2.12.2.42 " Laboratory Equipment".
1.k(4) HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber efficiency and in-place leak tests are covered by " Test Method" items found in abstract Subsections of 14.2.12.2 Ventilation Systems. Individual test procedures which will be submitted to the NRC at least 60 days prior to performance of the tests will expand the abstracts to " Demonstrate proper operation of filtration systems" to satisfy Reg. Guides 1.52 and 1.140.
1.1(4) See new test abstract Subsection 14.2.12.9.7 titled
" Steam Generator Blowdown".
1.1(7) See revised Subsection 14.2.12.2.22 titled
" Radioactive Waste Systems".
1.m(1) See revised Subsection 14.2.12.2.24 titled " Fuel and Pool Cooling and Cleanup".
1.m(3) 1.m(6) See new test abstract Subsection 14.2.12.2.43 titled " Fuel Builaing HVAC".
l 1.n(2) See revised Subsection 14.2.12.2.9 titled " Fire and Protection".
1.n(7) 1.n(9) Vents and drains for various contaminated or potentially~ contaminated systems will be tested with their respective systems.
l l 1.n(13) See. revised Subsection 14.2.12.2.15 titled l "Consnunications".
1 1.n(14)(e) See new test abstracts 14.2.12.2.44 titled "RAB Main Ventilation",
14.2.12.2.46 titled " Reactor Cavity Cooling Fans",
14.2.12.2.47 titled "CEDM Cooling Fans", and 14.2.12.9.8 titled " Turbine Building Ventilation".
1.n(16) The refueling water storage tank (RWT) has no cooling system and is heated using electric heaters which will be tested using an individual component test.
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0640.14 Response (Cont'd) 1.n(18) Heat tracing and freene protection systems will be tested in conjunctica with the systems protected.
Boric Acid and Caustic systems requiring heat tracing will have heat tracing component tested prior to system solution fill.
Low Power Testing 4.f See CESSAR-F Subsection 14.2.12.4.1.
4.j See new test abstracts Subsection 14.2.12.2.45, 14.2.12.2.46 and 14.2.12.2.47. Testing will be j
done with reactor at full temperature and pressure.
4.n See new test abstract Subsection 14.2.12.2.40.
Power Ascension Tests 5.n See new test abstract Subsection 14.2.12.2.39.
5.r These items will be tested under CESSAR-F Subsection 14.2.12.5.15 test abstract titled "Intercomparison of PPS, Core Protection Calculator (CPC) and PMS Inputs". Power levels at which tests will be performed are Standard CE levels of 20, 50,
. 80 and 100%.
, 5.w Penetration room coolers will be tested under new
- test abstract Subsection 14.2.12.2.44 titled "RAB Main Ventilation", and 14.2.12.5.2 titled
" Containment Penetrations Temperature Survey".
5.x See response to Question 640.8.
l 5.b.b See CESSAR-F Subsection 14.2.12.5.10.
The FSAR will be amended as shown to reflect this response to NRC Question 640.14.
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Qu:stien 640.14 Response to Itemsi.e(7)&l.e(8) 14.2.12.9.1 Low Pressure Condensate 1.0 Objective To demonstrate the proper operation of the low pressure condensate system including hotwell level control.
2.0 Prerequisites 2.1 Construction activities complete..
2.2 Component testing and instrumentation calibration are complete.
.2.3 Support Systems available.
2.4 Test equipment and instrumentation available and calibrated.
3.0 Test Method 3.1 Demonstrate system flow requirements.
3.2 Demonstrate hotwell level control by varying notwell level through its range and observing control valves.
3.3 Demonstrate equipment operation.
3.4 Demonstrate minimum flow requirements.
4.0 Acceptance Criteria 4.1 Verify hotwell level can be maintained automatically.
4.2 Verify system flow ar.; pressure requirements are met.
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Qu:stion 640.14 Response to Item 1.e(8) 14.2.12.9.2 High Pressure Condensate AT-42C 1.0 Objective To demonstrate the proper operation of the high pressure condensate system.
2.0 Prerequisites Same as prereqs on page 1.
3.0 Test Method 3.1 Demonstrate system flow requirements to supply high pressure condensate to the suction of the feedwater pumps.
3.2 Demonstrate minimum flow requirements. ..
4.0 Acceptance Criteria 4.1 Verify system flow and pressure requirements are met.
Question 640.14 Response to Item 1.e(10) 14.2.12.9.3 Heater Drain Pumps - Initial Operation AT-57-1 1.0 Objective To demonstrate the proper operation of the heater drain pumps.
2.0 Prerequisites Same as page 1.
3.0 Test Method 3.1 Demonstrate that the heater drain pumps, through flow .
verification, meet minimum flow characteristics.
3.2 Demonstrate that minimum flow requirements are met by proper operation of minimum flow valves.
4.0 -Acceptance Criteria 4.1 Verify that the heater drain pumps meet design pressure and flow characteristics meet design.
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QuGstion 640.14 Response to Item 1.e(10) 14.2.12.9.4 Heater Drains and Vents AT-57-2 1.0 Objective To demonstrate the proper operation of the feedwater heater level control system.
2.0 Prerequisites Same as page 1.
3.0 Test Method 3.1 Demenstrate feedwater heater level control valves operate to maintain heater levels in their normal band.
3.2 Demonstrate equipment operation.
4.0 Acceptance Criteria 4.1 Verify feedwater heater levels are maintained within their normal band.
Qu:stion 640.14 Response to Item 1.e(12) 14.2.12.9.5 Air Evacuation AT-84 1.0 Objective To demonstrate the capability of the condenser air evacuation system to pull and maintain a condenser vacuum.
2.0 Prerequisites Same as page 1.
3.0 Test Method 3.1 Demonstrate that the air evacuation system will pull and maintain a condenser vacuum with the condenser being in a nornial operating lineup.
3.2 Demonstrate equipment operation.
4.0 Acceptance Criteria 4
4.1 Verify that the air evacuation system will pull and maintain a condenser vacuum under design requirements.
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Question 640.14 Response to Item 1.f(l) & (2) 14.2.12.9.6 Circulating Water AT-26 1.0 Objective To demonstrat' ' e proper operation of the circulating water system including cooling tower.
2.0 Prerequisites Same as page 1.
3.0 Test Method 3.1 Demonstrate equipment operation.
4.0 Acceptance Criteria 4.1 Verify nominal head and flow characteristics for circulating and auxiliary circulating water pumps meet design.
4.2 Verify pump and dischrge valve interlocks function satisfactorily.
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Ei 14.2.12.2.17 COMPONENT COOLING WATER EE 1.0 abiective To demonstrate capability of the Component Cooling Water System to provide coolin ter to the various components H tfa.a4 / /.4j fo ch,tg 2.0 M 1% 4 Prerequisites .Arycul,%gle m is. -
2.1 Construction activities to the various systems requiring Component
- Cooling Water ars complete.
2.2 Component Cooling Water System construction is couplete.
2.3 Component testing and instrueent calibration is complete.
2.4 Test equipeent available and calibrated as required.
3.0 Test Method 3.1 Demonstrate adequate flow to components supplied with Component Cooling Water.
3.2 Demonstrate proper operation of surge tank controls.
. 3.3 Demonstrate that the non-essential header isolates from the
._ essential header on an SIAS actuation.
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-- 4.0 --- Acceptance Critana f 4.1 Verify that Component Cooling Water flows meet design conditions.
4.2 Verify proper surge tank operation.
4.3 Verify that the non-essential header isolates on a SIAS.
l 4.4 Verify that the Component Cooling Water flow to each component meets design conditions.
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Qu;stion 640.14 Response to Item 1.j(6) 14.2.12.2.39 Loose Parts Monitor 1.0 Objective To demonstrate the ability of the loose parts monitor system to detect, alarm and record unusual noises detected within the primary system.
2.0 prerequisites 2.1 Construction activities completed.
2.2 Component testing and instrumentation calibration are complete.
2.3 Test equpment and instrumentation available and calibrated.
3.0 Test Method 3.1 Inject various strength test signals at the sound pickup devices.
3.2 Monitor system response to test signals.
4.0 Acceptance Criteria 4.1 Verify system detects, alarms and records when triggered by sounds of various magnitudes.
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Question 640.14 Response to Item 1.j(25) 14.2.12.2.40 Process Computer
- 1.0 Objective To verify that all system hardware is installed and operating properly, and that all system software responds correctly to external l inputs, and provides proper outputs to the computer peripheral equipment.
2.0 Prerequisites 2.1 All construction activities are complete.
l 2.2 All required test instrumentation is calibrated and available.
2.3 Support systems required for the process computer are available.
i 3.0 Test Method i 3.1 Test programs will be run to verify all required hardware l
functions.
I
! 3.2 Input signals will be applied and outputs verified.
3.3 Computer functional programs shall be verified using proper software and/or control panel inputs.
3.4 Alarm and indication functions shall be verified by the computer system instrumentation and/or the external test measurements.
- 4.0 Acceptance Criteria 4.1 Verify the process computer meets all design requirements.
~ _ - - - - - - - - _ - - _ _ _ - .
Question 640.14 Response to Item 1.k(2) 14.2.12.2.41 Personnel Monitor and Survey Instruments Personnel monitoring and survey instruments are calibrated and operated in accordance with written, reviewed, and approved plant procedures. Where applicable, instruments are calibrated against NBS traceable radiation sources. Each calibrated instrument is tagged with a calibration label showing instrument type, serial number, calibration date and due date, and individual who performed the calibration. Instruments that do not meet the established acceptance criteria are tagged with a non-conforming label that shows the date and identifies the person who removed the instrument from service.
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Question 640.14 Response to Item 1.k(3) 14.2.12.2.42 Laboratory Equipment Laboratory equipment used to analyze for radionuclides is calibrated and operated in accordance with written, reviewed, and approved plant' procedures. Calibrations are performed with NBS-supplied or traceable standards. Laboratory counting equipment capabilities will be verified by successfully analyzing the NRC-supplied Laboratory Qualification Standards.
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FSAR hsmsIk(&
14.2.12.2.22 RADIOACTIVE WASTE SYSTEMS .
1.0 (bjeetive To demonstrate proper oper ation of the Solid and Liquid Waste and Floor Drain Systems. .
j 2.0 Pr erequisites 1
[
2.1 Construction activities couplete. l c
l 2.2 Component testing and instrissentation calibration are completed. ;
i i 2.3 Support systems available.
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! 2.4 Test equipment and instrismentation available and calibrated.
3.0 Te st Method 3.1 Demonserrti system flow paths. ,
3.2 Demonstrate manual and automatic controls.
l 3.3 Demonstrate e pment operation.
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4.0 Acceptance Critari ,
__4.1. Verify flow paths. /
ee.
, 4.2 Verify equipment operation meets design specifications, to the
! extent practicable.
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l Qu;stion 640.14 I Response to Itec1.l(14) 14.2.12.9.7 Process Computer
.1 0 objective To verify that all system hardware is installed and operating properly, and that all system software responds correctly to external inputs, and provides proper outputs to the computer peripheral equipment.
2.0 Prerequisites 2.1 All construction activities are complete.
2.2 All required test instrumentation is calibrated and available.
2.3 Support systems required for the process computer are available.
3.0 Test Method 3.1 Test programs will be run to verify all required hardware functions.
3.2 Input signals will be applied and outputs verified.
3.3 Comp. uter functional programs shall be verified using proper software and/or control panel inputs.
3.4 Alarm and indication functions shall be verified by the computer system instrumentation and/or the external test measurements.
4.0 Acceptance Criteria 4.1 Verify the process computer meets all design requirements.
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FSAR N ll%ib 4 I60 (3) l
-- - 4 14.2 12.2.24 FUEL POOL COOLING AND CLEANUP
=-
10 objective To demonstrate the ability of the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System to. satisfy performance requirementst -
l 2.0 Prerequisites 21 Construction is complete.
2.2 Instrument calibration and component testing is completed.
23 Test equipment and instrumentation available and calibrated. -
2.4 Support systems available.
2.5 Spent Fuel Pool and Reactor Vessel Cavity leak testing j completed. .
\
l 30 Test Meth .d
! 31' Demonstrate system flow paths. ;
3.2 Demonstrate equipment operatione,.cb / M/s.? 4 .eafrAhhA4/s Ael'a AW l
5 3 (%g AIAS %d W wa k r (u, i c. /A.s .
4.0 Acceptance Criteria i \
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4 Verify system flow paths. Q j
4.2 Verify system equipment meets design specifications.
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- - e Question 640.14 Response to Item 1.m(6) 14.2.12.2.43 FUEL BUILDING HVAC (PT-615) 1.0 Objective To demonstrate the operation of the fuel building HVAC system.
2.0 Prerequisites 2.1 Construction is complete.
2.2 Component testing and instrumentation calibration is complete.
2.3 Test equipment and instrumentation is available and properly calibrated.
2.4 Support systems available.
'3.0 Test Method 3.1 Demonstrate automatic operation of system on a high activity level.
3.2 Demonstrate equipment operation.
3.3 Perform filter testing.
i 4.0 Acceptance Criteria L
Verify system isolates and goes into a recirculation mode on a 4.1 high activity level.
4.2 Verify system maintains proper design pressures within the fuel building.
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.. t.hw in (2.) Allh h 14.2.'12.2.9 FIRE PROTECTION F=5 P 1.0 objective To demonstrate proper operation of the Fire Protection System in the ,
detection, containment and extinguishing of ~ fires in safety related
- e areas of the Plant. - l 2.0 Prerequisites
,- 2.1 Construction is completed. i
' l 2.2 Component testing and instrumentation calibration is complete.
2.3 Test equipment and instrumentation available and properly calibrated. l l 2.4 Support systems available. l
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- 3. 0- Test Method .
l 3.1 Demonstrate the proper operation of the Fire Detection System. - 1 l
3.2 Demonstrate the proper operation of the Fire Water System.
l 3.3 Demonstrate various flow paths. , ,
' l l 3.4 Demonstrate operation of alarms, indicating instruments and !
- status lights. I
! i 08 5 fYsh. Cfrecb% f ck;,,( Fa'/t. ,piclm.W S/ S fws 4.0 Acceptance Critena Verify that the system operates as designed.
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[htv^ l r. (l'h 14.2.12.2.15 COMMUNICATIONS
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1.0 objective '
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demonstrate ti_. ;_ ni:::i_ . ' . . .. v u.i .. ._ _ : :: tr_
-meseteueedr-2.0 Prerequisites 2.1 Construction on the Communications System is complete.
2.2 Plant equipment that contributes to ambient noise, to the extent prac,ticable, is operating.
3.0 Tese Method 3.1 Demonstrate the proper operations of the plant paging, phone, sound powered and fueling / refueling systems.
3.2 Demonstrate the proper operation of the fire and evacuation alazas.
3.3 Demonstrate the proper operation of two-way radio and microwave l systems.
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l 4.0 Acceptance Criteria y q.1 Veridy that all phone and alarm systems operate correctly. ,
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14.2-41 1
Qu;stion 640.14 Response to Item 1.n(14)(e) 14.2.12.2.44 RAB MAIN VENTILATION (PT-47) 1.0 Objective To demonstrate the operation of the RAB Main Ventilation System.
2.0 Prerequisites 2.1 Construction is complete.
2.2 System testing and instrument calibration is complete.
2.3 Support systems are available.
2.4 Test equipment is properly calibrated and available.
3.0 Test Method 3.1 Demonstrate operation of equipment.
3.2 Demonstrate operation of automatic operations.
3.3 Perform filter testing.
4.0 Acceptance' Criteria 4.1 Verify proper operation of equipment.
4.2 Verify design flow rates.
4.3 Verify filter effectiveness.
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4.5 Verify the system will maintain equipment at design temperature.
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o Qu;stion 640.14 Response to Item 4.j and 1.n(14)(e) 14.2.12.2.45 CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATI'ON FANS 1.0 Objective To demonstrate the Containment Recirculation units can maintain the containment atmosphere within design specification.
2.0 Prerequisites 2.1 Construction is complete.
2.2 Component testing and instrument calibration is complete.
2.3 Test equipment and instrumentation available and properly calibrated.
2.4 Support systems are available.
2.5 The reactor is at full tenperature and pressure.
3.0 Test Method 3.1 Demonstrate the system can maintain containment atmospheric temperature within design limits with minimum required equipment.
4.0 Acceptance' Criteria 4.1 Verify system will maintain containment atmospheric design limits.
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i Question 640.14 l Response to i Item 4.j and 1.n(14)(e) l 14.2.12.2.46 REACTOR CAVITY COOLING FANS 1.0 Objective To demonstrate the Reactor Cavity Cooling Fans can maintain equipment temperatures within the design limits.
2 2.0 Prerequisites 2.1 Construction is complete.
2.2 Component testing and instrument calibration is complete.
2.3 Test equipment and instrumentation available and calibrated.
2.4 Support systems are available.
2.5 The reactor is at full temperature and pressure.
3.0 Test Method 3.1 Demonstrate the system can maintain equipment cooled by the Reactor Cavity Cooling Fans within design temperature limits.
4.0 Acceptance Criteria 4.1 Verify the system can maintain the design temperature for the designated equipment that it cools with minimum design fans operating.
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9 t- e Question 640.14
' Response to Item 4.j and 1.n(14)(e) 14.2.12.2.47 CEDM COOLING FANS 1.0 Objective To demonstrate that the CEDM Cooling Fans will maintain the CEDM's within design temperature limits.
2.0 Prerequisites 2.1 Construction is complete.
2.2 Component testing and instrumentation calibration is complete. .
2.3 Test equipment and instrumentation is available and calibrated.
2.4 Support systems are available.
2.5 The reactor is at full temperature and pressure.
3.0 Test Methed, 3.1 Demonstrate the CEDM Cooling Fans can maintain the CEDM's within design temperature limits.
4.0 Acceptance Criteria 4.1 Verify the system can maintain the CEDM's within design temperature limits with minimum design CEDM fans operating.
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f e Question 640.14 Response to Item 4.n(14)(e) 14.2.12.9.8 TURBINE BUILDING VENTILATION 1.0 Objective To demonstrate the Turbine Building ventilation system.
2.0 Prerequisites 2.1 Construction is :omplete.
2.2 Component testing and instrurrentation calibration is complete.
2.3 Test equipment and instrumentation is available and properly calibrated.
2.4 Support systems are available.
3.0 Test Method 3.1 Demonstrate equipment operation.
3.2 Demonstrate flow rates.
4.0 Acceptance Criteria 4.1 Verify design flow rates.
4.2 Verify filtration systems.
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Question 640.14 ,
Responte to '
Item 5.w :
14.2.12.5.2 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS TEMPERATURE SURVEY _
1.0 Objective To ensure that containment penetration concrete temperatures do not exceed maximum allowable design temperature.
2.0 Prerequisites 2.1 Reactor power is stable at desired level, i
l 2.2 Test equipment is properly installed and calibrated.
3.0 Test Method 3.1 Temperatures will be taken next to containment penetrations that have hot process lines running through them.
4.0 Acceptance Criteria 4.1 Danonstrate tilat penetration concrete temperature does not
, exceed maximum allowable design temperature.
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. .a Qu:stion No.
640.15 To help facilitate approval of changes to the Initial Test (14.2.12) Program:
- 1. For portions of any preoperational tests (including review and approval of test results) which are intended to be conducted after fuel loading: (1) list each test; (2) state what portions of each test will be delayed until after fuel loading; (3) provide technical justification for delaying these portions; and (4) state when each test will be completed.
- 2. List and provide technical justification for any tests or portions of tests described in FSAR Chapter 14 which you believe should be excepted from the license condition
, requiring prior NRC notification of major test changes to tests intended to verify the proper design, construction, i or performance of systems, structures, or components important to safety (fulfill GDC functions and/or are sub. ject to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B QA requirements).
Response 1. By definition, as found in Subsection 14.2.1.2(b),
preoperational tests are conducted prior to fuel loading.
No tests within the preoperational test schedule are intended to be delayed for conduct beyond fuel loading.
- 2. There are no tests or portions of tests described in FSAR Chapter 14 which are believed to require exception "from a
' license condition requiring prior NRC notification of major test changes to tests intended to verify the proper design, construction, or performance of systems, structures or components important to safety".
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