Text

Midland Plant Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Reliability Analysis.
	ML19341C172
Person / Time
Site:	Midland
Issue date:	10/31/1980
From:	Dennis Bley, Cate C, Stillwell D; PLG, INC. (FORMERLY PICKARD, LOWE & GARRICK, INC.)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML19341C170	List: ML19341C169; ML19341C172;
References
	PLG-0147, PLG-147, NUDOCS 8103020220
	Download: ML19341C172 (225)
	v • d • e

I PLG-0147 I

I MIDLAND PLANT AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM l

'l RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 5

I by Dennis C. Bley Carroll L. Cate Daniel W. Stillwell B. John Garrick lI N

!I Prepared for i CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY

! Jackson, Michigan October,1980 I

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PICKARD, LOWE AND GARRICK,INC.

CONSULTANTS - NUCLEAR POWER

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS h The Midland Plant Auxiliary Feedwater System Analysis benefited from Il:m the expertise of the Consumets Power Company (CPCo) engineering staff, the Midland Plant operations and mainte. nance staff s, and the Bechtel, Ann Arbor, engineering staff. They reviewed the AFWS model and provided detailed information on the plant hardware and practices.

The authors are especially grateful to Dennis Budzik of CPCo who pro-vided strong overall direction to the project. John Kindinger of CPCo provided f requent guidance and technical information throughout the

study. At Midland Plant, Jim Alderink coordinated our plant visit, pro-vided important information about the actual field installation, and reviewed our early work. Many others gave significant help at key points in the study.

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E TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page 1 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 1

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SUMMARY

2 3 INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE 12 3.1 Background 12 3.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System Description 17 3.2.1 System Function 17 3.2.2 Basic AFW System 17 0 3.2.3 Double Crossover Design 21 3.2.4 Three Pump Design 22 3.2.5 Electric Power and Other Babcock 23 and Wilcox Designs 3.3 Scope 23 4 METHODOLOGY 28 5 SYSTEM ANALYSIS 32 5.1 System Models 32 5.1.1 System Fault Tree 32 5.1.2 Computer Programs 32 y 5.1.3 Data 33 5.2 Random Failures 36 5.3 Test and Maintenance 36 -

5.3.1 Testing 36 ,

5.3.2 Maintenance 66 5.4 Human Interaction 69 5.4.1 Human Interaction / Recoverable Failures 69 5.4.2 Human Error / Testing 69 5.4.3 Human Error--Common Cause 69 5.5 Common Cause Analysis 70 5.5.1 The First Criterion 71 5.5.2 The Second Criterion 71 5.5.3 Results of Common Cause Analysis 77 5.6 Event Tree Analysis 79 6 RESULTS 95 6.1 Results of System Analysis 95 6.2 Results of Event Tree Analysis 115 7 REFERENCES 117 E

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l TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Section Page APPENDIX A Midland Auxiliary Feedwater System Fault Tree A-1 Base Case Design APPENDIX B: Midland Auxiliary Feedwater System Fault Tree B-1 Double Crossover Design APPENDIX C: Midland Auxiliary Feedwater System Fault Tree C-1 Three Pump Design APPENDIX Dr Midland Auxiliary Feedwater System D-1 Component Data Sheets I

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LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES Figure Page 1 Auxiliary Feedwater System Conceptual Block Diagram 3 2 Comparison of Reliability (NRC Data) of AFWAS Designs 6 W in Plants Using the B&W NSSS 3 Block Diagrams of Three Alternative Pump Configuration 9 Designs for the Midland Plant A W System 4 Midland Auxiliary Feedwater System - Base Case 13 5 Midland Auxiliary Feedwater System - Double Crossover 14 Uf 6 Midland Auxiliary Feedwater Syr, tem - Three Pump 15 .J 7 Simplified Core Cooling Eve".t ' free 16 $

8 Boundary of Analysis 27 9 Simplified Fault Tree 29 10 Cause Tree for the Midland Auxilia'y Feedwater System 30 11 Abbreviated Version of Midland Auxiliary Feedwater 92 Event Tree Given an Actuation Sigral 12 Midland Auxiliary Feedwater Eysnt Tree Given an Actuation 94 Signal 13 Conditional Unavailability of the Midland Plant AFWS 99 Table 1 Summary of Results - Zonditional Unavailabilities of 4 the Midland AFWS - Doucle Crossover (Plant Specific Data)/ Double Crossover (NRC Data) 2 Summary of Results - Conditional Unavailabilities of 10 the Midland AWS - Double Crossover / Base Case 3 Summary of Results - Conditional Unavailabilities of 11 g the Midland AFWS - Double Crossover /Three Pump l 4 AW Power Supplies 24 l

5 Summary of Major Characteristics of B&W Operating Plant 26 AFW Systems 6 NRC Failure Data 34 7 Fault Tree Component List and Failure Mode 37 8 De'ninant Random Failure Cutsets , 54 9 Pump Train Unavailability Due to Test and Maintenance 68 10 Susceptibility Codes 72 g 11 Generic Components and Their Sensitivities to Failure 73 12 Physical Barrier Information 74 13 Common Cause Candidates in Physical Location CIEV 78 14 Common Cause Candidates 80 l

15 Summary cf Results - Conditional Unavailabilities of 96 l the Midland AWS - Double Crossover (Plant Specific l

Data)/ Double Crossover (NRC Data) 16 Summary of Results - Conditional Unavailabilities of 97 the Midland AWS - Double Crossover / Base Case 17

Summary of Results - Conditional Unavailabilities of 98 the Midland A WS - Double Crossover /Three Pump l

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3 LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES (continued)

Table Page

.g 18 Dominant Contributors to Conditional Unavailability 100

} Loss of Main Feedwater - Double Crossover (NRC Data) 19 Dominant Contributors to Conditional Unavailability 101 Loss of Main Feedwater Due to Loss of Offsite Power -

Double Crossover (NRC Data) 20 Dominant Contributors to Conditional Unavailability 102 n

3 21 Loss of All AC - Double Crossover (NRC Data)

Dominant Contributors to Conditional Unavailability 103

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Loss of Main Feedwater - Double Crossover (Plant-Specific Data) 22 Dominant Contributors to Conditional Unavailability 104 Loss of Main Feedwater Due to Loss of Offsite Power -

Double Crossover (Plant-Specific Data) i 23 Dominant Contributors to Conditional Unavailability 105 Loss of All AC - Double Crossover (Plant-Specific Data) 24 Dominant Contributors to Conditional Unavailability 106 I 25 Loss of Main Feedwater - Base Case (Plant-Specific Data)

Dominant Contributors to Conditional Unavailability 107 Loss of Main Feedwater Due to Loss of Offsite Power -

Base Case (Plant-Specific Data) u 26 Dominant Contributors to Conditional Unavailability 108 Loss of All AC - Base Case (Plant-Specific Data)

I 27 Dominant Contributors to Conditional Unavailability 109 Loss of Main Feedwater - Three Pump (Plant-Specific Data)

, 28 Dominant Contributors to Conditional Unavailability 111 jJ Loss of Main Feedwater Due to Loss of Offsite Power -

Three Pump (Plant-Specific Data)

= 29 Dominant Contributors to Conditional Unavailability 113 Loss of All AC - Three Pump (Plant-Specific Data) 1 5

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1. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE A study was made of the reliability of the Midland Auxiliary Feed-water System for Consumers Power Company (CPCo) of Jackson, Michigan.

The purpose of the study was to e Provide a thorough and comprehendible assessment of the overall reliability of the system.

e Identify important contributors to unreliability.

e Compare three alternative pump configuration designs.

.O A principal aim of the study was to use the most applicable data in the analysis with due regard for the true range of uncertainty in this infor-mation. In addition, to make comparisons with NRC analyses more directly visible, calculations using the standard NRC data base have been included.

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SUMMARY

The emergency function of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AWS) is to provide heat removal for the primary system when the main feedwater sys-tem is not available. A conceptual block diagram of the AFWS is shown in Figure 1. Water is supplied through two pumps to each of two steam gen-erators. The AFWS must provide this function during small Loss of Coo-lant Accidents (LOCA) as well as following transients that lead to a loss of main feedwater. The AWS provit*ns initial cooling to prevent over-pressurization of the primary system and has sufficient preferred water supply to maintain hot standby conditions for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months followed by a cool-down to 320 F. The system is also used during normal plant startup, shutdown, and hot standby conditions. Requirements for success under g emergency conditions are that flow from a least one pump be delivered to at least one steam generator immediately following initial demand.

The fault tree analysis determ. es the system hardware minimal cut-sets, i.e., the smallest groups of combined component failure modes that lead to system failure. It further catalogs the causes for specific com-ponent failure modes and evaluates their likelihood of occurrence. The causes considered include:

e Random independent failures e Test and maintenance e Human error e Common cause failn ?s G

Two sets of data are used in separate quantifications. The NRC point estimate data from NUREG-0611Ill is identified here as NRC Data. Data most applicable to the Midland AFWS that includes uncertainty has been identified as Plant-Specific Data. The three specific cases described in NUREG-0611 are analyzed:

1. LMFW - transient initiated by interruption of the main feedwater system (reactor trip occurs) and offsite AC power remains avail-able.

2. LMFW/ LOOP - transient initiated by loss of offsite AC power and reactor trip occurs (main feedwater system is interrupted by the loss of offsite power). Onsite emergency AC power sources are treated probabilistically.

3. LMFW/only DC power available - transient is initiated as in item 2 above, but onsite energency AC power sources are unavail-able.

Note that these cases lead to conditional unavailability calculations that are coupled with specific states of electric power. Results are displayed in Table 1 for each of the three cases and each data set.

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TABLE 1.

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS CONDITIONAL

UNAVAILABILITIES** OF THE MIDLAND AFWS toss of Main toss of Main toss of Main reedwater reedwater reedwater Due to Loss and Loss of All AC Power of Offsite Power Contributors to Unavailability Double Double Double Double Double Double Crossover Crossover Crossover Crossover Crossover Crossover O (Plant (Plant (Plant Specific (NRC Data) Specific (NRC Data) Specific (NRC Data)

Data) Data) Data)

Random failures 7.0 E-5+ 3.5 E-5 6.6 E-4 2.5 E-4 1.7 E-2 6.4 E-3 (1.1 E-6) (8.4 E-6) (5.3 E-4)

Test and maintenance and 1.2 E-4 6.9 E-5 3.4 E-4 2.8 E-4 5.9 E-3 5.9 E-3 random system failures (3.9 E-8) (6.5 E-7) (1.9 E-4)

Human error (test--failure to 6.3 E-6 3.7 E-6 1.8 E-5 1.5 E-5 3.1 E-4 3.1 E-4 close full flow test valve) (1.1 E-10) (2.0 E-9) (5.3 E-7)

Common cause (full flow 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 e.4 E-6 test valve open af ter test) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10)

Other E E r. E E E System Total Mean 2.0 E-4 1.0 E-3 2.3 E-2 Variance 4.7 E-8 6.0 E-6 6.7 E-4 5th 3.4 E-5 4.1 E-5 3.5 E-3 $

95th 5.8 E-4 3.8 E-3 6.8 E-2 Median 1.4 E-4 1.2 E-4 4.0 E-4 5.5 E-4 1.6 E-2 1.3 E-2 l

The total unavailabilities as well as the individual contributions given in this table are not actual system unavailabilities but are system characteristics conditional on specific states of electric power as follows:

LMrwr Offsite AC power is continuously available.

, tarW/IDOP: Of f site AC power is unavailable--diesel generators may or may not accept load.

l IMrW/!oss of All AC: All AC power is unavailable; DC power is available.

- Unavailability is the fraction of times the system will not perform its function when required.

+7.0 E-5 read 7.0 x 10-5 l ( ) Variance - describes the spread of the results about the mean.

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a 9 Results using the NRC Data for each of the three cases are plotted in Figure 2 along with similar results[2] for other Babcock and Wilcox 5 (B&W) plants. Midland appears to be one of the better performing (B&W) auxiliary feedwater systems.

Three alternative pump configurati.on designs are analyzed. Their g block diagrams are shown in Figure 3:

3a. Double Crossover (DCO) - one 100% motor-driven pump and one 1004 turbine-driven pump. This option has been selected by CPCo for installation at Midland. It permits each pump to supply either or both steam generators. Each crossover path is controlled by 3 the same electrical supply as the associated pump.

O 3b. Base Case - one 100% motor-driven pump and one 100% turbine-driven pump. This option was the original Midland design. It permits each pump to supply either or both steam generators.

3c. Three Pump - two 50% motor-driven pumps and one 1004 turbine-driven pump. This design is similar to that used at some other (B&W) plants and is included for comparison purposes only.

NRC data was used only in the DCO analysis (Table 1) . Tables 2 and 3 present the results using plant-specific data for comparisons of the Base Case and the Three Pump designs against the DCO. The Base Case and the DCO have nearly identical reliability results. The DCO is clearly better than the Three Pump design analyzed.

It is possible to imagine modifications in hardware and procedures that have potential to reduce the impact of the dominant contributors.

. Some examples are given in Chapter 6. However, the system is already very reliable, i.e., no serious deficiencies have been identified. No changes should be made without a careful evaluation of all costs and ben-efits including the chance that a change aimed at improving reliability could actually degrade it.

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I FIGURE 2. COMPARISON OF FILIABILITY (NRC DATA) OF AfWAS DESIGNS IN PLMITS USING T!!E B&W NSSS (This figure, except for Midland, was taken from Reference 2.)

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I' FIGURE 2. COMPARISON OF RELIABILITY (NRC DATA) OF AFWAS DESIGNS IN Pill 3TS USI!!G THE B&W NSSS

'This figure, except for Midland, was taken from Reference 2.)

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TABLE 2.

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS CONDITIONAL

UNAVfsILABILITIES** OF Tile MIDLAtm AFWS (Plant Specific Data)

Loss of Main toss of Main loss of Main reedwater Feedwater Feedwater Due to Loss and toss of All AC Power of Offsite Power contributors to Unavailability Double Base Double Base Double Base Crossover Case Crossover Case Crossover Case O Random fatlures 7.0 E-5' 7.3 E-5 6.6 E-4 6.6 E-4 1.7 E-2 1.6 E-2

().1 E-8) (1.9 E-8) (8.4 E-6) (3.3 E-6) (5.3 E-4) (7.5 E-3)

Test and maintenance and 1.2 E-4 1.2 E-4 3.4 E-4 3.4 E-4 5.9 E-3 5.9 E-3 random system f ailures (3.9 E-8) (1.2 E-7) (6.5 E-7) (3.2 E-7) (1.9 E-4) (1.9 E-4)

Human error (test-f ailure to 6.3 E-6 6.4 E-6 1.8 E-5 1.0 E-5 3.1 E-4 3.1 E-4 close full flow test valve) (1.1 E-10) (3.4 E-10) (2.0 E-9) (9.2 E-10) (5.3 E-7) (5.3 E-6)

Common cause (full flow 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 test valve open after test) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10)

Other E E E E E E System total W Mean 2.0 E-4 2.1 E-4 1.0 E-3 1.0 E-3 2.3 E-2 2.2 E-2 Var iance 4.7 E-8 1.1 E-7 6.0 E-6 2.9 E-6 6.7 E-4 8.8 E-4 Sch 3.4 E-5 1.7 E-5 4.1 E-3 7.9 E-5 3.5 E-3 2.5 E-3 95th 5.8 E-4 7.0 E-4 3.8 E-3 3.5 E-3 6.8 E-2 7.0 E-2 Median 1.4 E-4 1.1 E-4 4.0 E-4 5.3 E-4 1.6 E-2 1.3 E-2 4

The total unava11 abilities as well as the individual contributions given in this table are not actual system .

unava11 abilities but are system enaracteristics conditional on specific states of electric power as follows:

utrw Offsite AC power is continuously available.

Duv/IDOP: Of f site AC power is unavailable--diesel generators may cr may not accept load.

DUW/ loss of All ACs All AC power is unavailables DC power is available.

" unavailability is the fraction of times the system will not perform its function when required.

+7.0 E-5 read 7.0 a 10-5, O

( ) Variance - describes the spread of the results about the mean.

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1 TABLE 3.

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS CONDITIONAL

UNAVAILABILITIES** OF THE MIDLAND AFWS (Plant Specific Cata)

Loss of Main toss of Main toss of Main Feedwater Feedwater Feedwater Due to loss and foss of All AC Power of Offsite Power Contributors to Unavailability Three Pump

C er Three Pump Th;ee Pump Random failures 7.0 E-5+ 8.1 E-4 6.6 E-4 2.0 E-3 1.7 E-2 1.7 E-2 (1.1 E-8) (1.4 E-6) (8.4 E-6) (1.1 E-5) (5.3 E-4) (3.6 E-5)

Test and maintenance and 1.2 E-d 4.9 E-4 3.4 E-4 9.2 E-4 5.9 E-3 5.9 E-3 S random system f ailures Naman error (test--failure to (3.9 R-Si (1.0 E-7) (6.5 E-7) (2.9 E-6) (1.9 E-4) (1.9 E-4) 6.3 E-6 2.6 E-5 1.0 E-5 4.9 E-5 3.1 E-4 3.1 E-4 close full flow test valve) (1.1 E-10) (2.0 E-9) (2.0 E-9) (8.8 E-9) (5.3 E-7) (5.3 E-7)

, Common cause (full flow 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 test valve open after test) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10)

Other g g g g g g W System Tot.i Mean 2.0 E-4 1.3 E-3 1.0 E-3 3.0 E-3 2.3 E-2 2.3 E-2 Variance 4.7 E-8 2.0 E-6 6.0 E-6 1.3 E-5 6.7 E-4 2.0 E-4 5th 3.4 E-5 2.2 E-4 4.1 E-5 4.0 E-4 3.5 E-3 8.0 E-3 95tn 5.8 E-4 3.8 E-3 3.8 E-3 9.0 E-3 6.8 E-2 5.0 E-2 Median 1.4 E-4 9.2 E-4 4.0 5-4 1.9 E-3 1.6 E-2 2.0 E-2 1 *The total unavailabilities as well as the individual contributions given in this table are not actual system unavailabilities but are system characteristics conditional on specific states of electric power as follows:

LMrd: Offsite AC power is continuously available.

LMW/t40P: Of fsite AC Tower is unavailable--diesel generators may or may not accept load.

IJ4FW/ Loss of All AC: All AC power is unavailabler DC power is available.

" Unavailability is the f raction of times the system w111 not perform its function when required.

+7.0 E-5 read 7.0 x 10*5,

) Variance - describes ther spread of the results about the mean.

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3. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

3.1 BACKGROUND

The purpos_ af this study is to analyze the reliability of three alternative Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFWS) designs for the Midland Nuclear St;cion. A diagram of each alternative system design is drawn and is presented here as Base Case, Figure 4; Double Crossover, Figure 5; and Three Pump, Figure 6. The auxiliary feedwater system supp!ies feed-water to the steam generators during normal plant startup, shutdown, and hot standby conditions. It also serves an important emergency function by providing cooling water to remove decay heat from the core. To place the AWS emergency function in perspective, we consider what options for g cooling are available to a core following cxtended high power opera- g tions. The simplified core cooling ever.t tree of Figure 7 provides a framework for discussion. Following an initiating event that could lead g

to loss of main feedwater (turbine trip, reactor trip, LOCA, etc.), core heat can be removed via the primary coolant system in two ways: through the steam ger.erators (steam production in the secondary side) or directly by reactor coolant blowing down through a valve or rupture. If a LOCA is large enough to remove the decry heat, sufficient makeup flow must be g delivered to the reactor; to avoid core uncovery. The design mode of heat g removal is by steam generator cooling (steam reliefs or power operated atmospheric vents). For continued success of this mode, feedwater must be supplied by the AWS or h. restoring main feedwater. Even if all feedwater supplies fail, successful core cooling can be provided by primary bleed and feed. Recent analyses show that high pressure injec-tion combined with the opening of power operated relief valves can supply g sufficient bleed and feed cooling to prevent core damage.I3) For cases 5 that involve loss of all AC power, only the feed systems can provide g cooling since the makeup pumps cannot run. In this report we address only tha reliability of the AP'O.

The fault tree analysis determines the system hardware minimal cut-sets, i.e., the smallest groups of combined component failure modes that lead to system failure. We further catalog the causes for specific com-ponent failure modes and evaluate their likelihood of occurrence. The g causes considered include e Random independent failures e Test and maintenance e Human error e Common cause failures Results are quantified using plant specific data for each case analyzed, and once using NRC generic point value data taken from NUREG-0611Ill as applied to the double crossover design. W I

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YES 1 SIXIESSFUL CORE COOLING u

if NO 2 SUCCESSFUL CORE COOLING BLTI MUST REGAIN MAKEUP

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FIGURE 7. SIMPLIFIED CORE COOLING EVENT TREE 4 . aus n m ,pgs aug spas g , sus eeeamm.ya q .m g. m pg

3 I

In the report, conditional unavailability is evaluated for the three specific electric power conditions considered by the NRC in NUREG-0611:

e Of fsite AC available e No offsite AC available e No AC available.

Note that these cases lead to conditional unavailability calculations that are coupled with specific states of electric power.

3.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM DESCRIPTION O

3.2.1 System Function The auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system (4-10] supplies feedwater to the steam generators during normal plant startup, shutdown, and hot standby operations when the main feedwater system is unavailable for ser-vice. The AFW system is also designed to respond automatically to emer-gency conditions, to supply feedwater to the steam generators (SGs) in I order to remove reactor decay heat, assist in establishing natural circu-lation, and to cool down the reactor coolant system to the point at which the plant decay heat removal system may be placed into operation.

4 The AW system must fulfill certain plant safety design bases, there-fore, care is taken in selection and design of the interfaces for motive power to the AW system. Electric power demands of the AW system are

.g I met by taking the load from the vital plant buses that are powered by the onsite emergency diesel generators. A redundant and diverse source of motive power is the steam from either of the two SGs. If a demand occurs i on the system, then it is highly likely that steam is available to drive the turbine for the AFW system pump. Valves and controls for the turbine-powered AFW system loop receive power from DC power systems which I are battery supported.

Three alternative designs are considered for the Midland AFW system.

Although distinct differences exist between the alternatives, the ersen-l tial elements, water sources, pumping sections, flow control, and isola-l tion remain the same.

In the following paragraphs, the basic system is described using the AFW system as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) . The i differences between the alternative designs are then presented.

[

l 3.2.2 Basic AFW System The Base Case AW design consists of two AFW pumps, a level control arrangement, AFW to SG feed lines, steam supply to the turbine-driven pump, and a water supply arrangement.

I 3

Three sources of water are supplied for the auxiliary feedwater I

system e The condensate storage tank (CST) serves as a backup source of water during normal system operations (startup, hot standby, and cooldown) and as the primary source of water during plant emer-gency conditions.

e The condensate system is used for plant startup, hot standby, or cooldown operations. E o The service water system serves as a safety-grade backup system to the CST during plant emergency conditions.

The CST is the source of makeup water to the plant condensate system and the AFW system during normal operations. The CST is always aligned to supply water to the AFW system during plant operation through a nor-mally open motor-operated valve (MOV) . This MOV receives an open signal from the auxiliary feedwater actuation system (AMS) during plant emer-gency conditions.

The condensate system is used to supply the AFW system during normal plant startup, shutdown, and cooldown operations. Three separate conden-sate system sources--either of two deaerating storage tanks or the con-denser hotwell--are available to the AFW pumps. MOVs in each separate supply line receive an automatic close signal from the AMS system in the event of a plant emergency which requires AFW.

The service water system provides a safety-grade backup to the CST.

Two MOVs in series supply each AFW pump. The "A" service water train

supplies the "t." AFW pump and the "B" service water train supplies the "B" AFW pump. These motor-operated valves open automatically upon O receipt of an AMS signal in conjunction with a two-out-of-four low suc-l tion pressure condition at the associated AFW pump. The low suction pressure trip also closes the associated normal suction valve from the CST.

Redundant auxiliary feedwater pumps are provided. The motive power for the auxiliary feedwater pumps is diverse and independent; using steam generated in either or both SGs to drive a turbine-pcwered pump, or vital 4160VAC electric power to the motor-driven pump. The motor breaker is DC controlled to close and trip. The motor breaker trips on bus under-l voltage, phase overcurrent, ground fault, and high-high SG level. The l motor-driven AEW pump restarts automatically when SG level is restored to normal. The valves associated with steam supply to the turbille-driven pump are DC motor-operated. The turbine controls are supplied power from the same DC source. The pumps and drives are located in separate rooms in the Auxiliary Building. Each room centains s fan cooler unit that is l

started when the associated pump starts. Cooling water for the fan cooler unit is supplied from the plant service water system.

18 I

3 I

Each pump has a recirculation line to remove pump heat during low flow conditions. Flow through the recirculation line is controlled by a solenoid valve that opens in response to pump flow. AW pump recircula-tion is normally directed to the condensate storage tank supplying the AFW pump.

, In addition to the recirculation line, each pump has a full flow test i

line that bypasses the recirculation solenoid. This line is used for the pump flow testing that is required by plant technical specifications.

The full flow test valve is normally locked closed and has a remote posi-tion indication in the Main Control Room.

Each pump has a manual suction and discharge isolation valve used for isolation of the associated pump for maintenance. Each pump also has a discharge check valve to protect the pump from back flow.

The motor-driven AFW pump discharge line contains the auxiliary feed-water to main feedwater cross-connect valve. The motor-driven AFW pump supplies flow to the SGs through the main feedwater system piping during i startup, hot standby, and cooldown operations. This valve is hydrauli-cally operated to open and fails closed upon loss of power. This valve also receives a close signal from the AFNAS.

The steam for the turbine-driven pump is supplied from either or both SGs through normally closed motor operated isolation valves. These j valves receive an open signal from the AFKAS. The supply from each SG l ties into a common supply line inside the Reactor Containment Building.

There is a normally open steam header isolation valve outside the build-ing. Should this valve be closed, an AFhAS signal is sent to open the I valve.

h j The turbine is supplied with a trip throttle valve and a turbine governor valve. The trip throttle valve is a motor-open, trip close E valve which trips closed on turbine overspeed. Once tripped, the valve motor must be energized, and the valve shut to reset the trip. When the valve motor has been driven to the shut condition, the overspeed trip is reset, and the valve is reopened. The turbine governor valve is an electro-hydraulically operated valve which maintains turbine speed at the required value after the turbine is started. Hydraulic pressure for valve operation is supplied by a lube oil pump attached to the turbine shaft. This pump also supplies lubrication for the turbine journal and thrust bearings. When the turbine is shut down, the governor valve is wide open. As the turbine increases in speed after the admission of steam, the governor valve closes to limit possible overspeed of the tur-bine and to control final turbine speed. In addition to overspeed, the turbine trips on high-high SG level. When SG level is restored, the pump automatically restarts.

The A W pumps are cross-connected after the pump discharge valve through two normally open MOVs. These cross-connect valves close auto-3 matically on high-high SG water level in either SG and must be manually reopened after the high-high level condition has been corrected. T1.ese I

valves do not receive an open signal from the AFWAS.

19

E I

Each SG AW line contains a normally open, motor-operated level con-trol valve. These valves operate to mair.tain a programmed water level in the associated SG. Base Case control circuit design requires that two channels of SG level indication require valve movement before the level control valve will change position. Failure of either level channel results in no valve movement under automatic control or manual control.

I 3

In addition, these valves can only operate for fifteen minutes out of 4 every hour.*

The supply line to each SG passes through a parallel Reactor Contain-ment Building AFW isolation valve arrangement. These isolation valves are normally closed and receive an open signal from the AFWAS. In the line to each SG there is one DC and one AC operated valve, which provides l

5 diversity of power supply for these valves. 9 Two check valves in series in the AFW line to each SG prevent blowing down an intact SG through the AW lines to a leaking or ruptured SG.

Turbine exhaust steam passes up through the exhaust line to the roof of the Auxiliary Building where the steam is exhausted to the atmos-phere. There are no isolation valves in the turbine exhaust line.

In addition to the AFWAS signal required to start the AFW system, the AFW feedwater isolation valves and the steam supply valves to the turbine-driven pump receive a Main Steam Line Isolation System (MSLIS) signal through a Feed-Only-Good-Generator (FOGG) logic network. This FOGG signal is designed to prevent the addition of feedwater to a rup-tured SG and is used as an interlock or blocking signal rather than a direct signal such as the A WAS signal (i.e., the FOGG signal being pre-sent prever.ts valve movement but does not cause valve movement) .

E 3

The A W system is normally in a standby status with the valves lined 4

up as indicated in Figure 4. Upon receipt of an AFWAS signal, the fol-lowing events occur: The motor-driven and turbine-driven AW pumps receive a start signal; the turbine steam supply valves from the SGs open; the AFW isolation valves to the SGs open; if closed, the CST isola-tion valve opens; the DAST and condenser isolation valves close; and the main feedwater cross-connect valve closes. Within 40 seconds they will be supplying both SGs.

In the event of a loss of suction to the A W pumps, after a time delay of 4 seconds, the service water valves will open and the CST outlet valve will close.

After the SG levels have been restored, the level control valves will throttle closed to maintain SG level. In the event of a high-high SG 1evel, the associated AFW pump will trip off and the discharge cross-connect valve will close. With an AFWAS signal still present, the asso-ciated AW pump will automatically restart upon the clearing of the SG

The design of these valves has been changed to allow continuous operation.

I 20

f L

[

J high level alarm. The discharge cross-connect valve must be reopened by the operator after the SG high level alarm has reset.

3.2.3 Double Crossover Design The double crossover design shown in Figure 5 represents the present design of the AFW system. The differences between the basic design (Base Case) and the double crossover are as follows:

e Improved Feed-Only-Good-Generator logic and system interaction.

e Two level control valves per SG, one supplied from each of the AFW pumps.

I e Improved level control system for the SGs.

The improved FOGG logic continously monitors differential pressure between the SGs and automatically isolates APW flow to the lower pressure SG whenever the differential pressure exceeds a predetermined value.

This allows the FOGG logic to be indepenaent of the MSLIS signal and to perform a direct function (i.e. , close valves) rather than a blocking or interlock function. In addition, FOGG signals are channelized and are I sent to the SG level control valves, thus preventing a single failure from disabling the FOGG function. Presented below are the new relation-ships between FOGG channels and the actuated valves and the AFWAS chan-nels and actuated equipment.

FOGG/ ACTUATED EQUIPMENT RELATIONSHIP Electric Power Actuated Equipment FOGG Channel AFWAS Channel AC DC 1P-05A NA 1A 1A05 1Dll 1P-05B NA 1B NA 1D21 1MO3865A 1C 1A NA 1Dll 1MO3870B 1C 1A 1B56 NA 1MO3865B 1D 1B NA 1D21 1MO3870A 1D 1B 1B55 NA ILV3875Al lA 1A lYll NA lLV3875A2 1A 1A lY12 NA ILV3875B1 1B 1B lY13 NA ILV3875B2 1B 1B lY14 NA LMO3177A 1B 1B NA ID21 1MO3177B 1B IB NA 1D21 21

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1 1

1 The level control valve arrangement for the double crossover design was shown in Figure 5. Each AFW pump discharges to two electro-hydraulically operated level control valves, one valve for each SG.

These level control valves are 120 VAC motor-operated and fail open upon loss of AC power. The AC power for the level control valves associated with one APW pump comes through an inverter network from the same DC load group as the pump's DC control power.

The level control system for each level control valve now relies upon a single level signal rather than two level signals, which was the requirement in the Base Case design. A single level channel failure will e not cause either underfeeding or overfeeding of the SG.

System operation remains the same for the double crossover design as was discussed for the base case design. g 3.2.4 Three Pumo Design The three pump design shown in Figure 6 is similar to the design of the auxiliary feedwater system used in Bellefonte Nuclear Power Station.

In this design, either both motor-driven pumps or one turbine-driven pump is required to operate in order for the AFW system to satisfactorily perform its safety functions.

For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the power sup-plies to the AFW feedwater isolation valves would be the same as the base case, that the motor-driven pumps discharge through the two AC-powered valves, and that the turbine-driven pump discharges through the two DC-powered valves. In addition, the control circuit for the level con-trol valves was assumed to be modified s'ach that a single channel of SG g level could only affect one level control valve rather than both. These g assumptions assure a system design that is similar to Midland. g Further assumptions were required concerning DC power to the turbine controls. DC power to the turbine-driven pump was assumed to be avail-able from either DC bus. Preliminary analysis indicated a single failure of DC bus 1D21 would cause system failure due to the loss of the turbine-driven pump and the failure to start of the second motor-driven AFW pump. An alternative assumption to power the second motor-driven pump from the same AC source as the first motor-driven pump produced the same results as the alternate DC power supplies to the turbine-driven pump. These assumptions allow the most flexibility for the AFW three pump design.

Assumptions concerning the service water modifications were made to maintain the same double isolation valve and independence of service water trains as are present in the current Midland design.

E I

22

1 I

)

3.2.5 Electric Power and Other Babcock and Wilcox Designs i The AFW system dependence on electric power is analyzed to the bus I that powers the equipment. The power supply interface used in the analy-sis is given in Table 4.

P A comparison of the Midland double crossover design with other oper-ating B&W plant AFWS designs is given in Table 5.

3.3 SCOPE II The three Midland alternative auxiliary feedwater system designs are analyzed as presently designed (with the assumptions noted above) and as expected to be maintained and operated. Two sets of data are used in I separate quantifications. The NRC point estimate data from NUREG-0611 is identified here as NRC DATA.

including uncertainty has been identified as Plant-Specific Data. The Data most applicable to the Midland AFWS, three specific cases described in NUREG-0611 are analyzed:

P' l. LMFW - transient initiated by interruption of the main feedwater system (reactor trip occurs) and offsite AC power remains avail-able.

2. LMFW/ LOOP - transient initiated by loss of offsite AC power and reactor trip occurs (main feedwater system is interrupted-by the loss of offsite power). Onsite emergency AC power sources (diesel generators) are treated probabilistically.

I

)

3. LMFW/only DC power available - transient is initiated as in item 2 above, but onsite emergency AC power sources are unavail-able.

The boundary of the analysis is pictured in Figure 8. The turbine steam supply from the SGs and all of the auxiliary feedwater system com-ponents are included directly in the analysis. The water supplies them-selves are not analyzed in detail. However, the piping systems and valves that deliver water to the auxiliary feedwater system are inclu-ded. Electrical power supplies are outside the boundary of the analysis and are considered as discussed in Cases 1, 2, and 3 above. The A WS actuation signal is outside the boundary of the analysis. The analysis is conducted conditional on the. presence of an A NS actuation signal.

Finally, some human interactions are included within the analysis and some are outside the boundary. Within the boundaries the human inter-action through test and maintenance aa well as operator response to sys-tem failure on demand are considered.

An event tree model of AFW system operation is developed in order to address detailed system concerns such as overcooling and undercooling, reliability of continued operation, discrimination among " Bad SG" condi-tions, and consequences of feeding the " Bad SG."

23 i 1

TABLE 4. AEW POWER SUPPLIES Base Case Alternative Component Power Supply

1. Motor-driven AFW pump POSA 4160V AC bus lA05 control power 125 VDC panel IDll

2. Turbine-driven AFW pump P05B control power 125V DC panel ID21

3. Level control valve, LV3875A 480V MCC 1B55

4. Level control valve, LV3875B 480V MCC 1B56

5. OTSG A steam supply to turbine MO3177A 125V DC panel 1D21

6. OTSG B steam supply to turbine MO3126 125V DC panel 1D21

7. Steam supply isolation valve MO3126 480V MCC 1B56

8. Turbine throttle valve MO3831 125V DC panel 1D21 w 9. Feedwater isolation to SG A (AC), MO3870A 480V MCC 1B55

10. Feedwater isolation to SG A (DC), MO3865A 125V DC panel 1Dll

11. Feedwater isolation to SG B (AC), MO3870B 480V MCC 1B56

12. Feedwater isolation to SG B (DC), MO3865B 125V DC panel 1D21

13. AFW discharge crossover, MO3872A 480V MCC 1855

14. AFW discharge crossover, MO3872B 480V MCC 1B56

15. CST isolation, MO3856 480V power panel IBP03

16. AFW suction cross-connect, MO3868A 480V power panel 1BP03

17. APW suction cross-connect, MO3868B 480V power panel 1BPO4

18. Train A service water to POSA, MO3893Al 480V power panel 1BP03

19. Train A service water to POSA, MO3893A2 480V power panel 1BP03

20. Train B service water to P05B, MO3893B1 480V power panel 1BPO4

21. Train B service water to P05B, MO3893B2 480V power panel 1BPO4

22. DAST A outlet valve, MO3840A 480V power panel B31

23. DAST B outlet valve, MO3840B 480V power panel B32

24. Condenser outlet valve, MO3836 480V power panel B31 l

No " WW = M mPe mee m MmN mp w fm sy, m yg

M M M TABLE 4 (continued)

Double Crossover Alternative Component Power Supply

, 1. Level control valve, LV3875Al 120VAC Panel lYll

2. Level control valve, LV3875B1 120VAC Panel lY12

3. Level control valve, LV3875A2 120VAC Panel lYl3

4. Level control valve, LV3875B2 120VAC Panel lY14 U$ Three Pump Alte eative Component Power Supply

1. Motor-driven AFW pump P05C 4160V bus 1A06 control power 125V DC panel 1D21

2. Turbine-driven AFW pump P05B 125V DC panel 1D21 or control room 1D11

3. Train A service water to P05B, M03893A3 480V power panel IBP03

4. Train A service water to P05B, M03893A4 480V power panel 1BP03

5. Train B service water to P05B, M03893B3 480V power panel 1BP04

6. Train B service water to P05B, M03893B4 480V power panel 1BP04 All other components same as Base Case Note: All power supplies for Three Pump Designs are assumed.

,d 4

l 4

I TABLE 5.

SUMMARY

OF MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF B&W OPERATWG PLANT AFW SYSTEMS

j -

i j Pt. Ate 7 San 6to 5e-o Oconee-I,11,113 Cryotal p sver-3 Dav a s-Beste-1 Tterue W a le I s t er:4- 1 M4 31ard 1 a 2 1 tur tane/mutor da teen 1 turtaane desven 2 tierbas.e dr iven I turbane dr iven 1 test,ane d4 a ven 1 t wa t ane dr avon 1 t us t.a sw dr a ven Pumpe 1 motur dr avett 2-1/2 capat ary motor 1 mwtor driven 1 motos da ava 2-1/ J c rac s t / sw.,tos 1 motes as av en 11.11 i driven da aveau ( ap a. a r y) 4 4

l 2% 000 g. CST 50,000 g, usTAe9 f or 1 W ,000 9. CST 2 CSTs eash 107, A9) 9 057 2 CsTs' eat.h 2 CsTs. 100.000 g eesh j P r imary Suct ion TDP Jb,000 9 1 %.000 g .

Swrce UST* 100,000 g. ,

condensor hotwell 6 f or MUP t

} Alternate Sus t &on Canal and reservoir Condensor hotwell Condensor hotoell 2 servsce wet : t r enne Noc teme ser vate wat ec 9 4v. r water sy s t em l et - herv e = wate r j sourc e connector 2.mi - Cun.ie. . , hu we l 4

tt; st ar t e.; thut .h n) 4

} Switchover to Manuel Manual for TDP Manual Aut ast ic Manual M an aa l Aut eat 4c ,.

I Altes t, ate Sectron A I

t Yes, with fiorita11Y No (poreally closed Tes, two with ches h Ves w t h normally Yea, wi th no,r m.el ay Wes. any pump f eeda Ves, ca h g ump f eeds e nth cqen valves paths not valve s ciceed valvve open valves any $5 SG t r. roe,qh a A f ferer t

. C n schar9* Crosst le consides ed) SFaCS. mae.ual conts o! IfV 44)

] Each MILP feeds 1 SG t TLP reeds both

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! 1

. te kup Power 2 diesel genesatore Keoiree hydro genote- 2 daesel generators 2 diesel generators 2 daeme t gener at ors 2 diesel Jene r at st s 4 dtesel gener at or m [

! t or s 12 per plar.t j g . . _ _ . . _.

j O Csarwn Steam Tea Ves tes No, snaret e steam Tes Yes Ye s S4 ply header Fed at.(g ly lines wath (som both SC C r os s % ve r tunt.v(t sono under SFK5 curtt rul TDP E fif AS , 4 RCP trip, 2 MFwF lo discharge 2 MfwP t rip 1 MrW valve h b reve r se 2 MrWP t r asw 1 So 2 MrwP to f,P, 2 MFWP RCP T #'E ' ' " t #' '1' 2 ptiVP tr aP 6, r e ssure 2 SG 10 le ve l AP au level t a sp LCCA wat 5 ' tsy. er H mmre J MENP t r ap 1 EG to level, 4 leCP 4 DCP t a te 4 DCP t r ip ^'^ # *#

Pump g, ,p SC level l ow , $4 a.r es '

In s t a nt ion la.

MDP Smme manus ESFAS S ame S ame N/A s ame $ ame manus 2 MFWF 5.ame i t s ap '

Loc at ion Euternal to ICA External to ICS Enteinal to ICS brKS All wathan IC S f aternal to ICS Late s nal t a US ICs control for flow SG 1evel control ICS cor trol f us flow T ur bine spuc4 cont r ol . Ich cont i o n f c. f l en I( h , is.t a al ft f ire bv level sor t r al cotto! vaaves SPs circuit s for each cont rol valve, 1sia edwoe.t sol coe.t a c l valves hPm .re t s u valvse $Pa ( t r i i.i t e re ea* h Mw Cetrol and f or loss of 4 KP, 30 flow contrc.1 v a l ve s , for lose of 4 A P, fut 1 s = o r 4 PM . 50 f lw c .e La ul .

Va l ve s 2 MfvP va l ve s gikcs asolatson valves 2 M4 WP 2 MrmP va vt [

All ewt rol separ at o ,

t r a ICS

- . . . - - _ . . . .._ . - - - - _ _ . - - . ~ - ~ - - - - - ----

Case 1 Mone required Mene requ&reJ Nee sequared M ace requ e r ed P6us.e s e p a r ed NE.e s equ a t ed lopen t? Non e re 4u u r d a t e .He h a) }-l ()

Ope rat or Ac t ion s C a se 2 Manual load of MES Open TL,. cou. g water Manual load of MI'P Nono r oyu h re j Nw.e gu msa ivJ h=4 requ 6 t s d Oenb Cdw ret'a 4 4 t d f or on daesel asenerator valve, testore load t a f TOP f a: Inn st am mui plyn sus t ained (a f TDP f a Als) shed PWR Atw Flow Case 3 None requated None avatlet le None available Maa.ual upcn AC val ve s M anual og+te AC v al we s One s cyb t r ed l og .wn t? teos e s equ a s est a r ea* sw6 FAY 3

~ ~ _ _ - - . . - - - , - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ - - ~ - = - - ~

Notes For details, refer to plant spectf tc TDP - Tushare Dr kven Pump Uh? - Upper Surge Tas.k % - st ems Gerus at or draft repGrts (RefGrence 21 MDP

Motor Dr iven Pwsp PCP - Deat tor t oulant Pusy EP - Se t l'u ne t CST - Cc.ndensate $tcreve Tank MrwP - Ma ar6 Fee dwa t e r Piamp ICS - Intege atwd urtt atst Sy st ee

gm

&M M M% d% dO M MM_ - - - -% - _ . - Mok

- . . . - - . . . . . .d %m g WATER SUPPLY j

,---------s' POWER

, f ,,,, SUPPLY

/ ,

/ \

! /

/ n \

\

i

i i > AUXILIARY )

{ l SG FEEDWATER l

< SYSTEM g

i e I

\ \ v I i \ /

) \ /

i \ /

I \ /

i

\ % p' , HUMAN s '/

j/ AFWS ACTUATION l N - ,,, g % SIGNAL g INTERACTION /

i %==.

- - ==.,a#

/

4 l

FIGURE 8. BOUNDARY OF ANALYSIS i

i

E

4. METHODOLOGY The approach taken in this study is to separate the reliability problem into two logically distinct modules--determination of minimal cutsets of eauipment failure modes and determination of cause sets, i.e.,

causes that can bring about failures of the equipment cutsets.

The first step is to develop a detailed fault tree of the system.

That tree is developed down to the level of basic component failure modes, such as " valve MOV-3870A fails to open." Thus when the minimal cutsets of this fault tree are determined, they represent groups of equipment functional failure modes that must occur together if the system is to fail. Those cutsets are characteristic of the system hardware

(

e alone. O A simplified fault tree for the Midland AFWS is shown in Figure 9.

The TOP event, "No Or Insufficient Flow (NOIF) To Both Steam Generators,"

can only occur if there is NOIF from the motor pump section AND from the turbine pump section. NOIF from a pump section can only occur on NOIF from all water sources or failures within the pump sections. The detailed fault trees are shown in Appendixes A, B, and C for the base case, double crossover, and three pump, respectively.

The second step is to tabulate the possible causes for each failure mode. A single equipment functional failure mode may be caused by random independent faults, test and maintenance, common or independent human interactions, common environmental conditions such as high temperature or flooding, aging, etc. Entire cutsets may fail due to any single cause or coincident combinations of causes.

The cause tree for the Midland AFWS, Figure 10, lays out the overall 9 solution approach of this report. NOIF to both steam generators can only occur if one or more failure mode cutsets are failed. Such failures must E-be caused by Random Independent Failures OR Independent Human Errors j OR l

Test and Maintenance in Conjunction With Other Causes OR Common Cause Failures OR Other Failure Causes.

B I

n g

1

~

l i

W NOlF8 TO BOTH STEAM GENER ATORS t

NOlF TO NOlF' TO SG 1 SG 2 j A A

!O NOlF TO 1 SG a 2

[D

=

NOlF FROM MOTOR NOlF FROM TURSINE DRlVEN PUMP ORIVEN PUMP SECTION (MDPS) SECTION ITDPS) 4

I

-O NOlF FROM Puue SECTiON

!1 An ^

!J NOlF TO NOlF 3 PUMP SECTION THROUGH ,

PUMP I

l NOlF F

' NOlF FROM

, SERVLCE 1 COND STORE } l WATER

NO OR INSUFFICIENT FLOW FIGURE 9. SIMPLIFIED FAULT TREE l

. _ ._ _ . _ - . _ . _ . . .~

NOlF

TO SOTH STE AM GENER ATORS r%

COMMON TEST AND IN DE PE NDE N T CAUSE RAN M MAINTE N ANCE HUM AN E RROR$

F AILUR ES r% 7% r%

tu O

TEST AND TEST AND M AINTE NANCE MAINTENANCE HUMAN ON TURelNE DRIVEN ON MOTOR DRIVEN INACTION j E NVIRONME NTA L AGING HUMAN l l PUMP TRAIN PUMP TR AIN )

F AILURES FAILURES ACT#ON i

b )

SYSTEM SYSTE M HUMAN F AILURE l P AILU RE S l I OTHER FAILURE (E XCLUDING PUMP TRAIN lE XCLUDING PUMP TR AIN l l TEST AND l p , p p PUMP TR AIN PUMP TR AIN l TEST AND l l ) l TEST AND MAINTE N ANCE M AINTE N ANCE TO RECOVER F AILURES TEST AND MAINTE NANCE) M AINTE N ANCE)

NO OR INSUF F ICIE NT F LOW FIGURE 10. CAUSE TREE FOR THE MIDLAND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM sy , num gg aus .ign seg dem sug uma gn uns e m.pmi mg .m sh = W

t i

a i j

l i

4 If time is available to recover from system failure, then recoverable random failures only lead to system failure when combined with human inaction--human failure to recover. Such cases were not considered in this analysis because, baced on available information, system success requires immediate operation.

1 i

lO l*

P

l e

I

)

, I O

I l1 i

e II ir 3

i 1

4 31 sE

E

5. SYSTEM ANALYSIS 5.1 SYSTEM MODELS 5.1.1 System Fault Tree .

The fault tree models the failures that must occur to prevent suc- (D cessful system operation. The TOP event is defined as "No Or Insuffi-cient Flow To Both Steam Generators." Success is defined as the flow from at least one pump train delivered to at least one steam generator.

The simplified fault tree of Figure 9 (Section 4) shows that for the system to fail we must fail to deliver sufficient flow to both steam generators. In each case this requires that there is no or insufficient flow through the steam generator inlet valve section or that there is no (p or insufficient flow delivered to that section. Secondly, we must have B no or insufficient flow from the motor driven pump (either must fail in g the three pump alternative) and no or insufficient flow from the turbine driven pump. Finally, there is no water from any of the potential water sources. The complete fault tree models are presented in Appendixes A, B, and C for the base case, double crossover, and three pump alternatives respectively, where the system is modeled to the level of major compo-nents. Included are the pumps, valves, electrical supply, motor opera-tors, and turbine and control mechanisms. Not modeled are drain lines, drain valves, piping, and connected lines which are small in size, i.e.,

syster components whose failure rates are very low compared to the ones included in the model. The AFWS flowpath is modeled from the water sources to the steam generators. Electrically, the system is modeled from the bus to the system. (Note that for the case No Offsite Power Available, the diesel generators are treated probabilistically.)

Variations on the main niodels were made depending upon the initial e conditions of the scenario. These variations were made at the basic event level and consisted of changes to the failure probability for the g

3 basic event. As examples, consider the following: to run the model for the case " Loss of Offsite Power," the failure probabilities for the AC buses were increased to the value of the probability of failure of a diesel generatst to start; to simulate the condition of maintenance on a pump train, #_he pump failure probability was changed to one (which indicates a failed component) which resulted in a new listing of minimum cutsets for system failure. In this manner, the basic tree developed for a particular system design can correctly evaluate system failure for varying initial conditions.

5.1.2 Computer Programs The computer programs that are used by Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc., to process information in system reliability analyses are in the public domain and are available through the Argonne Code Center. The codes are the most current versions of computer packages that have been g in use for many years. Most of the computer programs were used in y support of the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, and have been modified as developments are made to reduce computer cost or improve output presenta- a tions. The computer programs used on this project are RAS (lll, g COMCANII-A[12], and MOCARS(13),

32

~ .

3 5.1.2.1 R_AS_. Reliability analysis system, RAS, is a combination of codes that do qualitative and quantitative fault tree analysis. FATRAM (method of obtaining cutsets) KITT (kinetic tree theory), and COMCAN (commom cause failure analysis) are the core elements for RAS. FATRAM is known as a " top down" method for determining cutsets or pathsets for a fault tree. The tree top is developed for its inputs until it is O resolved to the basic events in the model. The super sets are then elim-inated leaving the minimal cutsets. Kinetic tree theory is the methodol-ogy used next to predict the system reliability characterisitics (quanti-tatively) from the cutset developed by FATRAM. These codes use the rare event approximation in quantifying reliability.

RAS also includes the COMCAN routines necessary to perform a common O cause failure analysis on fault trees. Thie ammon cause analysis uses the minimal cutsets as input to the algorithm. Searches are then carried out through other libraries of information supplied to the routines by the user to identify those cutsets that have a single cause of failure for each component.

5.1.2.2 COMCANII-A. The II-A version of COMCAN presently stands separ-ately from RAS. Incorporation is forthcoming. A principal advantage of COMCANII-A is that it allows the common cause analysis to be completed on a much larger tree without the need for " pruning" and analysis of each pruned branch.

5.1.2.3 MOCARS. The Monte Carlo sampling program, MOCARS, is a marked improvement over SAMPLE which was used in the Reactor Safety Study.

MOCARS readily accepts the cutsets as they are prepared in RAS. A Monte Carlo routine is then used to determine the distribution for the reli-ability characteristic in question. Improvements in MOCARS make it read-O ily usable for applications other than fault tree analysis.

5.1.3 Data 5.1.3.1 NRC Data. The data used for the point estimate quantification as requested by the NRC, is taken from Appendix III of NUREG-0611. The source for that data was primarily WASH-1400Il41 In some cases such generic data misrepresents equipment actually installed in a specific plant. Using point estimates masks the plant-to-plant variability as the primary source of uncertainty in the data as used in WASH-1400. A com-plete listing of this data source is provided in Table 6.

5.1.3.2 Generic and Plant.-Specific Data. A plant specific data book for Midland is provided in Appendix D. Here the best available data to des-cribe the specific equipment in place at Midland is presented. It is based upon generic data that includes a wide uncertainty band to account for plant-to-plant variability and where sufficient Midland specific data is available those generic distributions have been updated to account for the specific equipment and practices in place at Midland.

g m

E TABLE 6. NRC FAILURE DATA Events (x 10-6) MTTR Q (Demand) WASH-1400 Even*.

O CST 1GLOR .0001 360 -

PTKCONDF J001A05F 30. 8 -

JH00 J001BP3F 14. 8 -

JF00 J001BP4F 14. 8 -

JF00 J001B55F 14. 8 JF00 J001856F 14. 8 JF00

[

m J001D11F 1.2 2 -

JK00 4 J001D21F 1.2 2 -

JK00 PCV0001D - -

1 x 10-4 PCV0157C PCV0013D - -

1 x 10-4 PCV0157C PCV0015D - -

1 x 10-4 PCV0142C PCV0025D - -

1 x 10-4 PCV0142C PCV024-D - -

1 x 10-4 -

PCV075-D - -

1 x 10-4 -

PCV076-D - -

1 x 10-4 -

E PCVU53AD - -

2 x 10-4 PCVol33, 131C g PCVU53BD - -

2 x 10-4 PCV0137, 138C PLV75AlD - -

1.1 x 10-3 -

PLV75A2D - -

1.1 x 10-3 -

PLV75B1D - -

1.1 x 10-3 -

PLV75B2D - -

1.1 x 10-3 -

PM0105AA - -

4 x 10-3 PST3ACNT PM0177AA - -

6 x 10-3 -

l PM0177BA - -

6 x 10-3 -

, PM03126C - -

1 x 10-4 PMVMS02C l

i PM075A1A - -

6 x 10-3 -

PM075A2A - -

6 x 10-3 -

PM075BlA - -

6 x 10-3 -

PM075B2A - -

6 x 10-3 -

l PM08931A - -

6 x 10-3 -

l PM08932A - -

6 x 10-3 -

PM08933A - -

6 x 10-3 -

[

PM08934A - -

6 x 10-3 -

g PMV177AD - -

1.1 x 10-3 -

PMV177BD - -

1.1 x 10-3 -

PMV3856C - -

1 x 10-4 -

PMV865AD - -

1.1 x 10-3 -

PMV865BD - -

1.1 x 10-3 -

PMV868AC - -

1 x 10-4 -

PMV868BC - -

1 x 10-4 -

PMV870AD - -

1.1 x 10-3 -

E l

i

3 I TABLE 6. NRC FAILURE DATA (continued)

Events (x 10-6) MTTR Q (Demand) WASH-1400 Event PMV870BD - -

1.1 x 10-3 -

I PMV8931D - -

1.1 x 10-3 -

PMV8932D - -

1.1 x 10-3 -

3 PMV8933D - -

1.1 x 10-3 -

PMV8934D - -

1.1 x 10-3 -

PPM 105AF - -

1 x 10-3 PPMFW3AA PPM 105BF - -

1 x 10-3 PPMTURBF

, PREA109F - -

1 x 10-4 -

PREA209F - -

1 x 10-4 -

PREB109F - -

1 x 10-4 -

PREB209F - -

1 x 10-4 -

PRElA03F - -

1 x 10-4 -

PRElA08F - -

1 x 10-4 -

PRElAllF - -

1 x 10-4 -

PRElAl2F - -

1 x 10-4 -

PRElB03F - -

1 x 10-4 -

PRElB08F - -

1 x-10-4 -

PRElBilF - -

1 x 10-4 -

PRElB12F - -

1 x 10-4 -

PREllllF - -

1 x 10-4 4

PRE 1512X - -

1 x 10-4 -

PRE 1514X - -

1 x 10-4 -

PRE 1610F - -

1 x 10-4 IO PRE 1613F - -

1 x 10-4 -

PSTMOOAF - -

6 x 10-3 _

PSTM00BF - -

6 x 10-3 _

g PSTMOSAF - -

6 x 10-3 _

E PSTMOSBF - -

6 x 10-3 -

PTBlGOSA - -

4 x 10-3 -

PXV001AC - -

1 x 10""4 PXV0168C PXV001BC - -

1 x 10-4 PXV0153C w PXV0002C - -

1 x 10-4 -

GD PXV0004C - -

1 x 10-4 -

I PXV0014C PXV0017C PXV009AO 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4 5 x 10-4 PXVIESTY PXV009BO - -

5 x 10-4 PXVIESTY PXV037-C - -

1 x 10-4 -

PXV278-C - -

1 x 10-4 -

PXV279-C - -

1 x 10-4 -

Note: All other events were contained in the events listed above, therefore, no failure rates were assigned. All data taken from 3 WASH-1400 or NUREG-0611.

35

E I

5.2 RANDOM FAILURES Random system failures reflect the system malfunctions that occur as a result of random component failures. The coincident failure of each component in an AFWS cutset results in a random system failure. This situation does not include, and should be differentiated from, test and maintenance, common cause, and independent human errors. The section on human interaction elaborates on the subject of recovery of the system by repair or operator action.

Table 7 lists all basic events (component failure modes) for the three designs analyzed. Table 8 presents the dominant cutsets and basic events for the double crossover design using NRC data and all three designs using plant specific data for each of the three states of elec- O tric power analyzed.

5.3 TEST AIM MAINTENANCE 5.3.1 Testing The Auxiliary Feedwater System (AWS) and its supporting systems are tested periodically to satisfy plant technical specification require-ments. This testing ensures that these systems will be operable when required by various plant conditions. The plant technical specifications also limit the time that systems, or portions of systems, may be out of service and identify special testing requirements necessary to ensure plant safety while these out-of-service systems or components are being repaired.

Plant procedures concerning this technical specification testing were not yet available for this analysis; therefore, slight differences S between the actual test methods and the general methods discussed in this section may exist.

i 5.3.1.1 AFW Pumps. The auxiliary feedwater pumps are tested monthly on I

a staggered basis. This test requires that the AFW pump successfully pass 100% of the required flow through the pump test bypass line at the l

required pump discharge head. To develop the required pressure, the e pumps were assumed to be isolated from the AFW system at the level con-trol valves during this full flow testing. During the test, if the AFWS E g

is required to operate, the operator at the test bypass valve must close this valve to allow AFW flow to feed the SGs.

l Every 18 months, the auxiliary feedwater pumps are checked to ensure that they start upon receipt of an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal;

, and that the auxiliary feedwater pumps restart after tripping on high

! level in the steam generators when the steam generator water level is l returned to the normal control band.

5.3.1.2 AFW Valves. All manual, power-operated, or automatic valves that are not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position are veri-fied in the correct position monthly. This test is assumed to be a visual check rather than a valve cycling check.

36

E E E TABLE 7a. FAU*T TREE COMPONENT LIST AND FAILURE MODE BASE CASE Failure Data Basic Event Failure Mode Description of Event Appendix D Page No.

1. PPMlOSAF Fall to operate Pump POSA fails to deliver sufficient water (includes D-8 support equipment) .

2. PPMlOSBF Fail to operate Pump POSB fails to deliver sufficient water (includes D-8 support equipment).

3. PTBlGOSA Fail to start Turbine GOSA fails to start (includes MO3831 and turbine D-28 controls).

4. JOOlA05F No output 4,160 V switchgear bus LAOS fails. D-10

5. JOOlB55F No output 480 V MCC 1B55 fails. D-10

6. JOOlB56F No output 480 V MCC 1B56 fails. D-10 w 7. JOOlDllF No output 125 VDC panel 1Dll fails. D-12

8. JOOlD21F No output 125 VDC panel ID21 fails. D-12

9. JOO1BP4F No output 480 V power panel 1BPO4 fails. D-10

10. JOOlBP3F No output 480 V power panel 1BPO3 fails. D-10

11. JOOlY13F No output 120 V instrument panel lYl3 fails. D-10

12. JOO1Yl4F No output 120 V instrument panel lY14 fails. D-10

13. JOOlY31F No output 120 V instrument panel lY31 fails. D-10

14. JOOlY32F No output 120 V instrument panel lY32 fails. D-10

15. CMUAFlTO Flow lost CST makeup flow lost to condenser hotwell (includes D-5 LV-3834A, LV-3834B, and ball valve VO63) .

16. CSTIGLOR Rupture Condensate storage tank ruptures. D-27

17. 1RUPTLOF Flow lost APW flow lost in main feed system. D-27

18. IPPSW-AF No flow No supply from service water train A. D-ll

19. IPPSW-BF No flow No supply from service water train B. D-ll

20. PLV875AC Closed Level control valve, LV3875A, fails closed. D-5

21. PLV875BC Closed Level control valve, LV3875B, fails closed. D-5

22. PCVU53AD Closed Check valves in OTSG A supp'y l fail closed (includes CVOO4A D-2 and CVO53A).

23. PCVU53BD Closed Check valves in OTSG B supply fail closed (includes CVOO4B D-2 and CVO53B).

i l

l l

TABLE 7a (continued)

Failure Data Basic Event Failure Mode Description of Event Appendix D Page No.

24. PCVO76-D Closed Check valve OTSG B to AFW turbine fails closed. D-2

25. PCVO75-D Closed Check valve OTSG A to AFW turbine fails closed. D-2

26. PCVOO2AD Closed Check valve POSA discharge fails closed. D-2

27. PCVOO2BD Closed Check valve PO5B discharge fails closed. D-2

28. PCVO24-D Closed Check valve CST to AFW fails closed. D-2

29. PMV8931D Closed Service water supply valve MO3893Al fails closed. D-3

30. PMv8932D Closed Service water supply valve MO3893A2 fails closed. D-3

31. PMV8933D Closed Service water supply valve MO3893B1 fails closed. D-3

32. PMV8934L Closed Service water supply valve MO3893B2 fails closed. D-3

33. PMV868AC Closed Suction header cross-connect valve MO3868A transfers closed. D-4 w 34. PMV868BC Closed Suction header cross-connect valve MO3868B transfers closed. D-4

35. PMV177AD Closed OTSG A steam supply to AFW turbine MO3177A fails closed. D-4

36. PMV177BD Closed OTSG B steam supply to AFW turbine MO3177B fails closed. D-4

37. PMV872AC Closed AFW pump discharge cross-connect valve MO3872A transfers D-4 closed.

38. PMV872BC Closed AFW pump discharge cross-connect valve MO3872B transfers D-4 closed.

39. PMV870AD Closed Feedwater isolation valve MO3870A fails closed. D-4

40. PMV870BD Closed Feedwater isolation valve MO3870B fails closed. D-4

41. PMV865AD Closed Feedwater isolation valve MO3865A fails closed. D-4

42. PMV865BD Closed Feedwater isolation valve MO3865B fails closed, D-4

43. PXVO37-C Closed CST isolation valve VO37 transfers closed. D-3

44. PXV278-C Closed Service water train A isolation valve, V278, transfers D-3 closed.

45. PXV279-C Closed Service water train B isolation valve, v279, transfers D-3 closed.

46. PXVOOlAC Closed POSA suction valve, VOO1A, transfers closed. D-4

47. PXVOOlBC Closed PO5B suction valve, VDOlB, transfers closed. D-4

48. PXVOO3AC Closed POSA, discharge valve, VOO3A, transfers closed. D-4

49. PXVOO3BC Closed PO5B discharge valve, VOO3B, transfers closed. D-4

50. PXVOO9AO Open POSA full flow test valve, VOO9A, transfers open. D-5

%=W ePP MP 4e 4% = M m er' "%e %"W

E E E E E TABLE 7a (continued) ,

Failure Data Basic Event Failure Mode Description of Event Appendix D Page No.

51. PXVOO9BO Open PO5B full flow test valve, VOO9B, transfers open. D-5

52. PHV889-O Open AFW - main feed cross-connect valve HV3889 transfers open. D-5

53. PCNIC560 Open FOGG relay 95-1, channel IC, contacts 5-6, fail open. D-20

54. PCNID120 Open FOGG relay 95-1, channel 1D, contacts 1-2, fail open. D-20

55. PSTMOOAP Pail to operate Valve MO3870A motor operator does not operate (includes: D-25 motor operator, master contactor, 95 relay, FOGG power fuse, and breaker).

56. PSTM00BF Fail to operate Valve MO3870B motor operator does not operate (includes: D-25 motor operator, master contactor, 95 relay, FOGG power fuse, and breaker).

57. PSTCCOAP No signal Valve MO3870A controls fail (includes opening circuit, D-25

$ closing circuit, and common circuit failures).

58. PSTCCOBF No signal Valve MO3870B controls fail (includes opening circuit, D-25 closing circuit, and common circuit failures).

59. PCB15260 Open Breaker 52-26 in MCClB55 transfers open. D-13

60. PCB16260 Open Breaker 52-26 in MCClB56 transfers open. D-13

61. PRElAllF Open AFWAS relay K611, channel 1A, fails open. D-18

62. PRElBilF Open AFWAS relay K611, channel 1B, fails open. D-18

63. PSTMO5AF Fail to operate Valve 3865A motor operator does not operate (includes D-25 motor operator, master contactor, 95-1 relay, FOGG power fuse, and FOGG power breaker).

64. PSTMO5BF Fail to operate Valve 3865B motor operator does not operate (includes, D-25 motor operator, master contactor, 95-1 relay, FOGG power fuse, and FOGG power breaker).

65. PSTCCSAF No signal Valve MO3865A controls fail (includes opening circuit, D-26 closing circuit, and common circuit).

66. PSTCCSBF No signal Valve MO3865B controls fail (includes opening circuit, D-26 closing circuit, and common circuit).

67. PCNIC120 Open FOGG relay 95-1, channel IC, contacts 1-2 fail open. D-20

68. PCN1D560 Open FOGG relay 95-1, chdnnel ID, contacts 5-6 fail open. D-20

69. PRElAl2P Open AFWAS relay K612, channel lA, fails open. D-18

TABLE 7a (continued)

Failure Data Basic Event Failure Mode Description of Event Appendix D Page No.

70. PRElB12F Open AFWAS relay K612, channel 1B, fails open. D-18

71. PCCIAClE False signal Valve LV3875A closing circuit Cl fails energized. D-25

72. PCCIAC2E False signal Valve LV3875A closing circuit C2 fails energized. D-25

73. PCClBClE False signal Valve LV3875B closing circuit Cl fails energized. D-25

74. PCClBC2E False signal Valve LV3875B closing circuit C2 fails energized. D-25

75. PSTSLIAF False signal Valve MO3872A closing circuit fails energized. D-26

76. PSTSLlBP False signal Valve MO3872B closing circuit fails energized. D-26

77. PREllllF Open AFWAS relay Killl, channel lA, fails open. D-18

78. PMO105AA Fail to start PO5A motor fails to start. D-9

79. PSTBRIAF Fall to close POSA motor breaker does not close (includes control power D-25 and closing circuit failures).

$ 80. PMOL 77AA Fail to start Valve MO3177A motor operator does not operate (includes Di motor operator and power fuses).

81. PMOL 77BA Fail to start Valve MO3177B motor operator does not operate (includes D-7 motor operator and power fuses) .

82. PRE 1512X False signal MSLIS relay K512, channel 1B, fails closed, false signal. D-18

83. PRE 1514X False signal MSLIS relay K514, channel 1B, fails closed, false signal. D-18

84. PRE 1610F Open AFWAS relay K610, channel 18, fails open. D-18

85. PRE 1613F Open AFWAS relay K613, channel 1B, fails open. D-18

86. PCB17140 Open 1021 circuit breaker 72-14 fails open. D-15

87. PCB17150 Open ID21 circuit breaker 72-15 fails open. D-15

88. PCC177AF Fail to operate Valve MO3177A control circuit fails (includes opening, D-26 circuit, closing circuit, and common circuit).

89. PCC177BP Fail to operate Valve MO3177B control circuit fails (includes opening D-26 circuit, closing circuit, and common circuit).

90. PMO3126C Closed Valve MO3126 transfers closed (includes control circuit and D-4 valve failure).

91. PSTCSlAC False signal Valve MO3868A controls provide close signal (includes D-26 false signal).

92. PSTCSlBC False signal Valve MO3868B controls provide close signal (includes D-26 false signal).

8% WW " e4" 3"47 'We 45 " 8F "

8" M e" % " WW

Mm% d% gO m gaga bda ge M TABLE 7a (continued)

Failure Data Basic Event Failure Mode Description of Event Appendix D Page No.

93. PMV3856C Closed Valve MO3856 fails closed (includes inadvertant D-4 close signal).

94. PMO8934A Fail to operate Valve MO3893B2 motor operator fails to operate. D-6 =

95. PCBilO30 Transfer open Valve MO3893B2 circuit breaker opens. D-13

96. PRElBO3F Open Valve MO3893B2 A WAS relay fails open. D-18

97. PSTCCB2P No signal Valve MO3893B2 control circuit fails (includes open, close, D-25 and common circuits).

98. PMO8933A Fail to operate Valve MO3893B1 motor operator fails to operate. D-6

99. PCBilO2O Transfer open Valve MO3893B1 circuit breaker opens. D-13 100. PRElBO8F Open Valve MO3893B1 ANAS relay fails open. D-18 101. PSTCCBlF No signal Valve MO3893B1 control circuit fails (includes open, close, D-25 u

and common circuits).

102. PMO8932A Fail to operate Valve MO3893A2 motor operator fails to operate. D-6 103. PCB21030 Transfer open Valve MO3893A2 circuit breaker opens. D-13 104. PRElAO3F Open Valve MO3893A2 A WAS relay fails open. D-18 105. PSTCCA2P No signal Valve MO3893A2 control circuit fails (includes open, close, D-25 and common circuits).

106. PMO8931A Fail to operate Valve MO3893Al motor operator fails to operate. D-6 107. PCB21020 Transfer open Valve MO3893Al circuit breaker opens. D-13 108. PRElA08F Open Valve MO3893Al ANAS relay fails open. D-18 109. PSTCCAlF No signal Valve MO3893Al control circuit fails (includes open, close, D-25 and common circuits).

TABLE 7b. FAULT TREE COMiONENT LIST AND FAILURE MODES DOUBLE CROSSOVER Failure Data Basic Event Failure Mode Description of Event Appendix D Page No.

1. PPMlO5AF Fail to operate Pump POSA fails to deliver sufficient water (includes D-8 support equipment) .

2. PPMlO5BF Fail to operate Pump PO5B fails to deliver sufficient water (includes D-8 support equipment).

3. PTBlGOSA Fail to start Turbine GOSA fails to start (includes MO3831 and turbine D-28 controls).

4. JOO1AOSF No output 4,160 V switchgear bus LAO 5 fails. D-10

5. JOOlB55F No output 480 V MCC 1B55 fails. D-10

6. JOOlB56F No outrat ; 480 V MCC 1B56 fails. D-10

7. JOOlDllF No output 125 VDC panel 1Dil fails. D-12 u 8. JOOlD21F No output 125 VDC panel 1D21 fails. D-12

9. JOOlBP4F No output 480 V power panel IBPO4 fails. D-10

10. JOOlBP3F No output 480 V power panel 1BPO3 fails. D-10

11. JOOlYllF No output 120 V instrument panel lYll fails. D-10

12. JOOlY12F No output 120 V instrument panel lY12 fails. D-10

13. JOOlY13F No output 120 V instrument panel lY13 fails. D-10

14. JOOlY14F No output 120 V instrument panel lYl4 fails. E-10

15. JOOlY31F No output 120 V instrument panel lY31 fails. D-10

16. JOOlY32P No output 120 V instrument panel lY32 fails. D-10

17. CMUAFITO Flow lost CST makeup flow lost to condenser hotwell (includes D-5 LV-3834A, LV-3834B, and ball valve VO63) .

18. CSTIGLOR Rupture Condensate storage tank ruptures. D-27

19. 1RUPTLOF Flow lost AFW flow lost in main feed system. D-27

20. IPPSW-AF No flow No supply from service water train A. D-ll

21. IPPSW-BF No flow No supply from service water train B. D-ll

22. PLV75 AID Closed Level control valve, LV3875A1, f ails closed (mechanical D-5 failure).

23. PLV75A2D Closed Level control valve, LV3875A2, fails closed (mechanical D-5 failure).

"We " WW eW8 M eP" "We 95 = #F m eP Me" 4 " WW

TABLE 7b (continued)

Failure Data Basic Event Failure Mode Description of Event Appendix D Page No.

24. PLV75BlD Closed Level control valve, LV3875B1, fails closed (mechanical D-5 failure).

25. PLV75B2D Closed Level control valve, LV3875B2, fails closed (mechanical D-5 failure).

26. PCVU53AD Closed Check valves in OTJG A supply fail closed (includes CVOO4A D-2 and (: 053A) .

27. PCVU53BD Closed Check valves in OTSG B supply fail closed (incluoes CVOO4B D-2 and CVO53B).

28. PCVO76-D Closed Check valve, OTSG B to AFW turbine, fails closed. D-2

29. PCvo75-D Closed Check valve, OTSG A to AFW turbine, fails closed. D-2

30. PCV0001D Closed Check valve, outlet of LV3875Al, fails closed. D-2 8 31. PCV0013D Closed Check valve, outlet of LV3875A2, fails closed. D-2

32. PCV0015D Closed Check valve, outlet of LV3875B1, fails closed. D-2

33. PCV0025D Closed Check valve, outlet of LV3875B2, fails closed. D-2

34. PCVO24-D Closed Checx valve, CST to AFW, fails closed. D-2

35. PMV8931D Closed Service water supply valve, MO3893A1, fails closed. D-3

36. PMV8932D Closed Service water supply valve, MO3893A2, fails closed. D-3

17. PMV8933D Closed Service water supply valve, MO3893B1, fails closed. D-3

38. PMV8934D Closed Service water supply valve, MO3893B2, fails closed. D-3

39. PMV868AC Closed Suction header cross-connect valve, MO3868A, transfers D-4 closed.

40. PMV868BC Closed Suction header cross-connect valve, MO3868B, transfers D-4 closed.

41. PMV177AD Closed OTSG A steam supply to APW turbine, MO3177A, fails closed. D-4

42. PMV177BD Closed OTSG B steam supply to APW turbine, MO3177B, fails closed. D-4

43. PMV870AD Closed Feedwater isolation valve. MO3870A, fails closed. D-4

44. PMV870BD Closed Feedwater isolation valve, MO3870B, fails closed. D-4

45. PMV865AD Closed Feedwater isolation valve, MO3865A, fails closed. D-4

46. PMV865BD Closed Feedwater isolation valve, MO3865B, fails closed. D-4

47. PXVO37-7 Closed CST isolation valve, VO37, transfers closed. D-3

TABLE 7b (continued)

Failure Data Basic Event Failure Mode Description of Event Appendix D Page No.

48. PXV278-C Closed Service water train A isolation valve, V278, transfers D-3 closed.

49. PXV279-C Closed Service water train B isolation valve, V279, transfers D-3 closed.

50. PXVOOlAC Closed POSA suction valve, VOOlA, transfers closed. D-4

51. PXVOOlBC Closed PO5B suction valve, VOOlB, transfers closed. D-4

52. PXV0002C Closed Outlet valve, LV3875B2, transfers closed. D-4

53. PXV0004C Closed Outlet valve, LV3875Al, transfers closed. D-4

54. PXV0014C Closed Outlet valve, LV3875A2, transfers closed. D-4

55. PXV0017C Closed Outlet valve, LV3875B1, transfers closed. D-4

,, 56. PXVOO9AO Open POSA full flow test valve, VOO9A, transfers open. D-5

57. PXVOO9BO Open POSB full flow test valve, VOO98, transfers open. D-5

58. PHV889-O Open APW - main feed cross-connect valve, HV3889, transfers open. D-5

59. PCNIC560 Open FOGG relay 95-1, channel IC, contacts 5-6, fail open. D-20

60. PCN1D120 Open FOGG relay 95-1, channel ID, contacts 1-2, fail open. D-20

61. PSTMOOAF Fail to operate Valve MO3870A motor operator does not operate (includes: D-25 motor operator, master contactor, 95 relay, FOGG power fuse, and breaker).

62. PSTMOOBF Fail to operate Valve MO3870B motor operator does not operate (includes: D-25 motor operator, master contactor, 95 relay, FOGG power fuse, and breaker).

63. PSTCCOAF No signal Valve MO3870A controls fail (includes opening circuit, D-26 closing circuit, and common circuit failures).

64. PSTCCOBF No signal Valve MO38708 controls fail (includes opening circuit, D-26 closing circuit, and common circuit failures).

65. PCB15260 Open Breaker 52-26 in MCClB55 transfers open. D-13

66. PCB16260 Open Breaker 52-26 in MCC1856 transfers open. D-13

67. PRElAllF Open AFWAS relay K611, channel lA, fails open. D-18

68. PRElBllF Open AFWAS relay K611, channel 1B, fails open. D-18 sh = WW eM" "'4 eP'" "We " 45 " JF "

P "% e" % " WW

E E E E E E TABLE 7b (continued)

Failure Data Basic Event Failure Mode Description of Eveat Appendix D Page No.

69. PSTMO5AF Fail to operate Valve 3865A motor operator does not operate (includes D-25 motor operator, master contactor, 95-1 relay, FOGG power fuse, and POGG power breaker).

70. PSTMO5BP Pail to operate Valve 3865B motor operator does not operate (includes, D-25 motor operator, master contactor, 95-1 relay, FOGG power fuse, and FOGG power breaker).

71. PSTCCSAF No signal Valve MO3865A controls fail (includes opening circuit, D-26 closing circuit, and common circuit).

72. PSTCCSBF No signal Valve MO3865B controls fail (includes opening circuit, D-26 closing circuit, and common circuit).

73. PCNICl2O Open FOGG relay 95-1 channel IC contacts 1-2 fail open. D-20

$ 74. PCN1D560 Open FOGG relay 95-1 channel ID contacts 5-6 fail open. D-20

75. PRE 1Al2P Open AFWAS relay, K612 channel lA, fails open. D-18

76. PRElB12F Open AFWAS relay, K612 channel 1B, f ails open. D-18

77. PREllllF Open APWAS relay, Killl channel lA, fails open. D-18

78. PM0105AA Fail to start POSA motor fails to start. D-9

79. PSTBRIAF Fall to close POSA motor breaker does not closa (includes control power D-25 and closing circuit failures).

80. FMOl77AA Fail to start Valve MO3177A motor operator does not operate (includes D-7 motor operator and power fuses).

81. PMOL 77BA Fail to start Valve MO3177B motor operator does not operate (includes D-7 motor operator and power fuses).

82. PRE 1512X False signal MSLIS relay K512, channel IB, fails closed, false signal. D-18

83. PRE 1514X False signal MSLIS relay K514, channel 1B, fails closed, false signal. D-18

84. PRE 1610F Open AFifAS relay K610, channel IB, fails open. D-18

85. PRE 1613F Open AFWAS relay K613, channel 1B, fails open. D-18

86. PCB1714O Open 1D21 circuit breaker 72-14 fails open. D-15

87. PCB17150 Open 1D21 circuit breaker 72-15 fails open. D-15

88. PCC177AF Fail to operate Valve MO3177A control circuit fails (includes opening, D-26 circuit, closing circuit, and common circuit).

89. PCC177BF Fail to operate Valve MO3177B control circuit fails (includes opening D-26 circuit, closing circuit, and common circuit) .

TABLE 7b (continued)

Failure Data Basic Event Failure Mode Description of Event Appendix D Page No.

90. PMO3126C Closed Valve MO3126 fails closed (includes control circuit and D-4 valve failure).

91. PSTCSlAC False signal Valve MO3868A controls provide close signal (includes D-26 false signal).

92. PSTCSlBC False signal Valve MO3868B controls provide close signal (includes D-26 f alse signal) .

93. PMV3856C Closed Valve MO3856 fails closed (includes inadvertent close D-4 signal) .

94. PMO8934A Fail to operate Valve MO3893B2 motor operator fails to operate. D-6

95. PCBilO30 Transfer open valve MO3893B2 circuit breaker opens. D-13

96. PRElBO3F Open Valve MO3893B2 AFWAS relay fails open. D-18

$ 97. PSTCCB2F No signal Valve MO3893B2 control circuit fails (includes open, close, D-25 and common circuits).

98. PMO8933A Fail to operate Valve MO3893B1 motor operator fails to operate. D-6

99. PCBllO2O Transfer open Valve MO3893B1 circuit breaker opens. D-13 100. PRElBO8F Open Valve MO3893B1 AFWAS relay fails open. D-18 101. PSTCCBlF No signal Valve MO3893B1 control circuit fails (includes open, close, D-25 and common circuits).

102. PMO8932A Fail to operate Valve MO3893A2 motor operator fails to operate. D-6 103. PCB21030 Transfer open Valve MO3893A2 circuit breaker opens. D-13 104. PRElAO3F Open Valve MO3893A2 AFWAS relay fails open. D-18 105. PSTCCA2P No signal Valve MO3893A2 control circuit fails (includes open, close, D-25 and common circuits).

106. PHO8931A Fail to operate Valve MO3893Al motor operator fails to operate. D-6 107. PCB21020 Transfer open Valve MO3893Al circuit breaker opens. 3-13 108. PRElA08F Open Valve MO3893Al AFWAS relay fails open. D-18 109. PSTCCAlF No signal Valve MO3893Al control circuit fails (includes open, close, D-25 and common circuits).

110. POOCCAlX No signal valve LV3875Al control circuit fails (includes open, close, D-25 and common circuits).

% " WW = elP % eP" 4. " 45 " dr " *P 8% " % " Uf

m y ,,, as ,,, g sk ,,g5 mum m amm e uma oens W

sus & aus as TABLE 7b (continued)

Failure Data Basic Event Failure Mode Description of Event Appendix D Page No.

111. POOCCA2X No signal Valve LV3875A2 control circuit fails (includes open, D-25 close, and common circuits).

112. POOCCBlX No signal Valve LV3875B1 contro) circuit fails (includes open, D-25 close, and common circuits).

113. POOCCB2X No signal Valve LV3875B2 control circuit fails (includes open, D-25 close, and com% n circuits).

114. PRElAOlF Open Valve LV3875Al AFWAS relay fails open. D-18 115. PRElA02F Open Valve LV3875A2 A NAS relay fails open. D-18 116. PRElBOlF Open Valve LV3875B1 ANAS relay f ails open. D-l'3 117. PRElB02F Open Valve LV3875B2 AFWAS relay fails open. D-18 118. PCB16200 Open Valve Lv3875Al circuit breaker opens. D-13

$ 119. PCB16210 Open Valve LV3875A2 circuit breaker opens. D-13 120. PCB17200 Open Valve LV3875Bl circuit breaker opens. D-13 121. PCB17210 Open Valve LV3875B2 circuit breaker opens. D-13

TABLE 7c. FAULT TREE EVENTS AND FAILURE MODES THREE PUMP Failure Data Basic Event Failure Mode Description of Event Appendix D Page No.

1.' PPMlOSAF Fail to operate Pump POSA fails to deliver sufficient water (includes D-8 support equipment) .

2. PPMlO5BF Fail to operate Pump PO5B fails to deliver sufficient water (includes D-8 support equipment) .

3. PPM 105CF Fail to operate Pump POSC fails to deliver sufficient water (includes D-8 support equipment).

4. PTBlGOSA Fail to start Turbine GOSA fails to start (includes MO3831 and turbine D-28 controls).

5. JOOlAO5F No output 4,160 V switchgear bus LAOS fails. D-10

6. JOOlA06F No output 4,160 V switchgear bus lA06 fails. D-10

$ 7. JOOlB55F No output 480 V MCC 1B55 fails. D-10

8. JOOlB56F No output 480 V MCC 1B56 fails. D-10

9. JOOlDllF No output 125 VDC panel 1Dll fails. D-12

10. JOOlD21F No output 125 VDC panel 1D21 fails. D-12

11. JOOlBP4F No output 480 V power panel 1BPO4 fails. D-10

12. JOOlBP3F No output 480 V power panel 1BPO3 fails. D-10

13. JOOlY13F No output 120 V instrument panel lY13 fails. D-10

14. JOOlY14F No output 120 V instrument panel lY14 fails. D-10

15. JOOlY31F No output 120 V instrument panel lY31 fails. D-10

16. JOOlY32F No output 120 V instrument panel lY32 fails. D-10

17. CMUAFlTO Flow lost CST makeup flow lost to condenser hotwell (includes D-5 LV-3834A, LV-3834B, and ball valve VO63).

18. CST 1GLOR Rupture Condensate storage tank ruptures. D-27

19. IRUPTLOF Flow lost AFW flow lost in main feed system. D-27

20. IPPSW-AF No flow No supply from service water train A. D-ll

21. IPPSW-BF No flow No supply from service water train B. D-11

22. PLV75AlC Closed Level control valve LV3875A1 fails closed. D-5

23. PLV75A2C Closed Level control valve LV3875A2 fails closed. D-5

4. m W ePP 8% P 'W e m 45 dr op b em 'We - W

E M M N N N NOE U N TABLE 7c (continued)

Failure Data Basic Event Failure Mode Description of Event Appendix D Page No.

24. PLV75BlC Closed Level control valve LV3875B1 fails closed. D-5

25. PLV75B2C Closed Level control valve LV3875B2 fails closed. D-5

26. PCVU53AD Closed Check valves in OTSG A supply fail closed (includes CVOO4A D-2 and CVO53A).

27. PCVU53BD Closed Check valves in OTSG B supply fail closed (includes CVOO4B D-2 and CVO53B) .

28. PCVO76-D Closed Check valve OTSG B to APW turbine fails closed. D-2

29. PCVO75-D Closed Check valve OTSG A to AFW turbine fails closed. D-2

30. PCVOO2AD Closed Check valve POSA discharge fails closed. D-2

31. PCVOO2BD Closed Check valve PO5B discharge fails closed. D-2

32. PCVOO2CD Closed Check valve POSC discharge fails closed. D-2

$ 33. PCVO30AD Closed Check valve LV3875Al outlet to OTSG E51A fails closed. D-2

34. PCVO3OBD Closed Check valve LV3875B1 outlet to OTSG E51B fails closed. D-2

35. PCVO31AD Closed Check valve LV3875A2 outlet to OTSG E51A fails closed. D-2

36. PCVO31BD Closed Check valve Lv3875B2 outlet to OTSG E51B fails closed. D-2

37. PCVO32AD Closed Check valve condensate supply to PO5A fails closed. D-2

38. PCVO32BD Closed Check valve condensate supply to POSB fails closed. D-2

39. PCv032CD Closed Check valve condensate supply to PO5C fails closed. D-2

40. PCVO34AD Closed Check valve service water supply to POSA fails closed. D-2

41. PCVO34BD Closed Check valve service water supply to POSB fails closed. D-2

42. PCVO35AD Closed Check valve service water supply to PO5C fails closed. D-2

43. PCVO35BD Closed Check valve service water supply to PO5B fails closed. D-2

44. PCVO24-D Closed Check valve CST to AFW fails closed. D-2

45. PHVO20AC Closed Pressure control valve, PCVO20A, fails closed. D-5

46. PHVO20BC Closed Pressure control valve, PCVO208, fails closed. D-5

47. PHV889-0 Open AFW main feed cross-connect valve, HV3889, transfers open. D-5

48. PMV177AD Closed OTSG A steam supply to AFW turbine, MO3177A, fails closed. D-4

49. PMV177BD Closed OTSG B steam supply to AFW turbine, MO31778, fails closed. D-4

50. PMV870AD Closed Feedwater isolation valve, MO3870A, fails closed. D-4

51. PMV870BD Closed Feedwater isolation valve, MO3870B, fails closed. D-4

52. PMv865AD Closed Feedwater isolation valve, MO3865A, fails closed. D-4

i TABLE 7c (continued)

Failure Data Basic Event Failure Mode Description of Event Appendix D Page No.

53. PMV865BD Closed Feedwater isolation valve, MO3865B, fails closed. D-4

54. PXVO37-C Closed CST isolation valve, VO37, transfers closed. D-3

55. PXV278-C Closed. Service water train A isolation valve, V278, transfers D-3 closed.

56. PXV279-C Closed Service water train B isolation valve, V279, transfers D-3 closed.

57. PXVOOlAC Closed POSA suction valve, VOOlA, transfers closed. D-4

58. PXVOOlBC Closed PO5B suction valve, VOOlB, transfers closed. D-4

59. PXVOOlCC Closed PO5C suction valve, VOOlC, transfers closed. D-4

60. PXVOO3AC Closed POSA discharge valve, VOO3A, transfers closed. D-4

61. PXVOO3BC Closed POSB discharge valve, v003B, transfers closed. D-4

$ 62. PXVOO3CC Closed PO5C discharge valve, VOO3C, transfers closed. D-4

63. PXVOO9AO Open POSA full flow test valve, VOO9A, transfers open. D-5

64. PXVOO9BO Open PO5B full flow test valve, VOO9B, transfers open. D-5

65. PXVOO9CO Open PO5C full flow test valve, VGO9C, transfers open. D-5

66. PMV93AlD Closed Service water supply valve, MO3893Al, fails closed. D-3

67. PMV93A2D Closed Service water supply valve, MO3893A2, fails closed. D-3

68. PoiV93A3D Closed Service water supply valve, MO3893A3, fails closed. D-3

69. PMV93A4D Closed Service water supply valve, MO3893A4, fails closed. D-3

70. PMV93BlD Closed Service water supply valve, MO3893B1, fails closed. D-3

71. PMV93B2D Closed Service water supply valve, MO3893B2, fails closed. D-3

72. PMV93B3D Closed Service water supply valve, MO3893B3, fails closed. D-3

73. PMV93B4D Closed Service water supply valve, MO3893B4, fails closed. D-3

74. PCVO24-D Closed Check valve CST to AFW fails closed. D-3

75. PCNIC560 Open FOGG relay 95-1, channel 1C, contacts 5-6, fail open. D-20

76. PCN1D120 Open FOGG relay 95-1, channel 1D, contacts 1-2, fail open. D-20

77. PSTMOOAF Fall to operate Valve MO3870A motor operator does not operate (includes: D-25 motor operator, master contactor, 95 relay, FOGG power fuse, and breaker).

78. PSTMOOBF Fail to operate Valve MO3870B motor operator does not operate (includes: D-25 motor operator, master contactor, 95 relay, FOGG power fuse, and breaker).

'We m W eW' "'% P 'W e M M esm Mem We m W

TABLE 7c (continued)

Failure Data Basic Event Failure Mode Description of Event Appendix D Page No.

79. PSTCCOAF No signal Valve MO3870A controls fail (includes opening circuit, D-25 closing circuit, and common circuit failures).

80. PSTCCOBP No signal Valve MO3870B controls fail (includes opening circuit, D-25 closing circuit, and common circuit failures).

81. PCB15260 Open Breaker 52-26 in MCClBS5 transfers open. D-13

82. PCB16260 Open Breaker 52-26 in MCClB56 transfers open. D-13

83. PRElAllF Open APWAS relay K611, channel 1A, fails open. D-18

84. PRElBllF Open AFWAS relay K611, channel 1B, fails open. D-18

85. PSTMO5AF Pall to operate Valve 3865A motor aperator does not operate (includes D-25 motor operator, master contactor, 95-1 relay, FOGG power vi fuse, and FOGG power breaker).

86. PSTMOSBF Fail to operate Valve 3865B motor operator does not operate (includes, D-25 motor operatot, master contactor, 95-1 relay, FOGG power fuse, and FOGG power breaker).

87. PSTCCSAF No signal Valve MO3865A controls fail (includes opening circuit, D-26 closing circuit, and common circuit) .

88. PSTCC5BF No signal Valve MO3865B controls fail (includes opening circuit, D-26 closing circuit, and common circuit).

89. PCNICl2O Open FOGG relay 95-1, channel 1C, contacts 1-2 fail open. D-20

90. PCN1D560 Open FOGG relay 95-1, channel ID, contacts 5-6 fail open. D-20

91. PRElAl2P Open AFWAS relay K612, channel 1A, fails open. D-18

92. PRElB12F Open AFWAS relay K612, channel IB, fails open. D-18

93. PREllllF Open AFWAS relay Killl, channel 1A, fails open. D-18

94. PRElll2P Open AFWAS relay Kill 2, channel IB, fails open. D-18

95. PMOlOSAA Fail to start POSA motor fails to start. D-9

96. PMOlOSCA Fail to start POSC motor fails to start. D-9

97. PSTBRlAF Fail to close POSA motor breaker does not close (includes control power D-25 and closing circuit failures).

98. PSTBRIBF Fall to close POSC motor breaker does not close (includes control power D-25 and closing circuit failures) .

l

TABLE 7c (continued)

Failure Data Basic Event Failure Mode Description of Event Appendix D Page No.

99. PMOL 77AA Fail to start Valve MO3177A motor operator does not operate (includes D-7 motor operator and power fuses).

100. PMOL 77BA Fail to start Valve MO3177B motor operator does not operate (includes D-7 motor operator and power fuses).

101. PRE 1512X False signal MSLIS relay K512, channel lA, fails closed, false signal. D-18 102. PRE 1514X False signal MSLIS relay K514, channel IB, fails closed, false signal. D-18 103. PRE 1610F Open AFWAS relay K610, channel 1A, fails open. D-18 104. PRE 1613F Open AFWAS relay K613, channel IB, fails open. D-18 105. PCB17140 Open 1Dll circuit breaker 72-14 fails open. D-15 106. PCB17150 Open ID21 circuit breaker 72-15 fails open. D-15 m 107. PCC177AF Fail to operate Valve MO3177A control circuit fails (includee opening, D-26 circuit, closing circuit, and common circuit).

108. PCC177BF Fail to operate Valve MO3177B control circuit fails (includes opening D-26 circuit, closing circuit, and common circuit) .

109. PMO3126C Closed valve MO3126 fails closed (includes control circuit and D-4 valve failure).

110. PMV3856C Closed Valve MO3856 fails closed (includes inadvertent close D-4 signal) .

111. PMO93A1A Fail to operate Valve MO3893Al motor operator fails to operate. D-6 112. PMO93A2A Fail to operate Valve MO3893A2 motor operator fails to operate. D-6 113. PMO93A3A Fail to operate Valve MO3893A3 motor operator fails to operate. D-6 114. PHO93A4A Fall to operate Valve MO3893A4 motor operator fails to operate. D-6 115. PMO93BLA Fail to operate Valve MO3893B1 motor operator fails to operate. D-6 116. PMO93B2A Fail to operate Valve MO3893B2 motor operator fails to operate. D-6 117. PMO93B3A Fail to operate Valve MO3893B3 motor operator fails to operate. D-7 118. PMO93B4A Fail to operate Valve MO3893B4 motor operator fails to operate. D-8 119. PCB93AlO Transfer open Valve MO3893Al circuit breaker opens. D-13 120. PCB93A20 Transfer open Valve MO3893A2 circuit breaker opens. D-13 121. PCB93A30 Transfer open valve MO3893A3 circuit breaker opens. D-13 122. PCB93A40 Transfer open Valve MO3893A4 circuit breaker opens. D-13 123. PCB93B10 Transfer open valve MO3893B1 circuit breaker opens. D-13 l No, m W ePUs m'4 P % 96 dW ep M e" "We e R

M M MY h M N TABLE 7c (continued)

Failure Data Basic Event Failure Mode Description of Event Appendix D Page No.

124. PCB93B20 Transfer open Valve MO3893B2 circuit breaker opens. D-13 125. PCB93B30 Transfer open Valve MO3893B3 circuit breaker opens. D-13 126. PCB93B40 Transfer open Valve MO3893B4 circuit breaker opens. D-13 127. PREA3OlF Open Valve MO3893Al APWAS relay fails open. D-18 128. PREA302F Open Valve MO3893A2 AFWAS relay fails open. D-18 129. PREA801F Open Valve MO3893A3 AFWAS relay fails open. D-18 130. PREA802F Open Valve MO3893A4 AFWAS relay fails open. D-18 131. PREB301F Open Valve MO3893B1 APWAS relay fails open. D-18 132. PREB302F Open Valve MO3893B2 AFWAS relay fails open. D-18 133. PREB801F Open Valve MO3893B3 AFWAS relay fails open. D-18 134. PREB802F Open Valve MO3893B4 AFWAS relay fails open. D-18

$ 135. PSTCCAlD No signal Valve MO3893Al control circuit fails (includes open, D-25 close, and common circuits).

136. PSTCCA2D No signal Valve MO3893A2 control circuit fails (includes open, D-25 close, and common circuits).

137. PSTCCA3D No signal Valve MO3893A3 control circuit fails (includes open, D-25 close, and common circuits.

138. PSTCCA4D No signal Valve MO3893A4 control circuit fails (includes open, D-25 close, and common circuits).

139. PSTCCBlD No signal Valve MO3893B1 control circuit fails (includes open, D-25 close, and common circuits).

140. PSTCCB2D No signal Valve MO3893B2 control circuit fails (includes open, D-25 close, and common circuits).

141. PSTCCB3D No signal Valve MO3893B3 control circuit fails (includes open, D-25 close, and common circuits).

142. PSTCCB4D No signal Valve MO3893B4 control circuit fails (includes open, D-25 close, and common circuits).

143. POOCCAlX False signal Valve LV3875Al transfers closed due to control faults. D-25 144. POOCCA2X False signal Valve LV3875A2 transfers closed due to control faults. D-25 145. POOCCBlX False signal Valve LV3875B1 transfers closed due to control faults. D-25 146. POOCCB2X False signal Valve LV3875B2 transfers closed due to control faults. D-25

.__ _. - -- - . - - . - .~ . . _ _ _ _ . _ ~ .- . - . __ .--. ..

i B:

l

! i TABLE 8. DOMINANT RANDOM FAILURE CUTSETS TABLE 8.A.l. Loss of Main Feedwater - Double Crossover (NRC Data) -

Failure to Start on Demand l

aanx t '

Catset g:

Cutsets Unavailability g, Cumalative Importance 1 PTSIGOSA, PM0105AA 1.6 x 10-5 45.6 45.6 2 PrBIG05A, PPM 105AF 4.0 x 10-6 11.4 57.0 .

3 PPM 105dF, PM0105AA 4.0 x 10-b 11.4 68.4 :

4 PXV00980, PM0105AA 2.0 x 10-6 5.7 74.2 !

5 Pr81G05A, PXV009AO 2.0 x 10-6 5.7 79.8 6 PPM 105BF, PPM 105AF 1.0 x 10-6 2.9 82.7 Oli r 7 Pra1005A, JOO1A05F 9.6 x 10-7 2.7 85.4 8 PXV009BO, PPM 105AF 5.0 x 10-7 1.4 86.8

! 9 PPM 105BF, PXV009A0 5.0 x 10-7 1.4 88.3 10 PXV001BC, PM0105AA 4.0 x 10-7 1.1 89.4 11 PTBlG05A, PRE 1111F 4.0 x 10-7 1.1 90.5 l

12 PM03126C, PM0105AA 4.0 x 10-7 1.1 91.7 i

l Basic Events l

Rank Basic Event Description Unavailability Importance 1 PTBlG05A Turoine G05A fails to start 2.4 x 10-5 68.5 (and controls) 2 PM0105AA POSA motor fails to start 2.3 x 10-5 66.4 j 3 PPM 105BF P058 fails to deliver suf- 6.0 x 10-6 17,1 ficient water 4 PPM 105AF P05A fails to deliver suf- 5.8 x 10-6 16.6 g ficient water :

5 FXV00980 P058 full flow test valve 3.0 x 10-6 8.6 transfers open g 6 PXV009Ao POSA full flow test valve 2.9 x 10-6 8.3 transfers open 7 JOOlA05F 4,160V switchgear bus lA05 1.4 x 10-6 4,0 fails 8 PM03126C Valve M03126 fails closed 6.0 x 10-7 1.7 9 PXV0018C P058 suction valve transfers 6.0 x 10-7 1.7 closed 10 PREllllF AFWAS relay Killl fatis open 5.8 x 10-7 1.7 t

y H m & d% dO M % Ob d% g H TABLE 8.A.2. Loss of Main Feedwater Due to Loss of Offsite Power -

Double Crossover (NRC Data) - Failure to Start on Demand

" 8' Cutset Rank Cutsets Unavailability Cumulative Imp ance Importance 1 PTBIG05A, JOOlA05F 1.5 x 10-4 58.8 58.8 2 PPM 105BF, J001A05F 3 7 x 10-5 14.7 73 5 3 PXV009BO, J001A05F 1.8 x 10-5 73 80.8 4 PTBlG05A, PM0105AA 1.6 x 10-5 6.4 87 2 5 PTBlG05A, PPM 105AF 4.0 x 10-6 1.6 88.8 6 PPM 105BF, PM0105AA 4.0 x 10-6 1.6 90 3 m

Basic Events Rank Basic Event Description Unavailability Importance 1 J001A05F 4,160V switchgear bus lA05 2.2 x 10-4 86.5 fails 2 PTBlG05A Turbine G05A fails to start 1 7 x 10-4 67.9 (and controls) 3 PPM 105BF P05B fails to deliver sur- 4.3 x 10-5 17.o ficient water 4 PM0105AA POSA motor fails to start 2 3 x 10-5 9.2 5 PXV009B0 P05B full flow test valve 2.1 x 10-5 8.5 transfers open 6 PPM 105AF PO5A fails to deliver suf- 5.8 x 10-6 23 ficient water

l B

I i

TABLE 8.A.3 Loss of All AC - Double Crossover (NRC Data) -

Failure to Start on Demand Cutset g Rank Cutsets Unavailability Cumulative g,po, e, Importance 1 PTBlGOSA 4.0 x 10-3 62.7 62.7 2 PPM 105BF 1.0 x 10-3 15.7 78.4 3 PXV00980 5.0 x 10-4 7.8 86.2 4 PXV001BC 1.0 x 10-4 1.6 87.8 5 PM03126C 1.0 x 10-4 1.6 89.4 6 PMV868BC 1.0 x 10-4 1.6 91.0 7 PMV3856C 1.0 x 10*4 1.6 92.5 8 PXV037-C 1.0 x 10-4 1.6 94.1 9 PCV024-D 1.0 x 10-4 1.6 95.7 Basic Events Rank Basic Event Description Unavailability Importance 1 PTBlG05A turbine GOSA fails to start 4.0 x 10-3 62.7 O (and controls) 2 PPM 105BF 1.0 x 10-3 P058 fails to deliver suf- 15.7 ficient water 3 PXV009BO P058 full flow test valve 5.0 x 10-4 7.8 transfers open i 4 PMV868BC Suction header cross-connect 1.0 x 10-4 1.6 valve transfers closed I

1 5 PMO3126C Valve MO3126 transfers closed 1.0 x 10-4 1.6 6 PMV3856C Valve MO3856 transfers closed 1.0 x 10-4 1.6 7 PXV037-C CST isolation valve trans- 1.0 x 10-4 1.6 fers closed 8 PCV024-D CST check valve fails closed 1.0 x 10-4 1.6 i

9 PXV001BC P058 suction valve transfers 1.0 x 10-4 1.6 closed s

56

TABLE 8.B.l. Loss of Main Feedwater - Double Crossover -

Failure to Start on Demand

" 8" Cutset Rank Cutsets Unavailability Cumulative e

Importance 1 PTBlG05A, PPM 105AF 3 3 x 10-5 46.5 46.5 2 PPM 105BF, PPM 105AF 1 5 x 10-5 20 7 67 2 3 PTBlGOSA, PM0105AA 5.8 x 10-6 8.2 75.4 4 PTBlG05A, PSTBRIAF 3 5 x 10-6 4.9 80.4 5 PPM 105BF, PM0105AA 2.6 x 10-6 37 84.0 6 PPM 105BF, PSTBRIAF 1.6 x 10-6 2.2 86.2 7 PTBlGOSA, PREllllF 1.5 x 10-6 2.2 88.4 8 PTBlG05A, J001A05F 1.2 x 10-6 1.7 90.1 Basic Events Rank Basic Event Description Unavailability Importance 1 PPM 105AF POSA fails to deliver sur- 5.1 x 10-5 69 4 ficient water 2 PTB1G05A Turbine G05A fails to start 4.9 x 10-5 66.6 (and controls) 3 PPM 105BF POSB fails to deliver sur- 2.2 x 10-5 29 7 ficient water 4 PM0105AA POSA^ motor fails to start 9.0 x 10-6 12 3 5 PSTBRIAF POSA motor breaker does not 5.4 x 10-6 7,4 close 6 PREllllF AFWAS relay Kllll fails open 2.4 x 10-6 32 7 J001A05F 4,160V bus lA05 fails to 1.9 x 10-6 2.6 suppl,y power

TABLE 8.B.2. Loss of Main Feedwater Due to Loss of Offsite Power -

Double Crossover - Failure to Start on Demand Cutset Cutset i Rank Cutsets Unavailability Cumulative Imp ance Importance 1 PTBlG05A, J001A05F 3 9 x 10-4 59 1 59.1 2 PPM 105BF, J001A05F 1.8 x 10-4 26.4 85.4 3 PTBlG05A, PPM 105AF 3 3 x 10-5 49 90,4 Easic Events Rank Basic Event Description Unavailability Importance 1 J001A05F 4,160V switchgear bus lA05 6 3 x 10 " 69.7 fails 2 PTBlG05A Turbine G05A fails to start 4.4 x 10-4 65.9 (and controls) 3 PPM 105BF POSB fails to deliver sur- 2.0 x 10-4 29 4 ficient water 4 PPM 105AF POSA fails to deliver sur- 5.1 x 10-5 73 ficient water 9e _

W5 M %P 4. % W m e r 8% em ' 'We W5

Y M O Y M Ub Y WM &

TABLE 8.B.3 Loss of Main Feedwater Due to Loss of All AC -

Double Crossover - Failure to Start on Demand Cutset Rank Cutsets Unavailability Cumulative Imp a e Importance 1 PTBlGOSA 1.1 x 10-2 63 4 63 4 2 PPM 105BF 4.7 x 10-3 28 3 91 7 Basic Events Rank Basic Event Description Unavailability Importance 1 PTB1G05A Turbine G05A fails to start 1.1 x 10-2 63.4 (and controls) 2 PPM 105BF FOSB fails to deliver sur- 4 7 x 10-3 28.3 ficient water

5 I

i TABLE 8.C.l. Loss of Main Feedwater - Base Case -

Failure to Start on Demand Cutset Rank Outsets Unavailability """ ' "* O Imp tt ce Importance 1 PPM 105AF, PTB1G05A 3.3 x 10-5 44.8 44.8 2 PPM 105AF, PPM 105BF 1.5 x 10-5 20.0 64.8 3 PM0105AA, PTBlGOSA 5.8 x 10-6 7,9 72,7 4 PSTBRIAF, PTBlGOSA 3.5 x 10-6 4.8 77.4 5 PM0105AA, PPM 105BF 2.6 x 10-6 3.5 81.0 6 PSTBRIAF, PPM 105BF 1.6 x 10-6 2.1 83.1 7 PREllllF, PTalG05A 1.5 x 10-6 2.1 85.2 8 JOOlA05F, PTB1G05A 1.2 x 10-6 1.7 86.9 9 PXV003AC, PTBlG05A 1.2 x 10-6 1.6 88.5 10 PCv002AD, PTBlG05A 1.1 x 10-6 1.5 89.9 11 PPM 105AF, PXV003BC 8.9 x 10-7 1.2 91.1 Basic Events Rank Scsic Event Description Unavailability Importance I

1 PPM 105AF POSA fails to deliver suf- 4.9 x 10-5 67.5 ficient water E 2 PTB1G05A Turbine COSA fails to start 4.8 x 10-5 65.8 (and controls) 3 PPM 105BF P058 fails to deliver suf- 2.1 x 10-5 29.4 ficient water 4 PM0105AA PO5A motor fails to start 8.7 x 10-6 12.0 5 PSTBRlAF POSA motor breaker does 5.2 x 10-6 7,2 not close 6 PREllllF ATWAS relay K1111 fails open 2.3 x 10-6 3,2 7 JOOlA05F 4,160V switchgear bus lA05 1.8 x 10-6 2.5 fails 8 PXV003AC POSA discharge valve trans- 1.7 x 10-6 2,4 fers closed 9 PCV002AD Check valve P05A discharge 1.6 x 10-6 2.2 fails closed 10 PXV003BC P058 discharge valve trans- 1.3 x 10-6 1.8 I

E I

60

SM N M OM S Y UN $M &

TABLE 8.C.2. Loss of Main Feedwater Due to Loss of Offsite Power -

Base Case -Failure to Start on Demand Rank Cutsets Cutset Unavailability "*" * **

Importance Importance 1 JOOI A05F, PTBlGOSA 3 9 x 10-4 59.1 59.1 2 JOOlA05F, PPM 105BF 1.7 x 10-4 26.4 85.5 3 PPM 105AF, PTBlGOSA 3 3 x 10-5 4.9 90.4 4 PPM 105AF, PPM 105BF 1.4 x 10-5 2.2 92.6 O

Basic Events Rank Basic Event Description Unavailability Importance 1 J001A05F 4,160V switchgear bus lA05 5.9 x 10-4 89 2 fails 2 PTBlGOSA Turbine G05A fails to start 4.4 x 10-4 66.1 (and controls) 3 PPM 105BP POSB rails to deliver sur- 1.9 x 10-4 29.5 ficient water 4 PPM 105AF P03A fails to deliver sur- 4.9 x 10-5 7,4 ficient water

TABLE 8.C.3 Loss of Main Feedwater Due to Loss of All of AC -

Base Case - Failure to Start on Demand

" 8" Rank Cutset Cutsets Unavailability hpo e Cumulative Importance 1 PTBlGOSA 1.1 x 10-2 64.7 64.7 2 PPM 105BF 4.7 x 10-3 28.8 93.5 Basic Events Rank Basic Event Description Unavailability Importance 1 PTBlGOSA Turbine G05A fails to start 1.1 x 10-2 64.7 (and controls) 2 PPM 10SBF POSB rails to deliver sur- 4.7 x 10-3 28.8 ficient water 1

3 I TABLE 8.D.l. Loss of Main Feedwater - Three Pump -

Failure to Start on Demand Cutset Rant Cutsets Unavailability Cumulative Impor ce importance 1 POOCCaix, PTBlGOSA 1.5 x 10-4 19.1 19.1 2 POOCCBlX, PPM 105BF 6.9 x 10-5 8.5 27.3 3 POOCCAlX, PTBlG05A 5.9 x 10-5 7,3 34,9 4 PHV020BC, PTB1G05A 5.8 x 10-5 7.2 42.1 n

V 5 PNV020AC, PTB1G05A 5.8 x 10-5 7.2 49.3 6 PSTM000F, FTBIGOSA 3.7 x 10-5 4.6 53.9 7 PSTMOOAF, PTc1G05A 3.7 x 10-5 4.6 58.5 8 PPM 105CF, PTB1G05A 3.3 x 10-5 4.1 62.6 9 PPM 105AF, PTBIGOSA 3.3 x 10-5 4.1 66.6 10 POOCCAIX, PPM 105BF 2.6 x 10-5 3.3 69.9 11 PHV020BC, PPM 105BF 2.6 x 10-5 3.2 73.1 12 PHV020AC, PPM 105BP 2.6 x 10-5 3.2 76.3 13 PSTM00BF, PPM 105BF 1.7 x 10-5 2.1 78.4 14 PSTM00AF, PPM 105BF 1.7 x 10-5 2.1 80.4 15 PPM 105CF, PPM 105BF 1.5 x 10-5 1.8 82.2 1.5 x 10-5 I 16 PPM 105AF, PPM 105BP 1.8 84.1 17 PLV75B1C, PTBlG05A 6.1 x 10-6 0.8 84.8 18 PM0105CA, PTB1G05A 5.8 x 10-6 0.7 85.5 19 PM0105AA, PTBIG05A 5.8 x 10-6 0.7 86.3 20 POOCCBlX, PXV003BC 4.7 x 10-6 0.5 86.8 I9 Basic Events Rank Basic Event Description Unavailability Importance 1 PTalG05A Turbine G05A fails to start 5.3 x 10-4 65.2 (and controls) 2 PPM 105BF Pump POSB fails to deliver 2.3 x 10-8 29.1 sufficient water 3 POOCCalX LV3875B1 transfers closed 2.3 x 10-4 28.5 (controls) 4 POOCCAIX LV3875Al transfers closed 8.8 x 10-5 10,9 (controls) 5 PHV020BC Pressure control valve 8.6 x 10-5 10,7 PCV0208 fails closed 6 PHV020AC Pressure control valve 8.6 x 10-5 10,7 PCV020A fails closed 7 PSTM00AF M03870A motor operator does 5.6 x 10-5 6.9 not operate 8 PSTM00BF M03870BF motor operator does 5.6 x 10-5 6.9 not operate 9 PPM 105CF Pump P03C fails to deliver 4.9 x 10-5 6.0 I 10 11 PPM 105AF PXV003BC sufficient water Pump POSA fails to deliver sufficient water P05B discharge valve trans-4.9 x 10-5 1-4 x'10-5 6.0 1.8 fers closed 3 12 13 PLV75BIC PM0105CA Level control valve LV3875B1 fails closed POSC motor fails to start 9.1 x 10-6 8.6 x 10-6 1,1 1,1 14 PM0105AA POSA motor fails to start 8.6 x 10-6 1,1 I

63

~

E I

TABLE 8.D.2. Loss of Main Feedwater Due to Loss of Offsite Power -

Three Pump - Failure to Start on Demand Cutset Rank Cutsets Unavailability umulative Imp r nce Importance 1 PTB1G05A, JOO1A05F 3.9 x 10*4 19.9 19.9 2 PTB1G05A, JOO1A06F 3.9 x 10*4 19.7 39.7 3 PPM 1058F, JOOlA05F 1.7 x 10*4 8.9 48.6 4 PPM 105BF, J001A06F 1.7 x 10*4 8.9 57.5 5 POOCCBlX, PTBIGOSA 1.5 x 10*4 7.8 65.3 6 POOCCBlX, PPM 105BF 6.9 x 10-5 3.5 68.8 4 7 PTB1G05A, POOCCAlX 5.9 x 10-5 3.0 71.8 8 PTalG05A, PHV020BC 5.8 x 10-5 2.9 74.7 9 PTBlG05A, PHV020AC 5.8 x 10-5 2.9 77.6 g 10 PTBlG05A, PSTM00BF 3.7 x 10-5 1.9 79.5 11 PTB1G05A, PSTM00AF 3.7 x 10-5 1.9 81.4 12 PTB1G05A, PPM 105CF 3.3 x 10-5 1.6 83.1 13 PTB1G05A, PPM 105AF 3.3 x 10-5 1.6 84.7 14 PPM 105BF, POOCCAIX 2.6 x 10-5 1.3 86.1 15 PPM 105BF, PHV020BC 2.6 x 10-5 1.3 87.4 16 PPM 105BF, PHV020AC 2.6 x 10-5 1.3 88.7 17 PPM 105BF, PSTM00BF 1.7 x 10-5 .8 89.5 18 PPM 105BF, PSTM00AF 1.7 x 10-5 .8 90.4 19 PPM 105BF, PPM 105CF 1.5 x 10*5 ,7 91,1 Basic Events Rank Basic Event Description Unavailability Importance 9

i 1

1 PTB1G05A Turbine 1G05A fails to 1.3 x 10*3 66.3 start (and controla) l I

2 Jro1A05F 4,160V switchgear bus lA05 5.8 x 10*4 29.6 fails 3 J001A06F 4,160V switchgear bus 1A06 5.8 x 10*4 29.6 fails 4 PPM 105BF P058 fails to deliver suf- 5.8 x 10*4 29.6 ficient water 5 POOCCB1X valve LV3875B1 transfers 2.3 x 10*4 11.7 closed 6 POOCClX Valve LV3875Al transfers 8.8 x 10-5 4,4 closed 7 PHV020BC Pressure control valve 8.6 x 10-5 4,4 PCV020 fails closed 8 PHV020AC Pressure control valve 8.6 x 10-5 4,4 PCV020A fails closed 9 PSTM00AF MO3870A operator fails 5.7 x 10-5 2,9 (and controls) 10 PSTM00BF M038708 operator fails 5.7 x 10-5 2.9 (and controls) 11 PPM 105CF P05C fails to deliver suf- 4.9 x 10-5 2.5 ficient teater 12 PPM 105AF POSA fails to deliver suf- 4.9 x 10-5 2.5 ficJent water I

64

a r ame AB mas ans, ,,,o g,, agu m - m ,,,03,, ga ,, my ,,, g TABLE 8.D.3 Loss of Main Faedwater Due to Loss of All of AC -

Three Pump - Failure to Start on Demand Cutset Rank Cutsets Unavailability Cumulative Importance 1 PTB1G05A 1.1 x 10-1 62.5 62.5 2 PPM 105BF 4.7 x 10-2 27 9 90 3

$ Basic Events Rank Basic Event Description Unavailability Importance 1 PTBlGOSA Turbine GOSA fails to start 1.1 x 10-1 62.5 (and controls) 2 PPM 105BF P05B fails to deliver sur- 4.7 x 10-2 27 9 ficient water

E I

Every 18 months each automatically operated valve is checked to ensure the valve cycles to the correct position upon receipt of an Auxil-iary Feedwater Actuation Signal; the auxiliary feedwater steam generator level control valves are checked to ensure they maintain steam generator water level; and the feedwater stop valves are checked to ensure they g cycle shut upon receipt of a high level in the associated steam generator. g 9

5.3.1.3 Auxiliary Peedwater Actuation System. The Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System (AFWAS) is functionally checked monthly. Channel checks are performed at least every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , and the instrumentation channels are calibrated at least every 18 months.

5.3.1.4 condensate Storage Tank. Level in the Condensate Storage Tank is verified at least every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . With one of the two Condensate g Storage Tanks inoperable, an auxiliary feedwater pump supply flowpath is demonstrated to be operable at least daily.

5. 3.1. 5 Service Water System. Service water valves (manual, automatic, or power-operated) which service safety-related equipment are verified to be in the correct position monthly if the valves are not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position.

Every 18 months each automatic valve is verified to actuate to its correct position upon receipt of an Essenti.nl Safeguards Features Actua-tion Signal (ESFAS) and each service water pump is verified to start on an ESFAS test signal.

5.3.2 Maintenance All system components were reviewed for possible contribution to maintenance unavailability. Generic data was reviewed in conjunction g with this component review to identify prevalent failure modes and the effect of the associated maintenance on system operation. The following

=

is a brief discussion of the tesults of this review.

5.3.2.1 Hardware Failures (Mechanical Components). Packing replacement and adjustment is the dominant cause of maintenance on valves. In most cases, this maintenance can be performed with the valve in the correct position for system operation (fully open or fully closed). Valve repairs requiring disassembly of the valve, although not frequently occurring, may have a major impact on system availability due to system isolation requirements necessary to safely perform this maintenance.

Those valves which require full A WS shutdown in order for repair also require a plant shutdown (per technical specifications) and, therefore, do not contribute to the maintenance unavailability of the AWS. Those valves requiring maintenance which only need a single AFW pump train to g be shut down do contribute to maintenance unavailability of the AWS. g Valves which are periodically cycled, which have a throttling action, or which are in a high energy system are the dominant contributors to this unavailability. These valves 9re included in the pump train naintenance unavailability.

l W

I g

I I

Pump maintenance consists of a range of actions from major disassem-bly to packing adjustment. For the AFW pumps, most maintenanc e performed requires isolation of the pump from the system and, therefore, contri-butes to the maintenance unavailability of the pump train.

The maintenance on large motors range from inspection and cleaning to W major disassembly. The prevalent failure mode is bearing failure which requires partial disassembly of the motor. All maintenance of the AIM pump motor contributes to maintenance unavailability and is included in the pump train maintenance unavailability.

Turbine maintenance can range from simple adjustments to major disas-A sembly. A review of Licensee Event Reports from January 1972 to April

) 1978 revealed only one reported failure of a turbine in an AFWS. This I failure was due to a casing steam leak discovered during startup after routine maintenance had been performed. Turbine failure is included in the maintenance contribution to unavailability of the turbine driven pump train.

5.3.2.2 Electrical Pailures (Controls, etc.). Motor-operated valve (MOV, LCV) control circuit failures occur with moderate frequency.

I Repairs generally consist of troubleshooting and defective component replacement or repair. In some cases, the associated valve may be placed in the desired position prior to commencing repairs on the control cir-cuit. The level control valves (two) for each pump train, and the SG AFW isolation valves (two per SG) were considered for their maintenance con-tribution to system unavailability; however, their individual contribu-tion to maintenance unavailability is less than 1% of the contribution of the individual pump trains to maintenance unavailability.

3 The AFW pump motor breaker and control circuit requires periodic maintenance and repair. Because the 4160V breakers are interchangeable 1 between 4160V cubicles, and spare breakers are available, major breaker repair is not included in the maintenance unavailability of the motor-driven pump train. All other control and breaker maintenance is included in the unavailability of the motor driven AFW pump train.

5.3.2.3 Data. Plant historical records for maintenance actions were available for this analysis; however, because the plant is not yet oper-ating, this data was not used in determining the maintenance unavailabil-ity of the dif ferent pump trains, instead generic values from WASH-1400, the Reactor Safety Study, were used.

From WASH-1400, the expected frequency of pump maintenance is one act every 4.5 months. This maintenance is assumed to include the pump, the I driver (turbine or motor), and associated control circuits. The mainte-nance duration ranged from a few minutes to several days. The plant technical specifications limit this maintenance duration to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

The lognormal mean maintenance act duration is 19 hours2.199074e-4 days 0.00528 hours 3.141534e-5 weeks 7.2295e-6 months .

Based upon the preceding discussion, Table 9 presents the maintenance unavailability contributions for AFW pump trains.

l -

67

TABLE 9 PUMP TRAIN UNAVAILABILITY DUE TO TEST AND MAINTENANCE

"" month Q maintenance turbine = 4.5 months"x 19 hours2.199074e-4 days 0.00528 hours 3.141534e-5 weeks 7.2295e-6 months actuation 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months = 5 9 x 10-3 Q maintenance motor

= 4.5 montna

""'"x 19 hours2.199074e-4 days 0.00528 hours 3.141534e-5 weeks 7.2295e-6 months actuation month 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months = 5 9 x 10-3 Q test turbine = 15 minutes hour month g (operator error) month 60 minutes 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months x 0 9 = 3 1 x 10-4 Q test motor = 15 minutes hour month (operator error) month 60 minutes 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months x 0 9 = 3 1 x 10-4 System Unavailability Due to Test and Maintenance Q systemT+M = (Q maintenance turbine + Q test turbine)

(Q system with turbine pump down)

+ (Q maintenance motor + Q test motor)

(Q system with motor pump down)

E E S N 9

1 3 !

I ;

5.4 HUMAN INTERACTION 5.4.1 Human Interaction / Recoverable Failures For the purposes of this analysis, due to the short period of time between failure of the A WS to start and loss of the SGs due to dryout, no opera *ar action to recover the AFWS was considered. This conservatism l

could be eliminated if more definitive calculations for timing of AWS starting are made.

There are some system failures from which the operator may recover.

The most significant of these is a turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump trip.

The dominant contributor to turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps failure to start on demand is a failure of the turbine controls; primar-ily due to turbine trip on overspeed during startup. The operator may manually reset the overspeed trip, or take control cf the turbine-driven A W pump if, during a demand, this pump did not operate. The probability S of failure for the operator failing to take action within 30 minutes is Pg--0.044 mean with 0.005 variance.

Using this value, a point value estimate of the system unavailability (failure to start and no recovery) for the double crossover system design is 2.5 x 10-5, 5.4.2 Human Error / Testing I During the monthly full flow testing of the A W pumps, an operator is stationed at the full flow test bypass valve. After the pump is started, this operator throttles open the full flow test valve to achieve rated pump flow and discharge head. Should the A W S be actuated by a plant transient, this operator must close the full flow test valve to allow the AFW pump to feed the SGs. The full flow test is assumed to last 15 minutes per month. Pump unavailability due to this test is equal to 15 minutes _ hour _ month month 60 minutes 720 hcurs

= 3.5 x 10-4 3 The operator error, failing to act correctly during the first 5 minutes after the onset of an extremely high stress situation is 0.9. The unavailability of a pump train on demand due to this failure is 3.1 x 10-4 5.4.3 Human Error--Common Cause A common cause human error has been identified for the A WS. The error can occur after the pump monthly flow testing. Essentially, after each pump test, the auxiliary plant operator must close the full flow 3 test valve. The pumps themselves are controlled from the main control board, and position indication is available for the full flow test valve I

g ee

E I

at the main control board. If the pumps are tested sequentially (i.e.,

one pump is tested and at the completion of this test the other pump is tested) common human error or combinations of errors is possible. These errors consist of: the auxiliary plant operator failing to close the full flow test valve for the first pump and failing to close the second pump's full flow test valve (close coupling is assumed); and the main control board operator failing to notice the valve position indication for the full flow test valves on the main control board (also close cou-pled if the first valve position indication is missed). The recovery time for this failure is based upon the probability of the improper valve position being discovered during shift change when the oncoming and off-going operators " walk down" the main control boards from NUREG-0611, Table III-2, the point value estimate for this potential human error is 1 x 10-4 with an estimated error factor of 20. g Based upon discussions with the plant operators, the following recovery histogram was constructed.

t 3 ~

0.75

.O 1

2 t

g 0.20 g 8

0 o5 5

l E , e 0 2 7 30 -

The mean value from this histogram for recovery is 2.53 days and the var-iance is 13.7 days.

The probability for failure on demand for this common cause human error is then (if one assumes that the error has occurred)

"" m nth QF =

month

" x 10' P(f) x 2.52 days x 30 days Op = 8.4 x 10-6 with a variance of 6.7 x 10-10, 5.5 COMMON CAUSE ANALYSIS The method used to perform the common cause failure analysis is based on the system logic model. Qualitative failure characteristics are iden-tified for each basic event. A search is then performed to identify those combinations of basic events that result in system failure and I

70

I I

share qualitative failure characteristics. Barriers between components, both physical and administrative, are considered in the analysis. The results of the common cause search are groups of cutsets identified by common failure characteristics and absence of barriers.

There is an extremely large array of failure causes that must be con-sidered in a comprehensive common cause failure analysis. These failure causes have been grouped into two major categories and these two categor-1 ies have been further subdivided. For each subdivision a generic cause of failure has been identified. The first division is made on the basis I

of barriers that can be erected to the cause of failure in order to pre-vent it from failing the entire system. The barriers that exist are of either procedural or physical. The failure causes, also called qualita-I tive failure characteristics of the basic event or " susceptibilities" are categorized by criterion based on barriers to the failure cause.

The susceptibility codes for the causes of failure considered in this I

analysis are given in Table 10. Due to the limits of the available information, assumptions were made concerning maintenance actions, test procedures, and manufacturers. These links are assumed to be different

! for different generic components.

5.5.1 The First Criterion 1

I A qualitative failure characteristic, or a susceptibility, is a com-mon link when physical barriers cannot be erected to prevent the propaga-tion of the failures, and procedural barriers must then be erected.

Typical common links used in a common cause analysis are:

e Manufacturer B e Test / Maintenance e Operator I

e Motive Power e Instrument Power e Installation e Calibration e Similar Parts The common links of manufacturer and similar parts were used in this E analysis.

5.5.2 The Second Criterion The coding of failure sensitivity to causes of failure are given for I each generic component type in Table 11. The final information tr.at l

I needs to be coded for the auxiliary feedwater system common cause analy-sis is the physical location of the basic events. Table 12 is the refer-ence used in location definition. The first part of the exhibit identi-I l

fies the codes used with the basic events and the location in the plant that these codes represent. The second part of the exhibit identifies all basic events used in the analysis and the physical location for these basic events.

I 71

E-I i

TABLE 10. SUSCEPTIBILITY CODES L

First Criterion Maintenance Action - MA MB MD M1 g M2 M3 M4 Test Procedure - T1 T2 T3 T4 TD TE TF TG TI TJ TK TL TM TP TS TT TU TV TW Manufacturer Anchor Darling - AD Byron Jackson - BG Control Component - CC Henry Pratt - HP Limitorque - LJ Terry Turbine - TT g Unknown (Similar - X1 X2 X3 X4 3 Coraponents Grouped X5 X7 X8 ,

Together) t; Second Criterion Impact -I Vibration -V Moisture -M Grit -G Stress -S I

E I

72

I I

i 1

TABLE 11. GENERIC COMPONENTS AND THEIR SENSITIVITIES TO FAILURE o

Component Type Code Special Condition Susceptibility Level Valve LV T M I S Manual Valve XV T M I S I

Pump PM T M I V

[ Turbine (includes TB T I V M G controls)

Contact CN T I V M G Circuit Breaker CB T I V M G

] Control Circuit ST T I V M G Power Bus 00 T I V M G Control Circuit CC T M I V M G Motor Valve MV T M I S Relay RE T I V M G

, Check Valve CV T M I Motor MO T I M G il m

g

E TABLE 12. PHYSICAL BARRIER INFORMATION Equipment Locations Used in the Midland AFW System Analysis R15A R15B - inside reactor building.

RSDC PISO - auxilary building pipe chase.

CLCV - auxilary building outside AFW pump rooms.

MAAA - auxilary building motor driven pump room.

TBAA - auxilary building turbine driven pump room.

YARD - exterior of buildings.

SAAA - 4160VAC switchgear room A.

SABA - 480VAC switchgear room A.

SBBA - 480VAC switchgear room B.

BAAD - 125VDC battery room A, Panel 1Dll.

BBAD - 125VDC battery room B, Panel 1D21.

PABA - service water pump room A.

PBBA - service water pump room B.

! OCHA - ESF actuation.- AFWAS channel A.

OCHB - ESF actuation - AFWAS channel B. I 1

t l Basic Events in Locations R15A, RISB, RSDC PMV177AD PCVU53AD PM0177AA

PMV177BD PCVU53BD PM0177BA Basic Events in Location PISO PMV870AD PMV865AD PM03126C PMV870BD PMV865BD 5 I

E I

74

3 l TABLE 12. PHYSICAL BARRIER INFORMATION (continued)

Basic Events in Location CLCV PLV75AlD PXV0014C PXV009A0 W PLV75A2D PXV278-C PMV8931D PLV75BlD PXV279-C PMV8932D PLV75B2D PMV868AC PMV8933D PM075A1A PMV868BC PMV8934D PM075A2A PMV3856C PM08931A PM075BlA PCV0001D PM08932A PM075B2A PCV0013D PM08933A PXV0002C PCV0015D PM08934A PXV0004C PCV0025D Basic Events in Location MAAA y PXV001AC PPM 105AF Basic Events in Location TBAA PXV001BC PXV009B0 PPM 105BF PTBlGOSA Basic Event in-Location YARD a PXV037-C L

Basic Event 1 'ation SAAA Basic Events in Location SABA PCN1D120 PSTM00AF PSTCCOAF PCB15260 PSTCSlAC I

N I

g V,

E TABLE 12. PHYSICAL BARRIER INFORMATION (continued) i Basic Events in Location SBBA PCNIC560 PCB16260 PSTM00BF PSTCSlBC PSTCC0BF 3 Basic Events in Location BAAD PCNICl20 PCB16200 PCB16210 E PSTCCSAF P00CCAlX P00CCA2X $

PSTMOSAF g Basic Events in Location BBAD PCN1D560 PCB17150 PCB17140 PSTMOSBF PCC177BF PCC177AF PCB17200 PCB17210 PSTCCSBF P00CCB1X P00CCB2X Basic Events in Location PABA PCB21030 PRElA03F PCB21020 PRElA08F PSTCCAlF PSTCCA2P l

l Basic Events in Location PBBA g PCB11030 PCB11020 PRElB03F PRElB08F PSTCCBlF PSTCCB2F Basic Events in Location OCHA PRElAllF PRElAl2F PREllllF PREA109F PREA209F PRE 1A03F PRE 1A03F Basic Events in Location OCHB PRE 1610F PRElBllF PRElB12F PRE 1613F PRE 1512X PRE 1514X PREB109F PREB209F PRElB03F PRElB08F E

l I

76

3 I

5.5.3 Results of Common Cause Analysis E All cutsets with common susceptibilities were in the same location, CLCV, the area of the auxiliary building outside the AFW pump rooms.

Moisture, grit, and impact were found in this location. The number and order (number of basic events in the cutset) for each of these causes of

'g failure are given in Table 13. Moisture was found to be a common sus-ceptibility for the four level control valves and for four two-event cut-sets in the pump suction lines (consisting of the pump suction MOVs and various combinations of the service water supply MOVs). The design of these valves protects the motor operators from high humidity and other minor sources of water. Flooding or pipe rupture could, however, prevent these valves from operating when demanded. The level control valves are b the most susceptible to this cause because they must move from their nor-mally closed position to permit AFW flow to the steam generators. The I suction valves are only required to operate in the event of low pressure at the pump suction ard a coincident AFWAS signal. From WASH-1400, the probability of a pipe rupture is 1 x 10-4 per reactor year of opera-tion. However, this system is called upon to operate (and therefore pressurized) 16 times per year (six actuations and ten startup/

chutdowns) . The average run time is about two hours. The resulting probability of failure is 4 x 10-7 which is significantly less than the I common cause human error identified in Section 5.4 but was found to be a common susceptibility for the same cutsets as moisture. Motor operated valve design protects the motor operators from the normal sources of air-borne grit or dust during plant operation. During maintenance periods, the plant general maintenance procedures limit the sources of grit as a general housekeeping practice. This practice in conjunction with the I safety system testing that occurs prior to plant operation results in a large reduction in the probability of failure due to grit because of maintenance. In addition, because failure due to grit is not an instan-taneous failure, but rather a slow degradation in operation, any common cause failures will most likely be detected and corrected as a result of

= normal testing and preventive maintenance.

Because of the above reasons, the probability of system failure due to the common cause susceptibility--grit--is very much less than the com-mon cause human error identified in Section 5.4.

Impact is identified as a common cause susceptibility for 51 three-event cutsets in the pump suction piping, 16 three-event cutsets in the pump discharge piping, and 451 four-event cutsets in the pump discharge piping. There is no high energy piping in the immediate vicinity of the pump suction piping, thus eliminating pipe whip as an impact source. The only other possible sources of impact in this area are due to external causes such as explosion. Plant procedures limit the amount and location of explosive materials (acetelyne, etc.) and thereby form an administra-tive barrier to explosion as a cause of impact.

j The pump discharge piping is a high energy system when the AFW system W is in operation and is the only high energy system in the vicinity. If one assumes that pipe rupture leads directly to pipe whip (a conservative 77

E! i I) i TABLE 13 COMMON CAU"E CANDIDATES IN PHYSICAL LOCATION CLCV Cutsets Susceptibility Quantity Basic Events Moisture (suction) 4 2 t

(discharge) 1 4 Grit (suction) 4 2 (discharge) 1 4 Impact (suction) 51 3 (discharge) 16 3 (discharge) 451 4 I.

F:

l L

i E

2e g

3 assumption considering piping support design), impact as a source of com-mon cause failure can be no more severe than moisture as a source which has been discussed above. Therefore, the probability of failure due to impact is less than 4 x 10-7, which is significantly less than the common cause human error identified in Section 5.4.

{J Common links were found in 278 cutsets, identifying those cutsets as common cause candidates. The common links and manufacturer are identi-fied following the groups of common cause candidates with those suscepti-bilities in Table 14. Since these components are tested regularly during surveillance tests and normal operations, and are maintained regularly, E they should have shaken out most manufacturer-related problems. Further-5 more, the components are located in different areas of the plant and are

() therefore subjected to different environments.

5.6 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS Time sequential behavior, key system dependencies, and reduced system

. performance states can be modeled using event tree methods. The event tree of Figure 11 lays out such a model for the Midland Plant Auxiliary Feedwater System. Here, the initiating event is an auxiliary feedwater actuation signal. Next, the question of good and " bad" steam generators is addressed. We have defined a bad steam generator to be one with a steam break that has not been isolated. WASH-1400 gives the failure rate as 1 x 10-4 per for pipes. Further containment and steam generator 4 analyses could lead to a revised definition.

Next in the tree come the questions concerning the availability of I electric power. Without DC power, the entire system must fail. Without AC power, the turbine-driven pump train may still operate.

h The next three events define successful start of the auxiliary feed-water system. Turbine train starts, turbine restarts after turbine trip, and motor train starts. Probabilities of successful starting will be derived from decompositions of the system fault tree. Without success in at least one start path, the system fails on demand. When some electric pcwer is available we must now ask if the FOGG system operates. For cases with a single bad steam generator, FOGG must keep auxiliary feed-water isolated from that steam generator and must permit flow to a good steam generator. Lacking a final FOGG system design, we have assigned a reasonable unavailability of 10-4 per demand per train based on high quality actuation systems in WASH-1400. Given that the system has started, we next ask if the failure in the level conciol system leads to overcooling in either steam generator. Again lacking co.,plete level control system information, we have assigned a probability of failure of 10-4 per demand. Finally, given a successful start, we ask if the system continues to run successfully for eight hours.

The event tree in Figure 11 has been simplified by showing repeated 3 similar sequences coded A, B, and C. The full expansion of the complete tree is shown in Figure 12. Seven final system states have been identi-fled on the tree. S stands for complete success. The system starts successfully, does not overcool, and continues to run for eight hours.

79 1

TABLE 14. COMMON CAUSE CANDIDATES Cutset Basic Events Commonalities

1. PPM 105AF PPM 105BF Common Link M4, TK Manufacturer BG

2. PXV001AC PXV001BC Common Link MB Manufacturer X8 3 PXV009A0 PXV009B0 Common Link TK, MB Manufacturer X7

4. PPM 105AF PXV009BO

5. PXV009A0 PPM 105BF g Common Link TK

6. PCVU53BD PCVU53AD Common Link TI, M2 Manufacturer X1 7 PXV001AC PXV009BO

8. PXV009AO PXV001BC Common Link MB 9 PXV037-C PXV278-C PXV279-C Common Link MA Manufacturer HP

10. PXV001AC PXV0017C PXV0002C Common Link MB, TK

11. PXV001BC PXV0014C PXV0004C Common Link MB, TK 4e W ePF "o d" Me _

45 W *P So ____ W __ W

TABLE 14. COMMON CAUSE CANDIDATES (continued)

Cutset Basic Events Commonalities

12. PXV009A0 PXV0017C PXV0002C 13 PXV009B0 PXV0014C PXV0004C Common Link MB, TK Manufacturer X7

14. PCV0013D PCV0015D PCVU53AD 15 PCV0001D PCV0025D PCVU53BD Common Link M2, TI Manufacturer X1

16. PREB209F PREllllF PREA109F 17 PRE 1610F PRE 1613F PREllllF Common Link TV Manufacturer X2

$ 18. PMV8931D PXV279-C PXV037-C 19 PMV8932D PXV279-C PXV037-C

20. PXV278-C PXV8934D PXV037-C

21. PMV8931D PMV8934D PXV037-C

22. PMV8932D PMV8934D PXV037-C 23 PXV278-C PMV8933D PXV037-C

24. PMV8931D PMV8933D PXV037-C 25 PMV8932D PMV8933D PXV037-C Manufacturer HP

26. PM03126C PM075A2A PM075A1A 27 PM08934A PM08931A PMV3856C

28. PM08933A PM08931A PMV3856C

?9 PM08934A PM08932A PMV3856C

30. PM08933A PM08932A PMV3856C Manufacturer LI

TABLE 14. COMMON CAUSE CANDIDATES (continued)

Cutset Basic Events Commonalities

31. PRE 1514X PRE 1512X PREllllF

32. PRE 1613F PRE 1512X PREllllF 33 PRE 1514F PRE 1610F PREllllF Manufacturer X2

34. PXV0017C PXV0004C PXV0002C PXV0014C Common Link MB, TK Manufacturer X7 35 PMV865BD PMV865AD PMV870BD PMV870AD Common Link M1, TE Manufacturer AD m 36. PLV75A2D PLV75B2D PLV75 AID PLV75BlD Common Link M3, TJ Manufacturer CC 37 PCV075-D PCV0013D PCV075-D PCV0001D

38. PCV075-D PCVU53BD PCV0001D PCV076-D 39 PCV0013D PCV0015D PCV0001D PCV0025D

40. PCV075-D PCV0013D PCV076-D PCVU53AD Common Link M2, TI Manufacturer X1

41. P00CCA2X P00CCB2X P00CCAlX POOCCBlX Common Link TM Manufacturer X3

42. PSTCCSBF PSTCCSAF PSTCC0BF PSTCC0AF Common Link TS Manufacturer X3 43 PCB17140 PCB16200 PCB16210 PCB17150

44. PCB16200 PCB16210 PCB17200 PCB17210 Common Link TU Manufacturer X3

4. W M 'unedum 4e W W e F' %em go W5

$ M YE k SM M b Y YM &

TABLE 14. COMMON CAUSB CANDIDATES (continued)

Cutset Basic Events Commonalities 45 PCN1D560 PCNICl20 PCNIC560 PCN1D120 Common Link TW Manufacturer X5

46. PSTMO5BF PSTMOSAF PSTM00BF PSTM00AF Common Link TI Manufacturer LI 47 PRElB12F PRElAl2P PRElBllF PRElAllF

48. PREA109F PREB209F PREA209F PREB109F 49 PRElAl2P PRElBllF PREA209F PREB109F

50. PRElAl2P PRElBllF PREllllF PREB109F

51. PRElB12F PREA109F PREB209F PRElAllF m 52. PRE 1610F PREA109F PRE 1613F PREA209F 53 PRElB12F PRElll1F PREB209F PRElAllF Common Link TW Manufacturer X2

54. PRE 1613F PREA109F PRE 1512X PREA209F

55. PRE 1514X PREA109F PRE 1512X PREA209F

56. PRE 1514X PREA109F PRE 1610F PREA209F Common Manufacturer X2 57 PCB15260 PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF PSTCCSBF

58. PSTCCOAF PCB16260 PSTCCSAF PSTCCSBF 59 PCB15260 PCB16260 PSTCCSAF PSTCC5BF

60. PSTCSlAC PCB21030 P00CCB2X POOCCBlX

61. PSTCSIAC PSTCCA2P P00CCB2X POOCCBlX

62. PSTCSlAC PCB21030 PCB17210 P00CCBlX 63 PSTCSlAC PSTCCA2F PCB17210 P00CCBlX i

{

l i

f 1

TABLE 14. COMMON CAUSE CANDIDATES (continued)

Cutset Basic Events Commonalities

64. PSTCSlAC PCB21v. P00CCB2X PCB17200

65. PSTCSlAC PSTCC" P00CCB2X PCB17200

66. PSTCSIAC PCB23030 PCB17210 PCB17200 67 PSTCSlAC PSTCCA2P PCB17210 PCB17200

68. PSTCSIAC PCB21030 PSTCSlBC PCB11020 69 PSTCSlAC PSTCCA2F PSTCS1BC PCB11020

70. PSTCSlAC PCB21030 PSTCSlBC PSTCCBlF

71. PSTCSlAC PSTCCA2F PSTCS1BC PSTCCBlF

72. PSTCSlAC PCB21030 PCB17150 PCB17140 73 PSTCSlAC PSTCCA2F PCB17150 PCB17140

74. PSTCSIAC PCB21030 PCC177BF PCBill40 2 75 PSTCSlAC PSTCCA2P PCC177BF PCB17140

76. PSTCSlAC PCB21030 PCB17150 PCC177AF 77 PSTCSIAC PSTCCA2F PCB17150 PCC177AF

78. PSTCSlAC PCB21030 PCC177BF PCC177AF 79 PSTCSIAC PSTCCA2P ?CC177BF PCC177AF

80. PCB11030 PSTCSlAC PCB21030 PSTCSlBC

81. PSTCCB2F PSTCSlAC PCB21030 PSTCSIBC

82. PCB11030 PSTCSlAC PSTCCA2P PSTCSlBC 83 PSTCCB2F PSTCSlAC PSTCCA2P PSTCSlBC

84. PCB21020 PSTCSlAC P00CCB2X P00CCBlX

85. PSTCCAlF PSTCSlAC P00CCB2X POOCCBlX

86. PCB21020 PSTCSlAC PCB17210 POOCCBlX 87 PSTCCAlF PSTCSlAC PCB17210 POOCCBlX

88. PCB21020 PSTCS1AC P00CCB2X PCB17200 89 PSTCCAlF PSTCSIAC P00CCB2X PCB17200

90. PCB21020 PSTCSlAC PCB17210 PCB17200 l

4. W As mul P 4. MM N eP "%e" % M

N b dM NM U M Oh gqCe g g TABLE 14. COMMON CAUSA CANDIDATES (continued)

Cutset Basic Events Commonalities

91. PSTCCAlF PSTCSlAC PCB17210 PCB17200

92. PCB21020 PSTCSlAC PSTCSlBC PCB11020 93 PSTCCAlF PSTCSlAC PSTCSIBC PCB11020

94. PCB21020 PSTCSlAC PSTCSIBC PSTCCBlF

95. PSTCCAlF PSTCSIAC PSTCSlBC PSTCCBlF

96. PCB21020 PSTCSlAC PCB17150 PCB17140 97 PSTCCAlF PSTCSlAC PCB17150 PCB17140

98. PCB21020 PSTCSIAC PCC177BF PCB17140 99 PSTCCAlF PSTCSlAC PCC177BF PCB17140 100. PCB21020 PSTCSIAC PCB17150 PCC177AF 101. PSTCCAlF PSTCSlAC PCB17150 PCC177AF m 102. PCB21020 PSTCSlAC PCC177BF PCC177AF 103 PSTCCAlF PSTCSlAC PCC177BF PCC177AF 104. PCB11030 PCB21020 PSTCSIAC PSTCSIBC 105. PSTCCB2P PCB21020 PSTOSIAC PSTCSlBC 106. PCB11030 PSTCCAlF PSTCSlAC PSTCSIBC 107. PSTCCB2F PSTCCAlF PSTCSlAC PSTCSlBC 108. PSTCCOAF POOCCAlX P00CCB2X PSTCCSBF 109 PCB15260 POOCCAlX P00CCB2X PSTCCSBF 110. PSTCCOAF PCB16200 P00CC B2X PSTCCSBF 111. PCB15260 PCB16200 P00CCB2X PSTCCSBF 112. PSTCCOAF POOCCAlX PBC17210 PSTCCSBF 113 PCB15260 POOCCAlX PCB17210 PSTCCSBF 114. PSTCCOAF PCB16200 PCB17210 PSTCCSBF 115. PCB15260 PCB16200 PCB1721.0 PSTCCSBF 116. PCB16200 P00CCB2X P00CCA2X P00CCBlX 117 POOCCAIX PCB17210 P00CCA2X POOCCBlX 118. PCB16200 PCB17210 P00CCA2X P00CCBlX

TABLE 14. COMMON CAUSE CANDIDATES (continued)

Cutset Basic Events Commonalities 119 POOCCAIX P00CCB2X PCB16210 POOCCBlX 120. PCB16200 P00CCB2X PCB16210 POOCCBlX 121. P00CCAlX PCB17210 PCB16210 P00CCBlX 122. PCB16200 PCB17210 PCB16210 POOCCBlX 123 P00CCAlX P00CCB2X P00CCA2X PCB17200 124. PCB16200 P00CCB2X P00CCA2X PCB17200 125 POOCCAlX PCB17210 P00CCA2X PCB17200 126. PCB16200 PCB17210 P00CCA2X PCB17200 127 POOCCA1X P00CCB2X PCB16210 PCB17200 128. PCB16200 P00CCB2X PCB16210 PCB17200 129 POOCCAlX PCB17210 PCB16210 PCB17200 m

130. P00CCAlX PSTCSIBC PCB11020 P00CCA2X 131. PCB16200 PSTCSlBC PCB11020 P00CCA2X 132. POOCCAlX PSTCSlBC PSTCCBlF P00CCA2X 133 PCB16200 PSTCSlBC PSTCCBlF P00CCA2X 134. POOCCAlX PSTCSlBC PCB11020 PCB16210 135. PCB16200 PSTCSlBC PCB11020 PCB16210 136. POOCCAlX PSTCSlBC PSTCCBlF PCB16210 137 PCB16200 PSTCSIBC PSTCCBlF PCB16210 138. P00CCAlX PCB17150 PCB17140 P00CCA2X 139 PCB16200 PCB17150 PCB17140 P00CCA2X 140. POOCCAlX PCC177BF PCB17140 P00CCA2X 141. PCB16200 PCC177BF PCB17140 P00CCA2X 142. POOCCAlX PCB17150 PCC177AF POOCCA2X 143 PCB16200 PCB17150 PCC177AF P00CCA2X 144. POOCCAlX PCC177BF PCC177AF P00CCA2X 145. PCB16200 PCC177BF PCC177AF P00CCA2X 146. POOCCAlX PCB17150 PCB17140 PCB16210 ge gg - JWe 8mm e P 4. W=W ep unb em %= WW

st* m E M e 'h umPWMO M % 0 tus ame Om er - M 7

TABLE 14. COMMON CAUSE CANDIDATES (continued)

Cutset Basic Events Commonalities 147 P00CCAlX PCC177BF PCB17140 PCB16210 148. PCB16200 PCC177BF PCB17140 PCB16210 149. POOCCAIX PCB17150 PCC177AF PCB16210 150. PCB16200 PCB17150 PCC177AF PCB16210 151. POOCCAIX PCC177BF PCC177AF PCB16210 152. PCB16200 PCC177BF PCC177AF PCBi6210 153 PCB11030 POOCCAlX PSTCSlBC P00CCA2X 154. PSTCCB2F POOCCAlX PSTCSIBC P00CCA2X 155. PCB11030 PCB16200 PSTCSlBC P00CCA2X 156. PSTCCB2F PCB16200 PSTCSlBC P00CCA2X 157. PCB11030 P00CCAlX PSTCS1BC PCB16210

$ 158. PSTCCB2F P00CCAIX PSTCSlBC PCB16210 159 PCB11030 PCB16200 PSTCSIBC PCB16210 160. PSTCCB2F PCB16200 PSTCS1BC PCB16210 161. PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X POOCCBlX 162. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X POOCCBlX 163 PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PCOCCBlX 164. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF PCB16210 POOCCBlX 165 PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X PCB17200 166. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X PCB17200 167. PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PCB17200 168. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PCB17200 Common Manufacturer X2 169 PRElB12F PRE 1610F PREA109F PRE 1613F PRElAllF 170. PRElA12F PRElBllF PREA209F PRE 1610F PRE 1613F Common Link TV Manufacturer X2

7 - -

TABLE 14. COMMON CAUSE CANDIDATES (continued)

Cutset Basic Events Commonalities 171. PRElB12F PRE 1514X PREA109F PRE 1512X PRElAllF 172. PRElB12F PRE 1613F PREA109F PRE 1512X PRElAliF 173 PRElB12F PRE 1514X PREA109F PRE 1610F PRElAllF 174. PRElA12F PRElBilF PREA209F PRE 1514X PRE 1512X 175 PRElAl2P PRElBllF PREA209F PRE 1613F PRE 1512X 176. PRElAl2P PRElBllF PREA209F PRE 1514X PRE 1610F Common Manufacturer X2 177 PSTCCOAF PCB11030 POOCCAlX PSTCSlBC PSTCCSBF 178. PCB15260 PCB11030 POOCCAlX PSTCSlBC PSTCCSBF 179 PSTCC0AF PSTCCB2F POOCCAlX PSTCS1BC PSTCCSBF g 180. PCB15260 PSTCCB2P POOCCAlX PSTCSlBC PSTCCSBF 181. PSTCC0AF PCB11030 PCB16200 PSTCSIBC PSTCCSBF 182. PCB15260 PCB11030 PCB16200 PSTCSIBC PSTCCSBF 183 PSTCC0AF PSTCCB2P PCB16200 PSTCSlBC PSTCC5BF 184. PCB15260 PSTCCB2F PCB16200 PSTCSlBC PSTCCSBF 185 PSTCCOAF PSTCSlAC PCB21030 P00CCB2X PSTCCSBF ICS. PCB15260 PSTCSlAC PCB21030 P00CCB2X PSTCCSBF 18 ;' . PSTCCOAF PSTCSlAC PSTCCA2P P00CCB2X PSTCCSBF 188. PCB15260 PSTCSIAC PSTCCA2F P00CCB2X PSTCCSBF 189 PSTCCOAF PSTCSlAC PCB21030 PCB17210 PSTCCSBF 190. PCB15260 PSTCSlAC PC321030 PCB17210 PSTCCSBF 191 PSTCCOAF PSTCSlAC PSTCCA2P PCB17210 PSTCCSBF 192. PCB15260 PSTCSIAC PSTCCA2P PCB17210 PSTCC5BF 193 PSTCCOAF PCB21020 PSTCSlAC P00CCB2X PSTCCSBF 194. PCB15260 PCB21020 PSTCSlAC P00CCB2X PSTCCSBF 195. PSTCCOAF PSTCCAlF PSTCSlAC P00CCB2X PSTCCSBF 196. PCB15260 PSTCCAlF PSTCSlAC P00CCB2X PSTCCSBF 197. PSTCCOAF PCB21020 PSTCS1AC PCB17210 PSTCCSBF 198. PCB15260 PCB21020 PSTCSlAC PCB17210 PSTCCSBF sgq. aus M = .ign auq d'im up m igil ePUs m. 5mm unt em % N

m MM dM MMU M)b C MC MM M TABLE 14. COMMON CAUSE CANDIDATES (continued)

Cutset Basic Events Commonalities 199 PSTCCOAF PSTCCAlF PSTCS1AC PCB17210 PSTCCSBF 200. PCB15260 PSTCCAlF PSTCS1AC PCB17210 PSTCCSBF 201. PSTCCOAF P00CCAlX PCB17150 PCB17140 PSTCCSBF 202. PCB15260 POOCCAlX PCB17150 PCB17140 PSTCCSBF 203 PSTCCOAP PCB16200 PCB17150 PCB17140 PSTCCSBF 204. PCB15260 PCB16200 PCB17150 PCB17140 PSTCCSBF 205 PSTCCOAF P00CCAlX FCC177BF PCB17140 PSTCCSBF 206. PCB15260 POOCCAIX PCC177BF PCB17140 PSTCCSBF 207 PSTCC0AF PCB16200 PCC177BP PCB17140 PSTCCSBF 208. PCB15260 PCB16200 PCC177BF PCB17140 PSTCCSBF 209 PSTCC0AF POOCCAlX PCB17150 PCC177AF PSTCCSBF g 210. PCB15260 POOCCAIX PCB17150 PCC177AF PSTCCSBF 211. PSTCCOAF PCB16200 PCB17150 PCC177AF PSTCCSBF 212. PCB15260 PCB16200 PCB17150 PCC177AF PSTCCSBF 213 PSTCCOAP P00CCA1X PCC177BF PCC177AF PSTCCSBF 214. PCB15260 POOCCAlX PCC177BF PCC177AF PSTCC5BF 215 PSTCC0AF PCB16200 PCC177BF PCC177AF PSTCC5BF 216. PCB15260 PCB16200 PCC177BF PCC177AF PSTCCSBF 217 PSTCCOAP POOCCAIX PSTCSIBC PCB11020 PSTCCSBF 218. PCB15260 POOCCAlX PSTCSlBC PCB11020 PSTCCSBF 219 PSTCCOAF PCB16200 PSTCSlBC PCB11020 PSTCCSBF 220. PCB15260 PCB16200 PSTCSlBC PCB11020 PSTCCSBF 221. PSTCCOAF P00CCAlX PSTCSIBC PSTCCBlF PSTCCSBF 222. PCB15260 POOCCAlX PSTCSIBC PSTCCB1F PSTCCSBF 223 PSTCCOAF PCB16200 PSTCSIBC PSTCCBlF PSTCCSBF 224. PCB15260 PCB16200 PSTCS1BC PSTCCBlF PSTCCSBF 225 PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X PCB11030 PSTCSlBC 226. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X PCB11030 PSTCSlBC l

l l

TABLE 14. COMMON CAUSE CANDIDATES (continued)

Cutset Basic Events Commonalities 227 PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PCB11030 PSTCSIBC 228. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PCB11030 PSTCS1BC 229. PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X PSTCCB2P PSTCSlBC 230. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X PSTCCB2F PSTCSIBD 231. PSTCCOBP PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PSTCCB2P PSTCSlBC 232. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PSTCCB2F PSTCSIBC 233 PSTCCOBP PSTCCSAF POOCCBlX PCB21020 PSTCSlAC 234. PCB16260 PSTCC5AF P00CCB1X PCB21020 PSTCSlAC 235 PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF PCB17200 PCB21020 PSTCSlAC 236. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF PCB17200 PCB21020 PSTCSlAC 237 PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF P00CCBlX PSTCCAlF PSTCSIAC g 238. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF POOCCBlX PSTCCAlF PSTCSlAC 239 PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF PCB17200 PSTCCAlF PSTCSlAC 240. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF PCB17200 PSTCCAlF PSTCSlAC 241. PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF P00CCBlX PSTCSIAC PCB21030 242. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF POOCCBlX PSTCSlAC PCB21030 243 PSTCCOBP PSTCCSAF PCB17200 PSTCSIAC PCB21030 244. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF PCB17200 PSTCSlAC PCB21030 245 PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF P00CCBlX PSTCSlAC PSTCCA2P 246. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF POOCCBlX PSTCS1AC PSTCCA2F 247 PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF PCB17200 PSTCSlAC PSTCCA2F 248. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF PCB17200 PSTCS1AC PSTCCA2F 249 PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X PCB17150 PCB17140 250. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X PCB17150 PCB17140 251. PSTCC0BF PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PCB17150 PCB17140 252. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PCB17150 PCB17140 253 PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X PCC177BF PCB17140 254. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X PCC177BF PCB17140

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TABLE 14. COMMON CAUSE CANDIDATES (continued)

Cutset Basic Events Commonalities 255. PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PCC177BF PCB17140 256. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PCC177BF PCB17140 257 PSTCC0BF PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X PCB17150 PCC177AF 258. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X PCB17150 PCC177AF 259 PSTCC0BF PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PCB17150 PCC177AF 260. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PCB17150 PCC177AF 261. PSTCC0BF PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X PCC177BF PCC177AF 262. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X PCC177BF PCC177AF 263 PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PCC177BF PCC177AF 264. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PCC177BF PCC177AF 265 PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF POOCCA2X PSTCSlBC PCB11020 e

266. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X PSTCSlBC PCB11020 267. PSTCCOBF PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PSTCSlDC PCB11020 268. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PSTCSlBC PCB11020 269 PSTCCOBP PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X PSTCSlBC PSTCCBlF 270. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF P00CCA2X PSTCSlBC PSTCCBlF 271. PSTCC0BF PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PSTCSlBC PSTCCBlF 272. PCB16260 PSTCCSAF PCB16210 PSTCS1BC PSTCCBlF Common Manufacturer X3

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LONG TERM COOLING FIGURE 11. ABBREVIATED VERSION OF MIDLAND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER EVENT TREE GIVEN AN ACTUATION SIGNAL 92

S I F1 is immediate failure; the system dces not start on demand. F2 is initial cooling; the system starts successfully but long-term failure and no overcooling. F3 is overcooling in one steam generator; the system starts and continues to run successfully but level control malfunction leads to overcooling in one steam generator. F4 is early overcooling in one steam generator; the system starts successfully but fails to run for eight hours and level control malfunction leads to overcooling in one steam generator. F5 is over cooling in both steam generators; the system starts successfully and continues to run for eight hours but overcools 5 both steam generators, and F6 is overcooling in both steam generators and failure to run for eight hours; the system successfully starts but fails E to run for eight hours and level control malfunctions lead to overcooling in both steam generators.

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l 6. RESULTS t

l The results presented in this sectioa show that in the emergency mode the Midland plant Auxiliary Feedwater System is very reliable. Redun-I dancy, separation, and availability during testing are applied in corabi-nations that make the systea quite sound. The results presented here follow from the detailed fault trees given in Appendixes A, B, and C, the data given in Appendix D, and the analysis described in Section 5. They are based on failure of the auxiliary feedwater system to deliver suffi-l cient flow immediately upon demand to at least one SG; therefore, human

'- intervention to recover from some system failures is not considered. If further analyses of the B&W nuclear plant demonstrate that a time window exista during which actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system can pro-(

4 vide adequate core cooling, then the ef fects of ce erator intervention to restore system function should improve the system reliability. Such con-g siderations will require reviewing emergency procedures to determine the likelihood cf successful operator action.

6.1 RESULTS OF SYSTEM ANALYSIS The results for all three initiating event cases from NUREG-0611 are I given in Tables 15, 16, and 17. In Table 15, the point values based on NUREG-0611 data are tabulated along with means and variances based on plant-specific data for the double crossover design. The distributions obtained by propagating discrete probability distributions for the three I alternative designs - loss of main feedwater case are shown in Figure 13 to help picture the uncertainty bands and distribution shapes. Similar shapes apply to the other cases. In Table 16, means and variances based I on plant-specific data are provided for the double crossover and the base case designs. In Table 17, means and variances pased on plant-specific fata are provided for the double crossover and the three pump designs.

Test and maintenance in combination with random system failures are the dominant contributors to unavailability. They are followed by random failures alone, human error, and common human error in importance. For the three pump design and in all cases given a loss of all AC power, ran-dom independent failures are the dominant contributors. The dominant random independent failure contributions are associated with the pumps:

either the pumps themselves, their prime movers--motors or turbines, and the power supply to the motor-driven pumps. Dominant human errors are associated with failure of the operator to close the full flow recircula-tion test valve either during a test when the system is demanded to func-tion, or following a test in which the valve is left in the wrong posi-tion. Tables 18 through 29 describe the dominant contributions to condi-tional unavailability for each of the four situations described in I Tables 15, 16, and 17.

The dominant contributors for the double crossover design system I using NRC data are given in Tables 18,19, and 20 for the three cases of NUREG-0611. In each case, maintenance on the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump combined with random failures in the motor pump train is I .

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f TABLE 15. SUrt4ARY OF RESULTS cot 3DITIO!1AL* .'tJAVAILABILITIES*

OF TIIE MIDLAtlD AFWS i l

l 1

! ass of Main toss of Main Less of Main Feedwater Feedwater Due to Loss and I,oss of All AC Power l Feedwater of Offsite Power Contributors to j Unavailability I Double D)uble Doable Double Double D3uble Crossover Crossover Crossover Crossover Crossover Crossover (Plant (Plant (Plant Spectfic (NRC Data) Specific (NRC Data) Specific (NRC Data)

Data) Da.a) DJta)

Panha f ailures 7.0 E-5' 3.5 E-5 6.6 E-4 2.5 E-4 1.7 E-2 6.4 E-3 i (1.1 E-9) (8.4 E-6) (5.3 E-4) j Test and maintenance and 1.2 E-4 6.9 E-5 3.4 E-4 2.8 E-4 5.9 E-3 5.9 E-3 l

random system failures (3.9 E-8) (6.5 E-7) (1.9 E-4)

Iluman error (test--failure to 6.3 E-6 3.7 E-6 1.6 E-5 1.5 E-5 3.1 E-4 3.1 E-4 close full flow test valve) (1.1 E-10) (2.0 E-9) (5.3 E-7)

Common cause (full flow 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 l test valve open af ter test) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10)

E E E E C i Other E System Total .

I Mean 2.0 E-4 1.0 E-3 2.3 E-2 [

Variance 4.7 E-8 6.0 E-6 6.7 E-4 l 5tn 3.4 E-5 4.1 E-5 3.5 E-3 95th 5.8 E-4 3.8 E-3 6.8 E-2 Median 1.4 E-4 1.2 E-4 4.0 E-4 5.5 E-4 1.6 E-2 1.3 E-2 (

'The total unavailabilities as well as the individual contributions given in this table are not actual system unavailabilities but are systes characteristics conditional on specific states of electric power ws follows:

I.MFW Offsite AC power is continuously available.

t.Mfw/tDOP : Of f site AC power is unavailable--diesel generators may or may not accept load.

IM# toss of All AC: All AC power is unavailable DC power is available.

- Unavailability is the fraction of times the system will not perform its finction when required.

+7.0 E-5 read 7.0 x 10-5 1

( ) Variance - describes the spread of the results about the meen.

t 96

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TABLE 16.

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS CONDITIONAL

UNAVAILABILITIES** OF THE MIDLAND AFWS (Plant Specific Data) i l

l Loss of Main loss of Main Loss cf Main Feedwater f Feedwater reedwater Due to It.,ss and Loss of All AC Power of offsite Power Contributors to

'Jna va n labilit y Douole Base Double Base Douole Base Crossover case Crossover Case Crossover case I

r Ranto;s failures 7.0 E-5+ 7.3 E-5 6.6 E-4 6.6 E-4 1.7 E-2 1.6 E-2 (1.1 E-8) (1.9 E-d) (8.4 E-6) (3.3 E-6) (5.3 E-4) (7.5 E-3)

Test and maintenance and 1.2 E-4 1.2 E-4 3.4 E-4 3.4 E-4 5.9 E-3 5.9 E-3 random systen fattures (3.9 E-8) (1.2 E-7) (6.5 E-7) (3.2 E-7) (1.9 E-4) (1.9 E-4)

Haman error (test--failure to 6.3 E-6 6.4 E-6 1.8 E-5 1.8 E-5 3.1 E-4 3.1 E-4 j close full flow test valve) (1.1 E-10) (3.4 E-10) (2.3 E-9) (9.2 E-10) (5.3 E-7) (5.3 E-6) i i

! Com:non cause (full flow 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 l test valve open after test) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10)

' E E E E !

Other E E

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System Total l

Mean 2.0 E-4 2.1 E-4 1.0 E-3 1.0 E-3 2.3 E-2 2.2 E-2 Variance 4.7 E-3 1.1 E-7 6.0 E-6 2. '+ E-6 6.7 E-4 8.8 E-4 ;

l 2.5 E-3 5tn 3.4 E-5 1.7 E-5 4.1 E-5 7.9 E-5 3.5 E-3 l 3.8 E-3 6.8 E-2 7.0 E-2 5th 5.8 E-4 7.0 E-4 3.5 E-3 Median 1.4 E-4 1.1 E-4 4.0 E-4 5.3 E-4 1.6 E-2 1.3 E-2 t

'Tne total unavailabilities as well as the individual contributions given in this taole are not actual system

' unavstlabilities but are system characteristics conditional on specific states of electric power as follows:

l3 Ixtv Offsite AC power is continuously available.

Im v/In07: Of f site AC power is un.available--diesel generators may or may not accept load.

I.*4FW/ Loss of All AC: All AC poser is unavailables DC power is available.

l l

" Unavailability is the f raction of times the system will not perform its function when required.

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'7.0 E-5 read 7.0 x 10*5, i ) Variance - describes the spread of the results about the mean.

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TABLE 17.

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS CONDITIONAL

UNAVAILABILITIES** OF TIIE MIDLAND AFWS (Plant Specific Data) l toss of Main .foss of Main Loss of Main Feedwater Feedwa ter Feedwater Due to Loss and Loss of All AC Power of Offsite Power Contributors to i UnavailaDility

'" P Three Pump Three PJmp C er C er Random failures 7.0 E-5* 8.1 E-4 6.6 E-4 2.0 E-3 1.7 E-2 1.7 E-2 l (1.1 E-8) (1.4 E-6) (8.4 E-6) (1.1 E-5) (5.3 E-4) (3.6 E-5) '

Test and msantenance and 1.2 E-4 4.9 E-4 3.4 E-4 9.2 E-4 5.9 E-3 5.9 E-3 random system failures (3.9 E-8) (1.0 E-7) (6.5 E-7) (2.9 E-6) (1.9 E-4) (1.9 E-4)

Human error (test--failure to 6.3 E-6 2.6 E-5 1.8 E-5 4.9 E-5 3.1 E-4 3.1 E-4 close full flow test valve) (1.1 E-10) (2.0 E-9) (2.0 E-9) (8.8 E-9) (5.3 E-7) (5.3 E-7)

Common cause (full flow 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 8.4 E-6 test valve open after test) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10) (5.9 E-10)

Other E E e E E E

Sfstes Total Mean 2.0 E-4 1.3 E-3 1.0 E-3 3.0 E-3 2.3 E-2 2.3 E-2 Variance 4.7 E-8 2.0 E-6 6.0 E-6 1.3 E-5 6.7 E-4 2.0 E-4 5th 3.4 E-5 2.2 E-4 4.1 E-5 4.0 E-4 3.5 E-3 8.0 E-3 95th 5.8 3-4 3.8 E-3 3.8 E-3 9.0 e-3 6.8 E-2 5.0 E-2 Median 1.4 E-4 9.2 E-4 4.0 E-4 1.9 E-3 1.6 E-2 2.0 E-2 e

*The total unavailabilities as well as the individual contributions given in this table are not actual system unavailabilities but are system characteristics conditional on specific states of electric power as follows

Dim Offsite AC power is continuously available.

LMW/IDOP: Of fsite AC power is unavailable--diesel generators may or may not accept load.

IMN/ Loss of All AC: All AC power is unavailables DC power is available.

- Unavailability is the fraction of times the system will not perform its function when required.

+7.0 E-5 read 7.0 x 10-5, t

( ) Variance - describes the spread of the results about the mean.

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, i i i iitukf$Miiiiut<.d'.i ii i i i i iF4 :::. u .u iTib.o i i iiiii o 1 X 10-6 1 X 10-0 1 X 10~4 1 X 10-3 1 X 10-2 UNAVAILABILITY FIGURE 13. CONDITIONAL UNAVAILABILITY OF THE MIDLAND PLANT AFWS - TilREE ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS, PLANT-SPECIFIC DATA - LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER

I TABLE 18. DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS TO CONDITIONAL UNAVAILABILITY LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER Double Crossover (NRC Data) i Rank Event Description Unavailability 1 Maintenance of turbine-driven AFWP an system 3 5 x 10-5 Ie failure on demand without this pump.

2 Maintenance of motor-driven AFWP and system 3 4 x 10-5 failure on demand without this pump.

3 Turbine or turbine controls fail and POSA 1.6 x 10-5 motor fails to start.

4 Common cause--human error--full flow test 8.4 x 10-6 valves open after test.

5 Turbine or turbine controls fail and POSA 4.0 x 10-6 g fails to deliver sufficient water. E 6 P058 fails to deliver sufficient water and 4.0 x 10-6 POSA motor fails to start. m 7 P05B test valve is open an.: Dr..jA motor fails to start.

2.0 x 10-6 g

8 Turbine or turbine controls fail and POSB 2.0 x 10-6 test valve is open. E 9 POSB in test (operator error) and system 1.9 x 10-6 E failure on demand without this pump.

10 POSA in test (operator error) and system 1.8 x 10-6 failure on demand without this pump.

I l

1

1 100

I I

I j TABLE 19 LOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS TO CONDITIONAL UNAVAILABILITY 4

I LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER Double Crossover (NRC Data)

Rank Event Description Unavailability 1 Maintenance of turbine-driven AFWP and system 2.5 x 10-4 failure on demand without this pump.

2 Turbine or turbine controls fail and 4,160V 1 5 x 10-4 bus 1A05 fails to supply power.

3 POSB rails to deliver sufficient water and 3 7 x 10-5 4,160V bus 1A05 fails to supply power.

A 4 Maintenance of motor-driven AFWP and system failure on demand without this pump.

3 4 x 10-5 5 P05B test valve open and 4,160V bus lA05 1.8 x 10-5 fails to supply power.

6 Turbine or turbine controls fail and POSA 1.6 x 10-5 motor fails to start.

i 7 P05B in test (operator error) and system 1 3 x 10-5 failure on demand without this pump.

8 Common cause--human error--full flow test 8.4 x 10-6 valves open after test.

9 Turbine or turbine controls fail and POSA 4.0 x 10-6 fails to deliver sufficient water.

10 POSB rails to supply sufficient water and 4.0 x 10-6 POSA motor fails to start.

11 POSA in test (operator error) and system 1.8 x 10-6 failure on demand without this pump.

I l

i 101 l

3 I

TABLE 20. DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS TO CONDITIONAL UNAVAILABILITY LOSS OF ALL AC i

Double Crossover (NRC Data)

Rank Event Description Unavailability l

4 1 Maintenance of t.urbine-driven AFWP. 5 9 x 10-3 2 Turbine or turbine controls fail. 4.0 x 10-3 3 POSB rails to ueliver sufficient water. 1.0 x 10-3 !

4 POSB in test (operator error). 3 1 x 10-4 5 POSB test valve open. 1.0 x 10-4 6 P05B suction valve transfers closed. 1.0 x 10-4 7 valve M03126 transfers closed. 1.0 x 10-4 8 Suction header cross-connect valve M0868B 1.0 x 10-4 transfers closed.

9 valve M03856 transfers closed. 1.0 x 10-4 ,

10 CST isolation valve 037 transfers closed. 1.0 x 10-4 11 CST outlet check valve 024 fails closed. 1.0 x 10-4 BL g

12 Common cause--human error--full flow test 8.4 x 10-6 valves open after test.

I i

b s

B I-102

I t TABLE 21. DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS TO CONDITIONAL UNAVAILABILITY LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER Double Crossover (Plant-Specific Data) i

! Rank Event Description Unavailability 1

l 1 Maintenance of motor-driven AFWP and system 9 3 x 10-5 ig failure on demand without this pump.

(g 2 Turbine or turbine controls fail and POSA 3 3 x 10-5 I fails to deliver sufficient water.

l 3 Maintenance of turbine-driven AFWP and system 2.6 x 10-5 failure on demand without this pump.

i 4 P05B rails to deliver sufficient water and 1.5 x 10-5 fails to deliver sufficient water.

(E I S common cause--human error--fu11 flow test valves open after test.

a.4 x 10-6 jE l

6 Turbine or turbine controls fail and POSA 5.8 x 10-6 motor fails to start. , ,

7 P05A in test (operator error) and system 4.9 x 10-o l failure on demand without this pump.

8 Turbine or turbine controls fail and POSA 3 5 x 10-6 I 9 motor breaker does not close.

P058 fails to deliver sufficient water and POSA motor fails to start.

2.6 x 10-6 10 POSB fails to deliver sufficient water and 1.6 x 10-6 POSA motor breaker does not close.

11 Turbine or turbine controls fail and AFWP 1.5 x 10-6 relay Killl (P05A) fails open.

12 P05B in test (operator error) and system 1.4 x 10-6 failure on demand without this pump.

lI l

l l

103

t I

TABLE 22. DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS TO CONDITIONAL UNAVAILABILITY f: I LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATEI DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER Double Crossover (Plant-Specific Data) l l

4 Rank Event Description Unavailability l

1 Turbine or turbine controls fail and 4,160V 3 9 x 10-4 bus lA05 fails to supply power.

2 Maintenance of turbine-driven AFWP and system 2.4 x 10-4 l W

failure on demand without this pump.

3 P05B rails to deliver sufficient water and 1.8 x 10-4 4,160V bus 1A05 fails to supply power.

4 Maintenance of motor-driven AFWP and system 9 3 x 10-5 failure on demand without this pump.

5 Turbine or turbine controls fail and POSA 3 3 x 10-5 fails to deliver sufficient water.

6 P05B in test (operator error) and system 1.3 x 10-5 failure on demand without this pump. ' E 7 Common cause--human error--rull flow test 8.4 x 10-6 gl valves open after test.

8 POSA in cost (operator error) and system 4.9 x 10-6 failure on demand without this pump.

i s

I B:

104 f

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t TABLE 23 DOMIllANT CONTRIBUTORS TO C0!JDITIO!1AL UNAVAILABILITY f I

LOSS OF ALL AC

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t Double Crossover (Plant-Specific Data) l

[

i !

l Rank Event Description Unavailability l 1 Turbine or ts.rbine controls fail. 1.1 x 10-2 l IE 2 Maintenance of turbine-driven AFWP. S.9 x 10-3 l

!E 3 POSB fails to deliver sufficient water. 4.7 x 10-3 l 4 POSB in test (operator error). 3 1 x 10-4 l

! 5 Common cause--human error--full flow test 8.4 x 10-6 valves open after test.

I L I

t I ;

8 I !

f i

105

B I

TABLE 24. DOMIllANT CONTRIBUTORS TO CONDITI0flAL UNAVAILABILITY LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER Base Case (Plant-Specific Data)

Rank Event Description Unavailability 1 Maintenance of motor-driven AFWP and system 9.4 x 10-5 failure on demand without this pump.

2 POSA fails to deliver sufficient water and 3 3 x 10-5 turbine or turbine controls fail.

3 Maintenance of turbine-driven AFWP and system 2.6 x 10-5 failure on demand without this pump.

4 POSA fails to deliver sufficient water and 1.5 x 10-5 P058 fails to deliver sufficient water.

5 Common cause--human error--full flow test 8.4 x 10-6 valves open after test.

6 POSA motor fails to start and turbine or 5.8 x 10-6 turbine controls fail.

7 POSA in test (operator error) and system 5.0 x 10-6 failure on demand without this pump.

8 POSA motor breaker does not close and turbine 3 5 x 10-6 or turbine controls fail.

9 POSA motor fails to start and POSB fails to 2.6 x 10-6 deliver sufficient water.

10 POSA motor breaker does not close and P05B 1.6 x 10-6 fails to deliver sufficient water.

11 AFWS relay K1111 (POSA) fails open and 1.5 x 10-6 turbine or turbine controls fail.

12 POSB in test (operator error) and system 1.4 x 10-6

failure on demand without this pump.

l I

B 106

t i

'I I

!u YABLE 25 DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS TO CONDITIONAL UNAVAILABILITY 4

} LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER DUE TO LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER i

l Base Case (Plant-Specific Data) i i

l

) Rank Event Description Unavailability l

l l 1 Turbine or turbine controls fail and 4,160V 3 9 x 10-4 I

bus 1A05 fails to supply power.

2 Maintenance of turbine-driven AFWP and system 2.4 x 10-4 l failure on demand without this pump.

i 3 POSB rails to deliver sufficient water and 1 7 x 10-4 I

4,160V bus 1A05 fails to supply power.

i 4 Maintenance of motor-driven AFWP and system 9.4 x 10-5 i failure on demand without this pump.

[ 5 Turbine or turbine controls fail and POSA 3 3 x 10-5 fails to deliver sufficient water.

!' 6 POSB rails to deliver sufficient water and 1.4 x 10-5 i POSA fails to deliver sufficient water. ,

l 7 P05B in test (operator error) and system 1 3 x 10-5 i

failure on demand without this pump.

8 Common cause--human error--full flow test 8.4 x 10-6 jI i

9 valves open after test.

POSA in test (operator error) and system failure on demand without this pump.

5.0 x 10-6 5

f

I 107

t:

Ii i TABLE 26. DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS TO CONDITIONAL UNAVAILABILITY t .

LOSS OF ALL AC Base Case (Plant-Specific Data) ,

i Rank Event Description Unavailability l

1 Turbine or turbine controls fail. 1.1 x 10-2 2 Maintenance of turbine-driven AFWP. 5.9 x 10-3 E 3 POSB rails to deliver sufficient water. 4.7 x 10-3 m 4 POSB in test (operator error). 3 1 x 10-4 5 Ccmmon cause--human error--full flow test 8.4 x 10-6 valves open after test.

5 I'

i l

[

s I

B.

108 l-_-..-.-,,--.---.- - ..- _ -- -._-.____--.- _

8 I TABLE 27. DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS TO CONDITIONAL UNAVAILABILITY LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER Three Pump (Plant-Specific Data)

Rank Event Description Unavailability 1 Maintenance of turbine-driven AFWP and system 2.9 x 10-4 failure on demand without this pumo.

2 Turbine or turbine controls fail and LV3875B1 1 5 x 10-4 transfers closed (controls).

I 4 3 Maintenance on motor-driven AFWP (POSA) and system failure on demand without this pump.

Maintenance on motor-driven AFWP (P05C) and 9.8 x 10-5 9.8 x 10-5 system failure on demand without this pump.

5 POSB rails to deliver sufficient water and 6.9 x 10-5 A LV3875B1 transfers closed (controls).

6 Turbine or turbine controls fail and LV3875Al 5.9 x 10-5 I 7 transfers closed (controls).

Turbine control or turbine valve 0208 controls fail and pressure fails closed.

5.8 x 10-5 8 Turbine or turbine control fail and pressure 5.8 x 10-5 E 9 control valve 020A fails closed.

Turbine or turbine controls fail and M038708 3 7 x 10-5 motor operator fails.

10 Turoine or turbine controls fail and M03870A 3 7 x 10-5 motor operator fails.

11 Turbine or turbine controls fail and P05C 3 3 x 10-5 fails to deliver sufficient water.

12 Turbine or turbine controls fail and POSA 3 3 x 10-5 fails to deliver sufficient water.

13 POSB fails to deliver sufficient water and 2.6 x 10-5 LV3875Al transfers closed (controls).

l 14 POSB fails to deliver sufficient water and 2.6 x 10-5 l

pressure control valve 020B fails closed.

I 15 POSB rails to deliver sufficient water and 2.6 x 10-5 pressure control valve 020A fails closed.

16 POSB fails to deliver sufficient water and 1 7 x 10-5 A03870B motor operator fails.

l 17 P05B fails to deliver sufficient water and 1.7 x 10-5 M03870A motor operator fails.

18 P058 in test (operator error) and system 1.6 x 10-5 i failure on demand without this pump.

'" 19 P05B rails to deliver sufficient water and 1 5 x 10-5 P05C fails to deliver sufficient water.

I 109

TABLE 27. DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS TO CONDITIONAL UNAVAILABILITY I'

(continued) i' LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER 3 Three Pump (Plant-Specific Data)

Rank Event Description Unavailability i 20 P058 fails to deliver sufficient water and 1.5 x 10-5 POSA fails to deliver sufficient water.

21 Common cause--human error--full flow test 8.4 x 10-6 i valves open after test.

22 E

Turbine or turbine controls fail and level 6.1 x 10-6 g control valve LV3875B1 Tails closed.

l 23 Turbine or turbine controls fail and P05C 5.8 x 10-6 l motor fails to start.

24 Turbine or turbine controls fail and POSA 5.8 x 10-6 motor fails to start.

25 POSA in test (operator error) and system 5 3 x 10-6 failure on demand without this pump.

l 26 P05C in test (operator error) and system 5 3 x 10-6 t

failure on demand without this pump. '

l 3

i h

i I

B I

110

. . . - . _ _ - . . _ . _ - - - . _ _ . . - ~ , . . . . - . . - . _ _ _ . . . - - . _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ -

I TABLE 28. DOMIf1A!iT C0tiTRIBUTORS TO C0t1DITI0fiAL UfJAVAILABILITY LOSS OF MAI1 FEEDWATER DUE TO LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER Three Pump (Plant-Specific Data)

Rank Event Description Unavailability 1 Maintenance of turbine-driven AFWP and system 7 2 x 10 U failure on demand without this pump.

,/ 2 Turbine or turbine controls fail and 4,160V 3 9 x 10-4 bus 1A05 fails to supply power.

I 3 4

Turbine or turbine controls fail and 4,160V bus 1A06 fails to supply power.

P058 fails to deliver sufficient water and 3 9 x 10-4 1 7 x 10-4 4,160V bus 1A05 fails to supply power.

POSB fails to deliver sufficient water and 8 5 4,1607 bus 1A06 fails to supply power.

1.7 x 10.4 6 Turbine or turbine controls fail and LV3875BA 1.5 x 10-4 transfers closed.

7 Maintenance on motor-driven AFWP (POSA) and 9.8 x 10-5 system failure on demand without this pump.

8 Maintenance on motor-driven AFWP (P05C) and 9.8 x 10-5

.E eystem failure on demand without this puap.

9 POSA fails to deliver sufficient water and 6.9 x 10-5 I 10 LV3875B1 transfers closed.

Turbine or turbine controls fail and LV3875Al transfers closed.

5 9 x 10-5 11 Turbine or turbine controls fail and pressure 5.8 x 10-5 control valve 0208 fails closed.

12 Turbine or turbine controls fail and pressure 5.8 x 10-5 cnntrol valve 020A fails closed.

13 P05B :n test (operator error) and system 3 8 x 10-5 failure on demand without this pump.

14 Turbine or turbine controls fail and M03870B 3 7 x 10-5 motor operator fails (and controls).

15 Turbine or turbine controls fail and M03870A 3 7 x 10-5 motor operator fails (and controls).

16 Turbine or turbine controls fail and P05C 3 3 x 10-5 fails to deliver sufficient water.

17 Turbine or turbine controls fail and POSA 3 3 x 10-5 fails to deliver sufficient water.

18 2.6 x 10-5 I* 19 P058 fails to deliver sufficient water and LV3875Al transfers closed.

P05B fails to deliver sufficient water and 2.6 x 10-5 pressure control valve 020B fails closed.

I

111

tl f TABLE 28. DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS TO CONDITIONAL UNAVAILABILITY l (continued) ,

LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER DUE TO LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER l Three Pump (Plant-Specific Data) Fl l

Rank Event Description Unavailability l 20 POSB fails to deliver sufficient water and 2.6 x 10-5 pressure control valve 020A fails closed.

21 P05B fails to deliver sufficient water and 1.7 x 10-5 M03870B operator fails (and controls). E 22 POSB fails to deliver sufficient water and 1.7 x 10-5 g M03870A operator fails (and controls).

23 P05B fails to deliver sufficient water and 1 5 x 10-5 P05C fails to delver sufficient water.

24 Common cause--human error--full flow test 8.4 x 10-6 valves open after test.

25 POSA in test (operator arror) and system 5 2 x 10-6 l failure on demand without this pump.

26 POSC in test (operator error) and system 5.2 x 10-6 failure on demand without this pump. ;

I i

h i

i B

112

i I TABLE 29 DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS TO CONDITIONAL UNAVAILABILITY LOSS OF ALL AC

! Three Pump (Plar,t-Specific Data) lI Rank Event Description Unavailability 1 Turbine or turbine controls fail. 1.1 x 10-2 2 Maintenance of turbine-driven AFWP. 5 9 x 10-3 3 P058 fails to deliver sufficient water. 4.7 x 10-3 4 P058 in teat (operator error). 3 1 x 10-4

'g 5 P05B discharge valve transfers closed. 2 9 x 10-4 g 6 LV3875B2 transfers closed (controls) and 2.2 x 10-4 LV3875A2 transfers closed (controls).

7 LV3875AS transfers closed (controls) and 2.1 x 10-4 M038708 fails closed.

8 LV387582 transfers closed (controls) and 2.1 x 10-4 l M03870A fails closed.

lg 9 Cormon cause--human error--full flow test 8.4 x 10-6 lE valves open after test.

I l

i I .

G m .

g

B the cominant contributor. For the loss of main feedwater case, mainte-I nance on the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump combined with random failures in the turbine train ranks second. In the other two cases, this failure mode is not as important because of the reduced availability of AC electrical power. Next in all cases is turbine or turbine control failure coupled with failure of the motor-driven pump motor. Using l plant-specific data for the double crossover system, Tables 21, 22, and 5 23 show the same dominant contributors appear with some changes in order-ing.

Dominant contributors for the base case design using plant-specific data are presented in Tables 24, 25, and 26. These results are very sim-Ilar to the double crossover case using plant-specific data both in the tank order of the individual contributors and in the quantification.

Tables 27, 28, and 29 present the dominant contributors for the three pump design using plant-specific data. The overall results of this l design are not as good as for the double crossover or base case designs. E Although there are three pumps, success requires either the turbine pump operating or both 50% motor pumps operating. The leading contributor for the cases when AC power may be available is maintenance of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump combined with random failures in the motor-driven pump trains. Ilowever, the large number of fairly important contributors due to random failures throughout the system leads to the overall effect that combined random failures provide the dominant contri-bution to system unavailability. Such random failures include failure of the turbine or turbine controls combined with single motor pump train .

level control valve failing, failure of the turbine-driven pump combined with failure of power to either electrically driven pump, turbine or tur-bine control failure and a single pressure control valve in a motordriven pump train failing, and failure of the turbine-driven pump combined with failure of a motor-operated valve in either motor-driven pump train.

This design suffers from the fact that success, given a failure in a tur-bine pump train, requires that two complete trains of motor-driven pumps operate.

The selected design, the double crossover system, has very low unavailability. Nevertheless, it is instructive to list possible system modifications that have potential to further reduce that unavailability.

To improve unavailability, the modifications must attack dominant con-tributors of Tables 18 through 23. For example, consider the following dominant contributors and the possible modifications that might address them.

e Maintenance of the turbine-driven auxiliary feed pump and system failure on demand without this pump--reduce the frequency of pump maintenance by carefully eliminating any nonessential main- g tenance, consolidating maintenance, etc., and reduce the dura- g tion of pump maintenance outages through additional preplanning, training, etc.

e Maintenance of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and random failures in the turbine-driven pump train--same as for turbine maintenance.

114

I e Turbine or turbine controls fail combined with rr.ndom failures in the motor-driven pump train--modifications to improve reli-ability of turbine controls, perhaps provisions for preheating t control fluid ano positive identification that the turbine trip is reset.

e iluman errors associated witr the full recirculation flow valve during and following pump test--carefully written test proce-dures to ensure the valves are reclosed, staggered testing to avoid sequential highly coupled human failures, automatic clos-ing of these test valves when an AWAS is present.

These contributors are responsible for approximately 80% of the total unavailability of the auxiliary feedwater system. Thus, improvements could have a substantial effect on the overall unavailability. Ilowever, a 3 word of warning is appropriate. It is possible tnat some of these

.g changes could create more problems than they solve. For example, a redesigned turbine control system might not perform better than the one already installed. Also, for any of these options aimed at the single cause of failure, accomplishment of any one enormously decreases the i value of those remaining. Finally, the system is already very reliable and no serious deficiencies have been identified. Any changes considered should only be made after a careful evaluation of all costs and benefits

.I including the chance that a change aimed at improving reliability could actually degrade it.

6.2 RESULTS OF EVENT TREE ANALYSIS The event tree analysis described in Section 5 has been performed for

l the double crossover system (see Figures 11 and 12). A decomposition of 5 the double crossover system event tree and time dependent reliability calculations have been used to quantify the system event tree. Probabil-ities have been calculated for each path and cach sequence number in Figure 12. We have summarized those calculations in the following brief table.

Relative System State 9 I Following Demand

1. Immediate failure 4 x 10-5

2. Initial cooling, long-term 1 x 10-5 failure l 3. Successful operation but 2 x 10-4

E overcooling in at least one SG

4. Initial overcooling and 2 x 10-9 long-term failure -

115 t

l l

l State 3, overcooling, may not be a serious contributor to public risk.

Recent calculations show that natural circulation cooling can be effect-

! ive even with two phase conditions in the primary as long as the core ,

rernains covered. Overcooling cannot shrink the primary coolant enough to l uncover the core. States 2 and 4--initial cooling but long-term i failure--are much less serious than State 1--immediate failure. They have removed initial decay heat, permitted some cooldown, and have allowed power to decay. Much more time is available for recovery. i l

The event tree developed in this study can provide a basis for '

I revised analyses in the future. As more details on FOGG and the ' level control system become available, they can be easily included. Also, additional thinking on good and bad SGs can be incorporated.

l l h I

I i

I B-l l

l l g;

116 E!

I

7. RE FE RENCES I 1. USNRC, " Generic Evaluation of Feedwater Transients and Small Break Loss of Coolant Accidents in Westinghouse Designed Operating Plants," NUREG-0611, January 1980.

2. Weaver, W. W., R. W. Dorman, R. S. Enzinna, " Auxiliary Feedwater Systems Reliability Analyses: A Generic Report for Babcock and Wilcox-Designed Plants," BAW-1584, December 1979.

3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Transient Response of Babcock and Wilcox-Designed Reactors," NUREG-0667, May 1980.

4. Midland FSAR, Chapterc 8 and 9.

5. Midland P& ids for Auxiliary Feedwater, Main Steam, Condensate and Feedwater, and Service Water Systems.

6. Midland Schematics for AFW pumps and motor-operated valves.

7. Midland Technical Specifications for Auxiliary Feedwater, Condensate Storage Tank, Electric Power, Service Water, and Instrumentation Systems.

8. AEM System Operating, Emergency and Surveillance Procedures.

9. Discussions with members of the Midland Plant Staff in the Opera-tions, Maintenance, Startup, and Technical Groups.

10. Sullivan, T. S., J. P. Kindinger, "AFW System Configuration and Con-trol Task Recommendation," Consumers Power Company Internal Corres-pondence, Kind 5-80, April 9,1980

11. Users Guide for the Reliability Analysis System (RAS) Computer Code, TREE-ll68, developed by EG&G, IDAHO, Inc., at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), September 1977.

12. COMCAN II-A, A Computer Program for Automated Common Cause Failure Analysis, TREE-1361, developed by EG&G, IDA HO, Inc., at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), May 1979.

13. MOCARS: A Monte Carlo Code for Determining the Distribution and Simulation Limits, Scott D. Mathews, developed by EG&G, IDAHO, Inc.,

July 1977.

14. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," W4SH-1400, 1975.

15. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Staff Report on the Generic Assessment of Feedwater Transients in Pressurized Water Reactors Designed by the Babcock and Wilcox Company," NOREG-0560, May 1979.

117

I APPENDIX A MIDLAND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM FAULT TREE BASE CASE DESIGN This appendix presents the fault tree model constructed to represent I the original AFWS design at Midland. The tree logic defines the compo-nent failure modes necessary to fail the system. The fault trees have been heavy lined to show the level to which the quantification was performed. Quantification was performed to the level at which the most applicable data was available. The detailed fault trees were constructed to ensure that all components which could possibly affect the system performance were included in our analysis.

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Il APPENDIX B MIDLAND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM FAULT TREE DOUBLE CROSSOVER DESIGN This appendix presents the fault tree model constructed to represent
= the AFWS as it is presently designed at Midland. The tree logic defines the component failure modes necessary to fail the system. The fault trees have been heavy lined to show the level to which the quantification was performed. Quantification was performed to the level at which the ll 'M most applicable data was available. The detailed fault trees were constructed to ensure that all components which could possibly affect the system performance were included in our analysis.
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I I APPENDIX C s MIDLAND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM FAULT TREE l THREE PUMP DESIGN 1 This appendix presents the fault tree m del constructed to represent an alternate design of the AFWS. The basic system modeled was similar to lg 3 the AFWS installed at some other B&W nuclear plants. The tree logic defines the component failure modes necessary to fall the system. The fault trees have been heavy li,ed to show the level to which the
I quantification was performed. Quantification was performed to the level at which the most applicable data was available. The detailed fault trees were constructed to ensure that all components which could possibly affect the system performance were included in our analysis.
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i APPENDIX D l MIDLAND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA SHEETS The following sheets were used in developing the reliability characteristics (f ailure rate and time for restoration) for the components constituting the Midland AFWS. The methods for establishing repair time are as follows: A. For components that are tested monthly hours MTTR = = 360 hours. , B. For components that are tested quarterly
~~, s MTTR = = 1,080 hours.~~
C. For components that are tested when the AFW system is actuated we have 6 actuations per year (based on industry experience). MTTR = 730 hours. s 2 D. For components in the motor-driven pump train up to the pump train discharge check valve, we have 6 actuations per year (Item C. above), one test per month (Item A above), and 10 plant startups or shutdowns per year. 8 MTTR = = 156 hours. E. For components in the Condensate Storage Tank discharge up to I MOV-3856, we have 2 tests per month (2 pumps tested once per month), 10 startups or shutdowns, and 6 actuations per year. MTTR = * **
~~+0 F. For components in the turbine-driven pump trains, we have one test per month and 6 actuations per year. , rs MTTR = = 243 hours.~~
G. For components in the motor-driven pump train from the pump discharge valve to the MFW cross-connect, we have 10 startups or shutdowns per year and 6 actuations per year. MTTR = 273.75 hours = 274. 0 D-1
~~/; ' ' Pickard, Lone and Garrick, Inc.~~
~~CHECNED [^ DATE N CONSULTANiG - NUCLEAR PCWEn JOB No. 083 CPC AFPROVED DATE b Ed l v no C n $f SHEET 1 0F E~~
# 6 AVAILABILITY DATA SHEET BY DATE ITEM: Valve, Check OVERALL FAILUEE RATE: 1 x 10-4 (3) Fai1/ Demand REPAIR TlYE; Varies HR E
~~E Reference~~
1. NPRDS, pg. 364 27 Failures in 12.237 x 106 hours = 2.2 x 10-6 F/hr. E

2. WASH-1400 Fail to open 1x 10-4/ Demand Range Factor (RF) = 3 g Reverse leak 1 x 10-7/ Hour RF = 3 A. MITR for monthly testing - 360 hours B. MTTR for one test per month and 6 actuations per year - 243 hours C. MPfR for 24 tests, 6 cycles for actuation and 10 SU/SD - 110 hours SPECIFIC COMPONENTS

1. PCV0001D Use Reference 2. E PCV0013D Use Reference 2. g PCV0015D Use Reference 2.
~~PCV0025D Use Reference 2. 5',~~
2. PCV024-D Use Reference 2.

3. PCV075-D Use Reference 2.
~~( PCV076-D Use Reference 2. . l~~
~~4. PCVU53AD Use 2 x Reference 2 (two valves in series).~~
~~PCVU53BD Use 2 x Reference 2 (two valves in series) .~~
~~5. PCV002AD Use Reference 2.~~
~~PCV002BD Use Reference 2. PCV002CD Use Reference 2.~~
~~6. PCV030AD Use Reference 2.~~
PCV030BD Use Reference 2. g PCV031AD Use Reference 2. PCV031BD Use Reference 2. PCV032AD Use Reference 2. PCV032BD Use Reference 2. PCV032CD Use Reference 2. PCV034AD Use Reference 2. . PCV034BD, Use Reference 2. y PCV035AD- Use Reference 2. g PCV035BD, Use Reference 2. y I t 9 1 1 1 . D-2
~~I ,~~
PiCbdf(I, LOWe dil(I CJf tl0k, lnC. CHECXED DATE '//7'?) CONSULTANTS NUCLEAR POWEn JOB tao. 083 CPC A / 17840 Skypark Boulevard APP R OV E D ^> DATE b' / M frvine, Cahtornia 92714 SHEET 2 0F 24 AVAILASILITY D ATA SHEET BY D ATE '#!7i irt i. Valvo, Manual Butterftv OVERALL FAILURE RATE;._ 41 0 f1) F AIL /10 HR. REPAIR TI'.iE: varien HR Reference
1. NPRDS, pg. 343 - (4-11.99 inches) 2 failures in 4.631 x 106 hours (all modes) A = 0. 4 3 x 10-6 F/hr.

2. WASH-1400 Fail to remain open (plug) 1 x 10-4 F/ Demand RF = 3 A. MTTR for monthly testing - 360 hours.
~~B. MTTR 1.ar quarterly testing - 1080 hours. C. MTTR for valve in normal service -4 hours. A SPECIFIC COMPONENTS~~
~~1. PXV278-C Locked open, fail closed (plug) use Ref. 1, MTTR Ref. B.~~
~~PXV279-C Locked open, fail closed (plug) use Ref. 1, MTTR Ref. B. .g 2. PXV037-C Locked open, fail closed (plug) use Ref. 1, MTTR Ref. C. 3~~
~~3. PMV8931D Motor-operated valves, normally closed, use Ref. 1, MTTR Ref. B.~~
PMV8932D Motor-operated valves, normally closed, use Ref. 1, Ml'TR Ref. B. PMV8933D Motor-operated valves, normally closed, use Ref. 1, MTTR Ref. B. PMV8934D Motor-operated valves, normally closed, use Ref. 1, MTTR Ref. B. PMV93AlD Motor-operated valves, normally closed, use Ref. 1, MTTR Ref. B. PMV93A2D Motor-operated valves, normally closed, use Ref. 1, MTTR Ref. B. PMV93A3D Motor-operated valves, normally closed, use Ref. 1, MTTR Ref. B. PMV93A4D Motor-operated valves, normally closed, use Ref. 1, MTTR Ref. B. PMV93BlD Motor-operated valves, normally closed, use Ref. 1, MTTR Ref. B. PMV9382D Motor-operated valves, normally closed, use Ref. 1, MTTR Ref. B. PMV93B3D Motor-operated valves, normally closed, use Ref. 1, MTTR Ref. B. PMV9384D Motor-operated valves, norraally closed, use Ref. 1, MTTR Ref. B. I i D-3
b, f PiChar(I, l.One .Inti Garrick, Inc. CHECKED _._
/
DATE /[I CONSULTANTS - NUCLEAR POWER 17840 skypark Doulevard JO B TJ 0. 083 CPC AFPROVED R DATEle[O srvine, Cahfornia 92714 F.EET 3 0F- ?4 AVAILADILITY DATA SiiEET BY DATE U IT C.t Valve, Manual Gate OVERALL FAILURE RATE: 0.4 (3) 0 FAIL /10 HR. REPAIR TIME: 'nrinn HR E m Reference
~~1. NPRDS, pg. 37~ - (4-11.99 inch gate valve) 10 failures in 27.162 x 106 hrs.~~
(all modes) A = 3.7 x 10-7 F/hr. A. MTTR for 6 actuations/ year - 730 hours B. MTTR for 1 test / month, 10 SU/SD, and 6 actuations/ year - 156 hours C. MTTR for 24 test / year, 6 actuations and 10 SU/SD - 110 hours l D. MTTR for 1 test / month and 6 actuations/ year - 243 hours E E. MTTR for 10 SU/SD and 6 actuations/ year - 274 hours SPECIFIC COMPONENTS
1. PMV3856C ('.ncludes valve and fa'se signal) use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. C.

2. PMO3126C (includes valve and f alse signal) use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. D.

3. PMV868AC (Valve only) Normally open, transfers c1caed. Use Ref. 1 and F PMV868BC MTTR Ref. B. (868A), D (868B).

4. PMV177AD (Normally closed) use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. L, PMV177BD (Normally closed) use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. f,.
PMV870AD (Normally closed) use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. ... PMV870BD (Normally closed) use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. A. PMV865 J (Normally closed) use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. A. PMV865dD (Normally closed) use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. A.
~~5. PMV872AC Normally open, transfers closed. Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. A.~~
~~PMV872BC Normally open, transfers closed. Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. A.~~
~~6. PXV001AC Normally open, transfers closed. Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. B.~~
PXV001BC Normally open, transfers closed. Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. D. PXV001CC Normally open, transfers closed. Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. B. PXV003AC Normally open, transfers closed. Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. Ec PXV003BC Normally open, transfers closed. Use Ref. 1 and MTTR def. A. PXV003CC Normally cien, trc -i: o closed. Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. E. PXV0002C Normally open. transfers closed. Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. A. PXV0004C Normally open, transfers closed. Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. E. PXV0014C Normally open, transfers closed. Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. A. PXV0017C Normally open, transfers closed. Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. A. t D-4
~*
PirliM(I, l 0%e dit(I Garrit!< Inc. CHEC - DATE M/ N CONT ULTANTG - NUCLEAR PdWER JOB NO. 083 CPC APPROVED p DATE h[N 2 7840 skypark Doulevard trvine, Californea 92714 SHEET 4 0 F _. 24 AVAILASILITY D ATA SHEET BY DATE / 74 -- ITEM: V ive, Manual Globe 6 OVERALL FAILURE RATE: 0.8 FAIL /10 H R. REPAIR TIME: 9aCi S HR Reference
1. NPRDS, pg. 390 (4-11.99 inch globe valve) 3 failures in 3.75u x 106 hours (all modes) A=8x 10-7 F/hr.

2. Self-actuated pressure control valvo. Failure rate 20 x 10-6/ hour based W upon engineering judgment.
~~A. MTTR for 6 actuations/ year - 730 nours B. MTTR based on valve position indication indicating valve in wrong position~~
~~- I hour C. MTTR for 6 actuations/ year and 10 SU/SD - 274 hours SPECIFIC COMPONENTS~~
~~1. PLV75AlD (Normally closed) Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. A.~~
~~PLV75A2D (valve only) PLV75AlD only use MTTR Ref. C. E PLV75BlD PLV7582D~~
~~2. PXV009AO (Normally closed test valve), use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. B.~~
PXV009BO (Normally closed test valve), use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. B. PXV009CO (Normally closed test valve), use Ret. 1 and MTTR Ref. B. p 3. PLV875AC (Normally open) Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. C. PLV875BC (Normally open) Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. A.
~~4. PLV75AlC Normally open. Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. C.~~
PLV75A2C Normally open. Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. A. PLV75BlC Normally open. Use Ref. 1 and MTTE Ref. A. PLV75B2C Normally open. Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. A.
5. CMUAFITO Use 3 x Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B.

6. PHV889-0 Use 0.1 x Ref. 1 (Normally closed, transfer open) and MTTR Ref. B

7. PHV020AC Use Reference 2 and MTTR Reference C.
]
~~PHV02030 Use Reference 2 and MTTR Reference C. 4 D-5 l~~
~
l
Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. CHECKED O DATE //z/N CONSULTANTS NUCLEAR POWER JOB NO. 083 CPC 17840 Skypark Doulevard APPR OVED b DATE E 71 g f rvme, California 92714 SHEET 5 0F 24 AVAILABILITY DATA SHEET BY b'i DATE / /!7'I ITEM. Motor Ocorator, AC Reversible 480V OVERALL FAILURE RATE: 4.3 (3) 8 FAIL /ta HR. REPAIR TIME: Varies HR _Refe r enc e
1. WPRDS, pgs. 448, 449 (Oirect acting, reverse acting, double acting, geared) (includes valve) (includes controls) (all modes) 255 failures in - 416 x 106 hours A = 11. 3 8 x 10-0 F/hr.

2. WASH-1400 MOV Fail to operate 1 x 10-3 F/ Demand RF - 3 (Includes operator, valve and controls)

3. IEEE 500 pg. 386 MOV Fail to operate Low Med. Rec.
~~1.25 2.5 12.5 in 106 cycles RF - 3~~
~~4. NPRDS pg. 243 (motor polyphase 480VAC) 53 Failures in 12.405 x 106 hours A = 4. 27 x 10-6 F/hr.~~
~~A. MTTR for quarterly testing - 1080 hours SPECIFIC COMPONENTS~~
~~1. PMO8931A Operator only, use Reference 4 and MTTR Reference A.~~
PMO8932A Operator only, use Reference 4 and MTTP Reference A. PMO8933A Operator only, use Reference 4 and MTTR Reference A. PMO8934A Operator only, use Reference 4 and MTTR Reference A. PMO93A1A Operator only, use Reference 4 and MTTR Reference A. PMO93A2A Operator only, use Reference 4 and MTTR Reference A. PMO93A3A Operator only, use Feference 4 and MTTR Reference A. PMO93A4A Operator only, use Reference 4 and MTTR Reference A. PMO93BlA Operator only, use Reference 4 attd MTTR Reference A. PMO93B2A Oparator only, use Ref'rence 4 and MTTR Reference A. PMO93B3A Operator only, use Returence 4 and MTTR Reference A. PMO93B4A Operator only, use Reference 4 and MTTR Reference A. t D-6 9
'S4 CHECKED DATE /'8 Picleard, Lowe and Garricic, Inc. CONSULTANTS - NUCLEAR POWER J00 NO.
~~'17810 Skypark Boulevard APPROVED ) DATE /> /id '~~
arvine, cahfornia 92714 SHEET 6 0F 24 AVAILABILITY D ATA SH EET BY NO DATE //[M ITEM: Motor Operator. DC Reversible 125VDC OVERALL FAILURE RATE: 19 8 (3) 0 FAIL /10 HR. REPAlR TIME: 360 gg Reference
1. NPRDS, pgs. 450, 451 (Direct acting, reverse acting, double acting, geared) (includes controlg) (all modes) 37 Failures in 1.169 x 10 hours A = 31. 6 5 x 10-6 F/hr.

2. WASH-1400 - see Motor Operator, AC, sheet 5, ref. 2 e 3. IEEE 500 - see Motor Operator, AC, sheet 5, ref. 3

4. NPRDS, pg. 249 (Motor DC commutator Sing e Speed) 5 Failures in 0.253 x 10 hours A = 19. 76 x 10-6 F/hr.
A. MTTR for 1 test / month and 6 actuations/ year - 240 hours SPECIFIC COMPONENTS . 1. PMOL 77AA Operator only, use Ref. 4. and MTTR Ref. A.; with , PMOL 77BA power fuse use 19.8 x 10-6 F/hr. (see sheet 14 for fuse) [19.76 + . 0 2 = 19. 78 = 19.8] 5 o ~ I f I D-7
m CHECKE0 M q DATE
~~, /P,/ l'ickard, Lowe and Garrick inc.~~
CONSULTANTS - NUCLEAR PdWER JOB NO. 083 CPC 5 ArPROVED DATE 0 frvi e, c io n a 92[1I SHEET 7 GF _ 24 AVAILABILITY D ATA SHEET BY ! DATE $ [h IT E '.1 Pump, Centrifuga1 <500 to 2499 OVERALL FAILURE RATE: 19.8 (3) FAIL /10 H R. 6 REPAIR TIME; varles HR E E Reference
1. WASH-1400 Fumps Failure to Start (Includes Driver) 1x 10-3/D RF - 3 Failure to Run (Includes Drive) 3 x 10-3/hr RF - 10

2. NPRDS, pg. 273 90 Failures in 4. 555 x 106 hours A = 19. 7 6 x 10- 6 F/hr.
~~A. METR for 1 test / month, 6 actuations/ year and 10 SU/SD - 156 hours B. MTTR for 1 test / month and 6 actuations/ year - 243 hours SPECIFIC COMPONENTS~~
~~1. PPM 105AF Use Ref. 2 and MTTR Ref. A.~~
PPM 10SBF Use Ref. 2 and MTTR Ref. B. PPM 105CF Use Ref. 2 and MTTR Ref. A. i l s 1 . D-8
i - Pickard, Lone and Garricl<, Inc. i CHECKED [O DATE //./N CONSULTANTS - NUCLEAR POWER JOB No. 083 CPC APPROVED f DATE
~~/ / ' />.~~
~~17840 Skypark Doulevard trvine, California 92714 SHEET g~~
OF 24 I Kv'A;tABILITY DATA SHEET BY DATE ///7'/ ITEM: Motor, Induction Squirrel Cage 3500-4999VAC OVERALL FAILURE RATE. 3.50 (3) 73,tjig sH R. REPAIR TIME: HR Referen g
1. WASli-1400 Fail to Start 3 x 10-4/D Range Factor 3 g Fail to Run 1 x 10-5/D Range Factor 3

2. NPRDS, pg. 244 14 Failures in 3.995 x 10 6 hours A = 3.50 x 10 -6 F/hr.

3. IEEE 500 (201 hp and larger)
~~pg. 206 low rec. high max.~~
All modes .707 1.897 7.73 10.43 Catastrophic , .566 1.518 6.184 8.344 Fail to run .336 .901 3.672 4.954 Fail to start .230 .616 2.512 3.390 A. MTTR for 1 test / month, 6 actuations/ year and 10 SU/SD - 156 hours . SPECIFIC COMPONENTS
~~1. PM0105AA Use Ref. 1 and afTR Ref. A PM0105CA Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. A o~~
I
~
~~t D-9 4~~
.i
~~// /@, Pickard, l. owe and Garrick, Inc.~~
JOB NO. 083 CPC I y CHECKED DATE _ CONSULTANTS - NUCLEAR POWER APPROVED *
/'
DATE & / As 17840 Skypark Boulevarr* trvine, Cahf ornia 92714 SHEET 9 0F 24 AVAILABILITY D AT. ' S;!EET (Y DATE I/!Il IT U.h AC Distributier Puses (4160, 480, 120) OVERALL FAILURE RATE: 14 4 ( ) 6 FAIL /10 HR. REPAlR TIME: HR R efe r enc e
~~1. NPRDS, pg. 25 Plant electrical systems (less standby / auxiliary power) 5 System failures in 1847 x in3 hours 80 Component failures in 1847 x 103 hours A = 4. 3 x 10-5 F/hr.~~
~~From bar graph on effect of failure by major components~~
~~=1/3 of failures result in loss of subsystem / channel~~
~~80 fx 1847 x 10 3~~
~~= 14.4 x 10-6 F/hr.~~
~~A. MTTR Based upon technical specification requirements SPECIFIC COMPONENTS I~~
~~l. JOOlA05F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference A =~~
JOOlA06F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference A JOOlBP3F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference A JOOlBP4F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference A JOOlB55F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference A JOOlB56F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference A JOOlY13F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference A JOOlY14F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference A JOOlY31F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference A JOOlY32F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference A JOO1YllF Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference A JOOlY12F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference A NOTE: For loss of offsite power cases, use 3.7 x 10-2 Failure on demand. Ref. WASH-1400 Appendix 2 Flectric Power System Analysis (OEDG - 3.7 x 10-2 Failure on demand) B D-10
~
1 f L
l CllECKED
~
O DATE I/N' Pickard, l. owe and Carrick, Inc. CONSULTANTS - NUCLEAR POWER 17840 Skypark Bouleva d JOB fd0. 083 CPC l j AFPROVED /) DATE / / ip Irvine, California 92714 SilEET 10 0F 24 I i AVAILABill! Y DATA SHEET BY M DATE / 27 l t IT U.1 Service Uater System by Subsystem OVERALL FAILURE RATE: 380 F/hr. C FAIL /10 HR. REPAIR TIME: 72 HR Reference
~~1. NPRDS, pg. 59 35 Systems 0 system failures in 951.8 x 103 hours ,~~
109 componcnt failures ' From effect of failure graphs = 30% of equipment failures (pumps) ! caused loss of subsystem. W Assume 1/3 of 109 failures cause subsystem failure 36
~~-- =~~
~~38 x 10-6 F/br. 951.8 x 103~~
~~.. MTTR of 72 hours based on technical specification requirements k~~
~~l SPECIFIC COMPONENTS~~
~~l. 1PPSW-AF Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference A~~
} IPPSW-BF lI I P I l D-ll l . t - , - - . . - . _ ~ - _ - . . . , _ . - . . . . . _ . - . . - . - . . .
// ,/ Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc.
CHECKED b- DATE / CONSULTANTS - NUCLEAR POWER JOB No.08 3 CPC [3 17840 Skypark Boulevard APPROVED DATEg'7*g Irvine. Cahfornia 92714 SHEET I1 0F 24 AVAILABILITY DATA SHEET BY _DATE ///7Y IT U.1 DC Distribution System CVERALL FAILURE RATE: 11.2 (10) paitfios HR. REPAIR TIME: 2 gn Reference
~~1. NPRDS, pg. 26 42 Systems; 1164.4 x 103 hours; 0 system failures in 35,630 tests. There have been 39 component failures in this tirae period.~~
~~3 Estimate A 3~~
~~= 3.35 x 10 -5 1164.4 x 10~~
2. WASH-1400 3 x 10-6/hr. RF - 3 no/ output (Batteries)

3. NPRDS, pg. 26 Batteries .42 x 10-6 F/hr. I From bar graph 1/3 of component failures cause subsystem fa ure 39 x
~~3 = 11.2 x 10-6 F/hr. 1164.4 x 10 A. MTTR 2 hours based on technical specification requirements SPECIFIC COMPONENTS~~
~~1. JOOlDllF Use Reference 3 and MTTR Reference A g JOOlD21F 5~~
~~i h s B~~
~~. ,-12 ~~~
f
l'icleard, lowe and Garricic, Inc. CHECKED /' DATE O / CONSULTANTS - NUCLEAR POWER JOB NO. 083 CPC
~~/ ' 17840 Skypark Doulevard~~
[3 12a DATE 0/8' OF 24 = I APPR OVE D trvine, Cahfornia 92714 SHEET BY DATE M AVAILABILITY DATA SHEET ITEM. Breaker Circuit Closer / Interrupter AC 450V [MCC) 120V Panel DVERALL FAILURE RATE: 0.39 (3) 0 FAIL /10 H R. REPAIR TIME: 4 HR
'"~*""*
Reforence '",*"*'*
~~'"-" ""~' ' " " " * " ' " '~~
~~1. IEEE 500, Indoor design -~~
~~"#I"" '" "~ " d ""~~
pg. 148 AC Breakers RF = 5 ALL a00f 5 A2 . t a. .6% 2 97 59 400 47XI '79 Catasfepuit .g .c4 3 .194 . Act 37.1 ?96 0 2*68 M Sevelovt Operettea .006 .043 .194 .V3 - - f at ts ta oreg . . . . 24.3 *;6 % ?hs FMi Fails to f ate rvet on opeaN . . . 0. 7 64.3 693 ell I Fatte ta close . . .1 1 13 10 Dt9A"A 3 - - = 17 9 103.2 1017 H2 o,...t.. w., i.o.uc . oi . .m . .s. i..i, . . I 2. WASH-1400 Fail to operate 1 x 10-3/D RF = 3 Premature Transfer 1 x 10-6/hr. RF = 3 6
3. NPRDS, pg. 97 Indoor Sealed Manual 13 failures in 3.110 x 10 hours A= 3.93 x 10-A. MTTR Based on engineering judgment and announced failures - 4 hours SPECIFIC COMPONENTS E 1. PCB11030 (480V MCC CB for S.W. valves) Use Ref. 3 and MTTR Ref. A.
~~PCB11020 (Normally closed) PCB21030 PCB21020 PCB93A10 PCB93A20 PCB93A30 PCB93A40 PCB93B10 PCB93B20 PCB93B30 PCB93840~~
2. PCB15260 (480V MCC CB for MOV3870A, B) Use Ref. 3 and MTTR Ref. A PCB16260 (Normally closed)

3. PCB16200 120V Panel CB Use Ref. 3 and MTTR Ref. A.
8, PCB16210 120V Panel CB Use Ref. 3 and MTTR Ref. A. PCB17200 120V Panel CB Use Ref. 3 and MTTR Ref. A. PCB17210 120V Panel CB Use Ref. 3 and MTTR Ref. A. I, D-13
l,{
~~. PiCliar(l, LOWe an(I Cartirl(, Inc.~~
~~CHECKED DATE /! 9'/ CONSULTANTS - NUCLEAR POWER JOB NO. 083 CPC w~~
'(
17840 Skypark Doulevard APPROVED DATE 0 / '4~,, Irvine, California 92714 SHEET 12b 0F 24 AVA! LABILITY D ATA SHEET BY DATE V g E '.1 Breaker,,4160VAC Indoor Metal Clad C VERALL FAILURE RATE: _ 1.29 (3) paitfio6 HR. REPAIR TIME: 360 gg R efe renc e
~~1. NPRDS, pgs. 94, 95 (Indoor metal clad, maanetic, motor) 85 failures in 65.663 x 106 hrs. A = 1. 2 9 x 10-6 F/hr5~~
~~-3 2.* WASH-1400 Failure to operhte 1 x 10 F/ Demand RF = 3~~
~~3. IEEE 500 see sheet 13, ref. 1.~~
~~A. MTTR - 5 hours from NPRDS, pg. 36 B. MTTR For 1 test / month, 6 acutations/ year and 10 SU/SD - 156 hours. SPECIFIC COMPONENTS~~
~~1. 4160V Breaker for P5A Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. B.~~
4160V Breaker for P5C Use Ref. 1 and MTTR Ref. B. I i h s i. B D-14 t
L Picleard, Lowe and Garricle, Inc. CHECKED DATE O[ ' CONSULTAN TS - NUCLEAR POWER JOB NO. 083 CPC l y I 7 - [',. 17840 Skypark Doulevard APPROVED DATE trvine, Cahfornia 92714 SHEET 13 0F 24 I AVAILABILITY DATA SHEET BY DATE /[/ ITEM. Breaker Circuit Closer / Interrupter DC OVERALL FAILURE RATE: 038 (5) F AI L/10 H R. 6 REPAIR TIME: 4 HR Reference r- . .. I ni o,
1. IEEE 500, pg. 150 Indoor design ,, ,,.,,,. . . . , e c ,,,
DC Breakers u_ , , , ,..,,, ,,.. t. ,,,, ... ,,,, ALL sODfl .02 .131 4 f.2 50 4J1 SM sw; C4'AUmlC .cel . OM .11 .33 39.3 314.6 11ee lies Sportout Operetten .005 .03M 11 .31 p e t t s te opee . . . . {} 144.1 Ital 1841 Falls te laterewst en speatq . . . . 1$.3 130.5 1 301 13;5 I Fatts te C lebe Of;4A0t D Op.eetet pree.Larely
~~. 10.7 D~~
~~85.4 0 454 0 sta c~~
~~.tCIPIL57 .015 101 .29 .07 - - -~~
P l
2. NPRDS see AC Circuit Breaker 450V, sheet 12, ref. 3. l A. MTTR see sheet 12, ref. A l -'
~~SPECIFIC COMPONENTS ; 1~~
~~1. PCB 17140 (Normally closed, DC) Use Ref. 3. sheet 12 MTTR l~~
PCB 17150 Use Ref. A. sheet 12 i i I ! 8 D-15 .
. , , . . . - .._y. , _ - - . _ . , . . ., .,___m... . . . ,r._...-...-,__._..,_,._.y,,__. ~. m._,_ . . _ . . _ - . . . . _ . . . , , , ,
~~l CHECKED DATE~~
'/
Picl<artl, Lowe ant! Garricl<, Inc. CONSULTANTS NUCLEAR POWER J00 ND. OR1 CPc h p 17840 Skypark Doulevard APPR OVE D s DATE 0/? C. Irvine. Cahtornia 92714 SHEET 14 0F 24 AVAILADILITY DATA SHEET BY
~
DATE//!7 ITE?.1: Fuses OVERALL FAILURE RATE: 0.021 (5) 0 FAIL /10 HR. REPAIR TIME: 1 HR Reference r .. u. r- . t36
~~1. IEEE 500, pg. 193 431~~
~~, , _ , , , , . c, t.. . w ... m. t.. ii n. ..~~
~~ALL 't'fdl .M AJ .3 .3 . - - to CAfasttoputt 004 .021 . ft$ .209 * -~~
60 Fenes (3 pea) Defe rettag .006 .021 .??S .?DS . * *

Felle te latercept + = = * * * = 10 IqCIPf f gf .nn) .0C9 .399 =
~~. n95 - * -~~
A. MTTR based on announced failures - 1 hour-SPECIFIC COMPONENTS B i h s I B D-16 . I
1 i 1 CHECKED DATE
~~#j/ I'icl<ard, Lone and Gar.kl<, Inc.~~
CONSIJLTANTS - NUCLEAR POWER JOB NO. 083 CPC 17840 Skypark Boulevard APPROVED f' _ DATE //'" frvine, Cahfornia 92714 SHEET 15 0F 24 AVAILABILITY DATA SHEET BY DATE //!7'i IT E.'.t . Motor Starter ) OVERALL FAILURE RATE:
~~.12 (2) F alL/106 HR. REPAIR Tl'.1E:~~
4 HR Reference , , , , , . , . ,,.,,,,,,,,, tal qsp
1. IEEE 500, pg . 171 -ie - *-i. o~ ;
t.. .: .... ... t.. ... .. . Ad n'Ot t 1 % .214 .ai t.0 CA!ai'WOPats 000 .121 .241 1. 0 *W
}
~~Sevr 9ew. Geer.tts4 02 % . 0 Al Mll . 2 T? F.lls te spee .0108 .f'61 .0371 144~~
~~. . . i . i. i .t.,~,i -i ., .cm .em .* .r I ...,..i...~~
~~icm t~~
. en. . o. n .M.i .in .m) .n: .m .m A A. MTTR based on announced failures - 4 hours SPECIFIC COMPONENTS 1
~~3 o l i 'l .I l D-17 I 4~~
.. - - - - . - ~ ~ . - . _ -_. .- . . . . - , . - . . . , _ . . . . - . . - - - - - . . . - - . . . - . - - - . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - _ _
~~CHECKED - R DATE~~
~~/ p'/ Pickard, L<me and Garrick, Inc.~~
CONSULTANTS - NUCLEAR POWER JOB NO. 083 CPC h e> 17840 Skypark Boulevard APPROVED DATE l ' / '.". frvine, California 92714 SHEET 16 24 OF AVAILABILITY DATA SHEET BY DATE //!N ITEM: Relav Control i_00-199VDC OVERALL FAILURE RATE: 0.39 (3) G FAIL /10 HR. REPAlR TIME: HR Reference
1. NPRDS, pg. 289 26 failures in 44.137 x 106 operating hours General Purpose A = . 59 x 10-6 E A. MTTR see sheet 17 B. MTTR for monthly '.est - 360 hours SPECIFIC COMPONENTS

1. PRElAllF Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B.
PRElBilF Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PRElA12F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PRElB12F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PREllllF Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PRE 1112F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PRE 1A03F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PRElA08F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PRElB03F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PRElB08F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PREA301F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PREA302F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PREA801F Use RC.ference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PREA802F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PREB301F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PREB302F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PREB801F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PREB802F Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PRE 1512X Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PRE 1514X Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PRE 1610X Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. PRE 1613X Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B. I B D-18 i L
Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. CHECKED gj\ DATE///,// jf e, CONSULTANTS NUCLEAR POWER JOB NO. 083 CPC APPROVED D AT E ' '! I Irvine, Ca o n a 921 SHEET 17 0F 24 AVAILABILITY DATA SHEET BY b' DATE // !7'l ITEM. Relay Control 100-199VAC , OVER ALL FAILURE RATE: 0.49 (3) Fait /10 8H R. REPAIR TIME: or 0 HR I R e fe re nc e
~~1. NPRDS, pg. 288 29 failures in 59.076 x 10 6 cperating hours (General Purpose) A = .49 x 10-D F/hr.~~
~~I A. MTTR for general purpose relay in energized circuit - 4 hours SPECIFIC COMPONENTS I E I s i I 0-1e g~~
^
Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. CHECKED DATE / 2m. CONSULTANTS - NUCLEAR POWER JOS fJ0. 083 CPC 17840 Skypark Doulevard APPR OVED ] DATE h q C' - frvine Cahfornia 92714 SHEET 10 0F 24 AVAILABILITY DATA SilEET BY DATE / TY ITEM: Rel3V9- Protective OVERALL FAILURE RATE: 0.036 (3) FAIL /100 HR. REPA!R TIME: 4 HR Reference '"]* "** *
~~'"'~~"'" '"'#'"'~~
1. IEEE 500, pg. 155

i. .., .. u.. i. e .,
ALL *LMS .02 .097 .25 10.54 1 3. 5 7 to CATAsit0P=IC 0CF .Q34 .092 3.9 1 3. 5 F 10 levriset 0perettee 007 .038 092 3,9 . . . . falls to etee . . = - 186 509 1.C2 14.4
~~.. . to ..ii . ..~~
~~b. due te gentacts rails to t tse~~
~~? = = = = 854 2.991 5.90 35.4~~
4. due to teil, secte tw

4. due to coatects Ot:aADE9 ,g ,g39 ,1 g , g} . . . .
Centacts cemetering l4C!Pl[4f .005 322 .C58 f. 43 - *
~~A. MTTR see sheet 17 I~~
~~B. MTTR for monthly test - 360 hours SPECIFIC COMPONENTS~~
1. PCNIC560 Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B PCN1D120 Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B PCNICl2O Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B PCN1D560 Use Reference 1 and MTTR Reference B l
I B D-20 t f
___ ___ . _ _ . . _ _ - -__ _ __ _ __ _ _ . . _. _ _ _ . . . ~ . _ _ _ _ _ __ i
~~/'$,. Picl<ard, t.one and Car.irls, Inc.~~
~~CHECKED A, .. DATE CONSULTANTS flUCLEAR POVER JOB f;C. l~~
</ 17040 Skypark Boulevard APPROVED 's DATE/c[g, trvine, Cahtornia 92714 SHEET I9 0F 24 f
BY
~~#" ~ DATE // 2 f" AVAILABILITY D ATA SIIEET ITEM:~~
~~Switchaear Protective Relay CVERALL FAILURE RATE: 0.08 (3) FAltno 6HH. REPAIR TI'.tE: HR~~
~
Rcierence ! 1. NERDS, (100-199VDC) 1 failure in 13.027 x 106 eperating hours ! pg. 189 A = 7. 7 x 10-8 F/hr. ) il x. -R - , hee < 17
~~g Sezcze1c cosecuesrS I~~
~~4 1 I I i t~~
~~'t I~~
~~t t t D-21~~
~~.i .i 1~~
bvi' , Pickartl, lowe art (! Carrick, Inc. CHECKED DATE // / CONSULTANTS - NUCLEAR POW 2n JOB no. 083 CPC g'*_j g 17840 Skypark Boulevard APPROVED DATE Iryme Cahfornia 92714 20 24 SHEET OF ! i AVAILABILITY DATA SHEET BY DATE II!7'] ITEM: Switchaear Auxiliarv Rolav 100-199VDC OVERALL FAILURE RATE: 0.16 (3) _ FAIL /100HR. REPAIR TIME: 4 HR l Reference
1. NPRDS, pg. 192 0 failures in 6.258 x 106 operating hours < l.6 x 10-7 population 474 m A. MTTR see sheet 17 SPECIFIC COMPONENTS I.
I' 3 I i h s I B l D-22 I
a
~~_. Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc.~~
~~CHECKED DATE // COfJSULTANTS fJtJCLEAR POWER JOB NO. 083 CPC~~
,, 17840 Skyparb 3oulevard APPROVED 4 DATE / / i '# Irvme, Cahfornia 92714 SHEET -21 0F 24 AVAILABILITY DATA SHEET BY DATE //!NI ITEM: Time Delay Relay, Pneumatic, AC or DC OVERALL FAILURE RATE: see below (3) 8 F AIL /10 H R. REPAIR TI',tE: 4 HR l
~~Referencq~~
~~1. NPRDS, pgs. 298, 299 DC (all volt) 1 failure in 4.709 x 106 hours A = .02 x ')-6 F/hr.~~
AC (all volt) " "# * * ' "# A = . 0 8 x 10-6 F/hr. I A. nrra see sheet 17 g seec1,1c cosPoxeses I 1 I l i . 4 -l l D-23 i
(
~~/ PICI(ard, t. owe and Garricl<, Inc.~~
CHECKED DATE I/'A CONSULTANTS NUCLEAR POWER JOB tJ0. 083 CPC APPROVED 'l 1 DATE [ jI _t ' 17840 Skypark Boulevard irvine, California 92714 22 SHEET 0F 24 AVAILADILITY DATA SilEET BY DATE //!7 I ITEM: Transformer Control 480/120VAC OVERALL FAILURE RATE: .413 [8} 6 FAIL /10 HR. REPAIR TIME: 4 HR Reference '""*"*** m
'"~ '*
~~o, I~~
1. IEEE 500, pg. 371 '"""""-" '"--'"c"-
~~'~~ "" "*' "" "' "" "*' ""~~
~~Potential Trans-former """' "' '- *- CAWMWIC .0555 .413 3. 84 6.17~~
~~%i' RF = 8 .. - e. . 0 3, .m 3.x ...~~
~~3. . pee etreuti .0100 . ORC 4 750 1.M MMS .0063 .0449 433 .7~~
*teche*1 cal amage W*IPIINT .0102 .0758 70s 1.13
~~2. NPRDS, pg. 211 0 failures in 8.090 x lb6 hours oopulation 662 (0-299VAC Air Cooled Natural Circulation)~~
A. MTTR see sheet 17 B SPECIFIC COMPONENTS I l t h s l D-24 I 0
g j Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. ( CHECKED DATE CONSULTANTS - NUCLEAR POWER JOB NO. 083 090 17840 Skypark Boulevard APPR OVED f3' DATE b / E, 1rvine, California 92714 SHEET 21a OF 24 I AVAILABILITY D ATA SHEET BY DATE Il!7 ITEM: Miscellaneous Circuits 6 OVERALL FAILURE RATE: See below FAIL /10 HR. REPAIR TIME: Varies HR I Reference l f L SPECIFIC COMPONENTS b 1. PSTM05AF Motor operator - 19.76 (sheet 6) ; master contractor - 0.12 h m PSTM05BF (sheet 15) ; 95-1 Relay - 0.49 (sheet 17); FOGG Fuse - 0.02 (sheet 14); FOGG Breaker - 0.39 (sheet 12) ; l A = 20. 8 x 10-6, MTTR = 730 hours, RF = 3
~~2. PSTMOOAF Motor operator - 4.27 (sheet 5) ; Master contractor -~~
~~PSTM00BF 0.12 (sheet 15) ; 95 Relay - 0.49 (sheet 17) ; FOGG Fuse - 0.92 (sheet 14) ; FOGG Breaker - 0.39 (sheet 12) ; A = 5.29 x 10-6, MTTR = 730 hours, RF = 3~~
~~3. PSTBRlAF Breaker - 1.29 (sheet 12b) ; 3X relay - 0.6 (sheet 16);~~
~~PSTBRlBF OC Relay (2) - 0.07 (sheet 18) ; UV Relay - 0.04 (sheet 18) ; GF Relay - 0.04 (sheet 18) ; Fuse (2) - 0.04 (sheet 14) ; A = 2.12 x 10-6, MTTR = 156 hours, RF = 3~~
]
4. PSTCCAlF Control transformer - 0.41 (sheet 22) ; Power fuse - 0.02

(sheet 14) ; i l PSTCCA2P Open coil - 0.49 (sheet 17) ; Close coil - 0.49 (sheet 17) ; l PSTCCBlF LP circuit consisting of

breaker - 0.39 (sheet 12) ; I PSTCCB2P 62 Relay - 0.04 (sheet 18) ; 3 x Relay - 0.04 (sheet 18) ; l PSTCCA3F Fuse - 0.02 (sheet 14) . )
PSTCCA4F A = 1.90 x 10-6, MTTR = 4 hours (circuit failure PSTCCB3F indicated) RF = 3 PSTCCB4F E l l l D-25 l
CHECKED !y DATE /[/ Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. CONSULTANTS - NUCLEAR POWER JOB fJ0. 083 CPC O 'fpA 17840 Skypark Boulevard APPROVED DATE ' trvine, California 92714 SHEET ?lb 0F 24 _ AVAILABILITY DATA SHEET BY .DATE Il! Th ITEM: Miscellaneous Circuits OVERALL FAILURE RATE: See belOW 6 FAIL /10 HR. REPAIR TIME: Varies _HR Reference SPECIFIC COMPONENTS
\
50 PSTCCSAF Close coil - 0.59 (sheet 16) ; Open coil - 0.59 (sheet 16) ; PSTCC5BF PCC177AF Power fuse (2) - 0.04 (sheet 14) ; Time delay relay - 0.08 (sheet 21). h N PCC177BF A = 1. 3 0 x 10 - 6, MTTR = 4 hours, RF = 3
~~6. PSTCCOAP Close coil - 0.49 (shee t 17); Open coil - 0.49 (sheet 17) ;~~
~~PSTCCOBF Power fuse - 0.02 (sheet 14) ; Transformer - 0.41 (sheet 22). A = 1. 41 x 10 - 6, MTTR = 4 hours, RF = 3~~
~~7. PSTSLlAF A = 0.1 x 10-6 F/ hour based on engineering judgment.~~
~~PSTSL2AF MTTR = 4 hours based on indication available in the control PCCIAClE room. PCClAC2E RF = 3 PCClBClE PCC1BC2E~~
~~8. PSTCSlAC A = 0 . 01 x 10 - 6 F/ hour based on engineering judgment.~~
~~l PSTCSlBC MTTR = 4 hours. RF = 3 l~~
~~9. POOCCAlX X = 20 x 10-6 F/ hour based on engineering judgment as P00CCA2X no data was available for electrohydraulic valves.~~
POOCCBlX MTTR (POOCCA1X) = 274 hours POOCCB2X MTTR (all others) = 720 hours RF = 3 I B D-26 I I
E W CHECKED
~~-7 b% ,~~
~~Of/~9 Pickard, lone and Garrick, Inc. DATE ' CONSULTANTS - tJUCLEAR POWER JOB t:0. 083 CPC~~
~~/b DATE g / 17840 Skypark Boulevard APPROVED Irvine, Cahfornia 92714 I~~
SHEET 23c op 24 AVAILABILITY DA TA SHEET BY M DATE u[79 ITEM: Miscellaneous Hardware Failures OVERALL FAILURE RATE: See below (3) 6 FAIL /10 HR. REPAIR TIME: See below HR Reference
~~1. CSTlGLOR Condensate Storage Tank Rupture or Gross Leakage A = 1 x 10-10 from WASH-1400 Appendix 2 AFW System Analysis. MTTR = 1 hour based upon rapid detection.~~
~~RF = 3 0~~
~~2. 1RUPTLOF AFW flow lost in main feedwater header.~~
~~I A = 1 x 10-8 based on engineering judgment (must pass through a check valve and a closed MOV) MTTR = 1 hour, based upon rapid detection. 4 RF = 10 t I s I
~~D-27~~
~~I h CHECKED gg D/$TE n/~~
~~; Pick ard, Lowe and Carrick. Inc.~~
083 CPC Y?' CONSULTANTS - NUCLEAR POWER JOB No. _ APPROVED S DATE C' " 24 24 trvine. CNfo n a 2$1E SHEET 0F l AVAILABILITY D ATA SHEET BY DATE ITEM: Turbine Pump Controls and Turbine F
~~-2 OVERALL FAILURE RATE: (3) 1.06 x 10 FAIL /CEMAND REPAIR Tl?.tE: H R.~~
~~i Reference~~
~~1. EGG Pump Report supplied values that yielded a 1.06 x 10- F/ demand.~~
~~SPECIFIC COMPONENTS I~~
~~1. PTBlG05A Controls fail to perform function, turbine fails to start s~~
f f i i B I D-28
i REFERENCES
% Reference Source Date I 1. Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System 1978 Annual Reports of Cumulative National Technical Infce-mation Service, Spring-field, VA 22161 1979 System and Component Reliability, NUREG/CR0942
2. Reactor Safety Study U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 1975 WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014) Commission Appendix III I 3. IEEE Guide to the Selec-tion and Presentation of Electrical, Electronic The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Inc. or John Wiley & Sons, 1977 and Sensing Component Inc.
~~Reliability Data for Nuclear-Power Generating Stations, IEEE Std. 500-1977~~
~~4. Data Summaries of Licensee National Technical Infor- 1980 Event Reports of PUMF3 at mation Service, Spring-8 U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants NUREG/CR-120:,~~
~~field, VA 22161 o I ! 1 is~~
~~.}}~~

ML19341C172

Contents

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SUMMARY

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SUMMARY

3.1 BACKGROUND

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SUMMARY

SUMMARY

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