ML20091K970

Request for Exemption from Branch Technical Position BTP-CMEB 9.5-1 for Control Panels C43 & C44

ML20091K970
Person / Time
Site:	Midland
Issue date:	05/25/1984
From:	CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML20091K969	List: ML20091K965 ML20091K970
References
NUDOCS 8406070265
Download: ML20091K970 (23)

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.e CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY MIDLANO NUCLEAR PLANT REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION FROM BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION BTP-CHEB 9.5-1 FOR CONTROL PANELS C43 AND C44 MAY 25, 1984 i

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page I. BACKGROUND AND

SUMMARY

1 II. EXEMPTION REQUEST 3 III. BASIS FOR EXEMPTION 4 A. INTRODUCTION 4 B. DESIGN 7 C. CONCLUSION 12 IV. REFERENCES 13 LIST OF TABLES Table 1 Safe Shutdown Functions of Concern Within Panels C43 and C44 Table 2 General Fire Protection Information Safety Related Equipment Rooms LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 Main Control Room General Arrangement Figure 2 C43 and C44 Panel Arrangement Figure 3 Safety Related Equipment Room Fire Detection /

Suppression System cpm 3/C43-N/44/08

I. BACKGROUND AND

SUMMARY

BACKGROUND On October 26, 1983, a meeting was held between Consumers Power Company (CPCo), Bechtel, and the NRC staff to discuss fire pro-tection for control panels containing redundant safe shutdown com-ponents and their potential susceptibility to fire damage. CPCo presented a discussion of all safe shutdown panels within the con-trol room, control room peripheral rooms, and safety related equip-ment (SRE) rooms. The control panel arrangement and area layout are shown on Figure 1. CPCo stated that panels C43 and C44 con-tained redundcnt safe shutdown circuits that could be damaged by a single fire and, therefore, positive means would be required to safeguard these circuits from fire induced failures. CPCo indicated that a halon fire suppression system incorporating cross-zoned smoke detection system was being designed for the SRE room and panels C43 and C44 to provide this positive protection.

This submittal provides discussion on the low probability of actual fires in the SRE rooms and details of this state-of-the-art fire suppression system. This information will form the basis for an exemption request.

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SUMMARY

There are only two panels within the SRE rooms, the C43 and C44 panels which contain redundant channels of safe shutdown circuits which require protection frcm fire induced failures. This document demonstrates that the proposed and existing fire protection features for the SRE rooms within fire area 65A combined with the low proba-

! bility of fire in these rooms provide a level of fire protection consistent with the fire hazards both transient and in-situ identified l

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for these rooms. The highly reliable smoke detection /halon

. suppression system described in Section III will function such that internal or external panel fires will be extinguished before they can cause the loss of redundant safe shutdown functions.

Alternate methods of sa.eguarding the safe shutdown circuits in these rooms were considered but determined to be less effective in protecting both redundant trains than the total flooding halon sys-tem described in this submittal.

This document contains information pertaining to the low fire pro-bability and the highly reliable smoke detection /halon suppression system. Based on a probabilistic risk assessment study, the pro-bability of a fire in the SRE room (2.3 x 10-5) coupled with the overall probability of a failure of the smoke detection /halon sup-pression system (1 x 10-4) results in a failure rate of 2.3 x 10-9 per reactor year. Included are discussions of the following:

- Very low fire probability for the SRE rooms,

- High sensitivity and rapid response of the cross-zoned detec-tion system,

- The high success of Halon as a complete suppression agent,

- Redundant detection and automatic suppression components, and l

- . Passive protection of both redundant channels of safe shutdown circuits.

This information forms the basis for an exemption request from Branch Technical Position BTP-CMEB 9.5-1 as described in Section II.

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II. EXEMPTION REQUEST

- 4 Branch Technical Position BTP-CMEB 9.5-1, Section C5.b.(2), requires that redundant trains of safe shutdown systems be protected from fire damage by 1) separation of cables and equipment by a 3-hour fire barrier; or 2) separation of cables and equipment by a hori-zontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles combined with the installation of fire detection and automatic fire suppression; or 3) enclosure of cables and equipment of one train by a 1-hour rated fire barrier combined with the installation of fire detection and automatic fire suppression.

Based on the information contained in this document describing the highly reliable smoke detection /halon suppression system and other passive fire protection features, CPCo is requesting an exemption from BTP- CMEB 9.5-1 Section C5.b.(2), for the circuits of safe shutdown functions identified on Table 1 for C43 and C44 panels.

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III. BAS'IS FOR EXEMPTION A. INTRODUCTION A safe shutdown analysis was conducted for all control room cabinets, including the safety related equipment (SRE) room cabinets which contain safe shutdown circuits. Refer to Figure 1 for the location of the SRE room and fcr the layout of the panels within the room. The analysis of the SRE rooms indicated that potential fires in or near panels C41, C42, or C45 will not affect the safe shutdown capability of the plant. For panels C43 and C44, however, safe shutdown capability is threatened by the potential for uncontrolled fires in or adjacent to these panels. Some of the safe shutdown circuits within these panels are protected against such fires by transfer switches and require no further consideration. The remaining safe shutdown circuits of concern are the subject of this sub-mittal and the accompanying exemption request. A list of the functions controlled by these circuits of concern is presented in Table 1.-

Panel C43, a single multi-bay panel, is the Engineering Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) analog panel. Panel C44 is comprised of two multi-bay cabinets located end-to-end, separ-ated by a 3 inch air space, and contains the ESFAS digital logic module and Loss cf Off-site Power (LOP) and Emergency Core Cooling Actuation System (ECCAS) sequencers. Arrangement of the C43 and C44 panels is shown on Figure 2.

Circuit failures in any one channel, resulting in either inoper-able equipment or spurious operation of ESFAS, will not affect the safe shutdown capability of the plant. Passive protection of the redundant circuits of concern within panel: C43 and C44 4

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J is provided by physical separation of these circuits. In panel C43, the redundant circuits are located in different bays of that panel, and in C44 the redundant circuits are located in the opposite cabinets. This separation, combined with an effective fire detection / suppression system described-in this submittal, provides protection against loss of redundant safe shutdown functions as a result of a fire.

I Each Unit of the Midland Nuclear Plant has its own separate SRE room. The basis for this exemption request applies equally to both Units.

The SRE rooms in which these panels are located are an area of I

low activity and the in-situ fire loading is low, consisting primarily of wires and cable. A physical description of the

-SRE room is provided in tabular form in Table 2. A review of the potential for transient combustibles in the SRE rooms was performed by a Consumers Ccrporate Fire Protection Engineer.

The results of this review indicate that the expected transient combustibles loading for these rooms is very small and would consist primarily of materials in the posession of plant per-sonnel during the time that these rooms are occupied. The type and quantity of transient combustibles are contrclied by administrative procedures. The low transient combustible loading contributes to a low fire prcbability from this room.

l j In addition to the items mentioned above, the SRE rooms of both Units form a separate fire area designated 65A. The fire area boundary which separates the SRE room from the main control room (area 65) and the balance of plant consists of 3-hour fire rated construction. Door openings and HVAC duct penetra-

' tions in the boundary walls are equipped with automatic self-

, closing. fire rated doors and duct dampers. The fire rating on 5

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4 the doors and duct dampers is equivalent to that of the fire area boundary. Circuits in the SRE room are low voltage signal or control circuits with over-current protection provided as necessary. The combination of these factors supports the low fire probability. Based on nuclear plant experience, the median estimate of a fire in the Midland control room is 3.2 x 10-4 per reactor yearl. It is further conservatively assumed that the SRE room contains equipment and materials representative of the control room and, therefore, the probability that a control room fire would occur in the SRE room (considering relative floor area) is 7.3 percent. This is a conservative estimate because activity levels within the SRE room will be less than within the main control room and because not all fires postulated to occur in the SRE room have the same poten-tial fer affecting panels C43 and C44. This gives a median estimate of a fire in the SRE room of 2.3 x 10-5 per reactor year.

Although the SRE room has a low fire probability, it was decided that positive means should be provided to protect redundant safe shutdown channels from a potential fire.

Several options to achieve this protection were considered.

Relocation to achieve a separation of greater than 20' withir the SRE room is not a reasonable approach for the bays of panel C43 considering panel and plant construction and layout.

Similarly, separation of redundant circuitry within the SRE room by fire barriers is not a practical approach considering panel arrangement and due to lack of space. Electrical isola-tion devices were evaluated unfavorably, because their addition would significantly increase control system complexity, increase maintenance, and increase the susceptibility to control system failures due to the increased number of components. Therefore, 6

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a highly reliable fire detection / suppression system was chosen to protect both channels. Through rapid and reliable detection and suppression, not only are the safe shutdom functions safe-guarded. but also the progression of any potential fire is halted, minimizing the total extent of the damage. For fires internal to the C43 or C44 panels, fire damage will be limited to the local area of the ignition socrce or faulted circuit.

Fires external to any cabinet in the SRE room would t,e detected and extinguished before circuit damage could occur, thus preserving full system function of both redundant safe shutdown channels.

B. DESIGN It is the intent to provide maximum protection to the safe shutdown circuits and extinguish incipient fires, preventing damage to one redundant safe shutdown channel and minimizing fire damage to the affected channel. This will be accomplished by the installation of a highly reliable halon suppression system. The SRE room of each unit will be provided with a separate smoke detection /halon suppression system. In addi-tion to the total flooding halon system being installed, the SRE rooms will be outfitted with 3-hour fire rated doors and i HVAC supply duct dampers. The doors equipped with automatic self-closing devices will close upon activation of the detection  ;

system. These features provide containment of the halon gas within the SRE room to maintain the concentration at a suppres-i sion level. The highly reliable total flooding halon system being installed is composed of three subsystems: 1) a detection 7

system, 2) an actuation system, and 3) a supply / distribution system. Components of these subsystems have been laboratory tested (U.L. or F.M.) and their reliaoility has been proven under actual fire conditions.

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~The detection system utilizes ionization detectors strategically ,

' located for maximum surveillance and to provid. rapid detection of_any SRE room fire in its earliest development, the incipient  !

stage. Detector location is dependent on several factors l

including: 1) hazard location, 2) room construction and in l

j particular the ceiling details, and 3) smoke and air movement.

I Placement of the detectors is in accordance with the guidance f provided by NFPA72E.2 Minimum standards for detector placement l-outlined in this standard have been developed based on exten-l sive testing and data gathered from actual fire investigations.

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The actuation system is the interface between the detection system and the supply / distribution system. The actuation sys-l tem is composed of solid state electronic logic modules which accept input signals from either automatic fire detection

' devices or manually operated switches. These logic modules l_

convert the input signals to output signals which alarm in the control room and initiate the discharge of halon from the stor-age cylinders into the distribution piping. Spurious automatic

(- discharge of the halon system is minimized by the logic modules

(. using the principle of cross-zoned detection.

The supply / distribution syt. tem consists of halon storage cylin-I ders, each equipped with an electrically actuated valve, and a fixed piping manifold and distribution system with appropriately

, selected discharge nozzles to distribute the halon into the

( SRE room and into panels C43 and C44.

The high reliability and rapid extinguishing features of the halon system outlined above and detailed in NFPA 12A3 will be improved by: 1) improving detector response time 2) improving system reliability, and 3) discharging the extinguishing agent directly into each bay of both the C43 and C44 panels. These improvements are shown on Figure 3 and detailed below.

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Improving Detection Response Time The ionization detectors are divided into two redundant strings, called zones and are arranged in a cross-zoned pattern. Each zone is capable of detecting the presence of products of combus-tion (POC) originating in the SRE room and from within either the C43 panel or the C44 cabinets. Area detection is accomplished using detectors installed within each SRE room in accordance with the guidance provided in NFPA 72E. The detection response time associated with this arrangement is improved by the addition of local (spot) detection directly above the C43 and C44 panels.

The top of each bay of these panels will be opened and a smoke collection hood installed on each panel to direct the natural convection currents carrying the potential POC to the ionization detectors. This arrangement minimizes the dilution of the P0C by the SRE room air before it reaches these detectors. A total of four ionization detectors (2 per detection zone) will be mounted within each smoke collection hood.

In addition to improving detector response time, this t.rrangement eliminates the potential for single failures to compromise the system function associated with local detection. Since four detectors are monitoring POC from within all bays of each panel, the failure of a single detector will not prevent detection.

j Improving System Reliability The reliability of the detection rystem has been improved by I eliminating the system dependency associated with a single detector failure. The elimination of single failure modes within the actuation system has been accomplished through the 7

following system improvements.

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To prevent loss of nower to the smoke detection and halon suppression sys . redundant power supply, consisting of a battery backup, is located in the fire protection panel. This redundant power supply is capable of powering the smoke detec-tion system for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and still be capable of actuating the halon delivery system should a fire occur during loss of local power.

The halon is stored in two redundant cylinders, each sized to flood the room, including panels to a minimum concentration of 5 percent by volume which is sufficient for rapid extinguish-ment of a fire 3,4 The initial concentration of halon will assure that a minimum 5 percent concentration is maintained throughout a 10 minute soak time taking into account leakage of halon from the SRE room. The logic circuitry, on positive fire indication, will actuate; 1) alarms and 2) discharge the main cylinder releasing the total contents to the room and panels achieving a uniform 5 percent concentration. Should the main cylinder fail to discharge, after a short time delay (approximately 10 seconds), the second or reserve cylinder c

will be automatically actuated. Pressure switches, mounted in

( the halon discharge piping, will signal a successful discharge and will inhibit actuation of the reserve cylinder. Failure l

to detect the main cylinder discharge (or switch failure) may l

l result in both cylinders discharging and will result in halon

! concentration of 10 percent which does not pose a hazard to operating personne13 ,

!' To evaluate the smoke detection /halon suppression system

! reliability, a study was conducted utilizing the methods 5

l described in NUREG/CR 2300 . The failure rate of each of the components and functions shown on Figure 3 was developed based l

on established data 6,7 The SRE room 3-hour rated fire damper l

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has'no function'related to the smoke detection /halon suppres-sion system reliability ana was not included in the analysis.

Based on th'e foregoing, the failure rate of the system was conservatively calculated to be 1 x 10-4 per year. Elements of conservatism include consideration of potential common mode failures, a conservative estimate of the reliability of the control module, and no operator intervention.

Surveillance and operability requirements, which minimize

. potential single failures of the fire detection / suppression system functions, will be performed in accordance with Technical Specifications. Technical Specifications will ensure the oper-ability of the smoke detection /halon suppression system. Sur-veillance and maintenance of the automatic self-closing fire doors will be performed in accordance with the corporate Property Protection Department Fire Protection Manual.

Improved Distribution The supply / distribution system consists of two 100 percent capacity halon storage cylinders manifolded into a seismically supported distribution system. The distribution piping termin-ates with approved (U.L. or F.M.) discharge nozzles located in the SRE room and in each bay of the C43 and C44 panels.

The standard total flooding halon system described in NFPA 12A relies on turbulence created by area discharge nozzles and migration of the halon molecules to assure the desired concen-tration of halon within electrical' enclosures. Additional nozzles located within each bay of panels C43 and C44 are pro-vided to improve the distribution of halon. This arrangement assures extinguishment of any transient or in-situ fire either internal or external before involvement of nearby circuits.

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-The halon system internal to the cabinets will be designed such that distribution nozzles will not permit the direct impingement of the halon onto the solid state logic modules.

C. CONCLUSION Within the SRE rooms only panels C43 and C44 require fire pro-tection. The probability of a fire in this room is very low and will further be limited through administrative procedures.

The overall probability of a failuro of the smoke detection /halon suppression system (1 x 10-4) coupled with the probability of a fire in the SRE room (2.3 x 10-5) is 2.3 x 10 -9 per reactor year. This very low failure rate supports CPCo's proposed request for an exemption from BTP-CMEB 9.5-: as described in Section II. If a fire should occur, the halon supression system described will extinguish any transient or in-situ fire, preventing loss of redundant safe shutdown functions.

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IV.

REFERENCES:

1. Midland Energy Center Probabilistic Risk Assessment; May, 1984; prepared by Pickard, Lowe, and Garrick, Inc.

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

2. t.FPA 72E; Standard on Automatic Fire Detectors; 1982.

3. NFPA 12A; Standard on Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Systems; 1980.

4. Fire Protection Handbook, Fifteenth Edition, Section 18,

" Chapter 2, pp 18-11 through 18-22 National Fire Protection Association,Quincy,MA,1981.

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5. PRA Procedures Guide NUREG/CR, 2300. .

6. S. H. Levinson and M.C. Yeater, " Methodology to Evaluate the Effectiveness of Fire Protective Systems in Nuclear Power Plants," huclear Engineering and Design 76(1983),pp161-182

7. Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, 1975 s

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TABLE 1

! SAFE SHUTCOWN FUNCTIONS OF CONCERN WITHIN PANELS C43 and C44*

r Panel Circuit Number Description Component _ Function C43 Steam Generator Secondary 1PI3134A1 SG A Pressure Indicator Pressure Sensor / Logics 1PR3134A SG A Pressure Recorder IPI3134A2 SG A Pressure Indicator IPI311881 SG B Pressure Indicator l 1PR31188 SG B Pressure Recorder

! 1PI311BB2 SG B Pressure Indicator 2PI3234A1 SG A Pressure Indicator 2PR3234A SG A Pressure Recorder 2P!3234A2 SG A Pressure Indicator 2PI321881 SG B Pressure Indicator 2PR3218R SG B Pressure Recorder 2PI321882 SG B Pressure Indicator C44 Reactor Building Cooling *VV-57A RPCAS Start Fans Control Switches and *VV-5/8 RPCAS Start j Logic *VV-57C RBCAS Start

• VV-570 RBCAS Start

• VV-57A RBCAS Alarm

• VV-578 RBCAS Alarm

• VV-57C RBCAS Alarm i *VV-570 RBCAS Alarm

• 1 for Unit 1 2 for Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Safe- *VM-E9A Alarm Circuit guard Chillers Control *VM-59A Start Permissives

• Switches and Logic *VM-59A Start

• VM-59A Start Circuit

• VM-598 Alarm Circuit

• VM-598 Start Circuit I

• VM-598 Start

• 1 for Unit 1 2 for Unit 2 Chilled Water Pumps Control *VP-02A RBSAS Start Switenes and Logic *VP-028 RBSAS Start

• VP-02C RBSAS Start

• VP-020 RBSAS Start

• VP-02A ESFAS Start cpm 17/C43-N/44/DB E 1

' TABLE 1 SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS OF CONCERN WITHIN PANELS C43 and C44 (Continued)

Penel Circuit Number Description Component Function

• VP-02B ESFAS Start

• VP-02C ESFAS Start

• VP-020 -

E3FAS Start

• 1 for Unit 1 2 for Unit 2 CCW Pumps Control Switches *P-73A LOP /ECCAS Start Pump and Logic *P-738 LOP /ECCAS Start and Prevent Manual Stop of Pump Frevent Automatic Block OP-73 LOP /ECCAS Start Pump OP-73 LOP /ECCAS Start Pump Prevent Automatic Block

• 1 for Unit 1 2 for Unit 2 0 Shared Both Units ,

Makeup Pumps Control *P-58A LOP /ECCAS Start Pump Switches and Logic *P-588 LOP /ECCAS Start Pump

• P-58C LOP /ECCAS Start Pump

• P-58C LOP /ECCAS Prevent Trip Pu.np

• P-58C LGP/ECCAS Start Pump

• 1 for Unit 1 2 for Unit 2 AFW Isolation Valves - 1LV-3875A1 AFW Control to SG A Control Switches and Logic ILV-3875A2 AFW Control to SG B ILV-387581 AFW Control to SG 8 ILV-387582 AFW Control to SG A 2LV-3975A1 AFW Control to SG A 2LV-3975A2 AFW Control to SG B 2LV-3975B1 AFW Control to SG B LV-3975B2 AFW Control to SG A Motor-0 riven AFW Pumps - *P-05A Start Pump, Override Manual Control Switches and Logic Stop

• 1 for Unit 1 2 for Unit 2 cpm 18/C43-N/44/08 t -_ _ _ __ - - . - - - - - . - - - - _ _ _ - - _ - - -

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TABLE 1 SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS OF CONCERN WITHIN PANELS C43 and C44 (Continued)

Panel. Circuit Number Description , Component Function AWF Level Control Valve - IM0-3865A Open Valve AWF Supply to SG A Control Switch and Logic 1MO-3865B Open Valve AWF Supply to SG B 1M0-38708 Open Valve AWF Supply to SG B IM0-3870A Open Valve AWF Supply to SG A 2MO-3965A Open Valve AWF Supply to SG A 2M0-3965B Open Valve AWF Supply to SG B 2M0-39708 Open Valve AWF Supply to SG B 2MO-3970A Open Valve AWF Supply to SG A Service Water Pumps Control OP-75A LOP /ECCAS Start Pump Switches and Logic OP-75B LOP /ECCAS Start Pump OP-75C LOP /ECCAS Start Pump OP-750 LOP /ECCAS Start Pump OP-75E LOP /ECCAS Start Pump OP-75E LOP /ECCAS Start Pump OP-75E LOP /ECCAS Start Pump OP-75E LOP /ECCAS Start Pump Diesel Generators Control *G-11 ESFAS, Start OG A ,

Switches and Logic *G-11 ESFAS, Start OG B Auton.atic Stop for OG *Gil Autom: tic Close for DG *Gil

• G-12 ESFAS, Start DG A

. *G-12 ESFAS, Start DG B Prevent Trip from High Jacket Water Temperature Automatic Close for DG *G12 Automatic Stop for DG *G12 Prevent Trip from High Jacket Water Temperature

• 1 for Unit 1 2 for Unit 2 I

• Panels C43 and C44 contain additional safe shutdown functions which are protected by alternative methods.  ;

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TABLE 2 GENERAL FIRE PROTECTION INFORMATION SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT ROOMS FIRE AREA 65A

1. Auxiliary Building ,

el. 659'-0"

2. Rooms and Construction

a. Room Numbers 624 - Unit 1 626 - Unit 2

b. Wall Height 14'-0" r -

c. Wall Length 25'-1 1/2" N&S 4

16'-8" E&W 1 'M' d. WallArsd 351.7 sq ft N&S 233.3 sq ft E&W

e. Wall Thickness '

l'-6" N 3'-0" S t

s 2'-3" E&W

f. Wall Constru'ction Concrete all Perimeter Walls 8" Concrete Block Center Divider

' Wall

g. Floor and Cet1fng Area ' i 419 sq ft per room

• - h. Floor Thickness l'-G" Concrete

i. Ceiling Thickness .

l'-3" Concrete )

0'-3" Decking '

j. Total Volume < ', 5.863 cu ft

3. Ventilation

a. Type Mechanical t

b. Volume 2,000 cfm t ./.

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TABLE 2' GENERAL FIRE PROTECTION INFORMATION SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT ROOMS FIRE AREA 65A (Continued)

'4. Fire Loading

a. Room 624 6,170 Btu /sq ft-

b. Room 626 8,388 Btu /sq ft

~5. Fire Protection Features

a. Automatic Total Flooding Halon 1301 Cross Zoned Ionization Detection

b. Manual One 15 lb Portable CO2 per SRE Room Two 15 lb Portable CO2 Main

' Control Room One 1 1/2" dia 75 ft Fire Hose F.H.C. #18 cpm 21/C43-N/44/08

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