Special Rept 80-4:on 800623,unit Received Safety Injection Signal from High Steam Flow & lo-lo Tave Signal or Lo Steam Generator Pressure.Approx 540 Gallons Borated Water Injected Into RCS at 190 F.Originally Reported as 5,400 GallonsML19338D593 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Sequoyah |
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Issue date: |
09/17/1980 |
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From: |
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
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To: |
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References |
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RO-80-4, NUDOCS 8009230524 |
Download: ML19338D593 (4) |
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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEARML20141C4881997-06-18018 June 1997 Special Rept 97-03:on 970529 Fire Barriers Were Impaired to Provide Backup Fire Protection Capabilities IAW TS Before Removing Sys from Svc.Sys Impaired to Implement Mods for Upgrade of HPFP Sys.Fire Watch Established ML20138F8571997-04-28028 April 1997 Special Rept 97-01:on 970322,Unit 1 Reactor Bldg Biological Shield Blocks Removed & Containment Vessel Equipment Hatch Opened to Facilitate Movement of Equipment,Matl & Personnel Between Bldgs.Roving Firewatch Established ML20134L6991996-11-15015 November 1996 Special Rept 96-04:on 961012,lower Airlock Located on Elevation 690 in Auxiliary Bldg Breached.Caused by Movement of Personnel & Equipment Between Buildings.Established Roving Firewatch Until Barrier Reestablished on 961021 ML20112E5051996-05-22022 May 1996 Special Report 96-03:on 960420,biological Shield Doors Removed & Equipment Hatch Opened.Caused by Need to Facilitate Movement of Equipment,Material & Personnel.Roving Fire Watch Established ML20106J8561996-04-0808 April 1996 Special Rept 96-02 on 960305,fire Detector in Fan Room on Elevation 714 of Auxiliary Bldg Nonfunctional for Period Greater than Allowed by TS Due to moisture-induced Oxidation on Contacts.Fire Watch Established ML20100N3091996-02-29029 February 1996 Special Rept:On 960131,auxiliary Bldg Pipe Sleeve,Mark 1860 on Elevation 669 Breached.Roving Fire Watch Established After Fire Detectors on One Side of Penetration Verified Operable ML20096C5281996-01-0909 January 1996 Special Rept 95-10:on 951127,alarm Function for Fire Detection Zone 277 Bypassed,Rendering Fire Detectors Inoperable.Fire Watch Patrol Was Established within One Hour of Fire Zone Becoming Inoperable ML20094L7351995-11-13013 November 1995 Special Rept 95-09:on 951006,auxiliary Bldg Mechanical Sleeve Was Breached Beyond 7-day LCO Due to Tubing Inside Penetration Was Crossed & Sealant Was Removed from Sleeve. Unacceptable Seal Matl Was Removed ML20094D4131995-10-26026 October 1995 Special Rept:On 951006,notified NRC of SG Tube Insps That Fall Into Category C-3 Due to Detection of Circumferential crack-like Indications During ISI at TSP Intersections Associated W/Dents ML20093G2951995-10-11011 October 1995 Special Rept:On 950606,determined That Waste Gas Analyzer & Monitors H Concentrations Being Operated Incorrectly.Range 3 Successfully Calibrated by Comparing Analyzer Readout to Grab Sample Results ML20093B1561995-10-0303 October 1995 Special Rept 95-08: on 950909,Unit 1 Reactor Bldg Biological Shield Blocks Located on Auxiliary Bldg Removed & Equipment Hatch Opened.Roving Fire Watch Immediately Established & Fire Detectors on One Side of Breach Verified Operable ML20092H0431995-09-14014 September 1995 Special Rept 95-06:on 950810,auxiliary Bldg Sleeve Mark 1855 & 1856 Penetrating Floor Elevation Breached.Fire Barriers Will Be Reestablished After Completion of Mod Activities ML20092H0381995-09-14014 September 1995 Special Rept 95-04:on 970707,noncompliance w/10CFR50,App R, Section II.G.2 Requirements Documented on Problem Evaluation Rept.Affected Rooms Being Covered by Hourly,Roving Fire Watch Patrol ML20086T0771995-07-27027 July 1995 Special Rept:On 950621,auxiliary Bldg Pipe Sleeve,Mark 210 on Floor Elevation 669 Was Breached.Roving Fire Watch Was Established.Repair Work Rescheduled for Completion in Aug 1995 ML20086T5681995-07-26026 July 1995 Special Rept 95-04:on 950707,separation of Cables & Equipment & Associated Nonsafety Circuits of Redundant Trains by Fire Barrier Having 3-h Rating Occurred.Affected Rooms Being Covered by Roving Fire Watch Patrol ML20083M2881995-05-0909 May 1995 Special Rept 95-03:on 950404,auxiliary Bldg Pipe Sleeve Located on Floor Elevation 690 Breached to Support Routing of Drain Hose.Roving Fire Watch Established & After Fire Detectors on One Side of Penetration Verified Operable ML20082D3581995-03-24024 March 1995 Special Rept:On 950305,fire Detector Near RCP Declared Inoperable.Cause Unknown.Unit 1 Lower Containment Air Temp Being Monitored Frequently Until Detector Restored to Operable Status ML20080H6091995-02-17017 February 1995 Special Rept 95-01:on 950119,fire Barrier Intentionally Removed from Svc to Support Planned Work Activities Associated W/Replacement Batteries in 24/48 Volt Battery Room ML20080C1301994-12-0202 December 1994 Special Rept 94-13:on 941109,three Control Bldg Cable Tray Penetrations Breached & Will Be Breached in Excess of TS Allowable Timeframe to Support Mod Activities Associated W/ Cable Installation to Secondary Alarm Station ML20073F5291994-09-23023 September 1994 Special Rept:On 940923,provides Several Fire Barrier Penetrations That Have Been Intentionally Removed from Service to Support Unit 2 Cycle 6 Refueling Outage Activities ML20073B8411994-09-15015 September 1994 Special Rept 94-11,providing Details Re Fire Barrier Wall & Fire Barrier Penetration Intentionally Rendered Nonfunctional as Fire Barriers to Support Snp Unit 2 Cycle 6 Refueling Outage Activities.Roving Fire Patrol Established ML20072R1871994-08-29029 August 1994 Special Rept:On 940802 Provides Details Re Electrical Penetrations That Are Considered to Be Nonfunctional as Fire Barriers ML20072G1181994-08-17017 August 1994 Special Rept 94-09:on 940711,discovered That Fire Barrier Door A-182 Damaged & Nonfunctional as Fire Barrier.Caused by Broken Tack Welds.Cause of Broken Tack Welds Cannot Be Determined.New Door Ordered ML20071Q6851994-08-0101 August 1994 Special Rept:On 940707,several Fire Barrier Penetrations & Fire Barrier Doors Intentionally Removed from Service to Support Unit 2 Outage Discovered Inoperable for Period Greater than TS Limits ML20071L7351994-07-27027 July 1994 Special Rept 94-07:on 940621,fire Detection Instrument in Zone 116 for Auxiliary Bldg Cask Loading Area Inoperable for Period Greater than Allowable TS Timeframe. Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Established ML20070F8341994-07-14014 July 1994 Special Rept 94-06:on 940531,photoelectric Detection Instrumentation in Lower Compartment Cooler Areas Inoperable.Caused by Trouble Alarms on Pyrotronics Sys.Air Temp Is Being Monitored Every Hour ML20149E2551994-05-23023 May 1994 Special Rept 94-05:on 940407,Unit 2 Fire Detectors Declared Inoperable,On 940416,fire Protection Sprinkler Sys in ABGTS Filter Housing Area Declared Inoperable & on 940415,fire Protection Hose Station in ERCW Bldg Taken Out of Svc ML20065Q6021994-04-22022 April 1994 Special Rept 94-04:on 940314,fire Detection Instruments in Fire Zone 116 for Auxiliary Bldg Cask Loading Area Inoperable for Period Greater than Allowable TS Timeframe. Hourly Fire Patrol Established to Inspect Loading Area ML20064N2101994-03-22022 March 1994 Special Rept 94-03:on 940216,fire Barrier Wall Between Unit 1 & 2 Board Rooms on Elevation of Auxiliary Bldg Breached & LCO 3.7.12 Entered.Patrol Will Be Maintained Until Mod Completed & Wall Reestablished as Functional Fire Barrier ML20063L6411994-02-25025 February 1994 Special Rept 94-02 Re Six Fire Barriers Nonfunctional for Period of Time Greater than TS Allowable Timeframe in Support of Mod Activities.Fire Detectors Verified Operable & Roving Fire Watch Established ML20063K8531994-02-14014 February 1994 Special Rept 94-01:on 931230,two Thermal Fire Detectors in Fire Zone 277 Removed from Svc.Detectors Removed to Facilitate Removal & Repair of ERCW Pump M-B.Roving Fire Watch Established.Detectors Returned to Svc on 940123 ML20063A3941994-01-18018 January 1994 Special Rept 93-24:on 931218,penetrations 1602,1731,60A & 860 Intentionally Breached to Facilitate Installation of Design Mod.Fire Detectors on One Side of Penetrations Verified Operable & Roving Fire Watches Established ML20063A6381994-01-13013 January 1994 Rev 1 to Special Rept 93-16:on 921228,930821 & 28 DG 2A-A Failures Occurred Due to Lack of Adequate Internal Wiring, Actuators Restoring Spring Compression Relaxing & Less than Desired Testing.Supports for Internal Wiring Installed ML20062M0991993-12-27027 December 1993 Special Rept 93-23:on 930712,failure to Functionally Test Fire Protection Instrument Panel,Associated Fire Detectors & to Comply W/Ts Action Statements.Directive Issued Requiring Periodic Test Coordinator ML20058A8621993-11-18018 November 1993 Special Rept 93-22:on 931026,Fire Door A-156A Breached to Permit Temporary Electrical Cables to Be Routed from Existing Card Reader to Reactor Access Room.Fire Door A-156A Expected to Be Returned to Functional Status in Dec 1993 ML20059A9681993-10-20020 October 1993 Special Rept 93-21:on 930924,fire Barrier Door A-36 Intentionally Breached.Fire Door Barrier Will Be Breached in Excess of TS Allowable Timeframe & Is Expected to Be Returned to Functional Status in Dec 1993 ML20057E9021993-10-0808 October 1993 Special Rept 93-17:on 930903,LCO 3.7.12 Entered for Fire Barrier Being Nonfunctional for Period Greater than Allowed by Ts.Fire Detectors on One Side of Nonfunctional Fire Barrier Verified Operable ML20057F3421993-10-0808 October 1993 Special Rept 93-20:on 930927,LCO 3.7.11.1 Entered When Portion of Auxiliary Bldg Fire Header Isolated & Fire Pumps 2A & 2B Removed from Svc in Order to Perform Surveillance Test on Fire Pumps 1A & 1B.Test Completed & LCO Exited ML20057E9261993-10-0707 October 1993 Special Rept:On 930924,LCOs 3.7.11.1,3.7.11.2 & 3.7.11.4 Entered When Portion of Fire Header in Auxiliary Bldg Removed from Svc in Order to Perform Maint.Fire Suppression Water Sys Returned to Svc on 930925 & LCOs Exited ML20057D6101993-09-28028 September 1993 Special Rept 93-18:on 930916,LCOs 3.7.11.1,3.7.11.2 & 3.7.11.4 Entered When Fire Header in Auxiliary Bldg Removed from Svc as Result of Maint Activities for Repair & Replacement of Leaking Lines.Repairs Completed on 930919 ML20057B5361993-09-0202 September 1993 Special Rept 93-15:on 930902,declared Isolation Valve in One of Four Main HPFP Water Suppression Flow Paths Inoperable Upon Valve Failure of Annual Surveillance Operability Test. WR Written to Inspect,Repair or Replace Valve ML20056H2331993-09-0101 September 1993 Special Rept 93-08:on 930820,LCO 3.7.11.1 Was Entered Due to Inoperable Valve.Work Request Initiated to Inspect & Correct Valve Problem.Valve Cycled & Returned to Operable Status ML20056D6461993-08-12012 August 1993 Special Rept 93-14,fire Barriers Nonfunctional for Period That Exceeded Allowable TS Timeframe,After Being Intentionally Breached.Fire Detectors on One Side of Breaches Verifed Operable & Roving Fire Watches Established ML20046B3981993-07-28028 July 1993 Special Rept 93-13:on 930715,fire Header in Auxiliary Bldg Removed from Svc as Result of Maint Activities in Process of Repairing & Replacing Leaking Lines.Fire Watches & Backup Fire Suppression Water Sys Established ML20046A5341993-07-19019 July 1993 Special Rept 93-09 Provides Detail Re 19 Fire Protection Barriers,Detection Sys & Water Suppression Sys Being Impaired for Period Greater than TS Allowable Timeframe ML20045H9681993-07-16016 July 1993 Special Rept 93-12:on 930621,portion of Fire Header in Auxiliary Bldg Removed from Svc & Sys Not Restored to Operability within TS Required Time Period.Piping Repaired & Incident Investigation Initiated ML20045E6881993-06-25025 June 1993 Special Rept 93-07:on 930519,0521 & 0527,fire Doors A-146 & A-44 & A-196,respectively,were Breached Open.On 930525, Mechanical Sleeve C2/J Breached to Permit Cable Pulling. Detectors Verified Operable & Fire Watch Established ML20045C9211993-06-17017 June 1993 Special Rept 93-06:on 930511,HPFP Sys Operated W/Only One Operable HPFP Pump for Period,Exceeding TS 3.7.11.1 Allowable Timeframe Due to Maint.Dg 2A-A Returned to Svc on 930519 & EP Supply Reestablished to 2A-A HPFP Pump ML20044G5521993-05-27027 May 1993 Special Rept 93-05:on 930426,fire Barrier for Mechanical Sleeve Between 480-volt Shutdown Board Rooms 1B1 & 1B2 Breached.Caused by Unavailability of Fire Retardant Sealant.Roving Fire Watch Established ML20036B5031993-05-17017 May 1993 Special Rept 93-04:on 930415,Unit 1 East Valve Room, Elevation 706 Breached to Support Refueling Outage Activities for Timeframe Greater than Allowed by Ts.Fire Detectors on One Side of Penetration Verified Operable 1997-06-18
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEAR05000327/LER-1999-002-03, :on 990916,EDG Started as Result of Cable Being Damaged During Installation of Thermo-Lag for Kaowool Upgrade Project.Caused by Inadequate pre-job Briefing. Involved Individuals Were Counseled on Event1999-10-15015 October 1999
- on 990916,EDG Started as Result of Cable Being Damaged During Installation of Thermo-Lag for Kaowool Upgrade Project.Caused by Inadequate pre-job Briefing. Involved Individuals Were Counseled on Event
ML20217D2721999-10-12012 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 248 & 239 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20217B3651999-10-0606 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 247 & 238 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20212J6311999-10-0101 October 1999 SER Accepting Request for Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Requirements for Certain Inservice Insp at Plant,Unit 1 ML20217G3721999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20212F4761999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 246 & 237 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20212F0831999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from Certain Weld Insp at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) for Second 10-year ISI Interval ML20212C4761999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20212A1841999-08-25025 August 1999 Errata Pages for Rev 0 of WCAP-15224, Analysis of Capsule Y from TVA Sequoyah Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program ML20210L4361999-08-0202 August 1999 Cycle 9 12-Month SG Insp Rept ML20216E3781999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20210L4451999-07-31031 July 1999 Unit-2 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20210G6631999-07-28028 July 1999 Cycle 9 90-Day ISI Summary Rept ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML20211F9031999-06-30030 June 1999 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage ML20209H3831999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20196J8521999-06-28028 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative to Use Iqis for Radiography Examinations as Provided for in ASME Section III,1992 Edition with 1993 Addenda,Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20195K2951999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With 05000327/LER-1998-003-01, :on 981109,Vital Inverter 1-IV Tripped.Caused by Failed Oscillator Board with Bad Solder Joint,Attributed to Mfg Defect.Replaced Component & Returned Inverter to Operable Status1999-05-27027 May 1999
- on 981109,Vital Inverter 1-IV Tripped.Caused by Failed Oscillator Board with Bad Solder Joint,Attributed to Mfg Defect.Replaced Component & Returned Inverter to Operable Status
05000327/LER-1999-001-04, :on 990415,exceedance of AOT Occurred Due to Failure of Centrifugal Charging Pump.Rotating Element Was Replaced,Testing Was Completed & Pump Was Returned to Svc1999-05-11011 May 1999
- on 990415,exceedance of AOT Occurred Due to Failure of Centrifugal Charging Pump.Rotating Element Was Replaced,Testing Was Completed & Pump Was Returned to Svc
ML20206Q8951999-05-0505 May 1999 Rev 0 to L36 990415 802, COLR for Sequoyah Unit 2 Cycle 10 ML20206G3751999-05-0404 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 244 & 235 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20206R5031999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for April 1999 for Sequoyah Units 1 & 2.With ML20205N0361999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 234 to License DPR-79 ML20205P9811999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20204E8211999-03-16016 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 243 & 233 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20204C3111999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20205B6631999-02-28028 February 1999 Underground Storage Tank (Ust) Permanent Closure Rept, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Security Backup DG Ust Sys ML20203H7381999-02-18018 February 1999 Safety Evaluation of Topical Rept BAW-2328, Blended U Lead Test Assembly Design Rept. Rept Acceptable Subj to Listed Conditions ML20206U4331999-02-0909 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 242 & 232 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20211A2021999-01-31031 January 1999 Non-proprietary TR WCAP-15129, Depth-Based SG Tube Repair Criteria for Axial PWSCC Dented TSP Intersections ML20198S7301998-12-31031 December 1998 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20199G3641998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With 05000327/LER-1998-004-02, :on 981120,failure to Perform Surveillance within Required Time Interval,Was Determined.Caused by Leaking Vent Valve.Engineering Personnel Evaluated Alternative Methods for Performing Channel Check1998-12-21021 December 1998
- on 981120,failure to Perform Surveillance within Required Time Interval,Was Determined.Caused by Leaking Vent Valve.Engineering Personnel Evaluated Alternative Methods for Performing Channel Check
05000327/LER-1998-003-04, :on 981109,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred. Caused by Component in Bridge Circuit of Vital Inverter Failed.Inverter Bridge Circuit Replaced1998-12-0909 December 1998
- on 981109,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred. Caused by Component in Bridge Circuit of Vital Inverter Failed.Inverter Bridge Circuit Replaced
ML20197J5621998-12-0303 December 1998 Unit 1 Cycle 9 90-Day ISI Summary Rept ML20197K1161998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20196B0231998-11-19019 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 239 & 229 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20196C4091998-11-19019 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 238 & 228 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20195G3271998-11-17017 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 237 & 227 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively 05000328/LER-1998-002-05, :on 981016,turbine Trip Occurred Followed by Reactor Trip.Caused by Generator Lockout.Mod Being Evaluated to Physically Isolate Relays from Vibration of Transformers & Adding Two of Two Logic for Actuation of Sudden Pressure1998-11-10010 November 1998
- on 981016,turbine Trip Occurred Followed by Reactor Trip.Caused by Generator Lockout.Mod Being Evaluated to Physically Isolate Relays from Vibration of Transformers & Adding Two of Two Logic for Actuation of Sudden Pressure
ML20195F8061998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20154H6091998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With 05000328/LER-1998-001-05, :on 980827,turbine Trip Occurred Followed by Reactor Trip.Caused by Failure of Sudden Pressure Relay on B Phase Main Transformer.Control Room Operators Responded & Removed,Inspected & Replaced Failed Relays1998-09-28028 September 1998
- on 980827,turbine Trip Occurred Followed by Reactor Trip.Caused by Failure of Sudden Pressure Relay on B Phase Main Transformer.Control Room Operators Responded & Removed,Inspected & Replaced Failed Relays
ML20154H6251998-09-17017 September 1998 Rev 0 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Cycle 10 Colr ML20153B0881998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20238F2961998-08-28028 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 235 & 225 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20239A0631998-08-27027 August 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 05000327/LER-1998-002-03, :on 980716,inadequate Surveillance Testing Was Discovered.Caused by Misinterpretation of ANSI Standard. Revised Appropriate Procedures to Provide Required Guidance1998-08-14014 August 1998
- on 980716,inadequate Surveillance Testing Was Discovered.Caused by Misinterpretation of ANSI Standard. Revised Appropriate Procedures to Provide Required Guidance
ML20236Y2091998-08-0707 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Relief Requests RP-03,RP-05, RP-07,RV-05 & RV-06 & Denying RV-07 & RV-08 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
__
f TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANCOGA. TENNESSEE 374ot 1750 Chestnut Street Tower II i
September 17, 1980 Mr. James P. O'Railly, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory I'-4 asion Office of Inspection and Enforcement Ragion II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-327 - PACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DP'R SPECIAL REPORT 804 The enclosed special report provides infor: nation concetning da e.aargency I
core cooling system injection to the reactor coolant system. ?ais report is submitted in accordance with Segacyah unit 1 Terknie=1 Specification 6.9.2 and 3.5.3.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VAILEY AUTHORITY J. R. Calhoun Director of Nuclaar Power Enclosure (3) cc (Enclosure):
I Director (3)
Office of Management Information an.1 Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulato / Commission Washinoton, DC 20555 \\
Director (40)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connaission Washington, DC 20555 Mr. Bill Lavallee Nuclear Safety Analysis Center Palo Alto, california 94303
$O Mr. W. T. Cottle, NRC Inspector, Sequoyah 3
II C mCB h7 2 C ~
~ C. C' 9" 8009230
a o
Special Report 80-4 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 ECCS INJECTION TO REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Plant Status Date: June 23, 1980 Mode 3 Reactor Pressure 1725 psig Reactor Temperature 538 F
~
Event Description and Probable Consequences Unit 1 received a Safety Injection (SI) signal from High Steam flow and either Lo-Lo Tave signal or Lo Steam Generator pressure. Approximately 540 gallons of borated water was injected into the RCS at 190 F.
This event was originally reported as having injected 5400 gallons of borated water into the RCS. In reviewing the incident it has been de-termined that approximately 540 gallons of water was actually pumped into the RCS during the two-minute safety injection.
Sequoyah Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2 sequires that the current value of the usage factor be included in the Special Report if the usage factor exceeds 0.7.
Usage factors for the nozzles are not available at this time because the primary piping was designed to the USAS B31.1 Power Piping Code which does not require fatigue analysis.
However, IE Circular 78-05 states that Westinghouse informed Public Service Electric and Gas Company that 50 safety injections using 400F water would not result in excessive stress at the safety injec-tion nozzles on the Salem I Plant. Salem I is similar to Sequoyah.
Based en IE Circular 78-05, conversations with Westinghouse, and a preliminary evaluation, it is our opinion that the usage factor for the affected nozzles has rot exceeded 0.7.
I Cause Description and Lorrective Actions 0
The Reactor Coolant System Temperature fell below 541 F (Lo-Lo Tave) to 5380F. The operator opened all four MSIV's which brought in the Hi Steam flow signal.
The safety injection was terminated, two minutes af ter the SI signe.1 was activated, and the reactor coolant system was restored to pre-initiation conditio a.
Operations personnel have been cautioned to sre carefully observe plant conditions that could lead to a safety injection during abnormal plant operations.
[
E
Special Report 80-4 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 ECCS INJECION TO REACOR COOLANT SYSTEM Plant Status Date: June 23, 1980 Mode 3 Reactor Pressure 1725 psig Reactor Temperature 538 F
~
Event Description and Probable Consequences Unit i received a Safety Injection (SI) signal from High Steam flow and either Lo-Lo Tave signal or lo Steam Generator pressure. Approximately 540 gallons of borated water was injected into the RCS at 190 F.
This event was originally reported as having injected 5400 gallons of borated water into the RCS. In reviewing the incident it has been de-termined that approximately 540 gallons of water was actually pumped into the RCS during the two-minute safety injection.
Sequoyah Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2 requires that the current value of the usage factor be included in the Special Report if the usage factor exceeds 0.7.
Usage factors for the nozzles are not available at this time because the primary piping was designed to the USAS B31.1 Power Piping Code which does not require fatigue analysis.
However, IE Circular 78-05 states that Westinghouse informed Public Service Electric and Cas Company that 50 safety injections using l
400F water would not result in excessive stress at the safety injec-tion nozzles on the Salem I Plant. Salem I is similar to Sequoyah.
Based on IE Circular 78-05, conversations with Westinghouse, and a preliminary evaluation, it is our opinion that the usage factor for the affected nozzles has not exceeded 0.7.
Cause Description and Corrective Actions The Reactor Coolant System Temperature fell below 5410F (Lo-Lo Tave) to 5380F. The operator opened all four MSIV's which brought in the Hi Steam flow signal.
The safe' ion was terminated, two minutes after the SI signal was activate., and the reactor coolant system was restored to pre-initiation conditions. Operations personnel have been cautioned to more carefully observe plant conditions that could lead to a safety injection during abnormal plant operations.
Special Report 80-4 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 ECCS INJECTION TO REACIOR COOLANT SYSTEM Plant Status Date: June 23, 1980 Mode 3 Reactor Pressure 1725 psig Reactor Temperature 538 F Evenc Description and Probable Consequences Unit i received a Safety Injection (SI) signal from High Steam flow and either Lo-Lo Tave signal or Lo Steam Generator pressure. Approximately 540 gallons of borated water was injected into the RCS at 190 F.
This event was originally reported as having injected 5400 gallons of borated water into the RCS. In reviewing the incident it has been de-termined that approximately 540 gallons of water was actually pumped into the RCS during the two-minute safety injection.
Sequoyah Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2 requires that the current value of the usage factor be included in the Special Report if the usage factor exceeds 0.7.
Usage factors for the nozzles are not available at this time because the primary piping was designed to the USAS B31.1 Power Piping Code which does not require fatigue analysis.
However, IE Circula: 78-05 states that Westinghouse informed Public Service Electric and Gas Company that 50 safety injections using 400F water would not result in excessive stress at the safety injec-tion nozzles on the Salem I Plant. Salem I is similar to Sequoyah.
Based on IE Circular 78-05, conversations with Westinghouse, and a preliminary evaluation, it is our opinion that the usage factor for the affected nozzles has not exceeded 0.7.
Cause Description and Corrective Actions 0
The Reactor Coolant System Temperature fell below 541 F (Lo-Lo Tave) to 5380F, The operator opened all four MSIV's which brought in the Hi Steam flow signal.
The safety injection was terminated, two minutes af ter the SI signal was activated, and the reactor coolant system was restored to pre-initiation conditions. Operations personnel have been cautioned to more carefully observe plant conditions that could lead to a cafety injection during abnormal plant operations.
)
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