ML20080H609
| ML20080H609 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/17/1995 |
| From: | Shell R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 95-01, 95-1, NUDOCS 9502220410 | |
| Download: ML20080H609 (4) | |
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gyg lennehfwe Vaney Auftmfy Post Offte Bor 2'XO Stddy Dasy Tennessee 37379 February 17,1995 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
In the Matter of
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Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority
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50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SON) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 AND DPR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 95-01 The enclosed special report provides details concerning a conduit sleeve fire barrier and two failed fire barrier doorr that are nonfunctional as fire barriers. The conduit sleeve fire barrier was intentionally removed from service to support battery replacement in the 24/48-volt battery room and has been nonfunctional as a fire barrier for a time period greater than the TS allowable timeframe. The door failures were idenWied during routine inspection; however, because of the material delivery time for :eplacement of the doors, the doors have been nonfunctional as fire barriers i
for a period of time greater than the TS allowable timeframe.
This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).
If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone J. Bajraszewski at (615) 843-7749.
Sincerely, r k' R. H. Shell Manager SON Site Licensiqa Enclosure cc: See page 2 9502220410 950217
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PDR ADOCK 05000327
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 February 17,1995 KEM:JB:JLG cc (Enclosure):
Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 NRC Resident inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 11 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711 i
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ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 SPECIAL REPORT 95-01 l.
CONDUlT SLEEVE l
i Description of Condition j
On January 19,1995, control building Conduit Sleeve CO8-669-N-007 was breached. This fire barrier was intentionally removed from service to support the planned work activities associated with the replacement of batteries in the 24/48-volt battery room. The penetration will be breached in excess of the technical specification (TS) allowable timeframe of seven days.. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).
Cause of Condition The conduit sleeve was breached to route cables from the battery charger room to the battery room. This was a preplanned activity associated with the replacement of batteries in the battery room.
t Corrective Action l
In accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a), a roving fire watch was established after the fire detectors on one side of the penetration were verified l
operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the penetration fire barrier is reestablished. The fire barrier will be reestablished after the completion of the battery replacement activities. The work activities are expected to be completed in 90 days.
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- 11. FIRE DOORS Descriotion of Condition During a routine inspection, two fire doors were identified as deficient. On January 25,1995,it was determined that Door A-212 was nonfunctional as a fire barrier because the door was warped and the tack welds that secure the door skin to the internal structure were broken. It was determined that the door could not be repaired. This door accesses the high efficiency particulate air filter room on the Unit 2 side of auxiliary building Floor Elevation 749. On February 3, 1995,it was determined that rust damage to Door D-33 rendered the door nonfunctional as a fire barrier and that the door could not be repaired. This door provides outside access to the upper level of the diesel generator building. The j
doors have been nonfunctional as fire barriers for a period of time exceeding the TS allowable timeframe of seven days. These conditions are being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).
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- Cause of Condition The cause for the failure of Doors A-212 and D-33 can not be determined. The failure of Door A-212 is attributed to normal wear and use. It is theorized that exterior Door D-33 being exposed to the weather may have contributed to the rusting of the door's internal components. A review of work documents associated with fire door failures did not identify an adverse trend.
Corrective Action in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a), a roving fire watch was established after the fire detectors on one side of the penetration were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the penetration fire barriers are reestablished. The fire barriers will be reestablished after the installation of replacement doors. Replacement doors are scheduled to be delivered in approximately eight to ten weeks. Completion of the door installation is scheduled for two weeks after receipt of the replacement door.
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