ML20093B156

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Special Rept 95-08: on 950909,Unit 1 Reactor Bldg Biological Shield Blocks Located on Auxiliary Bldg Removed & Equipment Hatch Opened.Roving Fire Watch Immediately Established & Fire Detectors on One Side of Breach Verified Operable
ML20093B156
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 10/03/1995
From: Shell R
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
95-08, 95-8, NUDOCS 9510110265
Download: ML20093B156 (6)


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Tennessee Valley Authority. Post omce Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379 2000 4

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> October 3,1995 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority )

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 1 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 95-08 '

The enclosed special report provides details concerning the removal of the biological shield blocks and the opening of the Unit I containment vessel equipment hatch; the breaching of (1) both Unit I reactor building personnel air locks, (2) an auxiliary building door, and (3) multiple sleeve penetrations; and the removal of a fire barrier wall. These preplanned

- breaches are for the support of Unit 1 Cycle 7 refueling outage activities. The fire barriers are being breached for a period of time greater than the TS allowable timeframe.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

Ifyou have any questions conccrning this submittal, please telephone J. Bajraszewski at (423) 843-7749.

Sincerely, kk.

R. H. Shell Manager SQN Site Licensing Enclosure cc: See page 2 9510110265 951003 PDR ADOCK 05000327 i iS .. _. . _ _ PDR_ _ . . .

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 October 3,1995 1

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l cc (Enclosure):

Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager  ;

LU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North  ;

11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 j NRC Resident Inspector

. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road'
Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624 Regional Administrator i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II .

- 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900

' Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711

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' ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 95-08

1. Unit 1 Reactor Building Biological Shield Blocks and Containment Vessel Equipment Hatch Descrintion ofCondition ,

On September 9,1995, with Unit I entering a refueling outage, the Unit I reactor -

building biological shield blocks located on auxiliary building Floor Elevation 734 were removed, and the equipment hatch was opened.

The fire barrier penetration has been breached in excess of the technical specification .

(TS) allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition The shield blocks were removed, and the equipment hatch was opened to facilitate l' the movement of equipment, material, and personnel between the auxiliary building .

and the Unit I reactor building. The shield blocks will be removed from position (i.e., maintained in a storage position) for the duration of the Unit 1 Cycle 7 (UlC7) refueling outage (RFO).

Corrective Action In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified i operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the fire barrier is reestablished. Before entering Mode 4, the equipment hatch will be closed, and the shield blocks will be reinstalled, reestablishing the fire barrier.

J II. . Unit 1 Reactor Building Personnel Airlocks Descriotion of Condition L

On September 10,1995, the lower Unit I reactor building personnel airlock door, located on auxiliary building Floor Elevation 690, was breached open. _ On September 12,1995, the upper Unit I reactor building personnel airlock door, located ,

on auxiliary building Floor Elevation 734, was breached open.

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The fire barrier penetrations have been breached in excess of the TS allowable ,

timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

C=una of Condition The doors for both personnel airlocks were breached opened to facilitate the movement of equipment, material, and personnel between the auxiliary building and the Unit I reactor building. The doors will be breached for the duration of the UIC7 RFO.

Corrective Action In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a rovi g fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the fire barrier is  !

reestablished. The fire barrier will be reestablished before entering Mode 4. l III. Auxiliary Building Door l

Descriotion of Condition On September 11,1995, auxiliary building Door A-62, located on Floor Elevation 690, was breached. The door provides access to the Unit 1 penetration room from the general auxiliary building area.

1 The fire barrier penetration has been breached in excess of the TS allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with i

, TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

Cause of Condition The door is breached to facilitate UlC7 RFO activities, including the movement of personnel and equipment through the area and the routing of electrical cables l

(communications and video). The fire breach will remain open for the duration of the UIC7 RFO.

Corrective Action In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the fire barrier is reestablished. The fire barrier will be reestablished upon the completion of the outage activities.

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IV. - Sleeve Penetrations ,

4 Description ofCondition During September 10 through 12,1995, the following seven sleeve penetrations located in either the auxiliary building or Unit I reactor building were breached.

- Sleeve Number Suilding Elevation Mk-24 Auxiliary 775 Mk-32 Auxiliary 688 Mk-72 Auxiliary 717 Mk-100 Auxiliary 690 Mk-101 Auxiliary 698 X-108. Reactor 688 X-109 Reactor 688 t

These fire barrier penetrations have been breached in excess of the TS allowable l

timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with 1- TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

Came of Condition The sleeve penetrations are breached in support of U1C7 RFO activities, including the routing of electrical cables (communication and video) and the installation ofice blowing piping. The auxiliary building fire breaches will remain open for the <

l duration of the U1C7 RFO.

Corrective Action In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was _

immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the fire barriers are reestablished. The auxiliary building fire breaches will remain open for the duration of the UIC7 RFO. The reactor bhilding fire breach will be reestablished before

. entering Mode 4.

I V. Fire Wall j l

Descrintion ofCondition On September 14,1995, the IB-B centrifugal charging pump (CCP) room fire wall 1 was removed. The cement block wall provides compartmentalization for the IB-B i CCP from the general auxiliary building access area on Floor Elevation 669.

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The fire barrier penetration has been breached in excess of the TS allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

Canaa of Condition

- The penetration is breached to facilitate work being performed on the IB-B CCP motor, This fire breach will remain open for the duration of the UlC7 RFO.

Corrective Action In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the fire barrier is reestablished. The fire barrier will be reestablished before entering Mode 4.

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