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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217D2721999-10-12012 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 248 & 239 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20217B3651999-10-0606 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 247 & 238 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20212J6311999-10-0101 October 1999 SER Accepting Request for Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Requirements for Certain Inservice Insp at Plant,Unit 1 ML20212F0831999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from Certain Weld Insp at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) for Second 10-year ISI Interval ML20212F4761999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 246 & 237 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20211N8891999-09-0707 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 245 & 236 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20196J8521999-06-28028 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative to Use Iqis for Radiography Examinations as Provided for in ASME Section III,1992 Edition with 1993 Addenda,Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20206G3751999-05-0404 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 244 & 235 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20205N0361999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 234 to License DPR-79 ML20204E8211999-03-16016 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 243 & 233 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20206U4331999-02-0909 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 242 & 232 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20198C0211998-12-16016 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 241 & 231 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20196J8021998-12-0707 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 240 & 230 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20196B0231998-11-19019 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 239 & 229 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20196C4091998-11-19019 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 238 & 228 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20195G3271998-11-17017 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 237 & 227 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20195H0831998-11-17017 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 237 & 226 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20238F2961998-08-28028 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 235 & 225 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20239A0631998-08-27027 August 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20236Y2091998-08-0707 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Relief Requests RP-03,RP-05, RP-07,RV-05 & RV-06 & Denying RV-07 & RV-08 ML20236S4081998-07-0101 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 233 & 223 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20248L1961998-06-0808 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 232 & 222 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20217K4471998-04-27027 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Requests for Relief 1-ISI-2 (Part 1),2-ISI-2 (Part 2),1-ISI-5,2-ISI-5,1-ISI-6,1-ISI-7, 2-ISI-7,ISPT-02,ISPT-04,ISPT-06,ISPT-07,ISPT-8,ISPT-01 & ISPT-05 ML20216E4701998-03-0909 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving Exemption from Updated FSAR Requirements of 10CFR50.71(e)(4) for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20203K6811998-02-20020 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 231 & 221 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20198P9171998-01-13013 January 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 230 to License DPR-77 ML20217D7881997-09-29029 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 229 & 220 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20211G2061997-09-23023 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 228 & 219 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20210J5951997-08-12012 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 227 & 218 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20151L7981997-07-14014 July 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 226 & 217 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20148S0581997-07-0101 July 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 225 & 216 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20140F0311997-06-10010 June 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 224 & 215 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20138D2581997-04-28028 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Licensee Proposed Alternative to Use 1989 Edition of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI for Performance of Containment Repair & Replacement Activities Until 970909 ML20137Y8911997-04-21021 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 223 & 214 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20137R6071997-04-0909 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 222 & 213 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20101M5761996-04-0303 April 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 211 to License DPR-79 ML20100N5711996-03-0404 March 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 220 & 210 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20097D4191996-02-0707 February 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 218 & 208 to Licenses NPF-77 & NPF-79,respectively ML20097F2211996-02-0505 February 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 217 & 207 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20095F9891995-12-11011 December 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 216 & 206 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20094N5341995-11-21021 November 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 215 & 205 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20094D2451995-10-30030 October 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 204 to License DPR-79 ML20093E1191995-10-11011 October 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 214 to License DPR-77 ML20093B9471995-10-0404 October 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 213 & 203 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20092N0711995-10-0202 October 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 212 & 202 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20092H0811995-09-15015 September 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 211 & 201 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20092G7071995-09-13013 September 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 210 & 200 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79 ML20087L4671995-08-22022 August 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 207 & 197 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20086C2861995-06-29029 June 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 205 & 195 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20085M1581995-06-14014 June 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 204 & 194 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively 1999-09-07
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEAR05000327/LER-1999-002-03, :on 990916,EDG Started as Result of Cable Being Damaged During Installation of Thermo-Lag for Kaowool Upgrade Project.Caused by Inadequate pre-job Briefing. Involved Individuals Were Counseled on Event1999-10-15015 October 1999
- on 990916,EDG Started as Result of Cable Being Damaged During Installation of Thermo-Lag for Kaowool Upgrade Project.Caused by Inadequate pre-job Briefing. Involved Individuals Were Counseled on Event
ML20217D2721999-10-12012 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 248 & 239 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20217B3651999-10-0606 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 247 & 238 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20212J6311999-10-0101 October 1999 SER Accepting Request for Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Requirements for Certain Inservice Insp at Plant,Unit 1 ML20217G3721999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20212F4761999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 246 & 237 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20212F0831999-09-23023 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from Certain Weld Insp at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) for Second 10-year ISI Interval ML20211N8891999-09-0707 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 245 & 236 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20212C4761999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20212A1841999-08-25025 August 1999 Errata Pages for Rev 0 of WCAP-15224, Analysis of Capsule Y from TVA Sequoyah Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program ML20210L4361999-08-0202 August 1999 Cycle 9 12-Month SG Insp Rept ML20210L4451999-07-31031 July 1999 Unit-2 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20216E3781999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20210G6631999-07-28028 July 1999 Cycle 9 90-Day ISI Summary Rept ML20209H3831999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML20211F9031999-06-30030 June 1999 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage ML20196J8521999-06-28028 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative to Use Iqis for Radiography Examinations as Provided for in ASME Section III,1992 Edition with 1993 Addenda,Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20195K2951999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With 05000327/LER-1998-003-01, :on 981109,Vital Inverter 1-IV Tripped.Caused by Failed Oscillator Board with Bad Solder Joint,Attributed to Mfg Defect.Replaced Component & Returned Inverter to Operable Status1999-05-27027 May 1999
- on 981109,Vital Inverter 1-IV Tripped.Caused by Failed Oscillator Board with Bad Solder Joint,Attributed to Mfg Defect.Replaced Component & Returned Inverter to Operable Status
05000327/LER-1999-001-04, :on 990415,exceedance of AOT Occurred Due to Failure of Centrifugal Charging Pump.Rotating Element Was Replaced,Testing Was Completed & Pump Was Returned to Svc1999-05-11011 May 1999
- on 990415,exceedance of AOT Occurred Due to Failure of Centrifugal Charging Pump.Rotating Element Was Replaced,Testing Was Completed & Pump Was Returned to Svc
ML20206Q8951999-05-0505 May 1999 Rev 0 to L36 990415 802, COLR for Sequoyah Unit 2 Cycle 10 ML20206G3751999-05-0404 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 244 & 235 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20206R5031999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for April 1999 for Sequoyah Units 1 & 2.With ML20205N0361999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 234 to License DPR-79 ML20205P9811999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20204E8211999-03-16016 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 243 & 233 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20205B6631999-02-28028 February 1999 Underground Storage Tank (Ust) Permanent Closure Rept, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Security Backup DG Ust Sys ML20204C3111999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20203H7381999-02-18018 February 1999 Safety Evaluation of Topical Rept BAW-2328, Blended U Lead Test Assembly Design Rept. Rept Acceptable Subj to Listed Conditions ML20206U4331999-02-0909 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 242 & 232 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20211A2021999-01-31031 January 1999 Non-proprietary TR WCAP-15129, Depth-Based SG Tube Repair Criteria for Axial PWSCC Dented TSP Intersections ML20198S7301998-12-31031 December 1998 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept ML20199G3641998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With 05000327/LER-1998-004-02, :on 981120,failure to Perform Surveillance within Required Time Interval,Was Determined.Caused by Leaking Vent Valve.Engineering Personnel Evaluated Alternative Methods for Performing Channel Check1998-12-21021 December 1998
- on 981120,failure to Perform Surveillance within Required Time Interval,Was Determined.Caused by Leaking Vent Valve.Engineering Personnel Evaluated Alternative Methods for Performing Channel Check
ML20198C0211998-12-16016 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 241 & 231 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively 05000327/LER-1998-003-04, :on 981109,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred. Caused by Component in Bridge Circuit of Vital Inverter Failed.Inverter Bridge Circuit Replaced1998-12-0909 December 1998
- on 981109,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred. Caused by Component in Bridge Circuit of Vital Inverter Failed.Inverter Bridge Circuit Replaced
ML20196J8021998-12-0707 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 240 & 230 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20197J5621998-12-0303 December 1998 Unit 1 Cycle 9 90-Day ISI Summary Rept ML20197K1161998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20196C4091998-11-19019 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 238 & 228 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20196B0231998-11-19019 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 239 & 229 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20195H0831998-11-17017 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 237 & 226 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively ML20195G3271998-11-17017 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 237 & 227 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,respectively 05000328/LER-1998-002-05, :on 981016,turbine Trip Occurred Followed by Reactor Trip.Caused by Generator Lockout.Mod Being Evaluated to Physically Isolate Relays from Vibration of Transformers & Adding Two of Two Logic for Actuation of Sudden Pressure1998-11-10010 November 1998
- on 981016,turbine Trip Occurred Followed by Reactor Trip.Caused by Generator Lockout.Mod Being Evaluated to Physically Isolate Relays from Vibration of Transformers & Adding Two of Two Logic for Actuation of Sudden Pressure
ML20195F8061998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With ML20154H6091998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With 05000328/LER-1998-001-05, :on 980827,turbine Trip Occurred Followed by Reactor Trip.Caused by Failure of Sudden Pressure Relay on B Phase Main Transformer.Control Room Operators Responded & Removed,Inspected & Replaced Failed Relays1998-09-28028 September 1998
- on 980827,turbine Trip Occurred Followed by Reactor Trip.Caused by Failure of Sudden Pressure Relay on B Phase Main Transformer.Control Room Operators Responded & Removed,Inspected & Replaced Failed Relays
ML20154H6251998-09-17017 September 1998 Rev 0 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Cycle 10 Colr ML20153B0881998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.With 1999-09-07
[Table view] |
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UNITED STATES J
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.NASHINGTON, D.C. 20565-0001 o%...../
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 246 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77 AND AMENDMENT NO. 237 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By application dated June 24,1999, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, the licensee) proposed an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SON) Units 1 and 2. The requested changes would revise the TS to allow use of a fully qualified and tested spare inverter in place of any of the eight required inverters. Specifically, TVA proposed the addition of a new footnote to TS 3.8.2.1 and TS 3.8.2.2. Consistent with a plant design change, the footnote would allow the substitution of the spare inverter of a specified channel as a replacement of one of the two required inverters of the same channel. The footnote applies to the limiting condition for operation associated with the 120-volt altemating current (VAC) vital instrument power board channels and the associated inverter requirements. The proposed package also contains typographical corrections for the existing footnote for TS 3.8.2.1.
2.0 EVALUATION TVA proposed the above described changes to incorporate a design change that would
- provide a spare inverter for each of the four channels of 120-VAC vitalinstrument power board channels. The design change would upgrade the eight required inverters with new inverters that would have additional capabilities and improved reliability, in addition, TVA would utilize four of the presently installed inverters, after installing updated features, as spares for each of the required channels. The swtem would be designed such that each spare inverter could be aligned to provide the power requirements for one of the two associated 120-VAC vital j
instrument power board channels. This plant modification was undertaken to rectify inverter operational problems that have occurred in the past. The new footnote in the TS would allow TVA to utilize the spare inverters for maintenance or testing activities without having to rely on the TS action statement provisions (that could require dual plant shutdown) and would provide improved safety function availability and, therefore, improved plant reliability.
The SON vital alternating current (ac) and direct current (de) control and instrument power systems consist of four 125-volt batteries, four battery chargers and eight 120-VAC inverters with their respective safety related loads. TVA is adding four spare inverters that have the equivalent features and capability. The spare inverters would be designed to allow for manual replacement of one of the two inverters in the same channel. The 125-volt de distribution j
system is a safety-related system, which receives power from four independent battery 9909280217 990*23 PDR ADOCK 05000327 p.
PDR i
n-2 chargers and four 125-volt batteries and distributes it to safety-related loads of both units. The
- 120-VAC distnbution system receives ac power from eight independent inverters and i
distributes it to the safety-related loads of both units. 'The inverters provide a source af 120-volts,60-Hertz (Hz) power for the operation of the nuclear steam supply system instrumentation. This power is derived from the 480 VAC,3-phase,60-Hz distribution system (the preferred power supply), or the station batteries, which assure continued operation of the
- ac instrumentation systems in the event of a station blackout.
The 120-VAC vital instrument system incorporates features which serve to increase the overall I
reliability of the plant. Each channel has access to three power sources; a 480-VAC source, a 125-volt de source, and a 120-VAC maintenance source. TVA is providing a new maintenance source that utilizes a regulated transformer and obtains the power source from the 480-VAC shutdown boards. This source would provide a more stable and consistent voltage level for the 120-VAC vitalinstrument power boards when on the maintenance source. Each inverter i
has an auctioneered solid-state transfer switch between the 480-VAC and 125-volt de sources.
Transfer switches between the output of the inverter and the 120-VAC maintenance supply would be modified to utilize static switches that would transfer loads automatically for a loss of inverter output. The new design would continue to provide manual transfer capability so that the inverter may be taken out of service for maintenance without interrupting power to the loads. The current limiting feature of the inverter provides self-protection from load faults. The inverter and instrumentation power board are monitored to alert the operator of abnormalities.
The eight inverters are located in the Auxiliary Building at Elevation 749. Channels I and ll inverters are located in the Unit 1 area and Channels ill and IV inverters are located in the Unit 2 area. Channels I and 11 inverters are separated from Channels lil and IV inverters by a reinforced concrete block wall, extending to the ceiling. Channel I and the Channel lll inverters are separated from Channel 11 and Channel IV inverters, respectively, by a distance of about 60 feet. The spare inverters would be located with the required inverters of the same channel.
The normal supply of ac power to the distribution panels is from the corresponding inverter in each channel. Each inverter consists of three major subassemblies: a de power supply, an auctioneering circuit, and an inverter circuit. The dc power supply converts the 480-VAC normal inverter input to direct current. The auctioneering circuit accepts the de power supply (normal supply) and battery (emergency supply) inputs and permits a switchless bidirectional transfer between them in the event of 480-VAC supply failure and restoration. The de output of the auctioneering circuit is converted to ac by the inverting circuit.
The modified system would meet or exceed these system features and capabilities. The addition of a regulated maintenanca source and the automatic static switch provides additional capability to provide reliable power to the vital instruments boards and minimize the potential
. for a unit trip. The regulated maintenance source would be a more reliable supply to the board
.with better voltage control to support safety-related instrumentation operation during maintenance or inverter failure.: The ability to utilize spare inverters with the equivalent capabilities would allow better opportunities to properly maintain the inverters and minimize the potential to require unit shutdown for an inverter problem.
The new design that includes a spare inverter would provide the ability to remove the normal
. inverters for maintenance without the limitations of TS actions or the potential to require unit shutdown. The proposed TS changes support the use of a spare inverter that has the ability to
n
.. automatically switch to a regulated maintenance power supply. This ability would improve unit operation and reliability when the spare is in service by providing a reliable source of power to the 120-VAC vital instrument power boards in the event of inverter failure. When the normal inverter is replaced by the spare all required safety functions would be retained without a reduction in reliable power to the instrument boards. Therefore, the implementation of the proposed TS change to allow the use of a spare inverter would provide enhanced maintenance opportunities while providing an improved source of power to maintain required safety functions.-
The NRC staff has reviewed the subject amendment application against the guidance contained in NUREG-0800, " Standard Review Plan," Sections 8.3.1 (onsite ac power systems).
and 8.3.2 (onsite dc power systems). The staff finds that the required General Design Criteria
~ (GDC) of Title 10, Code of Federal Reaulations (10 CFR), Part 50, including GDC-17 (electric power systems), would continue to be met with implementation of the proposed changes to the SQN TS. The staff, therefore, finds the proposed changes to be acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
in accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration (64 FR 41973), and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the siigibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
5.0 ' CONCLUSION The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public would not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities would be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment would not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor: Ronald W. Heman, NRR Dated: SePL M E i
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1 Mr. J. A. Scalice Tennessee Valley Authority SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT cc:
Mr. Karl W. Singer, Senior Vice President Mr. Pedro Salas, Manager Nuclear Operations Licensing and Industry Affairs Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 6A Lookout Place Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street P.O. Box 2000 Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 Mr. Jack A. Bailey Mr. D. L. Koehl, Plant Manager Vice President Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Engineering & Technical Services Tennessee Valley Authority Tennessee Valley Authority P.O. Box 2000 6A Lookout Place Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Mr. Melvin C. Shannon Senior Resident inspector Mr. Masoud Bajestani Seouoyah Nuclear Plant Site Vice President U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Tennessee Valley Authority Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 P.O. Box 2000 Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 Mr. Michael H. Mobley, Director TN Dept. of Environment & Conservation Division of Radiological Health General Counsel 3rd Floor, L and C Annex Tennessee Valley Authority 401 Church Street ET 10H Nashville, TN 37243-1532 400 West Summit Hill Drive Knoxville, TN 37902 County Executive Hamilton County Courthouse Mr. N. C. Kazanas, General Manager Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Nuclear Assurance Tennessee Valley Authority SM Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Mr. Mark J. Burzynski, Manager Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 4X Blm Ridge 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 L